REESE  LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Deceived  ,  igo    . 

Accession  No.    -„  851 6  7  .   Class  No.  '  .  1 


,   V      .       •     , 

1-1       •  . 


The  Second  Boer  War. 

1899-1900. 


BY 
JOHN   P.  WISSER, 

Captain,  7th  United  States  Artillery, 

Late  Instructor  in  Tactics  and  Strategy,  United  States  Artillery  School,  Fort 
Monroe,  Va. ;  Author  of  "Practical  Problems  in  Strategy  and  Tactics." 


Kansas  O* 
HI  ^.p  ^|p«          PUBLISHING  COMPANY. 

1001. 

d  lOOu 


Copyrighted,  1901,  by 

HUDSON-KIMBERLY  PUBLISHING  COMPANY, 
Kansas  City,  Mo. 


PREFACE. 

The  account  here  given  was  derived  from  a  careful  study 
of  the  following  exchanges  of  the  Journal  U.  8.  Artillery  (to 
which  were  added  from  time  to  time  such  original  thoughts 
on   organization,   tactics  and   strategy  as  suggested  them 
selves),  viz.: 

Internationale  Revue, 

United  Service  Gazette, 

Revue  du  Cercle  Militaire, 

Militar-Wocheriblatt, 

Army  and  Navy  Gazette, 

Deutsche  Heeres-Zeitung, 

Schweizeris'che  Militdrische  Blatter, 

Allgemeine  Schweizeris-che  Militdrzeitung, 

Armee  et  Marine, 

Mittheilungen  uber  Gegenstdnde  des  Artillerie  und  Genie- 
Wesens-, 

Umschau, 

New  York  Sun, 

The  Engineer  (London), 

Engineering  (London), 

Kriegstechnische  Zeitschrift, 

Proceedings  Royal  Artillery  Institution, 

Jahrbiicher  fur  die  Deutsche  Armee  und  Marine. 

The  author  also  desires  to  express  his  obligations  to  the 
following  works,  which  appeared  during  the  progress  of  the 
war,  and  which  were  freely  used  by  him : 

Briton  and  Boer,  James  Bryce  and  others, 

Boer  War,  Lieut.-Col.  H.  M.  E.  Brunker, 


6  PREFACE. 

Der  BuernJcrieg  in  Sudafrika,  Maj.  L.  von  Estorff,  Gen. 
Staff, 

La  Guerre  au  Transvaal:  U offensive  des  Boers,  Lieut.-Col. 
Frocard  and  Capt.  Painvin, 

Der  Krieg  in  Transvaal,  von  Tiedemann,  Oberstleutnant, 

The  Siege  of  Ladysmith  (64  Photographs),  H.  St.  J.  Tug- 
man, 

Four  Months-  Besieged,  The  "Daily  News," 

Der  Krieg  in  Sudafrika,  Kunowski  and  Fetzdorff. 

The  best  current  accounts  of  the  war  were  undoubtedly 
those  of  the  German  and  French  military  periodicals,  espe- 
cially those  of  the  Militar-Wochenblatt  and  the  Revue  du  Cercle 
Militaire,  but  the  prejudice  against  the  English  in  nearly  all 
of  our  exchanges  (other  than  British)  was  so  evident  that  the 
author  had  great  difficulty  in  arriving  at  a  fair  and  unpreju- 
diced view,  and  in  presenting  an  unbiased  account  of  the 
events — his  particular  aim  in  writing  this  history.  Other 
difficulties  presented  themselves :  in  the  early  part  of  the  war 
the  British  official  despatches  were  very  meagre,  and  the 
available  maps  very  unsatisfactory,  so  that  little  information 
could  be  gleaned  from  them;  moreover,  few  British  writers 
took  up  the  subject  in  its  early  stages,  and  the  only  material 
at  hand  was  the  warped  accounts  in  both  British  and  for- 
eign journals.  It  was  not  until  Lord  Roberts  opened  his 
brilliant  campaign  that  the  foreign  journals  began  to  change 
their  tone,  and  the  British  journals  and  official  despatches 
began  to  assume  an  authoritative  air  and  to  offer  reliable  and 
really  useful  information. 

Little  original  material  will  be  found  in  this  work,  but  it 
is  believed  that  no  other  single  account  thus  far  published 
presents  the  subject  in  a  fairer  light.  This  history  has  been 
carefully  compared  with  the  recently  published  British, 
French  and  German  works  above  mentioned,  and  every  effort 
has  been  made  to  insure  accuracy.  One  great  difficulty  in 


PREFACE.  1 

the  way  is  the  lack  of  all  reliable  information  from  the  side  of 
the  Boers,  especially  as  regards  losses  in  battle. 

The  lessons  to  be  learned  are  brought  out  in  the  com- 
ments, and  while  the  thoughts  expressed  are  those  of  the 
author,  the  ideas  at  the  foundation  of  these  thoughts  were 
generally  derived  from  the  authorities  consulted. 

JOHN  P.  WISSER, 
Captain  7th  Artillery. 
Fort  Monroe,  Va.,  October  9,  1900. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


INTRODUCTION. 

The  history  of  the  South  African  Republic  (formerly 
called  the  Transvaal  Republic)  and  the  Orange  Free  State 
begins  with  that  of  Cape  Colony. 

The  Dutch  East  India  Company,  recognizing  the  im- 
portance of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  as  a  station  where  their 
vessels  might  take  in  water  and  provisions,  formed  a  colony 
there  in  1652.  The  colonists  gradually  drove  the  natives 
back,  reduced  them  to  slavery  and  introduced  Malays  and  ne- 
groes as  slaves.  The  Dutch  government  harasssed  the  farm- 
ers, demanding  a  large  part  of  their  produce,  and  thus  in- 
spired the  colonists  with  their  dislike  to  interference  by  the 
home  government,  and  a  love  of  independence.  In  1795  they 
attempted  to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  the  Dutch,  when  the  Brit- 
ish sent  a  fleet  to  support  the  authority  of  the  Prince  of 
Orange,  and  took  possession  of  Cape  Colony  in  his  name;  but 
as  Holland  was  not  able  to  hold  it,  the  British  ruled  there 
until  1802,  when,  at  the  peace  of  Amiens,  it  was  again  re- 
stored to  Holland.  In  1806  it  was  again  taken  by  the  British, 
and  was  finally  ceded  to  them  in  1815. 

The  Boers  ill-treated  the  natives  to  such  an  extent  that 
they  were  often  in  danger  of  extermination,  and  Great  Brit- 
ain had  to  protect  them. 

By  a  succession  of  wars  with  the  natives,  or  Kaffirs,  the 
boundary  was  gradually  extended.  The  first  of  these  wars 
took  place  in  1811-12,  the  second  in  1819.  In  1820  British 
emigrants  laid  the  foundation  of  the  settlements  around  Port 


1()  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Elizabeth,  and  in  1834  the  slave-emancipation  measure  took 
effect  in  Cape  Colony,  and  this  gave  great  offense  to  the  Dutch 
Boers,  who  were  large  slave-owners.  In  1835  the  third  Kaf- 
fir war  took  place,  and  not  long  after  that  the  Boers  resolved 
to  free  themselves  from  the  British  government  (which  began 
to  enforce  measures  to  protect  the  natives  against  Boer  in- 
justice) and  removed  beyond  the  Orange  River,  a  portion  also 
crossing  the  Drakensberg  Mountains  into  Natal  establishing 
in  both  places  republican  governments,  which  they  main- 
tained till  1842,  when  the  British  extended  their  authority 
into  Natal,  and  the  ,Boer  colony  there  passed  again  under  Brit- 
ish rule.  The  Boers  had  so  incensed  the  natives  that  the 
peace  of  the  whole  country  was  menaced,  and  interference 
became  necessary.  The  fourth  Kaffir  war  occurred  in  1846-8. 

The  Boers  beyond  the  Orange  River  maintained  their 
independence  till  1848,  when,  at  the  solicitation  of  the  Boer 
authorities  (in  consequence  of  the  lawless  state  of  the  coun- 
try), the  British  annexed  the  country  under  the  name  of  the 
Orange  River  Sovereignty.  Not  long  after,  the  Boers  of  Natal 
crossed  the  mountains,  joined  some  of  the  disaffected  Orange 
Boers  and  raised  the  standard  of  rebellion.  A  detachment 
of  British  troops  met  and  defeated  them,  and  a  number  re- 
treated over  the  Vaal  River  and  established  a  government  of 
their  own,  first  called  Trans-Vaal,  which  was  afterwards  rec- 
ognized by  the  British  in  1852,  and  then  called  the  South 
African  Republic. 

The  fifth  Kaffir  war  was  conducted  between  1850  and 
1853,  and  by  it  British  Kaffraria  was  formed  into  a  separate 
colony.  In  1853-4  the  Orange  Free  State  was  formed,  with 
the  consent  of  England. 

The  discovery  of  diamonds  in  the  districts  north  of  the 
Orange  River  in  1867  led  in  1874  to  the  annexation  by  the 
British  of  Griqualand  West,  in  1881  of  Basutoland,  and  in 
1885  of  Bechuanaland.  Later,  Cecil  Rhodes,  manager  of 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  11 

« 

the  South  African  Chartered  Company,  succeeded  in  adding 
Mashonaland,  Matebeleland,  and  finally  Barotseland. 

In  1877,  in  consequence  of  Boer  trouble  with  the  natives, 
an  empty  treasury,  and  general  discouragement  due  to  re- 
peated reverses  in  the  contests  with  the  natives,  England 
intervened  and  annexed  the  Transvaal.  In  1879  England 
fought  the  Zulu  war  to  protect  the  Transvaal  and  the  Boers. 

In  1881,  after  the  revolt  of  the  disaffected  Boers  and  the 
defeat  of  the  English  at  Majuba  Hill  in  1880,  the  republic  was 
restored  under  the  suzerainty  of  England,  but  this  was  so  far 
modified  in  1884  as  to  render  the  South  African  Republic 
practically  independent. 

The  discovery  of  rich  gold  deposits  in  1886  led  to  a  great 
influx  of  British  subjects,  and  difficulties  arose  from  the  at- 
tempts of  the  Boer  government  to  enforce  military  service  on 
them,  though  they  were  debarred  from  franchise.  The  ten- 
sion grew  stronger  as  the  number  of  foreign  gold-seekers 
(Uitlanders)  increased,  and  the  latter  began  to  ally  themselves 
with  Cecil  Rhodes,  with  Chamberlain,  the  Colonial  minister, 
and  with  other  influential  Englishmen.  This  finally  led,  in 
1896,  to  an  attack  by  Dr.  Jameson  and  500  men  of  the  Char- 
tered Company  on  Mafeking,  writh  the  intention  of  moving  on 
Johannesburg,  but  he  was  met  at  Krugersdorp  and  repulsed 
by  the  Boers,  under  Cronje,  who  killed  a  number  of  his  force 
and  sent  the  rest  for  trial  to  England. 

In  1897  the  Uitlanders  amounted  to  180,000,  and  pos- 
sessed 63  per  cent  of  the  landed,  and  90  per  cent  of  the  per- 
sonal property  of  the  country. 

In  April,  1899,  a  petition  signed  by  11,000  Englishmen 
living  in  Johannesburg  was  transmitted  to  Greene,  the  Brit- 
ish agent  at  Pretoria,  to  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  Governor  of  Cape 
Colony,  and  by  him  forwarded  to  the  Queen.  The  petition 
set  forth  the  fact  that  they  were  debarred  from  franchise,  and 
complained  of  the  dynamite  monopoly.  Krtiger  promise^  re- 


12  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

forms  in  the  franchise,  and  fixed  upon  9  years  as  the  term  of 
residence  required  to  obtain  the  right  to  vote,  instead  of  14, 
previously  established.  The  discontent,  however,  continued. 
Steyn  (the  President  of  the  Orange  Free  State)  then  proposed 
the  Bloemfontein  conference.  Milner  demanded  5  years  as 
the  term  for  naturalization,  but  Krtiger  would  only  compro- 
mise, and  proposed  7,  but  without  any  retroactive  effect. 
Milner  then  broke  off  the  conference.  The  Orange  Free  State 
then  intervened  and  persuaded  the  Volksraad  in  Pretoria  to 
grant  also  the  retroactive  effect  of  the  7-year  naturalization 
law,  and  to  give  four  new  seats  in  the  lower  house  to  the 
Uitlanders. 

Now,  complaints  about  the  police,  the  language  taught  in 
the  schools,  and  organization  laws  began  to  be  made,  and 
Chamberlain  began  to  make  inquiries  as  to  the  suzerainty 
of  England  and  to  express  a  desire  for  a  mixed  Commission 
in  Cape  Colony,  a  proposal  which  was  interpreted  to  aim  at 
the  independence  of  the  Republic. 

Upon  this  Krtiger  proposed  to  grant  the  5-year  naturali- 
zation law,  with  retroactive  effect,  and  10  seats  in  the  lower 
house,  provided  England  gave  up  all  claim  to  suzerainty. 
The  British  government  would  not  consider  the  last  point  at 
all,  and  on  the  12th  of  September  Chamberlain,  through  the 
British  representative  in  Pretoria,  Conyngham  Greene,  sub- 
mitted as  a  fundamental  condition  for  the  proposed  confer- 
ence: 5  years  naturalization,  one-quarter  of  the  seats  for  the 
Uitlanders,  and  equality  of  Boers  and  Englishmen  in  the 
Yolksraad  and  in  the  election  of  President.  On  the  14th 
both  Volkraads  decided  on  the  7-year  naturalization  law,  and 
demanded  as  a  basis  for  the  conference  the  convention  of 
1884. 

The  situation  was  critical.  Early  in  September  England 
had  ordered  5,000  troops  in  India  and  an  equal  number  from 
European  stations  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  proceed 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  13 

to  Africa,  and  towards  the  end  of  September  these  troops 
actually  sailed  from  Calcutta  and  Bombay  for  Natal.  The 
two  Boer  States  also  began  their  war  preparations,  and  by 
the  end  of  September  there  were  13,000  armed  men  on  the 
Natal  frontier,  1,500  in  Boshof  near  Kimberley,  and  4,000 
near  Malmain,  opposite  Mafeking. 

On  the  9th  of  October,  1899,  Mr.  Conyngham  Greene  the 
diplomatic  representative  of  Great  Britain  at  Pretoria,  re- 
ceived the  ultimatum  of  the  Transvaal  Republic.  It  slated 
that  if  in  48  hours  the  British  troops  did  not  retire  from  the 
border,  war  existed,  and  demanded  also  that  the  reini  or  ce- 
ments already  landed,  as  well  as  those  on  the  way,  be  sent 
back.  It  reached  the  Colonial  Office  in  London  on  the  10th. 
and  on  the  llth  the  British  government  replied  that  the  con- 
ditions imposed  by  the  Transvaal  were  such  that  the  British 
government  could  no  longer  discuss  the  subject.  On  that  day 
Mr.  Conyngham  Greene  left  Pretoria,  and  at  5  p.  m.  the 
Transvaal  was  declared  in  a  state  of  war,  and  the  offensive 
movements  of  the  Boers  began.  The  Orange  Free  State. 
bound  by  a  treaty  of  alliance,  joined  the  Transvaal. 

THE  THEATRE  OF  WAK. 

South  Africa  is  a  wide  plateau  or  table-land,  which  rises 
to  an  average  height  of  about  5,000  feet,  very  gradually  in  the 
west,  very  rapidly  in  the  east,  from  the  sea  towards  the  in- 
terior. In  the  south  and  southeast  there  are  three  well- 
marked  terraces:  the  coast  land,  the  karroos  (between  3,000 
and  4,000  feet  elevation)  and  the  plateau  beyond  the  Orange 
River  (about  5,000  feet).  Between  the  last  two  are  the 
Schneeberge  on  the  south  of  the  Orange  Free  State  and  the 
Drakensberge  on  the  east. 

In  Natal  the  end  of  the  coast  land  is  marked  by  Pieter 
maritzburg  (2,225  feet),  after  which  the  ground  rises  rapidly 


14  TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

and  the  country  becomes  very  difficult,  Colenso  having  an 
elevation  of  3,156  feet,  Glencoe  4,300  feet  and  Laings  Nek 
5,400  feet.  The  Drakensberge  rise  to  over  11,000  feet  in  the 
peaks,  and  from  5,500  to  7,500  feet  in  the  passes. 

In  Cape  Colony  the  karroo  southwest  of  the  Schneeberge 
is  about  70  miles  wide  from  north  to  south ;  southeast  of  the 
Schneeberge,  about  50  miles.  Water  in  these  regions  is  very 
scarce. 

Beyond  the  Schneeberge  rises  the  Orange  Free  State  pla- 
teau, with  comparatively  low  ranges.  North  of  the  Schnee- 
berge  and  west  of  the  Drakensberge  the  country  for  some  dis- 
tance is  not  level,  but  rolling  and  mountainous,  with  ranges 
running  parallel  to  the  eastern  border,  till  they  are  lost  in  the 
plains  of  the  western  Orange  River.  The  Transvaal  near  the 
southern  part  is  very  hilly  (from  the  foot-hills  of  the  Drakens- 
berge), and  is  intersected  by  several  minor  ranges  as  at  Pre- 
toria and  a  few  other  points.  To  the  northwest  the  country 
slopes  away  gradually. 

Aside  from  the  few  intersecting  chains  rising  above  the 
plateau,  the  broad,  unbroken  and  treeless  plains  of  the  Boer 
States  present  only  isolated  tables,  which  often  serve  as  land- 
marks for  several  days'  march. 

The  principal  stream  of  South  Africa  is  the  Orange  River, 
with  its  main  branch,  the  Vaal. 

The  climate  of  South  Africa  is  sub-tropical,  the  rainy 
season,  or  summer,  lasting  from  October  to  March,  the  dry 
season,  or  winter,  from  April  to  September.  During  the 
rainy  season  the  nearly  or  quite  dry  streams  suddenly  become 
filled  and  converted  into  impassable  mountain  torrents,  while 
the  larger  streams  are  all  very  high.  In  the  dry  season  it  is 
difficult  to  find  water,  for  not  only  do  the  smaller  streams  and 
springs  dry  up  entirely,  but  even  the  large  streams  are  so  low 
as  to  become  everywhere  passable,  and  the  entire  country  is 
dry  and  parched. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  15 

The  country  is  very  poorly  settled  (about  3  inhabitants 
to  the  square  mile);  the  roads  are  few  and  very  poor,  hard 
roads  being  extremely  rare.  Only  the  ox-wagons,  12  to  20 
team,  can  get  over  the  country.  In  the  rainy  season  the  roads 
quickly  become  almost  impassable.  The  railroads  are  conse- 
quently of  more  than  ordinary  importance,  but,  as  these  are 
generally  narrow-gauge,  their  carrying  capacity  is  not  over 
one-fifth  that  of  a  good  wide-gauge  road. 

The  South  African  Republic  (Transvaal)  has  a  popula- 
tion of  about  288,750  whites,  of  whom  80,000  are  Boers,  capa- 
ble of  putting  30,000  men  in  the  field.  The  Orange  Free  State 
has  about  77,716  whites,  of  whom  75,443  are  Boers,  with 
30,000  capable  of  bearing  arms. 

The  Transvaal  is  divided  into  31  districts,  each  of  which 
is  under  the  command  of  a  commandant,  or  field  cornet, 
who  has  an  assistant  field  cornet.  In  time  of  war  there  is 
about  one  field  cornet  to  every  200  men.  The  Orange  Free 
State  was  similarly  organized. 

The  principal  strategic  points  in  the  Transvaal  are  the 
fortified  capital,  Pretoria,  and  the  gold  center,  Johannesburg; 
in  the  Orange  Free  State,  the  capital,  Bloemf ontein ;  in  Cape 
Colony,  the  sea-ports,  Cape  Town,  Port  Elizabeth  and  East 
London,  and  the  seat  of  the  diamond-fields,  Kimberley;  in  Na- 
tal, the  port,  Durban,  the  capital,  Pietermaritzburg,  and  the 
depot  and  supply  station  for  northern  Natal,  Ladysmith. 

Among  the  minor  strategic  points  may  be  mentioned 
Sterkstrom  and  De  Aar,  important  railroad  centers,  Coles- 
berg,  the  point  of  assembly  of  the  disaffected  Cape  Colony 
Boers,  Mafeking,  with  a  garrison  threatening  Pretoria  di- 
rectly, and  the  bridges  at  Orange  River  Station,  Norvals  Pont 
and  Bethulie. 


16  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

THE  FORCES  ENGAGED. 

To  understand  the  initial  operations,  it  will  first  be  nec- 
essary to  obtain  a  clear  conception  of  the  positions  and 
strengths  of  the  respective  armies  at  the  opening  of  the 
campaign. 

THE  ENGLISH  TKOOPS. 

The  English  forces  for  the  Boer  war  are  divided  into 
three  groups;  viz.:  the  troops  in  Natal,  the  troops  in  Cape 
Colony  and  the  newly  mobilized  army  corps  to  be  sent  to 
South  Africa  from  England. 

The  Natal  Force. — The  Natal  force,  commanded  by 
Symons,  comprised 

10  battalions  of  infantry 7650  men. 

4  regiments  of  cavalry 1650  men. 

6  field  batteries  and  one  mountain  bat- 
tery (42  guns) 1218  men. 

4  companies  of  pioneers 600  men. 

4  companies  train 300  men. 

Natal  volunteers 760  men. 

Natal  Carabiniers 120  men. 

Imperial  Light  Horse  volunteers ....  500  men. 

Durban  volunteers.   . 750  men. 

Mounted  Natal  police  (9  guns) 550  men. 

Total.   .    .    .51  guns,  14,098  men. 
Reinforcements  arriving  (from  India), 

3  field  batteries  (18  guns) 530  men. 

Total  for  the  first  act  of  the  drama, 

69  guns,  14,628  men. 

The  Cape  Colony  Force. — The  Cape  Colony  force,  com- 
manded by  White,  comprised 

8  battalions  of  infantry 4090  men. 

2  companies  heavy  artillery.  ....     200  men. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  17 

2  companies  train 150  men. 

Total 4440  men. 

Reinforcements  arriving  (due  Octo- 
ber 29),  2  battalions  infantry.  .  .     700  men. 

Total  for  the  first  act 5140  men. 

There  was  no  cavalry  or  artillery  with  this  force.  The 
strength  of  the  volunteer  forces  on  the  western  border  of  the 
Boer  States  cannot  be  accurately  determined,  but  they  are 
estimated  at  about  4,000  men.  Besides  these  troops,  the  Eng- 
lish squadron  had  also  landed  a  naval  brigade  of  about  1,000 
men,  which  was  to  be  sent  to  the  western  border  of  the  Boer 
States. 

The  Army  Corps. — The  mobilized  army  corps,  under  Gen- 
eral Sir  Redvers  Buller,  was  organized  into  3  divisions  (com- 
manded respectively  by  Lord  Methuen,  Sir  Clery  and  Sir 
Gatacre)  and  a  cavalry  division  under  French. 

Its  total  strength  was  about  40,000  men,  with  114  guns. 


On  the  eleventh  of  October  the  British  had  in  Glencoe 
camp  (near  Dundee)  about  4,000  men,  at  Ladysmith  about 
9,000  men. 

At  Aliwal  (on  the  southern  border  of  Orange  Free  State) 
there  was  only  a  half -regiment  and  100  mounted  infantry; 
further  south  a  small  reserve.  In  Kimberley  (on  the  western 
border  of  Orange  Freee  State) 

4  half-companies  infantry 700  men. 

Volunteers 1500  men. 

Artillery 20  guns. 

Mafeking  (on  the  western  border  of  the  Transvaal  Republic) 
had  only  600  volunteers  under  Colonel  Baden-Powell.  There 
were  also  400  volunteers  opposite  Tuli  (on  the  northern  bor- 
der) under  Colonel  Plumer. 


18  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

THE  BOER  TROOPS. 

The  Boers  had  about  35,500  men  under  arms  in  the 
Transvaal  (commanded  by  General  Joubert),  and  about  14.000 
regulars  in  the  Orange  Free  State  (under  General  Grobeler), 
posted  as  follows: 

At  Sandspruit  (main  body),  north 
of  the  wedge  of  Natal,  under 
Joubert 12,000  men. 

West  of  Majuba  Hill,  right  col- 
umn under  Kock 3,000  men. 

At    Wakkerstroom,    left    column 

under  Erasmus 2,000  men. 

Between    Utrecht    and    Vryheid, 

under  Schalk  Burger 4,500  men. 

Outposts  on  the  Buffalo  River  op- 
posite Vryheid,  under  Lukas 
Meyer 

On    the    road    to    Dundee,    under 

Viljoen 1,000  meu. 

In  Zoutpansberg  district  (north- 
ern border) 2,000  men. 

At  Komatiport  (opposite  Delagoa 

Bay) 2,000  men. 

Opposite  Mafeking  (on  the  western 

border),  under  Piet  Cronje  .  .  .     6,000  men. 

Reserve,  in  the  interior 3,000  men. 

At  Albertina  Station  and  Van 
Reenens  Pass  (west  of  Lady- 
smith),  under  Andries  Cronje,  8,000  men. 

From  Botha  Pass  to  Bezuiden- 
houts  (to  watch  the  passes  west 
of  Ladysmith) 3,000  men. 

Opposite  Kimberley  (on  the  west- 
ern border),  under  Prinsloo  .  .  3,000  men. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  19 

THE  STRATEGIC  POSITION. 

The  wedge  of  Natal,  projecting  as  it  does  into  the  Boer 
country,  would  be  advantageous  were  it  properly  occupied 
by  a  sufficient  force,  because  it  would  give  the  British  the 
great  advantage  of  always  operating  on  interior  lines,  but  the 
superior  force  of  the  Boers  enabled  them  to  overcome  this 
strategic  advantage,  and  turn  the  British  positions.  The 
weakness  of  the  small  British  force  on  th^  western  border 
was  an  element  of  great  danger,  especially  as  it  exposed  the 
important  railroad  from  Cape  Town  to  Buluwayo. 

In  occupying  their  too  advanced  position  at  Glencoe  the 
British  were  exposing  their  troops  to  disaster,  for  it  is  a 
maxim  of  war  that  "when  a  commander  endeavors  to  cover 
too  much  he  covers  nothing."  It  would  have  been  better  to 
have  concentrated  further  back,  as  at  Ladysmith,  and  util- 
ized the  advantages  of  interior  lines  by  falling  upon  the  sepa- 
rate Boer  columns  i  nturn  before  they  could  unite. 

THE  OPERATIONS. 

Preliminary  Operations  on  the  Western  Border. 

The  object  of  these  operations  on  the  part  of  the  Boers 
was  to  isolate  the  two  important  towrns  of  Kimberley  and 
Maf eking,  and  to  prevent  invasion  of  their-  territory ;  and  on 
the  part  of  the  British  to  gather  supplies  preparatory  to  siege, 
and  to  check  further  advances  of  the  Boers  beyond  the  Orange 
River. 

On  the  12th  of  October  the  Transvaal  Boers,  under 
Cronje,  advanced  in  two  columns  on  Mafeking;  one  (4,000 
strong)  from  the  Lichtenburg  district,  crossing  the  border  at 
Maritsani,  south  of  Mafeking — 500  men  of  this  column  at- 
tacked and  captured,  at  the  station  of  Kraaipan,  an  armored 
train  which  was  repairing  the  telegraph  line  north  of  Vry- 


20  TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

burg  and  carrying  ammunition  to  Maf eking;  the  other  col- 
umn from  Zeerust  and  the  Marico  valley,  threatening  Mafe- 
king  from  the  north.  On  the  13th  Cronje's  troops  destroyed 
the  railroad  and  the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Molopo  River, 
8^  miles  north  of  Mafeking.  On  the  14th  all  rolling  material 
and  stores  in  the  vicinity  were  sent  to  Kimberley.  On  the 
14th  the  Boers  occupied  Ramathlabama,  north  of  Mafeking. 
Soon  after,  the  railroad  and  bridge  at  Modder  River  Station 
were  destroyed  by  the  Boers.  On  the  16th  the  Boers  took 
possession  of  the  railroad  north  and  south  of  Kimberley,  and 
a  Boer  commando  from  Bethulie  moved  towards  Norvals 
Pont  and  destroyed  the  railroad.  On  the  same  day  another 
Boer  force  occupied  Taungs.  On  the  17th  the  Boers  de- 
stroyed the  bridge  over  the  Vaal  at  Fourteen  Streams  station. 
On  the  same  day  the  British  destroyed  the  railroad  bridge  at 
Hopetown.  On  the  18th  the  Boers  destroyed  the  railroad 
north  and  south  of  Kimberley.  While  these  preparatory 
measures  were  being  taken  on  the  western  border,  the  prin- 
cipal campaign  was  going  on  in  the  east,  in  Natal. 

Operations  in  Natal. 

On  the  night  of  October  11-12  the  Boers  advanced  in  sev- 
eral columns:  one  from  Sandstruit,  on  the  road  to  Laings  Nek, 
occupying  with  artillery  the  defile  of  the  railroad  to  New- 
castle; ai.o  her  f rom  Wakkerstroom  ^outh  through  the  Belebas 
Hills  to  the  Buffalo  River,  occupying  its  bridges;  a  third 
marched  from  Utrecht  on  the  road  towards  Glencoe;  a  fourth 
from  Doornberg  to  Rorkes  Drift,  occupying  the  cross-roads 
leading  to  Xrlencoe  and  Ladysmith  opposite  Waschbank  and 
Wessels  Nek  stations;  a  fifth  marched  to  the  right  of  Majuba 
Hill  along  the  border  to  Botha  Pass;  a  sixth  from  Vrede  to 
the  Mtiller  Pass;  and  the  Orange  Boers  (with  ox  train  and  11 
guns)  from  Albertina  and  Harrismith  in  three  columns  to 
Van  Reenens  Pass,  Tintwa  Pass  and  Bezuidenhout  Pass. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


21 


THE    NATAL    FRONTIER. 

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VOLKSEItST    %  ° 


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By  midnight  of  the  12th  all  the  passes  on  the  eastern, 
and  western  borders  of  Natal  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Boers, 
and  on  the  13th  the  British  abandoned  this  district  to  within 
six  miles  of  Glencoe  and  Dundee. 

At  3  a.  m.,  October  13th,  General  White  (then  command- 
ing at  Ladysmith)  advanced  on  the  road  toward  Acton  Homes 
to  attack  the  Boers  and  prevent  the  junction  of  the  columns 
from  the  passes;  he  struck  the  column  from  the  Tintwa  Pass 
(under  Major  Albrecht),  and  attacked  it,  but  the  attack  was 
repulsed,  and  General  Grobeler  from  Van  Beenens  Pass 


22  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

threatened  to  cut  him  off  from  Ladysmith.  White  was  there- 
fore compelled  to  retire.  The  Boers  followed  the  retiring 
British  and  occupied  positions  commanding  Ladysmith,  along 
the  line  Acton  Homes — Blaauwbank — Bester's  Station. 

In  the  north  the  columns  united  at  Ingagane,  near 
Konigsberg,  and  pushed  outposts  out  to  Glencoe  on  the 
evening  of  the  13th.  They  then  set  to  work  to  intrench  them- 
selves, awaiting  the  advance  of  the  left  wing.  The  British 
ordered  the  garrisons  of  Pietermaritzburg  and  Durban  to 
work  night  and  day  to  put  these  points  in  a  state  of  defense. 

By  October  loth  the  Boers  had  1,500  men  in  Newcastle, 
with  10  light  and  2  heavy  guns;  advance  guard  under  Viljoen 
at  Ingagane.  On  the  16th  the  main  body  of  the  Boers  was 
at  Ingagane,  and  on  the  18th  Joubert  made  his  headquarters 
at  Dannhauser.  On  the  19th  the  latter  marched  towards  the 
Impati  Hill,  while  Lukas  Meyer,  commanding  the  advance 
guard  of  the  column  from  Utrecht  (1,000),  was  ordered  to 
attack  from  the  east.  During  the  night  the  latter  succeeded 
in  getting  4  guns  on  Dundee  (or  Talaua)  Hill,  and  at  5:30 
a.  m.  opened  the  attack. 

The  advance  of  the  Boers  is  open  to  the  criticism  that  in 
subdividing  into  so  many  columns  they  exposed  themselves 
to  the  danger  of  being  separately  attacked  and  destroyed  be- 
fore they  could  reunite,  but  in  all  probability  the  explanation 
.of  their  action  lies  in  the  fact  that  this  subdivision  was  forced 
upon  them  by  the  nature  of  the  country  and  the  character  of 
the  roads. 

By  October  20th  the  left  wing  of  the  Boers  had  arrive  I 
in  position:  their  strategical  movements  were  completed,  and 
the  tactical  operations  began. 

The  Battle  of  Dundee  or  Glencoe. 

The  occupation  of  Dundee  (or  Talana)  Hill  (between 
the  Glencoe — Newcastle  railroad  and  the  Glencoe — Dundee 


THE  SECOND  BOH  It  \VAIf. 


BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW    OF    LADYSMITH 

AND     ENVIRONS. 


24  TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

branch)  by  the  Boers  on  the  20th  led  General  Symons  to  at- 
tempt to  dislodge  them  with  portions  of  two  regiments  sup- 
ported by  20  rapid-fire  guns,  but  he  only  succeeded  in  causing 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Boer  artillery  (4  guns).  General  Sy- 
mons tried  again  and  again  to  strike  the  enemy  in  flank,  but 
failed,  and  at  9  a.  m.  he  received  the  report  that  Dundee  was 
also  threatened  by  a  Boer  column  of  9,000  men  and  a  battery, 
under  Joubert  in  person,  coming  from  the  direction  of  Hat- 
ting Spruit  to  the  east  of  Dundee  Hill.  The  position  in  which 
Glencoe  would  be  placed  by  the  advance  of  this  column,  unless 
Dundee  Hill  were  taken,  decided  General  Symons  to  make 
another  advance  in  force.  In  this  attack  General  Symons 
fell,  mortally  wounded,  and  General  Yule  succeeded  to  the 
command.  At  1  p.  m.  the  position  was  taken  and  the  Boers 
retired.  The  British  lost  12  officers  and  33  men  killed,  21 
officers  and  163  men  wounded.  The  Boer  loss  is  not  known, 
but  is  given  at  300  killed  and  wounded;  their  field  hospital 
and  entire  train  was  taken  by  the  British.  Such  was  the 
battle  of  Dundee.  A  squadron  of  the  18th  Hussars,  sent  in 
pursuit  of  the  Boers  after  the  battle,  lost  4  killed,  9  wounded 
and  86  captured. 

While  General  Symons  with  all  his  force  was  thus  strug- 
gling against  the  advance  guard  of  the  Boers,  their  main  body 
was  quietly  advancing  in  the  rear,  cutting  communication 
between  Glencoe  and  Lady  smith,  and  completing  the  environ- 
ment of  both  these  places.  General  Schalk  Burgher,  with 
the  column  from  Vryheid,  closed  in  on  Glencoe  from  the  east, 
his  left  flanking  column  occupying  Waschbank;  while  Gener- 
al Viljoen,  passing  Glencoe  on  the  west,  pushed  his  outposts 
to  the  Impati  Hill;  and  Joubert's  right  column  under  Jan 
Kock  occupied  the  Biggars  Hill,  his  forces  reaching  around 
to  the  right  towards  the  Orange  Boers,  who  were  advancing 
towards  the  Pietermaritzburg  railroad. 

This  situation  forced  the  British  to  act,  but  it  was  a  ques- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  25 

lion  whether  to  strike  in  a  northerly  direction  to  prevent  the 
union  of  the  column  near  Dundee  with  the  main  column  far- 
ther west,  or  in  a  southerly  direction  to  prevent  that  of  the 
columns  from  east  and  west,  now  approaching  each  other  at 
Elandslaagte. 

On  the  21st  Yule  made  a  demonstia  ion  against  Ih9  BO3ia 
north  of  Glencoe  and  pushed  them  back,  and  in  the  night 
began  his  retreat  through  Dundee  on  Beith.  Dundee  and 
Glencoe  were  abandoned,  and  a  position  nearer  Ladysmith 
taken  up. 

Battle  of  Elandslaagte. 

At  the  same  time  General  White  decided  to  reopen  com- 
munication with  Glencoe  by  attacking  the  Boers  at  Elands- 
laagte. General  French  was  sent  out  by  rail  with  the  ad- 
vance guard  at  4  a.  m.,  but  the  main  body  under  White  did 
not  arrive  till  3 :30  p.  m.,  when  the  battle  opened. 

The  British  forces  were  about  3,400  strong,  comprising 

1st  Battalion  Devonshire  Regiment, 

\  2d  Battalion  Gordon  Highlanders, 

\  2d  Battalion  Manchester  Regiment, 

5th  Lancers, 

5th  Dragoons,  1  squadron, 

Natal  Carabiniers, 

Imperial  Light  Horse, 

2  field  batteries, 

Natal  field  battery. 

The  Boers  (the  advance  guard  of  Kock's  column)  occu- 
piel  two  kopjes,  or  heights,  their  principal  camp  being  be- 
tween these  kopjes  in  the  saddle,  the  artillery  (2  guns)  being 
intrenched  on  the  lower  of  the  two  heights.  They  were  about 
1,400  strong.  At  about  4  p.  m.  the  British  artillery  opened 
from  a  position  4,400  yards  from  the  Boers  and  prepared  the 
attack  for  the  infantry.  This  artillery  preparation  was 


26  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  ELANDSLAAGTE. 


deemed  sufficient  in  about  half  an  hour,  and  General  French 
decided  to  make  the  infantry  attack,  the  artillery  moving  up 
to  its  second  position  at  2,250  yards  from  the  Boers,  finally 
supporting  the  advance  at  1,950  yards. 

The  Devonshire  regiment  attacked  in  front,  advancing 
over  perfectly  open  ground.  Three  companies  were  deployed 
in  first  line  on  a  front  of  380  to  500  ya  ds,  famishing  their  own 
supports.  The  other  four  companies  remained  in  reserve  in 
single-file  columns  at  50  paces  interval,  the  latter  being  in- 
creased when  the  Boer  artillery  opened  on  them. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  27 

AVlieu  the  regiment  arrived  at  about  1,200  yards  from 
I  he  enemy's  position,  Major  Park,  commanding  the  first  line, 
halted  it  and  opened  fire,  the  only  protection  for  the  men 
being  low  ant-hills.  The  advance  was  continued,  and,  after 
a  few  volleys  executed  at  a  halt,  the  line  was  reinforced  by 
the  supports,  and  again  advanced.  In  spite  of  the  hail  of  bul- 
lets, the  line  moved  on  without  a  break,  unhesitatingly,  to 
within  750  yards  of  the  enemy,  and  there  remained  lying 
down  for  a  full  half-hour,  exposed  to  artillery  and  infantry 
fire,  awaiting  the  signal  for  the  final  assault.  Their  khaki 
uniforms  and  the  approaching  darkness  probably  saved 
them  from  destruction. 

Meanwhile  a  flank  movement  was  executed  by  the  Man- 
chester regiment,  which,  after  passing  the  guns,  was  joined 
by  a  dismounted  squadron  of  .Imperial  Light  Horse,  the  Gor- 
don Highlanders  following  in  support.  The  movement  was 
over  the  lowest  of  the  chain  of  heights,  turning  the  left  flank 
of  the  Boers.  On  arriving  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  a  heavy 
storm  broke  forth,  and  wThen  it  was  over,  the  Gordon  High- 
landers found  themselves  among  the  rocks  covering  the  crest 
of  the  hill,  and  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire.  The  supports 
then  entered  the  line,  filling  up  the  interval  between  the  col- 
umns. A  small  plateau  was  .then  crossed,  next  a  depres- 
sion between  the  hills,  and  finally  a*  steep  slope  had  to  be 
scaled,  but  in  spite  of  the  difficulties  and  losses  the  line  stead- 
ily advanced  to  within  600  yards  of  the  enemy.  The  ground 
was  entirely  open  as  regards  trees,  but  covered  Vith  stones 
and  wire  entanglements.  The  colonel,  Dick  Cunyngham,  of 
the  Highlanders,  had  been  twice  wounded,  and  half  the  offi- 
cers were  laid  low,  when  Colonel  Hamlton  ordered  a  trum- 
peter to  sound  a  charge,  which  was  taken  up  by  all  the  other 
trumpeters,  and  drum-major  Lawrence  jumped  to  the  front 
and  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the  line,  playing  the  na- 
tional air. 


28  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

* 

The  entire  line  now  advanced. 

At  6:30  p.  m.  the  Boers'  position  was  taken,  2  of  their 
guns  being  captured.  The  5th  Lancers  were  sent  in  pursuit. 
The  Boers  lost  100  killed,  108  wounded  and  188  prisoners,  in- 
cluding General  Kock  and  Colonel  Schiel  (commanding  the 
German  volunteers);  the  British  lost  6  officers  and  49  men 
killed,  29  officers  and  178  men  wounded,  and  10  men  missing. 
This  is  called  the  battle  of  Elandslaagte. 

The  communication  with  Yule  was  reestablished,  and  the 
latter  on  the  23d,  started  to  join  forces  with  White,  con- 
centrating at  Ladysmith. 

Action  at  Rietfontein. 

On  that  day  (23rd)  Yule  reached  Beith  by  the  Help- 
makaar  road,  and  at  9 :30  a.  m.  on  the  24th  was  at  Waschbank 
Spruit ;  the  column  followed  the  valley  of  the  Waschbank  and 
on  the  morning  of  the  25th  reached  that  of  the  Sundays,  and 
on  the  26th  entered  Ladysmith. 

General  White,  knowing  of  Yule's  approach,  moved  out 
to  Kietfontein  on  the  24th  to  cover  his  flank  from  attack. 
He  had  heard  that  a  force  of  Orange  Boers  from  Bester's 
Station  had  taken  up  a  stong  position  wrest  of  the  road  Glen- 
coe — Ladysmith.  His  force  consisted  of  about  4,500  men: 
5th  Lancers,  Natal  Volunteer  Oarabiniers, 

19th  Hussars,  Border  Mounted  Rifles 

Imperial  Light  Horse,          Natal  Mounted  Rifles, 
1st  Battalion  Gloucestershire  Regiment, 
1st  Battalion  Liverpool  Regiment, 
1st  Battalion  Devonshire  Regiment, 
2nd  Battalion  King's  Royal  Rifles. 
42nd  and  43rd  field  batteries,  10th  mountain  battery. 
He  met  the  Boers  (about  1,500  men)  at  Rietfontein,  the 
advance  guard  of  cavalry  under  French  coming  upon  them 
at  7  a.  m.,  and  held  them  in  check  until  noon,  when,  learning 


THE  SECOND  BOEl^W^R.       .  v<  29 

that  General  Yule  had  passed  through  thedelTfesof  the  Big- 
garsberg,  he  retired  to  Ladysmith.  British  loss  116,  Boers 
230. 

The  Boers  closed  in  on  Ladysmith  and  cut  the  Ladysmith 
—Pietermaritzburg  railroad  at  Colenso.  Their  concentric 
advance,  in  spite  of  the  disadvantages  they  experienced  after 
crossing  the  mountains  in  so  many  columns,  succeeded.  The 
Boers  were  forced  to  subdivide  their  forces  by  the  difficult 
country  they  passed  through,  but  the  same  excuse  cannot, 
be  applied  to  the  British.  The  probable  reasons  for  their 
dividing  into  two  forces  (Glencoe — Dundee  and  Ladysmith), 
instead  of  concentrating  at  some  point  as  at  Ladysmith,  were 
the  facts  that  Glencoe  threatened  a  Boer  advance  on  the  main 
road  over  Newcastle,  that  Dundee  possessed  important  coal- 
fields, and  that  Ladysmith  covered  the  very  important  line 
to  Pietermaritz. 

Meanwhile,  another  important  movement  took  place.  A 
Boer  column  started  from  Fort  Evelin  (the  southernmost 
point  of  the  Transvaal)  and  marched  along  the  Ummula  River 
over  Melmoth  to  the  coast,  evidently  with  a  view  to  influ- 
encing the  Zulus  to  take  an  active  part  against  the  English. 

Operations  on  Western  and  Southern  Border. 

In  the  west  and  south  of  the  Boer  Republics  the  strategic 
deployment  and  advance  progressed  more  slowly.  At  the 
opening  of  the  war  there  were  about  2,000  Boers  along  the 
Bechuana  railroad,  and  by  October  14th  Cronje  had  6,000 
men  opposite  Mafeking,  which  was  garrisoned  by  about  600 
colonial  troops  under  Colonel  Baden-Powell.  At  Kimberley 
there  was  a  garrison  of  about  2,500  men,  under  Colonel 
Kekewich,  half  of  which  were  British  troops,  with  a  consider- 
able number  of  guns.  A  detachment  of  3,000  Orange  Boers 
under  Prinsloo,  had  occupied  Boshof,  36  miles  northeast  of 


30  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Kimberley,  and  on  October  15th  moved  against  that  place  to 
besiege  it. 

On  October  15th  took  place  an  action  near  Maf eking,  in 
which  the  Boers  were  repulsed.  The  British  lost  two  killed 
and  15  wounded;  the  Boers  53  killed  and  many  wounded. 

On  October  24th  a  small  but  important  engagement  took 
place  north  of  Kimberley,  in  which  500  British  attacked. and 
defeated  700  Boers.  The  British  lost  3  killed  and  21 
wounded.  A  sharp  skirmish  also  took  place  at  Rhodes  Drift, 
near  Tuli.  On  the  same  day  the  Boers  occupied  Klipdani 
in  Griqunlaml  West,  :m<l  «  n  tiio  25ih  they  occupied  \\\  burg 
and  Barkly  West.  On  the  latter  day  the  Boers  made  a  de- 
termined attack  on  Mafeking,  but  were  repulsed  with  con- 
siderable loss.  Colonel  Baden-Powell  had  a  railroad  track 
laid  encircling  the  town,  and  armored  trains  were  placed  in 
operation  on  it  and  could  be  taken  quickly  to  any  threatened 
point. 

At  the  end  of  October  the  Boers  drew  from  Mafeking  to 
Kimberley  considerable  portions  of  the  besieging  troops. 
General  Cronje  himself  went  there,  leaving  Botha  in 
command. 

The  Boers  were  masters  of  the  situation  on  the  western 
border,  and  the  occupation  of  points  like  Tauiigs,  40  miles 
south  of  Vryburg,  had  enabled  them  to  isolate  the  English 
at  Mafeking  and  Kimberley.  On  the  southern  border  they 
had  occupied  Norvals  Pont,  Bethulie,  Rjuxvill j,  Aliwal  No.th 
and  the  bridge  over  the  Orange  River,  with  outposts  at  Buru 
ersdorp,  threatening  the  railroad  junction  at  De  Aaar. 

They  advanced  southward  in  two  columns:  one  over  Nor- 
vals Pont  on  Oolesberg  and  Arundel,  the  other  crossing  at 
Bethulie  and  advancing  on  Burgersdorp,  and  later  on  Stor  n- 
berg.  The  weak  British  garrisons  at  Colesberg  and  Ali- 
wal North  had  retired  on  Naauwpoort  and  Queensto\»n, 
respectively. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  81 

Summary  and  Review. 

Let  us  review  briefly  the  progress  of  events  up  to  the 
end  of  October,  which  marks  the  end  of  the  first  act  and  the 
beginning  of  the  second. 

At  midnight  on  October  11-12  General  Joubert  directed 
all  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Boers  under  his  orders  to  break 
camp,  and  by  noon  the  next  day  their  concentric  march  on 
the  British  position,  Dundee — Glencoe — Ladysmith,  was  wel" 
under  way.  The  plan  of  campaign  of  the  Boers  was  strategic- 
ally sound,  and  its  practical  execution  in  detail  was  tactically 
correct  in  the  main,  all  the  circumstances  being  carefully 
considered.  Among  the  tactical  measures,  to  ensure  ^he 
safety  of  the  general  movement,  may  be  mentioned  (1)  the 
sending  out  beforehand  the  advance  guard  of  the  Sandspruit 
corps  from  Volksrust  to  Laings  Nek  and  occupying  this  posi- 
tion and  the  railroad  defile  to  Newcastle  before  daybreak; 
(2)  the  movement  of  the  Wakkerstroom  corps  in  the  general 
direction  of  Newcastle,  and  occupying  the  bridges  over  the 
Buffalo  River;  (3)  the  Dornberg  corps  taking  up  a  position  at 
Vants  Drift  opposite  Rorkes  Drift  as  early  as  the  llth,  so  as 
to  be  able  to  reach  the  cross-roads  to  Glencoe  and  Ladysmith 
opposite  Waschbank  and  Weasels  Nek  on  the  12th;  (4)  the  ad- 
vance on  the  same  day  of  the  Utrecht  an(i  Vryheid  commands 
to  De  Jagers  Drift  on  the  Glencoe  road. 

The  Orange  Boers,  in  a  similar  manner,  occupied  the 
Botha,  Miiller,  Bezuidenhouts  and  Tintwa  passes  before  the 
evening  of  the  12th. 

The  danger  of  subdividing  into  many  small  columns  we 
have  already  discussed.  On  the  British  side  the  Dundee — 
Glencoe — Ladysmith  position  was  not  well  selected,  and  the 
coal-fields  at  Dundee  are  hardly  a  sufficient  reason  for  a  de- 
termined resistance  at  the  Dundee — Glencoe  line,  and  the  ex- 
cuse of  political  and  moral  reasons  is  too  often  advanced  to 
cover  military  mistakes.  A  concentrated  position  north  of 


32  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Ladysmith,  with  a  right  flank  column  at  Glencoe,  appears 
to  be  the- most  reasonable  solution;  but  such  a  Glencoe  force 
should  have  considered  itself  part  of  the  Ladysmith  main 
body,  and  should  not,  therefore,  have  allowed  itself  to  be  sur- 
rounded, but  should  have  retired  slowly  before  superior  forces 
toward  Ladysmith  or  Colenso. 

General  White  had  but  3,000  men  available,  as  it  was, 
with  which  to  attempt  to  prevent  the  union  of  the  separate 
Boer  columns,  each  of  which  was  his  superior  in  numbers, 
and  the  large  and  practically  independent  force  at  Glencoe 
tied  him  to  Ladysmith.  With  the  above  arrangement  he 
would  have  had  at  least  10,000  men  available  for  the  attack 
on  the  separate  Boer  columns,  and  nothing  to  look  out  for 
but  his  own  communications.  If,  however,  his  attempts  to 
prevent  union  failed,  then  his  only  course  should  have  been 
to  retire  beyond  the  Tugela  and  occupy  a  strong  position  cov- 
ering Pietermaritzburg  and  Durban. 

The  neglect  of  General  Symons  to  occupy  Dundee  Hillr 
which  commanded  the  British  camp,  cost  him  a  hard  fight. 
The  battles  of  Glencoe,  Dundee  and  Elandslaagte  were  really 
fought  to  redeem  a  bad  position,  made  so  by  imperfect  tac- 
tical dispositions.  An  energetic,  combined  struggle  with  one 
of  the  Boer  columns  from  a  good  position  north  of  Ladysmith 
would  have  been  far  ^better.  As  it  was,  the  British  frittered 
away  their  forces  in  advance  guard  and  outpost  affairs  which 
had  no  effect  on  the  advance  of  the  Boer  main  columns. 

General  White's  success  at  Elandslaagte  was  decisive, 
but  it  only  reestablished  a  communication  which  had  been 
unnecessarily  lost,  and  it  gave  the  Boer  columns  more  time 
to  complete  their  strategic  plans  and  concentric  march.  Con- 
sidered by  itself,  however,  it  was  a  well-planned  and  splen- 
didly executed  action.  General  Yule's  night  march  from 
Glencoe,  in  presence  of  an  enemy  greatly  superior  in  strength, 
was  a  remarkable  achievement,  and,  taken  in  connection 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  33 

with  General  White's  covering  flank  attack  at  Bietfontein, 
constitutes  an  excellent  tactical  study. 

The  bravery  of  the  British  officers  commands  the  respect 
and  admiration  of  the  world.  In  these  days  of  strong  de- 
fensive lines  and  the  great  power  of  weapons  in  warfare,  it 
is  more  difficult  than  ever  to  induce  the  soldier  to  come  up  to 
the  enemy's  lines,  to  come  in  contact  with  the  enemy — by 
which  alone  the  tide  of  battle  can  be  turned;  consequently 
the  example  set  by  the  officer  comes  more  than  ever  into  play, 
is  more  than  ever  a  necessity,  and  certainly  the  British  officers 
left  nothing  to  be  desired  in  this  respect.  The  British  loss  in 
officers  at  Glencoe  was  14^  per  cent  of  the  total  losses:  at 
Spicheren  the  Germans  lost  in  officers  4^  per  cent  of  the  total 
losses.  Whether  or  not  the  officers  exposed  themselves  un- 
necessarily is  a  very  difficult  question  to  decide:  it  is  the 
officer's  duty  to  get  his  men  forward,  to  keep  them  under  con- 
trol, and  to  economize  their  offensive  power  until  the  crisis 
is  over,  and  if  he  stops  to  consider  his  own  safety  he  is  liable 
to  miss  his  main  duty;  on  the  other  hand,  a  high  percentage 
of  officers  killed  or  wounded  is  very  demoralizing.  Between 
these  limits  he  must  choose,  and  the  best  course  of  action 
left  open  to  the  officer  appears  to  be  to  get  his  men  forward 
as  well  as  he  can  without  too  much  exposing  himself;  but  if 
it  is  necessary  to  advance  farther,  and  there  is  danger  of  lag- 
ging if  this  method  is  kept  up,  then  he  must  expose  himself. 

The  campaign  in  South  Africa,  the  first  to  fully  illustrate 
the  effect  of  the  modern  magazine  rifle  and  of  smokeless 
powder,  furnishes  no  new  principles  of  strategy  or  tactics,  but 
substantiates  the  conclusions  long  ago  reached  by  the  bast 
authorities  from  -a  careful  consideration  of  all  the  elements 
of  modern  warfare. 

The  reason  that  the  results  have  impressed  the  world  as 
unexpectedly  great  is  that  acts  speak  so  much  louder  than 

—3- 


34  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

treatises,  even  to  professional  men,  and  that  the  principles, 
heretofore  known  only  to  the  initiated,  now  suddenly  become 
the  world's  property. 

The  first  great  principle,  long  since  established,  which  it 
emphasizes,  is  the  power  of  the  offensive,  strategically  and  tac- 
tically, and  the  fact  that  this  offensive  alone,  in  spite  of  all 
the  new  power  of  defense,,  can  furnish  decisive  results.  In 
this  early  stage  of  the  campaign  the  offensive  is  largely  with 
the  Boers,  yet  even  here  the  limitations  of  their  offensive 
power, — in  failing  to  strike  hard  when  they  had  the  opportu- 
nity, and  more  especially  in  neglecting  that  other  essential 
element  of  the  offensive,  pursuit, — is  but  too  apparent. 

Another  important  principle  of  the  art  of  war  is  the  cor- 
rect estimation  of  the  enemy's  preparedness  and  strength. 
The  one  great  cause  of  the  early  British  disasters  was  their 
entire  underrating  of  their  enemy's  offensive  and  defensive 
powrer.  But  many  another  nation  has  made  this  mistake — for 
example,  France  in  1870  and  Kussia  in  1877;  hence  this  is  not 
so  surprising,  especially  when  we  consider  the  great  distance 
of  the  scene  of  action  from  the  home  country.  Of  course,  this 
error  of  judgment  falls  upon  the  supreme  heads  of  the  army 
command  and  upon  the  diplomatic  department,  and  does  not 
concern  the  troops  in  the  field. 

Any  other  nation,  under  similar  circumstances,  m'ght 
have  made  the  same  mistake,  and  yet  history  teaches  us  that 
wars  against  irregular  troops,  defending  their  country  and 
their  homes,  are  always  to  be  rated  among  the  most  difficult 
undertakings.  And  when  in  addition  the  nation  attacking 
has  to  do  so  over  a  long  line  of  communications,  extending 
across  the  ocean  for  thousands  of  miles,  and  against  a  nation 
well  led,  and  fully  armed  and  prepared,  the  difficulties  in- 
crease a  thousand-fold. 

Another  great  principle  of  strategy  that  finds  applica- 
tion of  this  campaign  is  the  danger  of  holding  on  to  what 


THE  8ECOND  BOER  WAR.  35 

appear  to  be  important  points  in  the  theatre  of  operations 
with  large  portions  of  the  army  of  operations.  The  lesson  of 
Metz,  which  caused  France  the  loss  not  only  of  Bazaine's 
army,  but  also  of  MacMahon's  at  Sedan,  was  not  taken  to 
heart  by  the  British  authorities.  White's  decision  to  hold 
Ladysmith,  and  the  announced*  intention  to  retain  possession 
of  Mafeking  and  Kimberley,  tied  the  hands  of  the  British 
leaders  in  the  field,  and  increased  the  difficulties  of  the  situa- 
tion. The  lesson  to  be  drawn  is  that  armies  should  never 
allow  themselves  to  be  shut  up  in  fortifications,  except  when 
there  is  no  other  means  left  them  to  save  themselves  from 
destruction. 

Still,  simple  as  the  principle  is,  it  is  so  different  in  prac- 
tice from  what  it  appears  to  be  in  theory,  that  criticism  must 
be  passed  with  caution.  If,  as  is  stated,  the  fall  of  Ladysmith 
and  Kimberley  would  have  been  the  signal  for  a  general  up- 
rising of  the  Dutch  Boers  in  Cape  Colony,  the  entire  question 
at  once  assumes  a  different  aspect,  and  cannot  be  answered 
on  purely  military  grounds. 

The  principal  tactical  principle  that  has  been  corrobo- 
rated by  the  battles  in  South  Africa  is  that  the  purely  frontal 
attack  is  no  longer  successful.  It  must  be  combined  with 
flank  attacks;  but,  since  the  latter  will  generally  be  met  by 
counter-measures  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  converting  them 
again  into  frontal  attacks,  these  counter-attacks  must  be  con- 
tinued and  extended  into  far  outflanking  movements,  requir- 
ing much  time  for  their  execution,  during  which,  between  the 
two  original  fronts,  a  contest  for  position  is  taking  place. 
These  tedious  maneuvers  are  rarely  practiced  in  time  of  peace, 
because  they  take  up  so  much  time,  but  they  should  be,  to 
make  them  second  nature  to  the  soldier.  Moreover,  many  por- 
tions of  the  line,  even  of  an  "army  acting  offensively,  must 
stand  temporarily  on  the  defensive.  Such  portions  should  re- 
sort immediately  to  intrenchments;  hence  the  necessity  for 


36  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

practice  in  this  important  branch.  In  consequence  of  the 
growing  importance  of  intrenching  on  the  field,  high  author- 
ities claim  that  the  subject  of  temporary  fortifications  and 
field  intrenchment  should  be  embodied  directly  in  the  drill 
regulations. 

In  the  way  of  organization  the  only  striking  feature  in 
this  campaign  is  the  great  use  made  of  mounted  infantry', 
which  constitutes  on  the  side  of  the  Boers,  indeed,  the  prin- 
cipal force,  but  is  also  much  used  by  the  British.  The  advan- 
tage of  such  a  force  is  undoubted,  especially  for  reconnoiter- 
ing  and  holding  points  important  for  the  deployment  of  the 
main  body.  This  suggests  that  the  cavalry  be  trained  to 
regard  its  fire-arm  not  as  its  exceptional,  but  as  its  principal 
weapon,  and  that  it  be  trained  to  fight  on  foot  even  more 
thoroughly  than  has  been  the  custom  in  the  past. 


THE  SEOOND  BOER  WAR.  37 


II. 
THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  NATAL  CONTINUED. 

After  the  battles  of  Dundee,  Glencoe  and  Elandslaagte, 
the  respective  forces  in  Natal  were  probably  about  as  follows: 
British.    Infantry  7,800,  cavalry  1,050,  artillery 
45  guns,  volunteers  (Natal  Volunteers 
and  Imperial  Light  Horse)  1,000. 
Boers.        30,000  men,  40  guns  (including  six  40- 
pounders). 

The  Boers  under  Meyer  and  Erasmus  who  pursued  Yule's 
column  came  into  position  on  Isimbulwana  Hill;  the  Orange 
Boers  (7,000)  arrived  at  Matawans  Hoek;  while  Joubert's 
main  body  closed  in  from  the  north,  extending  from  Lom- 
bards Kop  to  the  railroad  to  Harrismith. 

The  question  naturally  arises,  Why  did  not  White  retire 
toward  Pietermaritzburg  as  soon  as  he  found  himself  unable 
to  longer  hold  his  advanced  position  without  danger  of  being 
cut  off?  The  reasons  probably  are  that  he  had  orders  to  hold 
out  (for  political  reasons  and  moral  effect)  as  long  as  possible ; 
moreover,  the  worn-out  troops  of  Yule  undoubtedly  needed 
rest. 

In  case  retreat  had  been  attempted,  there  were  three 
roads  open  to  White.  First,  the  road  running  east  from  Lady- 
smith  and  then  branching  to  Weenen,  or  going  on  to  Pomeroy 
and  thence  to  Grey  town;  secondly,  over  the  open  ground  be- 
tween the  Isimbulwana  Hill  and  the  Klip  River;  thirdly,  the 
road  south  over  Nelthorpe  and  Colenso.  But  the  Boer  guns 
on  Lombards  Kop  and  Isimbulwana  Hill  commanded  the  first 
and  second,  and  the  left  bank  of  the  Modder  Spruit  was  occu- 


38  THE  8ECOND  BOER  WAR. 

pied  in  force  by  two  Boer  commandoes  (Meyer  and  Eras- 
mus). It  appears,  however,  that  White  had  decided  to  hold 
Ladysmith. 

The  Battles  of  Farquhar's  Farm  and  Nicholsons  Nek. 

On  October  30  White  decided  to  attack  the  Boer  forces, 
but  the  difficulties  were  very  great,  for  he  had  to  start  under 
artillery  fire  from  the  Isimbulwana  Hill,  and  the  Boer  col- 
umns were  now  united. 

Colonel  Carleton  with  the  Irish  Fusiliers,  the  Gloucester- 
shire battalion  and  a  mountain  battery,  constituting  his  left 
wing,  was  sent  to  Nicholsons  Nek  to  hold  in  check  the  Boers 
on  Lombards  Kop,  and  to  cover  the  left  and  rear.  The  center 
or  main  column,  under  Hamilton,  was  composed  of  4  batteries 
and  4  infantry  battalions,  and  advanced  along  the  railroad. 
The  right,  under  Grimwood,  composed  of  2  batteries  and  5 
battalions,  moved  directly  east,  between  Isimbulwana  and 
Lombards  Kop.  The  cavalry,  3  regiments  and  mounted  in- 
fantry, under  French,  covered  the  extreme  right.  A  naval 
brigade  with  two  heavy  guns,  just  arrived,  also  took  part  in 
the  engagement. 

The  Boer  outposts  retired  before  the  British  center,  and 
the  latter  in  advancing  lost  touch  with  the  right.  This  right 
soon  found  itself  outflanked,  was  compelled  to  change  front 
under  fire,  and  had  to  call  back  the  center  to  assist  it.  Never- 
theless, the  right  thus  reinforced  was  driven  back  completely 
routed,  covered  by  the  23d  battery.  This  is  known  as  the 
battle  of  Farquhar's  Farm. 

Meanwhile,  the  left  column  moved  on  unmolested  to 
Nicholsons  Nek,  except  that  as  they  arrived  there  two  large 
boulders  were  rolled  down  from  the  heights  by  a  Boer  patrol, 
and  at  the  same  time  there  was  a  blast  of  artillery  fire,  and 
this  so  frightened  the  mules  that  they  ran,  and  the  entire 
mountain  battery  with  all  the  wagons  of  reserve  ammunition 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  39 

were  lost.  The  infantry  held  the  position,  however,  and  in- 
trenched. But  the  Boers  having  been  reinforced,  and  the 
right  and  center  having  fallen  back,  this  entire  column  was 
finally  captured.  This  is  called  the  battle  of  Nicholsons  Nek. 

The  British  lost  in  these  two  engagements  several  hun- 
dred killed  and  wounded,  5  guns,  the  entire  train,  the  ammu- 
nition column,  and  1,500  mules. 

The  losses  in  detail  were:  6  officers,  57  men  killed;  10  offi- 
cers, 221  men  wounded;  38  officers,  977  men  missing. 

It  is  probable  that  White,  in  first  making  this  attack,  had 
decided,  if  successful,  to  retire  further  south,  but  his  failure 
determined  him  to  hold  on  to  Ladysmith  rather  than  abandon, 
the  great  supply  of  stores  there. 

The  General  Situation. 

On  the  evening  of  the  30th  there  were  5  commandoes  of 
Boers  south  of  the  city,  between  the  Klip  and  the  Flagstone, 
with  a  second  line  in  rear  occupying  Nelthorpe  and  Pieter 
stations;  another  commando  intrenched  on  the  Lombard  Kop; 
2  commandoes  (Meyer  and  Erasmus),  2,000  strong,  east  of  the 
Bulwana  Kopje;  while  on  the  north  and  northeast  Joubert 
had  seven  camps  in  a  semicircle  from  Lombards  Kop  to  the 
road  from  Van  Reenens  Pass;  and  finally  2  Orange  comman- 
does coming  from  Dewdrop  Spruit,  joining  hands  with  Jou- 
bert west  of  the  town. 

On  November  3  White  once  more  attempted  to  push  back 
the  Boer  lines  between  the  Klip  Kiver  and  the  Isimbulwana 
Hill.  The  point,  3,000  men,  under  General  Murray,  including 
a  greater  part  of  the  cavalry  and  several  batteries,  managed 
to  push  through  the  Boer  lines  and  escaped  to  Estcourt;  the 
rest  were  forced  back  to  Ladysmith. 

Colonel  Cooper,  occupying  Colenso  with  600  volunteers, 
with  a  detachment  of  the  Dublin  Fusiliers  at  Fort  Wylie,  re- 
tired to  Estcourt.  The  Boers  occupied  Colenso  on  the  3d. 


40  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

General  Joubert,  after  leaving  the  proper  force  to  con- 
tinue the  siege  of  Lady  smith  (the  garrison  of  which  was  now 
reduced  to  7,000),  continued  his  strategic  march  in  three  col- 
umns: one  to  strengthen  the  corps  at  Colenso  and  advance 
west  of  the  railroad,  the  second  advancing  over  Weenen,  the 
third  over  Greytown.  The  detachment  which  had  penetrated 
into  Zululand  crossed  the  lower  Tugela,  and  threatened  the 
communication  between  Pietermaritzburg  and  Durban,  from 
the  vicinity  of  Stanger. 

The  further  advance  was  thus  to  be  a  grand  right  wheel 
of  the  Boer  army,  to  be  followed  by  a  concentric  advance  on 
Pietermaritzburg.  But  the  arrival  of  the  2d  Brigade,  1st 
Division,  of  British  reinforcements  under  General  Hildyard 
at  Estcourt  caused  a  temporary  change.  General  Botha's 
Boer  corps  (7,000)  from  Colenso  came  to  a  stand,  the  corps 
originally  at  Colenso  moving  over  Ulundi-Courton  west  of  the 
railroad  took  the  British  in  the  left  flank,  that  moving  over 
Weenen  took  them  on  the  right  flank,  while  that  sent  over 
Greytown  was  to  take  position  at  Bietermaritzburg. 

Heavy  guns  were  gradually  brought  from  Pretoria  and 
Johannesburg  to  strengthen  the  Boer  lines,  which  were  drawn 
closer  and  closer  around  Ladysmith. 

General  Buller,  who  arrived  at  Cape  Town  on  October 
31,  remained  there  until  November  16,  when  he  started  north, 
and  on  the  26th  was  at  Pietermaritzburg.  Meanwhile  17 
transports  (with  about  19,000  men)  arrived  at  Cape  Town,  10 
being  sent  on  to  Durban,  where  the  troops  were  landed  to 
operate  towards  Ladysmith,  the  troops  from  the  others  being 
sent  north  by  rail  to  Orange  River  Station,  General  Methuen 
in  command. 

The  besieged  cities  of  Ladysmith  and  Kimberley  evi- 
dently determined  the  British  plan.  Part  of  the  reinforce- 
ments were  sent  to  Sir  Buller  in  Natal,  another  part  from 
Cape  Colony  to  Orange  River  Station  under  Lord  Methuen,  a 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  41 

third  and  fourth  under  Generals  Gatacre  and  French;  respect- 
ively, to  threaten  the  Orange  Free  State.  The  reinforcements 
were  too  small  to  warrant  such  a  subdivision  into  four  widely 
separated  columns.  It  would  have  been  better  to  have  con- 
centrated the  entire  force  in  Natal  against  the  main  Boer 
army,  or  to  have  retained  the  Boer  army  there  and  invaded 
the  Orange  Free  State  with  a  strong  column  in  the  center  or 
left. 

In  the  composition  of  the  units  there  are  decided  ele- 
ments of  weakness,  for  the  force  under  Clery  in  Natal  has 
parts  of  three  different  divisions,  the  others  being  in  one  or 
other  of  the  other  columns. 

Action  at  Willow  Grange. 

General  Clery  assumed  command  of  the  forces  south  of 
Ladysmith  on  the  18th.  A  Boer  column  reached  Nottingham 
road  and  moved  over  Ulundi  to  Highland  Station(Mooi  River) 
on  the  21st,  cutting  off  Estcourt.  The  British  forces,  2,000 
each,  one  under  Hildyard  at  Estcourt,  the  other  under  Barton 
at  Weston,  were  thus  surrounded.  The  Boers  had  a  splendid 
opportunity  for  a  tactical  offensive,  which  should  have  led  to 
decisive  results;  but  General  Joubert,  learning  of  the  arrival 
of  the  British  reinforcements  in  Pietermaritzburg,  decided  to 
retire  and  concentrate  his  forces  in  the  strong  position  north 
of  the  Tugela.  On  the  21st  General  Hildyard  attacked  the 
Boers  at  Willow  Grange  and  drove  them  back,  restoring  com- 
munication with  Weston.  Hildyard's  force  consisted  of  700 
mounted  men,  the  7th  and  66th  field  batteries,  and  three  bat- 
talions (East  Surrey,  West  Surrey  and  West  York).  He  lost 
13  killed,  65  wounded,  and  9  missing;  the  Boer  loss  is  reported 
as  30  killed,  100  wounded.  The  troops  from  Estcourt  and 
Weston  then  advanced  to  Frere,  the  Boers  retiring  to  Colenso. 

By  the  22d  of  November,  33  troopships  had  arrived  at  the 
Cape,  carrying  34,516  officers  and  men. 


42  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

A 'fortified  camp  was  established  at  Chieveley,  where  the 
reinforcements  were  concentrated. 

Events  in  the  Southern  and  Western  Theatres. 

On  October  30th,  a  Boer  attack  on  Mafeking  was  re- 
pulsed with  loss:  British  lost  2  officers  and  4  men  killed,  and 
5  men  wounded. 

On  November  1st,  a  Boer  force  crossed  the  bridge  at  Nor- 
valfontein  and  occupied  Colesburg,  and  another  (3,000  under 
Commandant  Dutoil)  assembled  at  Bethulie  bridge.  On  the 
2d,a  detachment  (3,500)  crossed  the  bridge  at  Bethulie,  the 
British  force  at  Stormberg  Junction  retiring  to  Queenstown. 
The  Boers  were  operating  at  this  time  south  of  the 
Orange  River  in  three  columns:  the  right  (2,000)  against 
De  Aar  and  the  Cape  railroad;  the  center  (1,000)  pushing  out 
on  the  Colesberg  road;  the  left  (3,000)  against  Queenstown 
and  Port  Elizabeth;  a  reserve  of  4,000  at  Bethulie. 

At  Mafeking  there  was  daily  skirmishing.  Colonel 
Plumer  from  Tuli  was  on  the  way  to  relieve  this  town. 

Lord  Methuen  arrived  at  Orange  River  Station  on  No- 
vember 9th.  General  French,  who  had  escaped  from  Lady- 
smith  on  the  last  train  out,  November  2d,  obtained  command 
of  the  troops  pushed  out  to  Naauwpoort. 

The  troops  actually  placed  under  Lord  Methuen's  com- 
mand were  the  following: 

1st  Brigade  (Guards),  1st  Division  (Colville).* 
9th  Brigade  (Featherstonehaugh,  later  Pole- 
Carew),  comprising 

1st  Northumberland  Fusiliers, 
2d  Northamptonshire, 
2d  Yorkshire  Light  Infantry, 
^  1st  Loyal  North  Lancashire. 
Mounted  Infantry,  1  regiment. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  43 

Naval  Brigade  and  4  navy  guns. 

Cavalry,  9th  Lancers  and  New  South  Wales  Lancers. 
Artillery,  3  batteries. 
Later  there  were  added: 

3d  Brigade  (Scotch  Brigade),* 
1st  Battalion  Gordon  Highlanders.! 
General  Gatacre  was  placed  in  command  of  the  troops 
of  the  Cape  force  already  in  position,  receiving  in  addition 
the  5th  Brigade.*     General  French  (who  had  escaped  from 
Ladysmith)  was  under  his  command. 

On  the  10th  of  November  a  British  reconnoitering  par- 
ty, under  Colonel  Gough,  composed  of  two  squadrons  of  the 
9th  Lancers,  1^  companies  mounted  infantry  and  a  field  bat- 
tery, struck  a  force  of  700  Boers  at  a  point  about  3  miles  west 
of  Belmont  and  had  a  sharp  skirmish  with  them. 

On  November  19th  a  Boer  commando,  500  strong,  at- 
tacked Kuruman,  but  was  repulsed.  On  the  20th  Cronje  left 
Mafeking  for  the  South,  the  commandoes  of  Snyman  and 
Malan  remaining  to  continue  the  siege. 

Meanwhile,  Lord  Methuen  developed  his  plan  of  opera- 
tions in  the  West.  After  repairing  the  bridge  at  Orange 
Kiver  Station,  he  advanced  with  6,000  men  on  the  21st  of 
November  against  Belmont. 

Action  at  Belmont. 

The  country  is  flat,  with  only  low  ridges,  100  to  200  feet 
high,  crossing  it,  and  two  miles  south  of  Belmont  rises  the 
Kaffirs  Kop,  which  is  much  higher.  On  the  21st  he  reached 
Witteputs  and  on  the  22d  Devondale  (about  5  miles  south 
of  Kaffirs  Kop).  The  Boer  forces  around  Kimberley  were 
commanded  by  Cronje,  the  outposts  at  Belmont  and  Kaffirs 
Kop  by  Delarey.  On  the  23d  the  attack  began  against  the 
first  rise,  which  was  quickly  taken,  followed  by  the  storming 

*See  Appendix. 

fFrom  the  Hi  e  of  communications. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  45 

the  second  rise,  the  cavalry  acting  on  the  left  flank  to  turn 
the  Boer  right.  The  third  rise  was  carried  with  more  diffi- 
culty, but  being  most  effectively  supported  by  the  artillery, 
the  Boers  retiring  to  the  Kaffirs  Kop.  The  cavalry  was  too 
much  exhausted  to  pursue.  This  is  known  as  the  battle  of 
Belmont. 

The  British  lost  4  officers  and  20  men  killed,  50  officers 
and  218  men  wounded,  and  2  missing.  Among  the  wounded 
was  General  Featherstonehaugh,  commanding  the  9th  brig- 
ade, who  was  succeeded  by  General  Pole-Carew. 

The  Boer  position  on  the  Kaffirs  Kop  proved  too  strong, 
and  Lord  Methuen  retired  to  Orange  Kiver  Station. 

Action  at  Graspan. 

On  the  following  night  (24th  and  25th)  Lord  Methuen 
again  advanced.  He  moved  over  Schalk  Farm,  in  order  to 
go  around  the  Kaffirs  Kop  and  Belmont,  and  was  approaching 
the  railway  station,  Graspan,  when  the  head  of  the  column 
ran  into  2,500  Boers  concealed  in  a  depression  of  the  ground, 
near  Enslin,  while  500  Boers  from  the  Kaffirs  Kop  attacked 
the  rear  guard.  Lord  Methuen  engaged  them  in  front  with 
the  naval  brigade,  and  turned  their  flanks  with  the  9th  brig- 
ade, while  the  cavalry  threatened  their  rear.  The  Boers  re- 
tired to  the  Modder  River.  The  cavalry  was  too  weak  to  pur- 
sue. This  is  called  the  battle  of  Graspan  or  Enslin. 

The  British  force  under  Lord  Methuen  in  this  action 
comprised : 

9th  Lancers. 

Billington's  Scouts. 

2  field  batteries. 

Guards  Brigade  (Colville). 

9th  Brigade  (Featherstonehaugh). 

Naval  Brigade  (Captain  Prothero,  from  the  Doris). 
The  Boers  under  Cronje,  were  about  3,000  strong,  with 
6  field  guns  and  2  machine  guns. 


46  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

The  British  lost  4  officers  and  20  men  killed,  5  officers  and 
161  men  wounded,  7  missing. 

The  Battle  of  Modder  River. 

Lord  Methuen,  after  resting  for  a  day,  and  reconnoitering 
to  the  front,  continued  his  advance  in  the  night  of  the  26th. 
Nothing  had  been  seen  of  the  enemy.  The  column  halted 
for  the  night  at  Klopfontein  Farm.  At  4  a.  m.  Methuen  re- 
sumed his  march,  the  2d  battalion  Northamptonshire  regi- 
ment as  advance  guard,  the  2d  battalion  Yorkshire  Light  In- 
fantry leading  the  main  column.  The  total  strength  (includ- 
ing reinforcements  joining  on  the  battlefield)  was  about  8,500 
men,  with  22  guns  (including  4  naval  guns).  The  Boers  num- 
bered about  8,000,  with  10  guns,  and  were  under  Delarey  and 
Cronje,  their  artillery  under  Albrecht. 

The  village  called  Modder  Kiver  (see  sketch)  lies  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Riet,  just  west  of  the  junction  of  the  Mod- 
der. The  Boer  position  was  in  the  shape  of  a  crescent,  its 
center  opposite  the  bridge,  its  right  flank  resting  on  a  group 
of  houses  north  of  the  dam,  its  left  flank  at  a  farm  beyond 
the  Free  State  border.  The  Eiet,  although  swollen  at  this 
time,  was  fordable  at  several  points,  and  both  banks  are  cov- 
ered with  trees  and  thick  brush.  The  railroad  bridge  had 
been  destroyed  by  the  Boers,  but  a  road  bridge  north  of 
Sevenfontein  remained  for  communication.  The  islands 
above  the  dam  are  covered  with  trees.  The  ground  on  the 
right  bank  rises  gradually  to  the  north  and  fully  commands 
the  south  bank. 

Although  the  principal  Boer  position  was  on  the  north 
side,  their  advanced  line  was  on  the  south.  Both  were  in- 
trenched, the  revetments  covered  with  bags  of  sand  and  gal- 
vanized iron  plates,  and  the  approaches  were  obstructed 
with  wire  entanglements.  Behind  the  advanced  line  the 


*«•• 


OF  THE 


UNIVERSITY 


SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


47 


ground  slopes  down  to  the  river,  affording  cover  for  horses 
and  wagons,  and  communication  over  the  river  was  effected 
by  innumerable  boats  and  rafts. 


48  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

The  artillery  was  all  on  the  north  side,  5  guns  at  the  cen- 
ter, 2  on  the  right  and  2  on  the  left  flank;  the  Maxim  gun 
near  the  junction  of  the  rivers,  and  a  Hotchkiss  gun  moved 
about  as  required. 

Methuen,  when  at  daybreak  his  patrols  drew  the  enemy's 
fire,  concluded  it  was  merely  an  advance  guard  fight  that  con- 
fronted him.  After  the  cavalry  and  mounted  infantry  came 
in  contact  with  the  advanced  line  of  the  Boers,  the  artillery, 
under  Colonel  Hall,  at  about  5:30  a.  m.,  took  position  at 
4,300  yards  and  bombarded  the  Boer  left  flank.  The  9th  Lan- 
cers and  the  mounted  infantry  protected  the  right  flank  of 
the  artillery.  The  artillery  duel  lasted  about  two  hours,  then 
the  infantry  advanced  in  dispersed  order,  the  naval  brigade 
(1,000)  and  the  artillery  composing  the  center,  the  right 
formed  of  the  Guard  (3,500)  under  Colville,  the  left  of  the 
9th  brigade  (4,000)  under  Pole-Carew.  The  latter  was  rein- 
forced on  the  field  by  the  first  battalion  of  the  Argyll  and 
Sutherland  Highlanders,  coming  from  the  Orange  River. 
The  line  advanced  to  within  600  yards  of  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion, but  could  make  no  farther  progress  and  lay  there  all  day. 
On  the  right  repeated  attempts  were  made  to  turn  the  Boer 
position.  On  the  left,  however,  a  part  of  the  9th  brigade 
succeeded  in  crossing  at  the  dam,  and  in  gaining  a  footing 
on  the  north  bank.  The  artillery  was  active  all  day.  At  3 
p.  m.  the  62d  battery  arrived  by  rail.  During  the  night  the 
Boers  evacuated  their  position.  This  is  called  the  battle  of 
Modder  River.  % 

The  British  lost  in  this  battle  4  officers  and  68  men 
killed,  19  officers  and  377  men  wounded,  7  missing. 

The  total  losses  of  these  British  columns  of  invasion  up 
to  and  including  November  28th  were  about  3,000  killed  and 
wounded.  General  Methuen  remained  at  the  Modder  River, 
repairing  the  bridge  there. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  49 

General  Situation. 

After  the  disaster  of  Glencoe  and  the  siege  of  Lady- 
smith,  England  proceeded  to  raise  another  (the  5th)  division, 
and  to  organize  a  siege  train.    The  later  disasters  decided 
'England  to  raise  still  another  (the  6th)  division. 

On  the  southern  border  of  the  Orange  Free  State  the 
British  (under  General  French)  reoccupied  Naauwpoort,  No- 
vember 19tli,  while  the  Boers  from  Aliwal  North  took  pos- 
session of  Jamestown,  and  moved  on  Dordrecht.  Gatacre 
moved  north  from  Queenstowrn  and  occupied  Bushmans 
Hoek,  November  27th,  and  the  Boers  destroyed  the  Steyns- 
burg  bridge,  between  Queenstown  and  Naauwpoort. 

The  general  situation  at  the  end  of  November  may  be 
summed  up  as  follows: 

In  Natal  the  continuation  of  the  siege  of  Ladysmith,  and 
the  holding  in  check  of  General  Clery's  relief  force  by  the 
Boers  on  their  strongly  intrenched  Tugela  line.  In  the  west 
the  continuation  of  the  siege  of  Mafeking  and  Kimberley,  and 
the  holding  in  check  of  the  relief  force  under  Lord  Methuen 
on  the  Kiet  River.  In  the  south  the  holding  in  check  of  Gat- 
acre's  division  and  French's  brigade. 

The  strength  of  the.  Boer  forces  in  Natal  was  about 
25,000  men,  south  of  the  Orange  River  about  10,000,  and  in 
the  west  about  12,000,  with  about  1,000  on  the  northern  bor- 
der, and  about  2,000  in  the  interior,  giving  a  total  of  about 
50,000.  They  had  about  45  field  guns  and  20  Maxims. 

General  Buller  (after  the  arrival  of  the  first  reinforce- 
ments) had  command  of  about  34,000  infantry,  6,800  cavalry, 
200  field  guns  and  40  Maxims  (after  deducting  garrisons,  etc.). 
By  the  middle  of  December  the  second  reinforcements 
brought  his  force  up  to  40,000  infantry,  7,650  cavalry,  206 
field  guns;  and  by  the  first  of  January  (when  the  third  rein- 

-4— 


50 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


forcements  arrived)  to  46,000  infantry,  7,650  cavalry,  221) 
field  guns  and  howitzers,  50  Maxims. 

Events  South  of  the  Orange  River. 

General  Gatacre's  troops  were  concentrated  at  Queens- 
town  to  act  in  concert  with  French,  in  order  to  throw  back 
the  invading  Boer  columns. 


T 


mm 

^Z~  ...Ate  <*~ 


KIMBERLEY. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  51 

On  the  18th  of  November  he  had  the  following  troops: 
2d  battalion  Royal  Irish  Rifles. 
2d  battalion  Berkshire  (part  only). 
These  were  reinforced  later  on  by: 

2d  battalion  Northumberland  Fusiliers. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Scots  Fusiliers. 
And  on  December  5th  by : 

74th,  77th  and  79th  field  batteries,  and 
12th  company,  field  engineers. 

He  also  had  some  Cape  Police,  Kaffrarian  Rifles  and 
Brabant's  Horse,  all  volunteers  and  irregulars. 
His  total  force  amounted  to  3,500  men. 
On  November  22d  he  established  his  camp  at  Putters 
Kraal,  leaving  about  1,000  men  at  Queenstown.    He  occu- 
pied Sterkstroom  with  about  300  men,  and  Bushmans  Hoek 
with  about  800,  but  early  in  December  he  combined  the  two 
advanced  posts  at  Molteno. 

General  French,  with  a  detachment  comprising  the  2d 
Berkshire  Regiment,  the  6th  Guards  Dragoon  Regiment  and 
mounted  Cape  Colony  organizations,  was  directed  to  secure 
to  line  Port  Elizabeth — Colesberg.  He  assembled  his  forces 
at  Naauwpoort,  reconnoitering  to  Arundel. 

On  December  8th  the  Boers  were  distributed  as  follows: 
800  men  at  Dordrecht,  700  (with  6  guns)  on  the  way  to  Dor- 
drecht from  Jamestown,  1,500  at  Stormberg,  400  near  Mol- 
teno, and  a  small  commando  at  Steynsburg.  The  Boers  in 
the  vicinity  of  Stormberg  were  commanded  by  Olivier. 

The  Battle  of  Stormberg. 

At  the  begining  of  December  the  Boers  in  the  south 
were  moving  on  Dordrecht,  Molteno  and  Indwe.  Mean- 
while, Gatacre's  troops  remained  inactive  until  the  first 
week  of  December  had  passed.  Then,  to  strengthen  Lord 
Methuen's  position,  an  offensive  movement  was  decided  upon. 


52 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


This  was  begun  by  a  reconnoissance  of  General  French  in  the 
direction  of  Arundel.  His  efforts  to  get  an  insight  into  the 
enemy's  position  failed,  and  on  the  10th  he  was  compelled  to 
retire. 

To  further  prepare  for  his  advance,  General  Gatacre,  on 
the  8th,  sent  Colonel  Dalgetty  with  all  his  available  cavalry 
and  a  half-battery  against  Dordrecht,  with  a  view  to  tak- 
ing this  town  and  threatening  Stormberg  (reported  to  be  occu- 
pied by  only  2,000  men)  on  the  left  flank. 

General  Gatacre  himself,  on  the  9th,  went  by  rail,  with 
about  2,500  infantry,  200  cavalry  and  2  batteries,  to  Molteno, 
and  marched  thence  on  the  night  of  the  9th  towards  Storm- 
berg  (8J  miles),  to  surprise  the  Boer  garrison.  The  column 
was  to  march  along  the  Molteno — Steynsburg  road  for  about 
5  miles,  then  turn  northeast  directly  towards  Stormberg  (at 
A,  sketch),  but  in  the  darkness  the  troops  moved  on  too  far 
(B,  sketch)  and  had  to  make  a  wide  sweep  (double  the  dis- 
tance) to  reach  their  objective,  striking  the  latter  on  the 


THEATRE  OF  OPERATIONS  OF  GENERALS  FRENCH  AND  GATACRE. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


53 


northwest  side,  where  it  was  practically  unassailable.  On 
arriving  about  three  miles  from  Stormberg  the  head  of  col- 
umn suddenly  found  itself  under  heavy  fire  in  front  and  right 
flank.  The  Royal  Dublins,  composing  the  advance,  broke  and 
carried  panic  with  them.  A  rally  was  effected  behind  a  kopje, 
and  a  new  position  taken  up  to  the  rear,  while  the  mounted 
infantry  was  sent  against  the  right  flank.  Before  the  new 
position  was  occupied  a  Boer  Maxim  battery  opened  on  the 


BATTLE  OF  STORMBERGK— Rev.  du  Cercle. 

rear  of  the  British,  and  they  again  retired  in  still  greater  dis- 
order, and  it  was  only  behind  the  British  artillery  that  order 
could  be  restored.  The  Boers  never  followed  up  the  retire- 
ment of  Gatacre,  except  with  long-range  artillery  fire,  and 
sniping  at  quite  extravagant  distances. 

Gatacre  continued  his  retreat  to  Molteno.    The  entire 
action  lasted  from  4  to  7  a.  m.    The  reserves  of  the  com- 


54  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

panies  that  assembled  on  the  hills  were  many  of  them  cap- 
tured, but  no  prisoners  were  lost  during  the  retreat.  The 
British  lost  60  killed  and  wounded,  about  700  prisoners  and 
3  guns.  This  is  the  battle  of  Stormberg. 

The  tactical  mistakes  in  this  advance  are  apparent. 
General  French's  movement  could  have  for  its  object  only 
one  of  two  things — it  was  either  a  feigned  attack,  with  a 
view  to  drawing  away  from  Stormberg  some  of  the  forces 
there,  or  else  it  was'  a  forced  reconnoissance  to  get  an  insight 
into  the  situation  at  Arundel.  In  either  case  it  was  an  error. 
In  the  first  case  it  was  absurd  to  hope  to  produce  any  effect 
on  the  garrison  of  Stormberg  by  a  movement  on  a  Boer  force 
three  days'  march  away.  In  the  second  case  the  object  did 
not  justify  the  use  of  such  a  large  force:  a  few  officers'  pa- 
trols would  have  served  the  purpose. 

Moreover,  Gatacre's  advance  was  not  properly  organized 
tactically,  for  there  were  no  real  flanking  columns  to  insure 
against  surprise,  Colonel  Dalgetty's  raid  not  being  such  in  a 
true  tactical  sense.  Finally,  the  whole  expedition  was  made 
by  too  great  a  force,  over  too  great  a  distance,  to  give  prom- 
ise of  surprise  in  a  country  friendly  to  the  enemy. 

This  break  in  the  center  of  the  general  British  line  en- 
dangered further  advance  by  Methuen  or  Clery,  and  French 
was  so  weakened  that  he  could  hardly  secure  the  railroad  line 
to  De  Aar. 

Dalgetty  took  and  held  Dordrecht;  but  French  failed  in 
his  attempt  to  turn  the  Boer  position  at  Arundel,  and  was 
compelled  to  return  to  Naauwpoort. 

The  Campaign  in  the  West. 

On  the  western  theatre  of  operations,  at  about  the  same 
time,  important  events  were  transpiring.  Lord  Methuen  was 
forced  to  inactivity  after  the  battles  on  the  Modder  and  Riet 
rivers,  not  only  because  his  troops  were  exhausted,  but  also 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  55 

because  the  Boers  under  General  Cronje  held  the  strong  po- 
sition of  Spytfontein — Magersfontein  in  his  front,  and  threat- 
ened his  right  flank  from  their  position  (under  Prinsloo)  at 
Jacobsdal,  and  even  his  line  of  communications  from  the  rear, 
Orange  Boers  under  Delarey  as  early  as  December  2d,  hav- 
ing turned  up  at  Graspan,  destroyed  the  railroad  bridge  there, 
and  then  worked  round  to  the  westward  to  cut  off  Lord  Meth 
uen.  Efforts  to  dislodge  these  forces  in  rear  proved  unsuc 
cessf ul ;  consequently  Lord  Methuen  decided  to  proceed  witn 
his  more  immediate  duty,  the  relief  of  Kimberley,  and  made 
his  preparations  to  force  the  Boer  lines  in  his  front. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  the  Modder  River  a 
bridge  of  boats  was  constructed  over  the  Riet  about  40  yards 
to  the  west  of  the  railroad  bridge,  and  an  iron  bridge  waa 
commenced  to  the  east  of  the  latter,  which  was  completed 
by  December  7,  when  the  first  train  crossed. 

Between  the  3d  and  the  8th  of  December  the  following 
reinforcements  reached  Lord  Methuen: 

12th  Lancers. 

Horse  Battery  G. 

Siege  Howitzer  Battery  (4  pieces,  5-inch). 

The  Highlander  Brigade  (Gen.  Wauchope). 

A  Balloon  Section. 

The  4.7  R.F.  gun  "Joe  Chamberlain,'1  from  the  Doris-. 

The  Canadian  and  Australian  contingents. 
His  entire  command  comprised  11-J  battalions,  6  squad- 
rons, 5  batteries,  1  battalion  mounted  infantry,  1  naval  brig- 
ade, 1  naval  battery  of  5  guns,  and  about  1,100  volunteers,  or, 
in  all,  about  13,000  men  and  35  guns. 

The  Boer  position  was  in  the  form  of  a  semicircle,  com- 
pised  of  two  ridges,  Spytfontein  in  the  western  part,  Magers- 
fontein in  the  eastern,  the  railroad  passing  between  them 
and  dividing  the  position  into  two  nearly  equal  sections,  that 
on  the  east  side  being  much  more  strongly  occupied  than  that 


56 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


on  the  west.     The  position  was  well  intrenched,  and  at  Ma 
gersfontein  the  trenches  were  so  arranged  as  to  allow  of  fire 
at  different  elevations  at  the  same  time.     Cronje  had  about 
6,000  men  and  13  guns. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


57 


The  Boers  were  reinforced  by  a  number  of  commandoes, 
one  of  which  occupied  Reads  Drift,  about  seven  miles  west 
of  the  Modder  River,  and  another  Jacobsdal  to  the  east. 

On  the  10th  of  December,  Lord  Methuen,  after  leaving  a 
flanking  force  to  guard  against  a  Boer  advance  from  Jacobs- 
dal,  crossed  the  Modder  River  on  the  temporary  bridge 
which  he  had  constructed  and  advanced  against  the  left  (or 
stronger)  flank  of  the  Boer  position. 

The  Battle  at  Magersfontein. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  December  the  12  cm.  naval 
gun  moved  out  about  a  mile  beyond  the  camp  and  fired  some 
15  shots  at  the  Magersfontein  heights,  ten  of  them  lyddite 
shells ;  the  cavalry  had  a  light  skirmish  on  the  right,  and  the 
9th  brigade  moved  out  in  support.  At  2  p.  m.  on  the  10th, 


BATTLE  OF  MAGERSFONTEIN.-J?ev.  du  Cercle. 


58 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


after  leaving  the  9th  brigade  to  guard  the  .train,  Lord  Me- 
thuen's  command  broke  camp  and  began  the  advance,  the 
artillery  opening  fire,  from  the  position  occupied  on  the  pre- 
ceding day  by  the  naval  gun,  on  the  heights  at  Magersfon- 
tein.  For  two  hours  the  firing  continued,  but  the  Boers 
made  no  reply.  The  artillery,  the  Highland  Brigade  and  the 
9th  Lancers  bivouacked  on  the  field  during  the  early  part  of 
the  night  of  the  10th,  about  2  miles  from  Modder  Kiver  Sta- 
tion, and  the  Guards  moved  up  in  support.  At  1  a.  m.,  in  a 
heavy  rain,  the  advance  was  continued. 

The  station  of  Spytfontein  is  about  10  miles  from  Mod- 
der River.  The  ground  rises  gradually  to  about  5  miles  north 
of  the  Riet,  then  it  begins  to  be  cut  up  by  kopjes.  These 


A  KOPJE. 

lines  of  kopjes  trend  obliquely  so  that  the  open  ground  is 
like  a  wedge  with  Spytfontein  at  the  apex,  and  Jacobsdal 
at  one  end  of  the  base.  The  Magersfontein  Kopjes  consti- 
tute this  portion  of  the  Boer  line.  They  rise  to  a  height  of 
150  feet. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  59 

The  Boer  trenches  ran  along  the  foot  of  the  heights  they 
occupied,  to  the  right  of  the  British  advance,  then  over  the 
kopjes  into  the  open  country,  so  that  a  wide  detour  would 
have  been  necessary  to  turn  them.  But  there  was  no  thought 
of  this,  Lord  Methuen's  plan  evidently  being  to  surprise  the 
position  and  attack  in  front  only,  nor  was  it  known  to  the 
British  that  the  Boer  trenches  lay  along  the  foot  of  the  hills; 
otherwise  the  artillery  fire  would  not  have  been  directed  on 
the  heights. 

In  the  early  dawn  of  December  llth  the  Highland  Bri- 
gade, still  in  closed  column,  arrived  within  500  yards  of  the 
enemy's  trenches,  having  just  passed  a  wire  entanglement 
(at  about  650  yards  from  the  enemy)  and  reached  a  perfectly 
open  terrain.  Just  as  the  order  to  deploy  for  attack  was 
given,  the  enemy  opened  fire,  and  so  murderously  that  the 
Highlanders  broke  and  fell  back  in  disorder  with  fearful 
loss.  General  Wauchope  fell  among  the  first.  The  brigade 
was  reassembled  a  few  hundred  yards  to  the  rear,  but  its 
spirit  was  broken. 

The  Guard  Brigade  was  then  deployed,  but  could  make 
no  headway,  and  finally  the  whole  of  Lord  Methuen's  force 
was  engaged — except  a  battalion  of  Gordon  Highlanders 
left  in  reserve  and  to  take  charge  of  the  train — the  Guards 
on  the  right,  Carew's  brigade  and  the  artillery  in  the  cen- 
ter, the  Highlander  Brigade  on  the  left.  The  howitzers  on 
the  left  fired  lyddite  shell  at  about  3,800  yards  range,  while 
the  three  light  batteries  in  the  center  advanced  to  within 
1,700  yards  of  the  Boer  trenches,  and  the  horse  batteries 
moved  to  the  right  of  the  light  batteries.  The  Boers  occu- 
pied the  road  towards  Jacobsdal  as  well  as  the  trenches  at 
the  foot  of  the  heights. 

The  Highlanders  not  being  available  for  another  attack, 
the  reserve  (Gordon  Highlanders)  was  ordered  up,  and  ar- 
rived about  9  a.  m.,  taking  position  in  front  of  Wauchope's 


60 


THE  SECOND  BOUli  WAR. 


.\ 


BATTLE  OF  MAGERSFONTEIN.— Bev.  du  Cercte. 

brigade,  the  two  battalions  of  the  Coldstream  Guards 
strengthened  the  right  wing,  and  the  Grenadier  Guards  were 
detached  to  cover  the  extreme  right  flank.  The  howitzers 
advanced  about  1,000  yards  nearer.  The  field  batteries  were 
then  about  1,200  yards,  the  howitzers  2,700  yards  and  the 
horse  battetries  about  1,600  yards  from  the  enemy.  But  noth- 
ing availed.  The  Boers  worked  continually  around  towards 
the  British  right. 

The  Yorkshire  Light  Infantry  had  ascended  the  Modder 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  61 

during  the  night  and  occupied  at  daybreak  a  ford  about  3 
miles  northeast  of  the  bridge;  after  leaving  3  companies  at 
this  ford,  the  5  others  were  sent  to  Browns  Drift,  further 
north.  This  force  protected  Methuen's  exposed  right  flank 
during  the  entire  day,  and  foiled  Cronje's  attempts  to  take 
the  British  lines  in  flank. 

At  about  2  p.  m.  the  Highlanders  were  again  demoral- 
ized and  fell  back  in  disorder,  but  were  assembled,  and,  sup- 
ported by  the  Scots  Guards,  took  up  their  position  again  near 
the  guns. 

At  about  5:30  p.  m.  the  enemy's  guns  (which  had  re- 
mained silent  up  to  this  time)  opened  fire  on  the  ammunition 
train  and  the  cavalry.  The  Highlander  Brigade  again  broke 
and  fell  back  to  the  field  hospital.  Another  attack  was  there- 
fore not  to  be  thought  of.  The  British  forces  bivouacked  on 
the  field  and  in  the  morning  began  their  retreat,  falling  back 
again  to  the  Modder  River. 

During  the  day  the  balloon  section  made  several  ascents, 
remaining  up  each  time  about  ten  minutes. 

General  Methuen's  advance  was  in  reality  a  forced 
reconnoissance,  for  nothing  was  known  of  the  enemy's 
strength  or  exact  position.  He  made  the  great  mistake  of 
allowing  an  interval  of  several  hours  to  elapse  between  his 
artillery  combat  and  his  infantry  attack,  and  in  the  latter 
he  brought  his  forces  into  action  successively,  consequently 
without  definite  result. 

General  Wauchope,  commanding  the  Highland  Brigade, 
was  killed,  and  General  Hector  Macdonald  succeeded  him. 

Again  we  find  that  the  British,  in  their  anxiety  to  sur- 
prise the  Boers,  neglected  all  measures  for  security  and  in- 
formation, and  were  themselves  surprised.  Lord  Methuen 
lost  about  1,000  men,  or  one-ninth  of  the  forces  actually 
engaged. 

The  British  lost  21  officers  and  139  men  killed,  48  offi- 


62  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

cers  and  624  men  wounded,  3  officers  and  121  men  missing, 
or  a  total  of  956.  The  Boers  lost  219. 

The  Highlanders  lost  about  25.4  per  cent  of  their  entire 
force  in  ten  minutes,  and  the  brigade  was  placed  Jiors-  de 
combat  for  the  day.  The  Black  Watch  lost  over  37  per  cent. 
It  has  been  stated  by  several  authorities  that  in  the  battles 
of  the  future  the  losses  of  the  army  will  probably  not  exceed 
20  per  cent,  although,  of  course,  particular  units  will  be 
subjected  to  severer  losses. 

The  battle  was  really  lost  in  those  ten  minutes  in  which 
the  Highlanders  suffered  their  great  losses,  and  it  is  clearly 
evident  that  nothing  but  imperfect  reconnoissance  is  to 
blame  for  the  British  reverse  in  this  case. 

How  General  Methuen  could  decide  to  cross  the  Mod- 
der  Kiver  and  advance  when  he  had  left  a  Boer  force  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  Riet,  in  his  flank  and  rear,  is  inexplicable. 

Before  the  close  of  the  year  but  few  further  movements 
took  place  in  the  western  and  southern  sections  of  the 
theatre  of  war,  and  none  of  any  importance.  On  December 
13th  General  French  with  the  6th  Dragoon  Guards,  the  10th 
Hussars  and  4  horse-artillery  guns  forced  back  a  commando 
of  Boers,  about  1,800  strong,  north  of  Naauwpoort;  and  again 
on  the  same  day  his  mounted  infantry  drove  back  a  column 
of  Boers  from  Zoutpans  Drift,  10  miles  east  of  Orange  River. 
On  December  25th  Dordrecht  was  occupied  by  Colonel  Dal- 
getty,  and  on  the  olst  there  was  a  small  skirmish  near  this 
place. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  NATAL. 

Tlie  First  Attempt  to  Relieve  Ladysmith. 
The  Battle  of  Colenso. 

General  Buller  remained  inactive  until  the  middle  of 
December.  The  Boers  under  General  Schalk  Burgher  (since 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


BATTLE  OF  COLENSO.— Rev.  du  Cercle. 

Joubert's  illness)  had  occupied  with  12,000  men  and  strength- 
ened the  Tugela  line  at  Colenso,  sending  out  detachments  to 
close  the  lines  leading  to  Ladysmith,  situated  on  their  flanks: 
on  the  right  flank  the  bridges  over  the  Little  Tugela  at 
Springfield,  and  on  the  left  flank  the  bridge  over  the  Bush- 
mans  River  at  Weenen,  and  the  Tugela  bridge  in  rear.  In 
rear  of  Springfield  they  occupied  a  strong  position  on 
Zwarts  Kop. 

At  Colenso  the  principal  Boer  position  was  north  of  the 
river,  but  they  had  also  occupied  the  southern  bank  east  of 
the  railroad,  resting  their  left  flank  on  the  Hlangwane  Hill. 
From  this  last  position  they  could  take  an  enemy  crossing 
at  Colenso  in  rear,  cut  him  off,  and  take  him  under  cross- 
fire. General  Buller  appears  not  to  have  been  aware  that 
this  hill  was  occupied. 

The  country  between  Colenso,  Frere  and  Springfield  is 
without  roads  and  very  hilly,  and  that  between  Colenso, 
Weenen  and  Estcourt  is  also  without  roads  and  has  the 
obstacle  of  the  Blaauwkrass  River  besides.  Moreover,  to 
move  on  either  of  the  flanks  of  the  Boer  position  necessi- 


64 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


tated  abandoning  the  railroad.  Finally,  such  a  movement 
in  either  direction  would  subject  the  British  to  flank  attack 
from  Colenso,  and  in  addition  the  distance  from  Colenso  to 
Springfield  or  to  the  Tugela  bridge  north  of  Weenen  is 
shorter  than  the  distance  from  Frere  to  either  of  these 
objectives. 


WRECK  OF  THE  BRIDGS  AT  F BERE.- Engineer ing 

The  railroad  bridge  just  north  of  Colenso  had  been  de- 
stroyed; the  road  bridge  about  600  yards  above  remained, 
but  was  mined;  there  was  a  ford  between  the  twro  bridges, 
and  one  just  above  the  road  bridge.  These  were  the  only 
points  where  the  river  could  be  crossed  without  con- 
structing a  bridge,  and  they  were,  of  course,  strongly  de- 
fended by  the  Boers.  Moreover,  just  below  Colenso,  where 


THE  SECOND  BOER  \VAK.  (35 

the  river. makes  a  sharp  turn  to  the  north,  the  Boers  had 
crossed  to  the  south  bank  and  occupied  the  Hlangwane  Hill, 
commanding  the  Coleiiso— Weenen  road,  and  threatening  the 
river  crossings  from  the  eastward;  and  on  the  west  they 
had  continued  their  lines  on  the  south  bank,  flanking  the 
upper  ford  and  the  space  between  the  bridges;  finally, 
Colenso  itself  was  occupied  by  the  Boers. 

General  Buller  had  at  Chieveley  and  Frere  about  19,000 
men  and  52  guns.  His  plan  was  to  have  Barton's  brigade 
with  2  field  batteries  and  6  12-pounder  navy  guns  occupy  the 
Hlangwane  Berg,  to  support  the  advance  of  Hildyard  and 
Lyttleton  on  Colenso  in  the  center,  while  Hart's  brigade  on 
the  left  was  to  first  force  the  B.ridle  Drift  (upper  ford),  and. 
if  successful,  the  troops  crossed  there  would  facilitate  the 
passage  of  the  other  columns  -at  the  iron  bridge.  If  unsuc- 
cessful, the  troops  would  hold  the  enemy  in  their  immediate 
front  wrhile  the  right  wing  forced  the  passage  of  the  iron 
bridge. 

On  the  evening  of  December  14th  and  the  morning  of 
December  15th,  General  Buller  prepared  for  his  advance 
from  Chieveley  Camp  by  bombarding  the  supposed  Boer 
positions  by  means  of  the  naval  guns  and  the  howitzer  bat- 
teries. On  the  15th  the  advance  was  begun,  Hildyard's  bri- 
gade moving  on  the  lower  ford,  Lyttleton's  through  Colenso 
on  the  road  bridge,  Hart's  brigade  on  the  upper  ford.  At 
4:45  a.  in.  the  navy  4.7-inch  guns  opened  on  Fort  Wylie,  and 
at  6  a.  m.  the  14th  and  66th  batteries  advanced  to  the  east 
of  the  railroad  and  came  into  position  at  750  yards  from  the 
Tugela  (about  1,200  yards  in  front  of  the  infantry).  The 
battery  of  naval  12-pounders  came  up  on  the  left  and  rear 
of  the  field  guns.  The  Boers  opened  on  the  field  guns  not 
only  with  their  artillery,  but  also  with  infantry  fire  from 
the  trenches  at  short  range,  and  the  field  batteries,  under 

-5— 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  67 

cross-fire  from  the  front  and  from  Hlangwane  Hill,  were 
soon  destroyed  and  had  to  be  abandoned. 

Barton's  brigade  advanced  against  the  western  spurs  of 
the  Hlangwane  Berg  and  reached  the  foot  of  the  slope,  when 
the  Boers  suddenly  opened  fire  from  front  and  flank,  and 
forced  back  the  right. 

Meanwhile  the  infantry  attack  began. 

Lyttleton's  brigade  and  part  of  Hildyard's  were  held  in 
check  by  the  garrison  of  Colenso,  while  Hart's  advanced 
towards  the  upper  ford.  The  troops  of  the  latter  were  still 
in  column  when  they  found  themselves  under  a  cross-fire 
from  the  Boer  trenches  on  the  north  and  the  south  banks,  as 
well  as  under  artillery  fire,  and  although  they  continued  to 
advance  and  even  succeeded  in  getting  a  few  men  to  the 
other  side,  they  lost  heavily  and  were  compelled  to  fall  back, 
and  joined  the  part  of  Hildyard's  brigade,  which  had  passed 
the  eastern  edge  of  Colenso  and  was  advancing  on  the  lower 
ford.  But  then  they  received  the  flank  fire  of  the  Boer 
trenches  on  the  north  bank,  and  the  artillery  fire  from  the 
Hlangwane  Hill.  Buller  sent  his  entire  cavalry  and  the 
mounted  infantry  against  Hlangwane  Hill,  but  the  British 
artillery  could  take  up  no  good  position  against  the  longer 
range  Boer  guns,  and  the  cavalry  and  mounted  infantry 
could  make  no  progress.  Finally,  in  consequence  of  the 
loss  of  the  artillery,  the  troops  fell  back  in  disorder  to- 
wards Frere. 

This  is  known  as  the  battle  of  Tugela  liiver,  or  the  battle 
of  Colenso. 

The  British  lost  about  900  killed  and  wounded,  and  11 
guns:  9  officers,  137  men  killed;  42  officers  and  G99  men 
wounded,  200  missing. 

The  Boers  in  the  trenches  in  this  locality  were  com- 
manded by  Botha,  and  numbered  only  about  2,000  men. 

The  causes  of  these  reverses  on  the  Tugela  are  but  ton 


TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  69 

apparent.  While  BuJler  was  still  at  Frere  Station,  his  ad- 
vance guard  was  directed  on  December  12th  to  reconnoiter 
as  far  as  Chieveley,  and  the  presence  of  Boer  forces  south 
of  the  Tugela  (between  it  and  the  Blaauwkrass  River)  was 
then  established.  Notwithstanding  this,  Buller  advanced  on 
the  15th  to  attack  the  Tugela  line  without  making  any 
attempt  to  determine  the  strength  and  position  of  these 
forces.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  he  met  with  sur- 
prises, flank  attacks  and  cross-fires.  Moreover,  it  is  an  estab- 
lished principle  that  to  cross  a  river  in  the  face  of  a  prepared 
enemy,  it  is  necessary  first  of  all  to  obtain  full  possession  of 
the  nearer  bank,  and  Buller's  neglect  of  this  condition  still 
further  explains  the  results. 

It  is  remarkable  that  during  the  long  period  of  inaction 
Buller  should  have  taken  no  measures  to  obtain,  by  careful 
reconnoissance,  a  clear  insight  into  the  strategic  situation. 
Had  he  done  so,  he  would  have  seen  that  an  advance  on  Co- 
lenso  laid  him  open  to  being  cut  off  by  an  advance  of  the 
Boers  at  Springfield  and  Weenen  against  his  lines  of  com- 
munication, which  would  have  put  him  into  the  same  plight 
as  White  at  Ladysmith.  But,  after  neglecting  all  proper 
reconnoissance,  that  he  should  advance  to  the  attack  with- 
out properly  securing  his  flanks  is  simply  incomprehensible. 

The  first  condition  for  forcing  the  passage  of  the  Tugela 
was  the  capture  of  the  Hlangwane  Hill  and  the  expulsion 
of  the  Boers  from  the  trenches  on  the  south  bank.  But  ap- 
parently the  British  did  not  even  know  that  these  points 
were  occupied  in  force. 

In  the  face  of  these  disasters  England  ordered  out  all 
her  reserves,  proceeded  to  mobilize  the  8th  division,  and  ap- 
pointed Field  Marshal  Lord  Roberts  commander-in-chief  in 
South  Africa,  with  General  Lord  Kitchener  of  Khartoum  as 
second  in  command.  The  total  losses  of  the  British  up  to 
this  time  (not  including  deaths  from  disease)  were  7,630. 


70 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


TEMPORARY  BRIDGE  AT 

Comments. 

Let  us  review  briefly  the  causes  of  the  events  up  to  the 
present: 

The  main  causes  of  the  late  disasters  to  the  British  arms 
in  South  Africa  are  readily  traceable  to  grave  mistakes  made 
early  in  the  campaign,  and  now  difficult  to  remedy.  Minor 
errors  have  marked  the  course  of  the  operations,  but  they 
were  due  largely  to  haste  and  a  natural  desire  to  overcome 
by  extraordinary  exertions  the  difficulties  of  a  situation 
which  was  rendered  dangerous  by  the  earlier  and  graver 
errors  in  training,  preparation,  recruitment,  material,  organ- 
ization, strategy  and  tactics. 

First,  as  regards  strategy.  The  wedge  of  Natal,  project- 
ing as  it  does  into  the  Boer  country,  would  appear  at  first 
to  offer  the  great  advantage  of  enabling  an  army  always 
to  operate  on  interior  lines.  With  such  a  position  a  compar- 
atively small  force  is  able  to  fall  on  the  fractions  of  the 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  71 

enemy,  as  his  separate  columns  cross  the  passes  of  the  bor- 
der, and  destroy  them  in  turn.  But  in  order  to  do  this,  the 
force  in  the  wedge  must  be  at  least  stronger  than  any  one 
of  the  enemy's  columns.  The  only  way  the  British  could  have 
taken  full  advantage  of  their  advantageous  position  would 
have  been  by  concentrating  their  forces  at  some  one  point 
just  north  of  Ladysmith;  instead  they  divided  them  into  two 
forces,  one  at  Glencoe — Dundee,  the  other  at  Ladysmith.  The 
result  was,  when  White  moved  out  from  Ladysmith  to  pre 
vent  the  union  of  two  of  the  Boer  columns  coming  over  the 
mountains,  he  had  but  3,000  men  available,  which  was  much 
below  the  strength  of  either  of  the  Boer  columns.  If  the 
troops  had  been  concentrated  in  one  place,  he  would  have 
had  10,000  men  available,  a  number  which  would  have  been 
far  greater  than  either  Boer  column. 

It  is  only  fair  to  state  that  when  Sir  George  White 
arrived,  he  found  the  situation  created  for  him,  and  that  he 
desired  to  withdraw  from  Glencoe  to  Ladysmith  at  once,  but 
for  political  reasons  he  had  to  hold  on  to  it.  Moreover,  by 
permitting  Symons  to  occupy  Glencoe,  the  occupation  of 
Ladysmith  became  a  necessity. 

In  the  defense  of  Dundee  and  Ladysmith  the  British 
showed  too  great  a  tendency  to  be  tied  down  to  localities, 
when  the  only  proper  course  would  have  been  to  retire  before 
superior  forces  and  try  to  hold  the  Pietermaritzburg — Durban 
railroad,  so  important  as  a  line  of  atlvance.  Their  tenacity 
and  pluck  in  defending  the  places  referred  to  are  to  be  com- 
mended as  such,  but,  although  inspired  by  quite  a  different 
motive  from  that  which  induced  Bazaine  to  hold  on  to  Metz 
in  1870,  the  ultimate  effect  on  the  general  situation  was  sim- 
ilar. The  same  may  be  said  of  the  defense  of  Mafeking  and 
Kimberley.  Instead  of  adding  to  the  strength  of  the  British 
attacking  forces,  they  weakened  the  strategic  plan,  because 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  Buller's  subsequent  movements 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  73 

were  greatly  influenced  by  the  desire  to. relieve  these  besieged 
garrisons;  whereas,  had  they  retired,  they  would  now  be 
available  to  assist  the  advancing  columns,  instead  of  being 
held  in  check. 

Turning  now  to  General  Buller's  plan  of  campaign,  he 
seems,  at  first  sight,  to  have  followed  good  strategic  princi- 
ples in  dividing  into  two  main  columns,  one  over  Durban — 
Estcourt,  the  other  over  Cape  Town — Orange  River  Station, 
concentrating  on  the  Boer  country,  with  Pretoria  as  the  ulti- 
mate objective.  But,  if  we  examine  more  closely,  we  find 
that  the  total  strength  of  his  command  does  not  warrant  any 
division,  because  neither  column  is  strong  enough  to  cope 
with  the  enemy  immediately  in  its  front  or  to  keep  up  proper 
communication  between  the  far  separated  columns  for  effect- 
ive mutual  support  or  combined  action.  His  entire  force 
should  have  been  sent  to  Durban  and  concentrated  on  the 
main  Boer  army  in  Natal,  if  rapid  and  decisive  results  were 
expected.  Of  course,  the  desire  to  relieve  the  garrisons  at 
Kimberley  and  Mafeking  had  a  great  influence,  and  no  doubt 
the  strength  and  ability  of  the  Boers  were  greatly  under- 
rated, but  judgment  and  decision  on  such  points  are  factors 
in  generalship  and  constitute  the  elements  of  strategy. 

Although  these  early  battles  prove  the  high  quality  of 
the  British  soldier  in  battle,  they  also  indicate  a  lack  of  mo- 
bility, and  a  too  great  dependence  on  their  base  of  supply, 
especially  the  railroad. 

Secondly,  as  regards  training.  The  best  training  is,  of 
course,  actual  war,  but  the  late  wars  of  the  British  have  not 
been  of  a  character  to  teach  them  what  an  active  and  well- 
trained  enemy  is  liable  to  do  on  the  battlefield.  Next  to 
actual  war  come  field  exercises  or  maneuvers,  and  it  appears 
from  what  the  British  officers  themselves  say  that  this  kind 
of  peace  training  was  inadequate:  first,  in  that  it  did  not 
include  on  a  sufficiently  large  scale  flanking  movements  by 


74  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

the  troops  representing  the  enemy;  secondly,  in  that  the 
maneuvers  were  not  conducted  on  a  scale  sufficiently  exten- 
sive to  make  the  officers  familiar  with  the  handling  of  large 
bodies  of  troops  on  the  battlefield.  The  former  explains  why 
the  British  are  continually  surprised  by  the  flanking  move- 
ments of  the  Boer  lines,  and  the  latter  may  account  for  some 
of  the  tactical  errors  about  to  be  considered. 

Thirdly,  let  us  analyze  the  British  tactics.  In  the  early 
part  of  the  campaign  they  were  very  deficient  in  cavalry,  but 
light  infantry,  properly  trained,  especially  as  opposed  to  such 
slow-moving  and  deliberate  enemies  as  the  Boers,  should 
have  done  excellent  service  on  reconnoissance,  notably  in  the 
rough  country  in  northern  Natal,  which  is  in  reality  more 
favorable  for  infantry  than  for  cavalry  scouts.  But  even 
later  on,  when  French  had  an  entire  cavalry  division  at 
Naauwpoort,  Gatacre  was  surprised  in  his  advance  from 
Queenstown.  Of  course  the  British  are  under  the  great  dis- 
advantage of  operating  in  country  where  the  natives  sympa- 
thize with  the  enemy,  but  this  does  not  satisfactorily  explain 
all  the  deficiencies  in  reconnoissance  work.  For  example, 
even  on  the  battlefield,  patrol  duty  to  keep  up  intercommu- 
nication between  the  parts  of  a  line  seems  to  have  been  neg- 
lected, as  at  Nicholsons  Nek,  where  one  column  of  a  small 
command  was  allowed  to  get  so  completely  separated  as  to 
be  captured,  never  having  been  informed  of  the  repulse  of 
the  adjacent  portions  of  the  general  line. 

The  cavalry  failed  entirely  in  its  reconnoissance  work, 
and  the  brigade  commanders  did  not  take  up  the  work,  when 
the  cavalry  retired  from  the  front,  by  advancing  their  lines 
of  infantry  to  force  the  enemy  to  develop  his  position. 

The  defeat  of  General  Buller's  army  at  Colenso  appears 
to  be  another  case  in  point.  It  is  to-day  considered  to  be  no 
dishonor  to  lose  a  battery  on  the  battlefield,  provided  its  sac- 
rifice is  demanded  by  the  general  situation ;  but  from  the  offi- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  75 

cial  report  it  appears  that  when  Colonel  Long  "advanced 
close  to  the  river  in  his  desire  to  be  within  effective  range/' 
it  "proved  to  be  full  of  the  enemy."  Now  the  artillery's  duty 
was  to  get  within  effective  range,  but  it  is  someone  else's 
business  to  see  that  the  bank  of  the  river  is  not  full  of  the 
enemy  before  the  artillery  is  ordered  to  the  front.  Again, 
imperfect  reconnoissance  appears  to  be  at  the  bottom  of  the 
trouble. 

However,  there  is  another  point  that  demands  considera- 
tion here.  For  some  years  the  continental  armies  have  been 
training  special  artillery  scouts — that  is,  mounted  men,  se- 
lected from  the  field  artillery  batteries,  whose  duty  it  is  to 
precede  a  battery,  clear  up  the  ground  along  the  road  of 
advance,  look  up  the  enemy's  position,  note  points  of  value 
to  the  artillery  commander,  and  report  promptly  whatever 
demands  reporting,  but  remain  constantly  in  touch  with  the 
enemy.  These  scouts  are  usually  formed  into  patrols,  under 
particularly  efficient  officers  or  non-commissioned  officers. 
The  British  field  artillery  appears  not  to  have  put  in  prac- 
tice this  most  effective  means  of  protecting  the  artillery  from 
surprise. 

Another  tactical  weakness  seems  to  be  the  failure  to 
occupy  positions  properly.  It  is  incomprehensible  why  Ta- 
lana  Hill  (which  cost  so  dear  to  retake  after  the  Boers  occu- 
pied it)  was  not  occupied  in  the  first  place. 

Moreover,  the  tendency  of  the  British  to  make  simple 
frontal  attacks,  is  to  be  condemned  as  too  great  a  waste  of 
life  in  these  days  of  enormous  strength  of  the  defense.  The 
mistaken  ideas  of  tactics,  which  induced  the  British  to  make 
such  purely  frontal  attacks,  in  great  measure  necessitated 
that  exposure  of  the  officers  and  men  which  resulted  in  such 
great  losses.  Wherever  they  tried  pressure  on  the  flanks  (as 
at  Elandslaagte  and  Kiedfontein)  they  were  successful. 


76  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

It  will  suffice  to  pass  in  rapid  review  the  other  elements 
of  weakness. 

As  regards  preparedness,  it  is  only  necessary  to  refer  to 
the  weak  garrisons  at  Kirnberley  and  Mafeking,  guarding  the 
important  railroad  from  Cape  Colony  to  Buluwayo,  to  the 
insignificant  forces  on  the  Orange  River,  covering  the  Port 
Elizabeth  railroad,  and  to  the  comparatively  small  force  at. 
the  keystone  in  Natal  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign.  At 
home,  the  unreadiness  of  the  Admiralty  promptly  to  trans- 
port the  reinforcements  was  severely  commented  on,  and  the 
length  of  time  allowed  for  recruiting  the  army  corps  was 
probably  necessitated  by  the  lack  of  a  full  supply  of  clothing 
and  equipment  in  the  store-houses.  The  conditions  in  South 
Africa  demanded  prompt  relief,  and  every  moment  of  delay 
increased  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  as  soon  became  fully 
apparent. 

The  greater  part  of  the  cavalry  division  of  the  army 
corps  and  the  field  artillery  arrived  after  the  infantry,  which 
was  a  great  disadvantage. 

The  want  of  artillery  material,  both  field  and  siege,  in 
sufficient  quantity,  made  itself  felt  very  early  in  the  war. 
But  this  was  not  due  to  an  actual  want  of  such  material  at 
home,  only  to  a  deficient  organization — the  lack  of  a  chief  of 
artillery,  who  could  demand  that  the  proper  artillery  guns 
be  sent,  and  who  could  be  held  responsible  for  not  having 
them  on  hand  in  time.  Another  deficiency  in  organization 
w  as  the  mixing  up  of  the  units  in  the  two  main  armies,  by 
which  one  brigade  of  a  division  would  be  in  one  army,  an- 
other in  the  other,  so  that  Clery's  column  had  parts  of  four 
different  divisions. 

The  English  had  known  for  years  that  a  collision  with 
the  Transvaal  would  occur  sooner  or  later,  but  they  closed 
their  eyes  to  the  strategical  facts  of  the  situation,  and  the 
military  forces  in  South  Africa  were  kept  at  an  insufficient 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  77 

strength.     The  6,000  miles  separating  the  latter  from  the 
mother  country  seem  never  to  have  been  considered. 

Former  governments  and  parties  must,  of  course,  take 
their  share  of  the  blame.  The  Cape  garrison  had  always 
been  weak,  and  originally  it  was  probably  sufficient  to  over- 
awe the  natives;  but  between  1881  and  1886,  when  there 
was  constant  friction  between  England  and  the  Transvaal, 
some  attempt  to  provide  for  the  impending  crisis  should  have 
been  made  by  reinforcing  the  garrisons,  and  this  would  have 
been  possible  even  up  to  1896,  but  after  that  any  such  in- 
crease would  certainly  have  led  to  war. 

The  chief  of  all  these  elements  of  British  weakness  is, 
of  course,  the  strategy  of  the  campaign-^the  great  superi- 
ority of  the  Boers  in  strategic  deployment  and  strategic 
advance,  due  to  their  unity  of  plan  and  action  being  every- 
where manifest.  The  original  inferiority  of  the  British  in 
numbers  is  also  a  prime  cause;  but  each  of  the  other  ele- 
ments has  had  its  effect  on  the  preliminary  situation  and  the 
subsequent  events. 

The  early  operations  of  the  Boers  are  marked  by  good 
strategy,  and  their  tactical  applications  of  their  forces  in 
battle,  especially  on  the  defensive,  by  considerable  skill,  but 
they  lacked  the  spirit  of  the  initiative  and  the  power  of  the 
tactical  offensive.  The  attack  of  the  several  columns  on  Dun- 
dee was  not  simultaneous;  at  Elandslaagte  the  advanced 
force  was  not  properly  supported;  after  the  battles  of  Dun- 
dee and  Elandslaagte  their  forces  became  too  cautious  in 
their  advance  and  so  allowed  Yule  to  escape;  they  failed  to 
push  their  advantage  and  to  attack  Ladysmith  vigorously  hi 
the  proper  direction,  before  the  British  could  have  time  to 
strengthen  their  position,  but  preferred  to  occupy  a  strong 
position  to  the  north  of  the  town;  and  finally,  after  the  battle 
of  Colensc,  they  failed  to  pursue. 


78  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


III. 

The  British  defeats  at  Magersfontein,  Stormberg  and  on 
the  Tugela  closed  the  second  epoch  of  the  war.  They  were 
followed  by  a  period  of  comparative  inaction. 

The  mistakes  in  strategy  of  the  second  epoch,  in  trying 
to  operate  on  three  distinct  lines,  separated  by  from  150  to 
300  miles — one  for  the  relief  of  Kimberley,  another  for  the 
direct  offensive  from  Queenstown  towards  Bloemfontein,  and 
the  third  for  the  relief  of  Ladysmith — and  in  splitting  up  the 
reinforcements  for  all  these  widely  separated  columns,  in- 
stead of  concentrating  on  one,  brought  their  natural  conse- 
quences, and  the  situation  for  the  British  became  a  very 
difficult  one. 

The  tactical  errors  in  applying  an  obsolete  method  of 
attack,  in  failing  to  develop  a  proper  system  of  reconnois- 
sance,  and  in  neglecting  to  support  field  artillery  by  infan- 
try or  cavalry,  the  inferiority  of  the  British  artillery  mate- 
rial at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  the  greater  mobility  of 
the  Boer  troops,  as  well  as  the  inexperience  of  the  British 
officers  in  exercising  the  higher  commands,  are  the  princi- 
pal additional  factors  that  have  determined  the  events. 

The  obsolete  method  of  attack  consisted  (on  the  Tugela, 
for  example)  in  not  preparing  for  the  attack  by  a  proper 
artillery  bombardment  from  guns  placed  in  well-covered 
gun-pits;  then  following  the  artillery  duel  (insufficient  in 
every  case  thus  far)  either  too  soon  (before  proper  prepara- 
tion) by  the  infantry  attack  (as  on  the  Tugela),  or  leaving 
too  long  an  interval  (as  at  Magersfontein) ;  finally,  in  deploy- 
ing an  insufficient  number  of  skirmishers  for  the  firing  line, 
in  line,  firing  volleys,  against  an  invisible,  well-intrenched 
-enemy,  and  making  only  frontal  attacks  on  the  position. 


SECOND  BOER  WAR^  79 

Both  sides  were  compelled  to  inaction  for  a  long  period: 
the  British  for  want  of  complete  trains,  for  laying  bridges 
and  to  enable  them  to  cut  loose  from  the  railroads;  and  the 
Boers  for  lack  of  any  further  reinforcements,  which  com- 
pelled them  to  economize  their  troops,  and  consequently 
prevented  them  from  taking  Lady  smith  or  Kimberley  by 
storm,  or  from  advancing  a*ny  farther  into  the  British 
domain. 

The  total  number  of  British  troops  in  South  Africa  on 
January  1,  1900,  was  about  103,400,  of  which  83,600  were 
unmounted  and  19,800  mounted.  The  position  of  the  troops 
was  as  follows: 

Lord  Methuen  was  in  an  intrenched  position  between 
the  Modder  and  Riet  rivers,  just  east  of  their  point  of  junc- 
tion, and  covering  a  bridge  over  the  two  rivers  as  well  as 
the  railroad  bridge.  He  had  about  13,000  men.  The  Boers, 
under  Cronje,  Delaray  and  Prinsloo,  about  20,000  strong, 
occupied  a  fortified  position  at  Spytfontein — Magersfontein, 
both  flanks  resting  on  the  Modder  River,  the  left  extending 
across  the  river  to  Jacobsdal.  They  were  gradually  closing 
in  on  Methuen,  and  stray  parties  threatened  his  line  of  com- 
munications, so  he  made  an  effort  to  clear  up  the  situation 
to  the  southwest,  and  on  the  1st  of  January  sent  General 
Babington  writh  a  part  of  the  1st  cavalry  brigade  from  the 
main  camp,  and  Colonel  Pilcher  with  a  small  detachment 
from  Belmont,  towards  Douglas.  Pilcher  surprised  a  Beer 
detachment  at  Sunnyside,  and  pushed  on  to  Douglas,  but 
the  approach  of  a  commando  (500)  of  Boers  along  the  Riet 
induced  him  to  leave  Douglas  on  the  3d  and  return  to  Bel- 
mont. Babington  also  returned  to  the  main  camp  without 
accomplishing  his  object. 

A  mixed  force  occupied  Zoutpans  Drift,  about  20  miles 
east  of  Orange  River  Station  on  January  6. 

Griqualand  West  and  British  Bechuanaland  have  prac- 


80  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

tically  joined  the  Boers,  and  Kuruman,  the  capital  of  the 
latter,  surrendered  on  January  2,  with  12  officers  and  10$ 
men. 

On  the  southern  border  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  Gat- 
acre  had  retired  towards  Sterkstroom,  French  was  at  Arun- 
del  and  Rendsburg,  and  Naauwpoort  and  De  Aar  were  occu- 
pied by  British  reserves.  On  December  31,  leaving  in  Rends- 
burg a  half-regiment  and  a  section  of  'horse  artillery,  French 
advanced  with  5  squadrons  of  cavalry,  80  men,  mounted  in- 
fantry and  10  guns  against  Colesberg.  He  occupied  a  posi- 
tion to  the  west  of  Colesberg  and  made  a  demonstration  in 
the  direction  of  the  railroad  junction  north  of  Colesberg. 
The  Boers  (1,000)  retired  in  the  direction  of  Xorvals  Pont> 
but  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  January,  being  reinforced, 
they  returned  and  forced  French  to  retire.  He  took  up  a 
position  about  5  miles  southeast  of  Colesberg.  On  the  6th 
he  sent  out  Colonel  Watson  with  a  half-battalion  of  the 
Suffolk  regiment,  to  occupy  a  small  height  about  2  miles 
west  of  Colesberg,  commanding  the  road  to  Philipstown. 
Colonel  Watson  advanced  in  close  column  to  the  top  of  the 
hill,  and  there,  wThile  giving  his  orders  for  the  occupation 
of  the  position  to  the  assembled  officers,  was  surprised  by 
the  Boers  and  lost  one-third  of  his  force.  French  remained 
operating  in  the  vicinity  of  Colesberg. 

In  Natal  the  situation  remained  practically  unchanged. 
Joubert,  who  had  been  absent. ill  since  December  6th,  had 
resumed  command  of  the  Boer  forces  north  of  the  Tugela 
on  December  18th. 

i 

The  Siege  of  Lady  smith. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  Buller's  third  attempt  to 
relieve  Ladysmith,  let  us  interrupt  the  narrative  of  events 
in  the  active  armies  and  cast  a  glance  at  the  military  situa- 
tion in  and  about  this  beleaguered  city. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


81 


,-v 

• 


RECEIVING  STATION,  WIRELESS  TELEGRAPHY. 

Ladysmith,  on  account  of  its  natural  advantages,  its 
position  on  the  railroad  and  its  situation  (well  to  the  north) 
in  Natal,  was  long  ago  selected  as  a  depot  of  supply  and 
point  of  support  for  this  colony.  Had  it  been  properly  for- 
tified and  adequately  supplied  with  supplies  and  material, 
as  well  as  with  a  strong  infantry  garrison,  in  addition  to  the 
necessary  artillery,  it  would  probably  never  have  been  be- 
sieged, or,  if  so,  it  could  have  held  out  indefinitely.  As  it 
was,  there  were,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  only  four 
months'  provisions  on  hand,  and  about  three  hundred  rounds 
of  ammunition  per  piece.  A  few  batteries  of  heavy  guns  on 
the  surrounding  hills,  with  strong  bridge  heads  on  the 
Tugela  at  Colenso  and  on  the  Bushmans  and  Mooi  rivers, 
would  have  protected  the  city  as  well  as  the  line  of  commu- 
nications. But  the  British  underrated  the  power  of  the  two 
Eepublics,  and  so  were  loth  to  make  the  proper  preparations. 
Had  the  Boers  been  trained  in  siege  operations,  the  place 
would  probably  have  fallen. 


82  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

The  town  lies  in  a  valley,  on  both  sides  of  the  Klip 
River,  and  is  commanded  on  all  sides  by  high  hills,  which, 
on  the  north,  run  in  a  ridge  close  to  the  river,  on  the  south 
consist  of  more  isolated  hills,  separated  from  Ladysmith  by 
a  broad  plain.  Outside  of  this  nearer  chain  of  hills  is  an- 
other line  encircling  them,  but  rising  somewhat  higher. 

The  position  of  White  was  on  a  ridge  beginning  at 
Helpmakaar  Hill  east  of  the  town  (nearly  half-way  between 
the  town  and  Lombards  Kop),  and  running  in  a  horseshoe 
bend  to  the  north  of  it,  bending  in  the  west  and  around  by 
the  southeast  of  the  town,  near  the  railroad  bridge  over  the 
Fouries  Spruit.  In  front  of  this  general  ridge  on  the  south 
side,  several  other  points  were  occupied:  Maiden  Castle, 
Besters  Hill  and  Waggon  Hill.  The  British  position  encir- 
cled Ladysmith — on  the  east  at  about  1J  miles,  on  the  north 
close  against  the  town,  on  the  west  at  over  2  miles,  and  on 
the  south  at  about  a  mile.  The  entire  line  measured  about 
13  miles,  for  the  occupation  of  which  White  had  originally 
about  12,000  troops,  but  this  strength  rapidly  diminished  to 
9,000. 

Outside  of  White's  lines  there  was  no  high  ground  nearer 
than  about  6,000  yards  from  the  center  of  Ladysmith,  which 
was  a  great  advantage  for  the  British.  The  Boer  lines  occu- 
pied the  nearest  chain  of  hills  outside  of  the  British  lines, 
and  this  was  about  3  miles  on  the  north  of  Ladysmith,  and 
5  miles  on  the  west  and  south. 

The  14  works  composing  the  British  line  were  occupied 
as  follows: 
Helpmakaar •. . .  1st  battalion  Devonshire  Regiment. 

Cemetery  Hill ) 

rp         ,  TT.,,  f  1st  battalion  Liverpool  Regiment. 

Junction  Hill 1st  battalion  Gloucestershire  Reg't. 

Gordon  Hill .  .      ,   ) 

_.   .  _.„          V  1st  battalion  Leicestershire  Reg't. 

Leicester  Hill .  . . .  f 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  83 

Naval  Brigade  (Powerful). 


5t 2d  battalion  Rifle  Brigade. 

King's  Post King's  Royal  Rifles. 

Range  Post 2d  battalion  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers. 

Red  Hill 1st  battalion  Royal  Irish  Fusiliers. 

Highlandman's  Post.  )  - 

Maiden  Castle i  2d  battalion  Gordon  Highlanders. 

Caesar's  Camp )  1st  battalion  Manchester  Regiment 

Waggon  Hill »  2  squadrons  Imperial  Light  Horse 

The  guns  were  distributed  as  follows : 
Cove  Redoubt  (opposite  Pepworth  and  Isimbulwana 

Hills) One  4.7-in.  navy  gun. 

Junction  Hill One  4.7-in.  navy  gun. 

Gordon  Hill Three  navy  13-pounders. 

Lady  smith c>  field  batteries  (30  guns). 

Several  3-pdr.  Hotchldss  guns. 
Two  mountain  guns. 
One  machine  gun  for  each  infan- 
try battalion  and  cavalry  reg't. 

The  Boer  lines  were  24  miles  in  extent,  and  were  occu- 
pied by  a  force  varying  continually  between  10,000  and 
20,000  and  by  22  guns: 

Pepworth  Hill "Long  Tom"  (15.5  cm.  or  6  in.). 

(4  m.  north  of  the  town)  Two  12-pdr.  field  guns. 

Two  37  mm.  R.  F.  guns. 

"Long  Tom,"  rendered  unserviceable  by  the  British,  was 
replaced  by  another  piece  of  the  same  kind. 

Isimbulwana  Hill "Slim  Piet"  (6-in.  Creusot). 

Valley  bet.  Pepworth  Hill    )  2  British  guns  captured  at  Nich- 

and  Surprise  Hill f      olsons  Nek. 

Surprise  Hill One  4.7-in.  howitzer. 

-.(Destroyed  by  the  British.) 

Lombards  Kop One  4.7-in.  howitzer. 

Between  Lombards  Kop     )  Three  field  guns, 
and  Isimbulwana  Hill. .  »    Two  75  mm.  mountain  guns. 


84  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

(  One  4.7-in.  howitzer. 
Beyond  Caesar's  Camp . . .  •] 

I  One  field  gun. 

Other  guns  were  behind  the  kopjes  west  of  the  town, 
and  were  moved  about  from  point  to  point  as  required. 

In  reserve One  37  mm.  R.  F.  "Pom-Poni." 

Several  Maxim  guns. 

The  British  had,  therefore,  but  five  guns  which  could 
reach  the  Boer  guns  of  position,  and  these  were  the  navy 
guns.  Without  them  they  would  have  been  helpless. 

Communication  from  Chieveley  Camp  with  Ladysmith 
was  kept  up  by  means  of  a  heliograph  station  on  Mount  Um- 
kolumba,  near  Weenen,  under  Captain  Kayser.  The  latter 
wTas  in  almost  daily  communication,  and  by  the  middle  of 
January  had  sent  over  41,000  words.  There  were  also  sev- 
eral balloons  in  Ladysmith,  which  did  excellent  service. 

On  January  6th  the  Boers  made  a  strong  attack  on  the 
British  lines,  especially  on  the  outlying  heights  of  Waggon 
Hill  and  Besters  Hill.  Some  of  the  positions  were  taken 
and  retaken  three  times  during  the  day,  but  the  Boers  were 
repulsed.  The  British  lost  in  this  action  14  officers  killed, 
25  wounded;  135  men  killed,  244  wounded. 

The  Boers  lost  (according  to  their  own  reports)  54  killed 
(including  5  field  cornets)  and  96  wounded;  total  150. 

It  is  remarkable  that  Buller  did  not  attack  the  enemy 
with  more  energy  at  the  same  time  that  the  latter  attacked 
White,  for  Buller  and  White  still  communicated  by  helio- 
graph, but  he  contented  himself  with  a  demonstration 
towards  the  Hlangwane  Hill  (east  of  Colenso),.  consisting 
merely  in  an  artillery  bombardment  of  the  Boer  position, 
to  which  the  Boers  did  not  even  reply.  His  only  chance  of 
helping  White  effectively  was  by  way  of  Springfield,  for 
White's  attack  was  towards  the  south,  and  he  would  nat- 
urally avoid  the  enemy's  strong  position  at  Colenso,  in  case 
he  broke  through  the  lines  in  his  front,  and  strike  westward. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


85 


This  is  the  military  situation  at  the  beginning  of  the 
third  act  of  the  war. 

Two  grand  movements  open  the  third  act.  In  Natal, 
General  Buller  decided  on  turning  the  right  flank  of  the 
enemy's  position  by  an  advance  over  Springfield,  Potgieters 
Drift  and  Trichards  Drift  on  Acton  Homes  and  Dewdrop; 
and  in  the  west  General  Koberts  developed  his  plan  to  turn 
the  Boer  position  in  his  front. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  NATAL. 

The  Second  Attempt  to  Believe  Lady  smith. 
Battles  on  the  Upper  Tugela. 

The  Boers  occupied  the  plateau  and  rugged  ridges  con- 
stituting the  foot-hills  of  the  Drakenberg  Mountains,  from 
Acton  Homes,  over  the  Tabayama  Hills  and  Spion  Kop  to 
Grobelaars  Kloof,  and  after  the  battle  of  Colenso  had  re- 
mained behind  the  Tugela,  merely  sending  out  patrols 
fcom  the  fortified  Hlangwaneberg,  and  in  the  west  over 
Springfield. 

For  some  time  after  the  battle  of  Colenso,  General  Bul- 
ler had  devoted  his  time  to  drawing  in  his  reinforcements, 


TRACTION  ENGINE  AND  TRAIN.-T/ie  Engineer. 


6  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

concentrating  at  his  headquarters  in  Frere  all  available 
forces,  a  large  supply  train,  and  a  number  of  traction 
engines  for  the  transportation  of  his  artillery.  The  coun- 
try as  far  as  Springfield  was  carefully  reconnoitered.  A 
narrow-gauge  road  was  also  laid  from  Frere  to  Springfield. 
The  enemy  was  deceived  by  feints  indicating  a  projected 
advance  around  his  left  flank  over  Weenen. 

General  Buller's  entire  force  comprised  about  25,000 
men. 

Leaving  only  Barton's  brigade  (and  several  navy  guns) 
at  Frere  to  hold  the  enemy  in  front,  and  cover  his  lines  of 
communication,  he  directed  the  rest  of  his  command  (about 
20,000  men)  westward  towards  the  upper  Tugela.  The  ad- 
vance guard  cavalry  brigade  of  Dundonald  and  Warren's 
division  left  Estcourt  on  January  10th,  and  the  brigades  of 
Lyttleton  and  Hart  (under  General  Clery)  left  Frere  on  the 
llth,  Hildyard's  brigade  following  on  the  12th.  On  account 
of  the  long  train  of  400  wagons  and  5,000  draught  and  pack 
animals,  and  the  precautions  taken  to  insure  safety,  as 
well  as  the  bad  condition  of  the  roads  from  heavy  rains,. 
Buller  did  not  reach  Springfield  till  the  13th,  where  a  day's 
halt  was  ordered.  Clery's  Division  was  then  sent  on  the 
road  to  Potgieters  Drift,  Dundonald  and  Warren  on  the 
western  road  to  Trichards  Drift,  Buller's  headquarters  being 
located  at  Spearman's  camp,  a  farm  on  the  southern  slope 
of  the  Zwarts  Kop.  His  general  plan  was  to  hold  the  enemy 
in  front  at  Colenso  by  means  of  Barton's  brigade,  to  attack 
his  right  flank  by  Clery's  Division  in  a  northerly  direction 
over  the  road  between  the  Arnot  Kop  and  the  Brakfontein 
Kopjes  or  over  the  plateau  to  the  east  of  Arnot  Kop,  pros- 
ing forward  towards  Ladysmith,  but  first  to  turn  the  Boer 
right  flank  by  means  of  Dundonald's  and  Warren's  columns, 
roll  it  up,  secure  the  roads  to  Oliviers  Hoek  and  the  Be- 
zuidenhout  Pass,  and  join  Clery's  division  over  Dewdrop. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


87 


General  Buller's  operations,  in  spite  of  all  the  difficul- 
ties in  the  way,  were  so  well  concealed  that  the  enemy  was 
not  aware  of  his  real  plan  until  he  had  crossed  the  Little 
Tugela  and  occupied  the  Zwarts  Kop,  although  the  move- 


88 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


ment  of  his  columns  had  been  noticed  and  in  a  general  way 
preparations  to  receive  his  attack  were  made. 

At  Springfield  provisional  magazines  were  established 
for  supplying  the  troops,  and  the  enemy's  position  was  care- 
fully reconnoitered  by  means  of  anchored  balloons. 


TRACTION  ENGINE  WITH  DYNAMO  AND  SEARCH-LIGHT. 

The  ford  at  Potgieters  Drift  was  secured  on  the.  llth, 
and  on  the  16th  half  of  Lyttleton's  brigade  and  a  howitzer 
battery  crossed  the  Tugela  there.  Six  howitzers  were 
promptly  placed  on  One  Tree  Hill  and  the  latter  occupied, 
while  the  heavy  guns  were  taken  up  Z warts  Kop  on  the 
south  bank  to  cover  the  position  on  the  north.  Coke,  with 
part  of  his  brigade,  was  placed  below  Zwarts  Kop  to  ob- 
serve Schiets  Drift,  the  remainder  of  his  brigade  guarded 
the  train  and  lines  of  communication.  The  advanced  posi- 
tion of  the  Boers  on  the  spurs  of  Brakfontein  Kopjes,  imme- 
diately in  front  of  Lyttleton,  separated  him  completely  from 
General  Warren,  who,  after  constructing  a  ponton  bridge 
at  Trichards  Drift,  crossed  there  on  the  18th.  Warren  had 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  89 

also  part  of  the  2d  and  3d  divisions.  Dundonald  moved  rap- 
idly to  the  left  and  cleared  the  western  side  of  Acton  Homes, 
but  Warren  decided  that  the  position  of  the  Boers  was  too 
strong  to  turn,  so  he  ordered  Dundonald  to  fall  back  to 
Trichards  Drift  on  the  19th,  and  directed  his  attention  to 
the  Spion  Kop,  which  appeared  to  be  the  key  to  the  position. 

Action  at  Venter  Spruit. 

General  Warren,  on  January  19th,  had  decided  to  mod- 
ify his  orders.  Meanwhile,  the  Boers  were  making  prepara- 
tions to  meet  his  attack.  General  Botha  at  Colenso  received 
orders  on  the  19th  to  repair  to  the  Upper  Tugela  and  assume 
command.  He  rode  all  night  and  at  3  a.  m.  on  the  20th 
arrived  in  the  camp  of  General  Schalk  Burgher.  The  posi- 
tion was  inspected  and  the  disposition  of  the  troops  made. 

On  January  20th,  General  Warren  placed  two  brigades 
{Woodgate's  and  Hart's)  and  6  field  batteries  under  General 
Clery  to  attack  the  Boer  position.  The  latter  was  in  the 
form  of  a  semicircle  around  an  amphitheatre  containing 
Three  Tree  Hill.  The  Boers  had  not  had  time  to  construct 
trenches,  but  they  built  up  with  stones  rude  ramparts  on 
their  ^pies  of  defense. 

The  British  advanced  in  two  columns.  One  (compris- 
ing the  1st  battalion  South  Lancashire  Regiment  and  the  2d 
battalion  Lancaster  Regiment  of  Warren's  brigade)  deployed 
and  moved  out  against  two  kopjes — Three  Tree  Hill  and 
another  to  the  east  of  it.  The  other  (comprising  the  rest  of 
Woodgate's  brigade  and  all  of  Hart's)  advanced  to  the  west 
of  Three  Tree  Hill  and  remained  massed  under  cover.  Hild- 
yard's  brigade  remained  in  reserve. 

The  ascent  of  the  kopjes  wras  very  difficult,  and  it  was 
not  until  7  a.  m.  that  the  artillery  came  into  action  on  Three 
Tree  Hill,  at  about  2,500  yards  from  the  Boer  defenses.  At 
7:30  a.  m.  the  hill  to  the  east  was  occupied  by  the  British, 


90  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

when  the  Boers  opened  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry.     At  11 
a.  m.  the  west  column  received  orders  to  advance. 

The  Boer  position  was  naturally  very  strong.  The 
ground  was  broken  and  covered  wkn  rocks  for  the  first  part 
of  the  British  advance,  but  for  1,000  yards  from  the  Boer 
lines  there  was  an  open,  gentle  slope  down  toward  the  Brit- 
ish position.  The  artillery  of  the  latter  also  had  very  little 
effect  against  the  Boer  defenses. 

At  3  p.  m.  the  British  artillery  opened  a  rapid  fire,  and 
then  the  entire  line  started  to  advance  over  this  open 
ground.  The  attacking  troops,  however,  could  make  no 
headway,  and  gradually  turned  into  the  valleys  instead  of 
going  up  the  slopes,  and  so  the  order  to  halt  was  given.  At 
7:30  p.  m.  fresh  battalions  from  Hildyard's  brigade  were  sent 
in  to  relieve  the  Lancashires. 

The  artillery  of  the  Boers  replied  only  at  intervals  to 
that  of  the  British,  constantly  changing  its  position,  and 
rarely  firing  more  than  three  shots  from  any  one. 

Meanwhile,  Dundonald's  mounted  brigade  was  active 
on  the  left  of  Hart's  brigade,  and  took  a  hill  about  1,700 
yards  to  the  west  of  the  latter,  holding  it  all  night. 

The  troops  bivouacked  in  their  positions  at  nigh^  On 
the  extreme  right  Lyttleton  made  a  demonstration  in  force 
against  the  Boer  position  opposite  Potgieters  Drift,  but 
found  the  latter  still  strongly  occupied.  On  the  morning 
of  the  21st  it  was  found  that  the  Boers  on  the  right  of  their 
line  had  retired  to  a  second  line  of  crests  defended  like  the 
first.  The  British  occupied  the  line  abandoned  by  the 
Boers. 

The  British  artillery  had  great  difficulty  in  coming  into 
action  on  this  day,  because  the  position  on  Three  Tree  Hill 
was  now  out  of  range  of  the  Boers,  and  there  was  no  nearer 
position  (except  on  the  plain)  available.  Two  field  batteries 
were  sent  by  Warren  to  strengthen  the  left,  and  four  how- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


91 


itzers  were  sent  by  Duller  to  reinforce  Warren.  Nothing 
was  accomplished  on  the  21st.  The  two  field  batteries  and 
the  howitzers  were  placed  on  the  plain  between  the  Venter 
Spruit  and  the  road  to  Acton  Homes,  and  bombarded  the 
Boer  lines  during  the  22d  and  23d,  but  produced  no  effect. 

The  troops  in  Ladysmith  made  sorties  on  the  20th  and 
22d,  but  without  result;  and  Barton,  at  Chieveley,  made  a 
weak  demonstration  on  Hlangwane  Hill. 

Action  on  the  Spion  Kop. 

On  the  23d,  since  the  Boer  lines  appeared  to  be  very 
thin,  an  attack  on  Spion  Kop  was  decided  upon  in  order  to 
break  through  them. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPION  KOP. 

General  Woodgate  was  designated  to  command  the 
forces,  comprising  the  advance  under  Colonel  Thornycroft 
(6  companies  mounted  infantry,  194  men  and  1  company 
of  engineers)  and  a  reserve  of  two  companies  of  the  South 
Lancashire  and  the  Imperial  Light  Infantry. 


<}2  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

The  height  was  scaled  in  the  night  of  the  23d  and  24th, 
and  at  3  a.  m.  the  troops  arrived  at  the  summit,  where  they 
surprised  and  drove  off  a  small  Boer  outpost.  They  at  once 
intrenched,  but  a  heavy  fog  prevented  them  from  appreciat- 
ing their  real  position.  At  8  a.  m.  the  fog  raised,  and  they 
found  themselves  enfiladed  by  IJie  Boers. 

The  outpost  of  Boers,  driven  off  by  the  British,  had 
given  warning,  and  in  the  fog  the  Boers  managed  to  bring 
five  guns  to  bear  on  the  British  position,  as  well  as  two 
Maxini-Nordenfelts,  and  had  sent  up  two  strong  columns  to 
retake  the  position,  so  that  when  the  fog  raised  at  8  a.  m. 
they  opened  with  artillery  and  musketry, on  the  British 
trenches,  and  by  10  a.  m.  the  British  were  driven  to  the 
southern  extremity  of  the  plateau.  General  Woodgate  fell 
mortally  wounded,  and  was  succeeded  by  General  Coke, 
who  arrived  in  the  afternoon  with  reinforcements,  but  later 
Colonel  Thornycroft  was  assigned  to  the  chief  command. 
The  two  battalions  of  Coke's  brigade  were  sent  as  reinforce- 
ments and  arrived  about  noon. 

The  extreme  right,  under  Lyttleton,  continued  its  ef- 
forts against  Brakfontein,  and  also  sent  reinforcements  to 
Thornycroft:  the  Scottish  Rifles  and  the  60th  Rifles  back 
over  Potgieters  Drift,  and  up  stream  to  a  ford,  where  they 
again  crossed  to  the  north  side,  then  the  former  went  up 
Spion  Kop  by  the  same  path  as  the  original  troops,  while 
the  latter  followed  along  the  foot  of  the  Spion  Kop,  then 
up  to  the  north  salient  of  the  east  side. 

The  arrival  of  these  reinforcements  during  the  after- 
noon (4:30)  enabled  the  British  to  hold  out  till  evening. 
Preparations  were  being  made  to  send  up  the  4th  mountain 
battery  and  two  naval  12-pounders,  and  part  of  Hildyard's 
brigade  was  assembled  at  the  foot  of  Three  Tree  Hill,  with 
orders  to  attack  Tabamyama  in  the  morning,  but  Colonel 
Thornycroft  was  not  informed  of  these  measures. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  93 

The  troops  on  the  plateau  on  the  Spion  Kop  had  suf- 
fered severely,  and  therefore  Colonel  Thornycroft  decided  to 
abandon  the  position  in  the  night,  commencing  his  retreat 
at  8:30  p.  m. 

On  the  25th  Buller  arrived  in  person  at  Trichards  Drift, 
and  gave  orders  to  retire  over  the  Tugela. 

On  the  27th,  General  Warren's  troops  were  taken  to  the 
south  bank  of  the  Tugela.  The  passage  was  accomplished 
without  accident  or  loss,  and  the  command  deserves  high 
praise  for  this  feat,  for,  besides  the  troops  and  the  guns  (6 
field  batteries,  4  howitzers  and  the  machine  guns),  there 
were  489  wagons — namely,  232  ox-wagons,  98  ten-mule 
teams,  107  six-mule  teams,  52  four-mule  teams. 

Lyttleton's  brigade  was  also  partly  drawn  to  the  south 
bank,  but  the  Zwarts  Kop  was  held,  as  well  as  One  Tree 
Hill. 

Buller's  plan  was  evidently  to  begin  the  turning  move- 
ment at  Acton  Homes,  but  Warren,  not  being  able  to  make 
any  progress  on  the  extreme  flank  of  the  Boer  position,  and 
recognizing  the  importance  of  Spion  Kop,  decided  to  fall 
back  and  take  that  first,  with  a  view  to  then  advancing  on 
the  Fair  ViewT — Rosalie  road  (branching  to  the  right  from 
the  Trichards  Drift — Acton  Homes  road).  In  other  words, 
he  converted  Buller's  plan  for  a  turning  movement  into 
what  practically  became  again  a  purely  frontal  attack.  He 
reported  his  decision  at  once  to  his  superior,  but  the  latter 
was  too  far  away  to  control  his  actions  in  time.  In  a  sim- 
ilar way,  after  Spion  Kop  was  taken,  it  was  abandoned, 
without  consulting  General  Warren,  by  the  immediate  com- 
mander, Thornycroft  (Woodgate  having  been  wounded).  In 
both  cases  orders  were  given  by  subordinates  entirely  up- 
setting the  main  plans  of  their  superiors. 

The  forces  at  this  time  were  distributed  somewhat  as 
follows: 


94  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

The  Boers  had  in  all  abowt  30,000  men— 12,000  at  Lady- 
smith,  3,000  at  Colenso,  and  about  15,000  on  the  heights  of 
the  Tabamyama  and  Brakfontein. 

The  British  had  for  the  turning  movement  about  12,000 
in  all— Lyttleton  3,000,  Hart  2,000,  Hildyard  3,000,  Wood- 
gate  4,000  and  Dundorald  800. 

The  losses  of  the  British  in  this  turning  movement  were 
216  killed,  671  wounded  and  315  missing;  that  of  the  Boers 
is  reported  at  1,200.  Buller's  total  losses  between  the  17th 
and  24th  amounted  to  87  officers  and  1,652  men. 

THE  THIRD  ATTEMPT  TO  BELIEVE  LADYSMITH. 

Battle  of  the  Vaal  Kranz. 

On  January  30th  Dundonald's  cavalry,  in  order  to  draw 
the  attention  of  the  Boers  to  their  western  flank,  made  a 
demonstration  towards  Hongers  Port  (11  miles  above  Wag- 
gon Drift),  still  further  destroying  the  bridge  there. 

On  February  3d  the  British  artillery  on  Z warts  Kop  and 
Alice  Hill  opened  a  heavy  fire  on  the  Boer  position  north 
of  the  Tugela.  Buller's  object  was  to  prepare  for  his  ad- 
vance over  Potgieters  Drift  and  Mole  Drift,  just  below,  his 
most  direct  route  towards  Ladysmith. 

Opposite  Potgieters  Drift  the  first  line  of  hills  is  that 
of  One  Tree  Hill,  and  beyond  that  rises  another  ridge  (a  spur 
of  the  Brakfontein  Kopjes)  called  the  Vaal  Kranz.  To  the 
east  of  these  hills,  near  the  bend  of  the  Tugela,  rises  the  Mole 
Spruit  Kop  and  further  north  the  Dornkloof  Berg,  the  lat- 
ter permitting  of  a  flank  fire  on  the  Vaal  Kranz,  and  being 
itself  flanked  by  the  western  spurs  of  the  Onderbrook  Pla- 
teau (especially  the  Kranz  Kloof). 

The  only  position  north  of  the  Tugela  held  by  the  Brit- 
ish after  the  retreat  of  Warren  over  Trichards  Drift  was 
the  One  Tree  Hill  ridge,  about  1J  miles  northeast  of  Pot- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


95 


gieters  Drift,  which  Lyttleton's  brigade  had  occupied.  The 
rest  of  General  Buller's  army  was  encamped  between  Spear- 
man's Farm  and  Springfield. 

On  February  4th  the  British  troops  broke  camp,  Clery's 
Division  marching  towards  the  valley  behind  the  Zwarts 
Kop,  while  Warren's  moved  towards  Potgieters  Drift. 
Wynne's  brigade  (llth)  and  6  field  batteries  crossed  the 
Drift  on  the  evening  of  the  4th  and  relieved  Lyttleton's 
brigade. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  VAAL  KRANZ.— Rev.  du  Cercle. 

The  plan  of  attack  wras  as  follows: 

Wynne's*  brigade,  with  the  field  batteries,  was  to  move 
over  One  Tree  Hill  and  demonstrate  against  the  Brakfontein 
Heights,  while  the  main  attack  was  to  proceed  over  a  sec- 
ond ponton  bridge  (to  be  constructed  farther  east),  directed 
against  the  southern  spur  of  the  Vaal  Kranz.  The  batteries 
with  Wynne  wTere  to  retire  in  echelon,  and  then  support  the 
main  attack.  In  support  of  the  general  movement  a  battery 

*Wynne  succeeded  Woodgate,  the  latter  having  been  wounded. 


96  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

of  six  4.7-inch  guns  had  been  established  on  Mount  Alice, 
and  six  navy  12-pounders  and  two  field  15-pounders  on  the 
Z warts  Kop. 

The  1st  brigade  of  cavalry  (13th  and  14th  Hussars  and 
a  horse  battery  under  Burn  Murdock)  was  to  attack  the 
Brakfontein  Plateau  on  the  right  of  Clery's  division,  while 
the  2d  brigade  (volunteers  with  a  battery  of  machine  guns 
under  Dundonald)  was  to  protect  the  right  flank  against  a 
Boer  advance  from  the  Doom  Kloof;  Cokels  brigade  was 
held  in  reserve.  Buller  had  been  reinforced  by  eight  6-inch 
howitzers  from  the  siege  train,  and  three  batteries  of  naval 
guns. 

On  the  morning  of  February  5th,  about  7  o'clock,  the 
British  field  batteries  (five)  moved  out  and  took  position,  in 
front  of  One  Tree  Hill  Ridge,  and  opened  fire,  together  with 


06. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  VAAL  KRANZ.  -Wochenblatt. 

Legend. 

Boer  trenches. 

L.  T.          Long  Tom,  arrived  from  Ladysmith  on  night  of  February  6. 

M.  K.         Maxim  and  Krupp  guns,  brought  from  Spion  Kop. 

K.  Krupp  gun. 

F.  Schneider  gun. 

J.,  St.,  V.  V.,  Z.,  A.,  D.,  Kr.,    Boer  Laagers. 

E  1.-  British  battery,  entrenched. 

E  2.  British  howitzer  battery. 

E  3.  British  field  batteries  (4). 

E  4.  British  infantry  advancing. 

E  5.  British  infantry  on  evening  of  February  5. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  97 

a  howitzer  battery  farther  in  rear,  and  the  six  4.7-inch  guns 
on  Alice  Hill. 

Wynne's  brigade  advanced  slowly  in  open  order.  At 
1,600  yards  from  the  enemy's  position  the  advanced  line 
halted. 

Meanwhile  Lyttleton's  brigade  moved  along  the  foot  of 
the  Zwarts  Kop,  and  the  engineers  laid  the  second  ponton 
bridge. 

At  10  a.  m.  the  first  British  battery  limbered  up  and 
proceeded  along  the  Tugela  to  the  first  ponton  bridge  and 
crossed  over;  the  other  batteries  followed  at  intervals  of 
half  an  hour.  As  soon  as  the  artillery  began  this  movement, 
the  Boer  artillery  opened  at  about  5,000  yards.  At  1  p.  m. 
Wynne's  brigade  received  orders  to  retire. 

The  second  ponton  bridge  was  completed  at  12  m., 
practically  without  any  losses.  The  batteries  took  position 
northeast  of  the  Zwarts  Kop,  and,  after  felling  trees  to 
mask  their  position,  opened  fire  and  continued  the  bombard- 
ment for  two  hours,  when  the  principal  attack  began. 

Lyttleton's  brigade  crossed  first  and  advanced  against 
the  Vaal  Kranz.  Monger's  Farm  on  the  British  right  flank 
was  taken.  MeanwThile,  the  artillery  (70  guns)  concentrated 
on  the  left  flank,  opened  at  2,400  yards  on  the  Vaal  Kranz 
Ridge.  The  Boers  were  taken  completely  by  surprise  and 
the  ridge  was  captured  by  the  Durham  battalion.  But  the 
Boers  promptly  took  measures  to  meet  the  British  advance, 
and  guns  were  rapidly  placed  on  the  Brakfontein  spurs. 
The  Boer  infantry,  rapidly  concentrating  at  the  northern 
end  of  the  Vaal  Kranz,  drove  the  British  from  the  east  side 
of  this  ridge.  By  evening  of  February  5th,  Lyttleton  occu- 
pied about  1,000  yards  of  the  west  side  of  the  Vaal  Kranz. 
The  tactical  value  of  the  Vaal  Kranz  had  been  greatly  over- 
rated, and  it  was  now  seen  that,  from  their  position  on  it,  it 
was  impossible  to  take  the  Boers  in  flank. 

-7- 


96  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

At  sunset  Hildyard's  brigade  relieved  Lyttleton's.  An 
attempt  was  made  to  capture  the  British  position,  but  it  was 
repulsed.  During  the  night  the  Boers  placed  a  6-inch  Greusot 
gun  on  the  Doom  Kloof,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  6th 
opened  on  the  British  with  musketry. and  shell  fire.  The 
position  of  the  Boers  was  exceedingly  strong,  as  the  British 
advance  would  have  been  practically  through  a  defile  be- 
tween the  Spion  Kop  on  the  west  and  the  Doom  Kloof  on 
the  east,  both  almost  impregnable.  Buller,  instead  of  out- 
flanking the  Boer  position,  found  himself  outflanked,  and 
since  it  became  known  through  balloon  reconnoissance  that 
the  Boers  had  placed  a  6-inch  gun  in  position  on  the  Doom 
Kloof,  and  it  was  recognized  that  the  latter  must  be  taken 
by  a  frontal  attack  to  clear  the  road  to  Ladysmith,  Buller 
gave  orders  at  9  p.  m.  on  February  Tth  for  the  retreat  over 
the  Tugela  to  Spearman's  camp.  Two  days  later  the  main 
part  of  the  army  was  back  in  Chieveley. 

The  British  lost  2  officers  killed,  16  wounded;  24  men 
killed,  280  wounded  and  5  missing. 

in  consequence  of  Buller's  defeat  the  Boers  began  a 
number  of  demonstrations  indicating  a  projected  strategic 
advance  against  the  British  lines  of  communication.  Jou- 
bert  pushed  out  a  considerable  force  over  the  Tugela  to- 
wards Chieveley,  occupying  Bloy's  Farm  and  the  Doom 
Kop;  other  troops  crossed  at  Bridle  Ford  (4J  miles  west  of 
Colenso)  and  at  Kobinson's  Ford  (6  miles  west  of  Colenso), 
threatening  Buller's  line  of  communication.  Cavalry  skir- 
mishes took  place  beyond  the  east  and  west  flanks  of  the 
British  at  Chieveley  and  Springfield. 

In  Zululand  a  Boer  column  of  about  2,000  men  pushed 
on  from  Vryheid  through  Nqutuland  and  Ingogo,  capturing 
the  police  station  at  Nqutu,  and  early  in  February  took  the 
Inkandhla  magistracy,  and  threatened  a  move  on  Eshowe, 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  99 

the  capital,  30  miles  distant.     Colonial  scouts  from  north 
Zululand,  however,  occupied  Eshowe. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  SOUTH  AND  WEST. 

Preliminary  Movements. 

During  the  period  from  the  6th  of  January  to  the  12th 
of  February  few  movements  of  any  importance  took  place  in 
the  southern  and  western  theatres,  but  reconnoitering  was 
carried  on  continually,  and  led  to  many  minor  engagements. 

Colonel  Pilcher  stationed  at  Belmont,  to  secure  the  rail- 
road there,  was  ordered  to  Sunnyside  on  January  1st  to 
prevent  the  reported  assembly  of  hostile  troops  in  that 
vicinity.  He  surprised  200  Boers,  taking  40  prisoners. 
The  rest  retired  on  Douglas,  followed  by  Pilcher,  but  on  the 
approach  of  Boer  reinforcements  down  the  Riet  River,  the 
latter  returned  to  Belmont. 

General  Babington,  with  the  12th  Lancers,  sent  to  sup- 
port Pilcher  on  the  2d,  also  returned  to  the  camp  on  the 
Modder  River  on  the  4th. 

Lord  Roberts  arrived  at  Cape  Town  on  January  10th, 
but  awaited  there  the  arrival  of  the  6th  and  7th  divisions. 

General  French,  near  Colesberg,  displayed  the  greatest 
activity.  His  efforts  were  directed  to  taking  Colesberg  and 
securing  the  crossings  of  the  Orange  River  at  Bothos  .Drift 
and  Norvals  Pont,  but  he  only  succeeded  in  establishing 
himself  on  the  heights  south  of  Colesberg. 

The  British  position  at  Colesberg  was  in  the  form  of 
a  wide  semicircle,  south  of  the  town,  with  the  Coles  Kop 
(900  feet  high)  in  the  center,  occupied  by  two  15-pounder 
guns.  About  1,000  yards  southwest  of  the  Coles  Kop  the 
British  held  a  small  kopje,  occupied  by  the  Berkshire  regi- 
ment, and  2  miles  southwest  of  Coles  Kop  they  had  Porters 
Hill,  occupied  by  two  guns  supported  by  a  company  of 


100  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

mounted  infantry,  while  2  miles  farther  south  was  the  Kens- 
burg  camp;  and  about  3  miles  northwest  of  Coles  Kop  two 
squadrons  of  Lancers  were  posted.  The  Boers  at  Colesberg 
were  commanded  by  De  Wet.  French's  activity  resulted  in 
causing  1,000  men  to  be  drawn  from  the  forces  besieging 
Ladysmith  and  600  from  Magersfontein  under  Delavey,  to 
strengthen  De  Wet. 

On  the  12th  of  February  the  Boers  made  an  energetic 
attack  and  drove  the  British  back  to  Rensburg.  On  the  13th 
the  Boers  continued  the  attack  and  forced  the  British  (under 
Clements)  to  Arundel.  French  was  ordered  to  the  Modder 
River  to  command  the  newly  formed  cavalry  division. 

On  the  26th  of  January  the  6th  division  (Kelly-Kenny) 
arrived,  and  was  sent  over  Port  Elizabeth  to  Steynsburg  and 
occupied  Thebus,  on  the  Rosmead  (Middelburg) — Storm- 
berg  line  (about  40  miles  west  of  Stormberg).  The  7th 
division  (Tucker)  arrived  at  Cape  Town  early  in  February, 
and  was  sent  towards  the  Modder  River. 

On  January  30th,  Prieska,  on  the  Orange  River,  100 
miles  west  of  Orange  River  Station,  was  occupied  by  a  Brit- 
ish force. 

Colonel  Plunier  was  encamped,  early  in  February,  at 
Krokodil  Pool  (about  65  miles  north  of  Mafeking),  with  a 
strong  Boer  commando  in  his  front,  which  held  the  kopjei* 
commanding  the  road  and  river. 

The  Boers  had  abandoned  their  positions  at  Graspan 
and  Belmont,  in  rear  of  Methuen's  army,  but  on  February 
4th  General  Macdonald  was  sent  with  the  Highland  Brigade, 
the  9th  Lancers  and  a  field  battery  to  Koodoos  Drift,  in 
order  to  prevent  at  that  point  the  union  of  two  Boer  com- 
mandoes, which  were  advancing  with  a  view  to  reoccupying 
Belmont.  Macdonald  would  probably  have  succeeded  in  his 
attempt,  but  was  recalled  by  Lord  Roberts.  He  lost  3  offi- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  101 

cers  and  5  men  killed,  4  officers  and  35  men  wounded.    On 
the  9th  he  was  ordered  back  to  the  camp  on  Modder  River. 

LORD  ROBERTS'  CAMPAIGN. 

The  problem  which  Lord  Roberts  had  to  solve  was  by 
no  means  a  simple  one,  but,  for  several  reasons,  he  adopted 
the  plan  to  take  the  Oth  and  the  7th  division,  as  well  as 
French's,  and  move  to  the  east  over  Klip  Drift,  around 
Jacobsdal,  on  Bloemfontein,  with  a  view  to  the  speedy  relief 
of  Kimberley. 

In  the  first  place,  Kimberly  had  nearly  reached  the 
limit  of  its  powers  of  resistance,  and  although  its  garrison 
held  6,000  Boers  to  the  spot,  and  not  available  for  the  active 
field  army,  still  its  loss  would  add  this  force  to  the  Boer 
Army  and  deprive  the  British  Army  of  the  garrison  of  2,600 
men  and  78  guns,  not  to  mention  the  necessity  for  saving 
the  valuable  diamond-fields.  In  the  next  place,  after  the 
failure  of  Buller's  third  effort  to  relieve  Ladysmith,  it 
seemed  useless  to  reinforce  him  and  attempt  any  further 
movements  in  that  difficult  country,  whereas  an  advance 
as  projected  in  the  western  part  of  the  Orange  Free  State 
would  be  over  ground  which  would  be  in  every  way  advan- 
tageous to  the  British.  Moreover,  such  an  advance  would 
probably  soon  draw  Boer  troops  from  in  front  of  Ladysmith, 
and  at  least  improve  the  chances  of  Buller's  breaking 
through  their  lines. 

The  difficulties  of  the  situation  are  traceable  to  the  orig- 
inal splitting  up  of  the  forces,  in  consequence  of  which  the 
British  are  now  in  four  columns  separated  respectively  by 
240,  64  and  144  miles,  or  448  miles  between  the  extreme  col- 
umns, and  they  are  tied  to  these  lines  on  account  of  the 
extreme  difficulty  of  withdrawing  the  immense  trains  (2,000 
transport  animals  and  several  hundred  wagons  per  division) 


102  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

as  well  as  the  magazines  of  supplies  and  materials  estab- 
lished on  these  lines.  In  addition,  if  an  attempt  were  made 
to  withdraw  on  any  one  of  these  lines,  the  Boers  would 
promptly  advance,  and  so  threaten  the  communications  on 
the  others. 

Moreover,  Lord  Eoberts  could  not  await  the  arrival  of 
the  8th  division  (expected  about  the  end  of  March),  in  order 
to  build  up  an  army  of  50,000,  and  then  advance  into  the 
Orange  Free  State  according  to  the  original  plan,  but  was 
compelled  to  act  promptly  for  the  relief  of  the  besieged 
places  and  of  the  general  situation,  with  what  forces  were 
available  for  an  advance — viz.,  the  6th  and  7th  divisions  and 
Brabant's  colonial  troops,  either  against  Cronje's  army  on 
the  Modder,  or  against  the  Boer  forces  at  Colesberg  (Arun- 
del)  or  Sterkstroom,  leaving  Buller  in  Natal  to  hold  as  many 
Boer  troops  as  possible  in  front  of  him  and  away  from  the 
decisive  theatre  in  the  west. 

On  the  10th  of  February  Lord  Koberts  arrived  on  the 
Modder  River,  and  immediately  proceeded  to  organize  his 
army,  gathering  in  all  available  cavalry  and  placing  it 
under  French,  and  filling  up  with  volunteers  and  local 
troops,  to  form  of  the  6th  and  7th  divisions,  recently  arrived, 
together  with  the  1st  division  (Lord  Methuen's)  and  the  9th 
brigade,  an  army  of  about  50,000 "men,  for  an  offensive  ad- 
vance for  the  relief  of  Kimberley  against  Cronje's  army  and 
Bloemfontein. 

General  Roberts  formed  his  army  into  four  divisions: 
1st,  Lord  Methuen's;  6th,  Kelly-Kenny's;  7th,  Tucker's;  9th, 
Sir  A.  Colvill's  (formerly  commanding  Guard  Brigade)  and 
French's  cavalry  division,  which  had  been  ordered  from 
Colesberg,  Clements  relieving  French  there. 

The  Guard  Brigade  was  placed  under  the  command  of 
Pole-Carew  (previously  commanding  the  9th  brigade),  while 
Colonel  Douglas  was  given  the  9th  brigade.  The  18th  bri- 


104  TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

gade  was  formed  of  volunteers  and  colonial  troops  (under 
Stephen  son). 

His  train  consisted  of  700  wagons  and  9,000  pack  and 
draught  animals. 

General  Roberts'  Army. 

9th  Division.  7th  Division. 

Colville.  Tucker. 

3d  Brigade.     19th  Brigade.  14th  Brigade.     15th  Brigade. 

Macdonald.     Smith-Dorrien.  Chermside.            Wavell. 

6th  Division.  1st  Division. 

Kelly-Kenny.  Methuen. 

13th  Brigade.     18th  Brigade.  1st  Brigade.      9th  Brigade. 

Knox.           Stephenson.  Pole-Carew.          Douglas. 

Cavalry  Division. 
French. 

3d  Brigade.  2d  Brigade.  1st  Brigade. 

Gordon.  Broadwood.  Porter. 

His  preparations  were  kept  perfectly  secret,  and  the 
activity  of  Buller  in  Natal,  the  appearance  of  Brabant's 
volunteers  in  front  of  Dordrecht,  General  Gatacre's  move- 
ments and  General  Clements'  resistance  at  Colesberg,  all 
served  to  keep  the  enemy  occupied,  attracted  his  attention 
to  other  points  in  the  theatre  of  operations,  and  prevented 
him  from  sending  timely  reinforcements  to  the  Modder 
Hiver. 

The  direction  of  Lord  Roberts'  attack  was  well  consid- 
ered. A  front  attack  on  Cronje's  strongly  fortified  position 
at  Spytfontein — Magersfontein  was  out  of  the  question.  A 
flank  movement  around  Cronje's  right  flank,  while  it  might 
relieve  Kimberley,  was  tactically  and  strategically  false: 
first,  because  Macdonald's  operations  near  Koodoos  Drift 
undoubtedly  attracted  the  attention  of  the  Boers  in  that 
direction;  and  secondly,  because,  even  if  successful,  it  would 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  105 

merely  force  Cronje  back  on  his  line  of  communications.  An 
attack  on  Cronje's  left  flank  had  first  to  be  directed  on  Prins- 
loo's  strong  position  at  Jacobsdal,  then  after  that  was 
taken,  Cronje's  position  would  be  flanked,  but  in  the  mean- 
time the  latter  would  have  had  plenty  of  time  to  change 
front,  so  that  Roberts  would  have  been  compelled  to  make 
a  frontal  attack  after  all. 

In  view  of  these  considerations,  Roberts  decided  to  go 
around  Cronje's  left  flank,  and  advance  over  Waterval  and 
De  Kiel's  drifts  (on  the  Riet)  arid  Klip  Drift  (on  the  Modder) 
over  Olifantsfontein,  a  maneuver  which  was  both  tactically 
and  strategically  sound,  and  promised  great  results.  Tac- 
tically, it  took  the  British  army  over  open  ground,  and  gave 
the  relief  column  a  direct  and  unoccupied  route  to  Kimber- 
ley,  and  strategically  it  cut  Cronje's  line  of  communications 
with  Bloemfontein. 

Lord  Roberts'  plan  was  to  leave  Lord  Methuen  with  the 
Guards  Brigade  at  the  junction  of  the  Riet  and  Modder  riv- 
ers in  order  to  support  the  turning  movement  by  a  frontal 
attack  on  Cronje's  position,  while  he  with  the  cavalry  under 
French,  the  Highland  Brigade,  the  divisions  of  Kelly-Kenny 
and  Tucker,  as  well  as  the  new  division,  passed  around  Cron- 
je's left  flank.  This  involved  a  division  of  his  forces,  and, 
of  course,  gave  the  enemy  an  opportunity  to  attack  the  sep- 
arated parts  in  detail,  but  his  superior  strength  and  the 
great  results  promised  warranted  his  taking  the  risk. 

On  the  12th  of  February,  French,  moving  over  Enslin, 
Graspan  and  Ramdarn,  crossed  the  Riet  at  Waterval  and 
De  Kiels  drifts,  and  after  a  march  of  37  miles,  the  Modder 
at  Klip  Drift  on  the  13th.  On  the  14th  he  had  an  action 
with  a  Boer  force  at  Roodekalkfontein,  and,  carefully  recon- 
noitering  on  the  way,  passed  between  Olifantsfontein  and 
Alexanderfontein  into  Kimberley  on  the  15th.  The  siege 
of  Kimberley  had  lasted  122  days  (October  15,  1899,  to  Feb- 


106 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  107 

ruary  15,  1900).  To  cover  his  left  flank,  a  detachment  under 
Colonel  Gordon  was  sent  over  Rondevals  Drift  (west  of 
Klip  Drift),  which,  after  some  slight  engagements  with  Boer 
detachments,  turned  to  the  left  and  reconnoitered  in  rear  of 
Oonje's  position. 

The  6th  division,  followed  by  the  Highland  Brigade, 
crossed  the  Riet  at  Waterval  Drift  on  the  14th,  reaching 
Klip  Drift  on  the  15th.  The  other  two  divisions  and  Rob- 
erts' headquarters  also  crossed  the  Riet  on  the  14th,  but  at 
De  Kiels  Drift.  A  Boer  commando  of  2,000  men  under  De 
Wet,  coming  from  Colesberg  to  reinforce  Cronje,  advanced 
from  Koffeyfontein  (9  miles  below  Waterval  Drift)  and  cap- 
tured a  large  British  wagon  train.  Roberts,  with  his  two 
divisions,  turned  on  Jacobsdal,  but  found  it  abandoned  and 
the  Boers  in  retreat. 

Cronje,  it  appears,  was  completely  surprised  by  Rob- 
erts' movement,  and  not  until  reports  of  French's  fight  north 
of  Klip  Drift  reached  him  did  he  have  any  clear  idea  of  the 
situation.  He  promptly  gave  orders  to  retire  frqm  the  Ma- 
gersfontein  position  and  to  raise  the  siege  of  Kimberley, 
directing  all  the  troops  in  this  vicinity  towards  Bloemfon- 
tein.  The  interval  between  French  (at  Kimberley)  and 
Kelly-Kenny  (still  south  of  the  Modder  River)  enabled  him 
to  slip  through.  On  the  15th  of  February  he  assembled  his 
troops,  and  on  the  16th  commenced  his  retreat  eastward. 
His  plan  was  first  to  move  along  the  north  shore  of  the  Mod 
der,  and  cross  to  the  south  at  Paardeberg  Drift.  On  the 
16th  Lord  Kitchener  (who  was  with  the  6th  division  at  Klip 
Drift)  saw  at  daybreak  immense  clouds  of  dust  moving  east- 
ward and  at  once  concluded  it  wras  Cronje's  army  in  retreat, 
and  decided  to  pursue,  sending  the  mounted  infantry  after 
his  train.  The  British  scouts  found  his  rear  guard  at  Roode- 
kalkfontein,  and  Kelly-Kenny  (who  had  crossed  the  Modder) 
hastened  after  him  with  Knox's  brigade  and  captured  a  part 


108  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

of  his  train.  On  the  17th,  French's  cavalry  division  started 
from  Dronfield  to  the  Modder  Kiver  in  pursuit  of  Cronje. 
Stephenson's  brigade  was  sent  back  over  Klip  Drift,  along 
the  southern  bank  of  the  Modder  River  to  cut  off  Cronje's 
retreat  in  that  direction.  The  two  divisions  with  Lord 
Roberts  were  ordered  to  move  on  Bloemfontein,  French  was 
directed  to  hang  on  Cronje's  rear,  while  Lord  Methuen  was 
sent  up  to  Kimberlev  to  restore  the  communications  there. 

Lord  Roberts  had  in  all  about  53,000  men,  but  for  his 
offensive  movement  only  40,000;  Cronje  had  in  all  about 
35,000  men:  5,000,  which  were  moving  from  Jacobsdal  on 
the  southern  road;  8,000,  his  main  army,  north  of  the  Mod- 
der at  Koodoos  Rand  Drift;  6,000  at  Stormberg,  and  10,000 
from  Colesberg,  at  this  time  near  Koffeyfontein,  marching 
against  Roberts'  right  flank.  About  6,000  had  retired  to  the 
north  and  northeast. 

Cronje  reached  Driput  on  the  16th,  halted  to  rest,  and 
continued  his  retreat  in  the  night  along  the  north  bank  of 
the  Modder  to  Wolvekraal  Drift.  He  was  followed  by 
Knox's  brigade,  which,  joining  Stephenson's  on  the  17th  at 
Klipkraal  Drift,  continued  its  advance  thence  along  the 
south  bank,  towards  Paardeberg  Drift. 

Battle  of  Paardeberg. 

Cronje  halted  at  Wolvekraal  Drift  (half-way  between 
Paardeberg  Drift  and  Koodoos  Rand  Drift),  intending  to 
cross  there  on  the  morning  of  the  18th.  On  the  north  side 
he  was  already  cut  off,  as  Broadwood's  brigade  and  a  horse 
battery  (from  Kimberley)  had  reached  Koodoos  Rand  Drift 
on  the  evening  of  the  17th  and  occupied  the  heights  there, 
and  French  with  his  other  two  brigades  struck  Cronje's 
wagon  park  at  noon  near  Kameelfontein  (north  of  Wolve- 
kraal Drift). 

Lord    Kitchener,   with   the   6th    division,    accidentally 


TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  109 

passed  Paardeberg  Drift,  and  so  reached  the  point  (on  the 
south  bank)  just  opposite  Cronje's  camp  (on  the  north 
bank).  The  9th  division  (over  Weydrai)  reached  Paardeberg 
Drift  in  the  night  of  the  17th,  Smith-Dorrien's  brigade  cross- 
ing there  to  the  north  bank,  while  Macdonald's  joined  the 
6th  division  on  the  south  bank. 

The  British  attacked  from  the  south  bank  on  the  18th, 
but  could  not  take  the  Boer  positions  along  the  river  bank, 
which  had  been,  intrenched  during  the  night.  On  the  19th 
the  7th  division  and  the  naval  brigade  arrived.  Lord  Rob- 
erts decided  to  prepare  for  any  further  attacks  by  artillery 
fire,  and  located  his  artillery,  consisting  of  about  50  guns, 
to  shell  the  Boer  laager,  posting  three  field  batteries  and 
two  naval  12-pounders  south  of  the  Modder  at  2,000  yards 
from  the  laager;  1  howitzer  battery  and  8  4.7-inch  naval 
guns  on  the  north  bank,  enfilading  the  river-bed,  in  which 
was  the  laager,  at  1,000  yards  range.  A  concentric  fire  was 
thus  brought  to  bear  on  Cronje's  camp,  which  was  kept  up 
for  several  days,  the  infantry  gradually  drawing  up  closer 
by  trenches  thrown  up  at  night. 

The  balloons  did  good  service  in  locating  vulnerable 
points  not  visible  to  the  gunners.  On  the  24th  they  located 
the  Boer  caissons,  which  were  promptly  blown  up  by  the 
artillery. 

Several  attempts  were  made  by  commandoes  of  Boers 
(under  Botha  and  others  from  Natal)  to  break  through  the 
British  lines,  and  reinforce  Cronje,  but  they  were  all  re- 
pelled with  heavy  loss.  French's  cavalry  division  was 
intrusted  with  the  duty  of  warding  off  these  attempts,  and 
took  position  on  both  banks,  facing  east,  supported  by  a 
part  of  the  7th  division. 

Cronje  lost  about  one-fourth  of  his  command  during  his 
week  of  heroic  resistance.  On  the  26th  he  made  a  desperate 
effort  to  break  through,  but  was  repulsed,  and  on  the  morn- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  Ill 

ing  of  the  27th  (the  anniversary   of   Majuba   Hill,  where 
Oonje  defeated  the  British)  he  surrendered. 

The  forces  which  capitulated  amounted  to  4,100  men, 
with  4  Krupp  guns,  2  Maxim  guns  and  9  1-pounders.  Among 
the  officers  who  surrendered,  besides  Cronje  and  his  bril- 
liant chief  of  artillery,  Major  Albrecht,  there  were  10  com 
mandants  and  18  cornets. 

The  fruits  of  the  victory  were  rapidly  reaped  in  other 
quarters.  Barkly  West  on  the  Vaal  was  occupied  by  a 
force  detached  from  Methuen's  command  at  Kimberley,  and 
the  country  around  Kimberley  was  gradually  taken  under 
British  control  again.  Colonel  Plumer  received  reinforce- 
ments from  Rhodesia,  to  enable  him  to  attack  the  Boer  posi- 
tion at  Crocodile  Pools. 

General  Roberts  moved  his  headquarters  to  Osfontein, 
his  main  army  facing  eastward,  on  both  banks  of  the  Mod- 
der  River,  while  his  cavalry  under  French  scouted  towards 
Bloemfontein.  The  main  Boer  position  was  between  Abra- 
hams Kraal  and  Aasvogel  Kop,  behind  the  Kaal  Spruit. 
General  Joubert  came  with  the  reinforcements  from  Natal 
and  had  the  supreme  command.  The  advanced  Boer  line 
was  held  by  Lukas  Meyer,  extending  over  Petrusburg,  Bosch- 
kop  and  Wolvespruit. 

THE  SOUTHERN  THEATRE  OF  WAR. 

The  effect  of  Cronje's  surrender  made  itself  felt  at  once 
in  the  other  theatres  of  operations,  in  spite  of  the  great  dis- 
tances separating  them.  The  central  position  of  the  Boers 
gave  them  the  advantage  of  interior  lines,  and  enabled  them 
to  transfer  quickly  troops  from  one  part  of  the  general  the- 
atre to  another,  where  they  were  most  needed  at  the  time; 
but  the  strategic  advance  of  the  Boers  was  too  extended 
for  the  forces  at  their  disposal,  and  they  tried  to  cover  too 


112  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

great  an  extent  of  country;  consequently,  when  the  British 
gained  the  superiority  in  numbers,  they  could  no  longer 
weaken  any  part  to  reinforce  another  temporarily,  because 
the  distances  were  so  great  that  they  could  not  hope  to 
bring  such  troops  back  in  time  to  meet  a  British  advance 
at  the  depleted  point. 

About  the  time  that  Roberts  began  his  advance,  the 
Boers  under  Delarey,  in  the  southern  theatre,  gained  some 
marked  successes,  forcing  the  British  first  from  Colesberg 
and  then  from  Rensburg  back  to  Arundel.  But  just  as  they 
were  ready  to  threaten  Roberts'  line  of  communications, 
reinforcements  had  to  be  sent  to  Cronje:  De  Wet  from 
Colesberg,  and  others  from  Dordrecht,  Molteno  and  Naauw- 
poort.  His  entire  force  was  about  10,000  strong,  and  after 
leaving  2,000  at  Arundel,  he  sent  the  rest  to  threaten  Rob- 
erts' right  flank,  and,  if  possible,  reinforce  Cronje. 

On  the  18th  of  February  General  Brabant  entered  Dor- 
drecht, and  the  British  forces  advanced  to  the  line  Barkly 
East — Jamestown — Colesberg.  Lord  Kitchener,  after  Cron- 
je's  surrender,  come  in  person  to  this  portion  of  the  theatre 
to  direct  the  advance. 

On  February  27th  General  Clements  reoccupied  Rens- 
burg and  Colesberg,  and  on  the  28th  Colesberg  Junction,  the 
enemy  retreating  on  Norvals  Pont. 

On  the  22d  and  23d  Gatacre  reconnoitered  towards 
Stormberg  and  had  a  severe  skirmish  there. 

THE  SITUATION  IN  NATAL. 

The  Fourth  Attempt  to  Relieve  Lady  smith. 

In  order  to  prevent  the  Boers  in  Natal  from  sending 
reinforcements  of  the  western  theatre,  and  if  possible  to- 
relieve  Ladysmith,  Buller  began  a  new  offensive  movement 
on  the  17th  of  Februarv.  This  time  his  attack  was  directed 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  1  ]  3 

on  the  Hlangwane  Berg,  east  of  Colenso,  in  order  to  gain 
possession  of  the  nearer  bank  before  attempting  to  cross 
the  Tugela.  As  early  as  the  12th  of  February  he  had  made 
a  reconnoissance  of  Hussar  Hill,  6  miles  northeast  of  Chieve- 
ley,  and  finding  the  Boer  lines  marked  by  Colenso,  Hlang- 
wane  Hill,  Green  Hill,  Monte  Christo  and  Cingolo,  he  deter- 
mined to  turn  the  left  flank  of  this  position;  on  the  14th  he 
had  directed  his  troops  on  Hussar  Hill,  the  irregular  cav- 
alry supported  by  two  infantry  battalions  covering  the  left 
flank,  Dundonald's  cavalry  covering  the  front  of  advance. 
The  latter  had  taken  Hussar  Hill  after  a  slight  skirmish  at 
8  a.  m.  on  the  14th,  and  by  night  the  British  troops  were 
intrenched  in  the  position.  The  15th  was  devoted  to  artil- 
lery fire  on  the  enemy's  line. 

On  the  16th  the  real  advance  began.  The  2d  division 
(Lyttleton,  who  had  replaced  Clery,  the  latter  being  ill)  and 
Wynne's  brigade  were  to  march  eastward  and  make  a  grand 
turn  to  the  left,  while  Dundonald's  cavalry  brigade,  cross- 
ing the  Blaauwkrass  River,  was  to  pass  farther  to  the  east- 
ward and  scale  the  hill  of  Cingolo ;  Barton's  brigade  was  to 
remain  with  the  artillery,  and  the  latter  (66  pieces)  was  to 
prepare  the  advance  by  firing  on  Green  Hill,  where  the 
Boers  had  a  heavy  gun  and  two  light  ones.  Hart's  brigade 
was  to  guard  the  railroad. 

Cingolo  was  occupied  by  a  Boer  outpost  only,  and  was 
quickly  taken  by  Hildyard's  brigade.  It  became  evident  in 
this  attack  that  the  Boers  were  still  in  force  here;  conse- 
quently, on  the  17th,  three  brigades  were  ordered  to  attack 
the  heights:  Barton's  on  the  left,  to  demonstrate;  Hildyard's 
on  the  right,  to  make  the  principal  attack;  the  4th  brigade 
(Norcott's)  in  reserve  on  its  left  rear;  Dundonald  covering 
the  right.  The  ascent  was  very  difficult.  The  troops  biv- 
ouacked on  the  ground  gained.  On  the  18th  the  attack  was 
resumed.  The  artillery  opened  at  8  a.  m.,  and  Hildyard's 

-8- 


114 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


SEARCH-LIGHT  FROM  H.'  M.  S.  TERRIBLE. 

brigade  (with  Xorcott's  on  its  left)  advanced  against  Monte 
Christo,  which  was  taken  by  11  a.  m.  The  Boers,  being 
taken  in  flank,  were  compelled  to  evacuate  Green  Hill  and 
Hlangwane  Berg,  which  were  occupied  by  Barton's  brigade, 
the  artillery  moving  up. 

Buller's  troops  gradually  forced  the  Boers  back,  and  on 
the  20th  the  latter  evacuated  the  south  bank  of  the  Tugela, 
and  a  battalion  of  Hart's  brigade  (from  Chieveley)  occupied 
Colenso.  where  they  found  the  bridge  destroyed. 

Tlie  Battle  of  Pieters  Hill 

On  the  21st  of  February  Buller  threw  a  ponton  bridge 
over,  below  Colenso.  The  British  troops  crossed  the  Tugela 
and  attacked  Grobelaars  Kloof  on  the  21st  of  February,  but 
without  much  success.  The  British  artillery,  posted  on 
Green  Hill  and  the  Hlangwane  Berg,  supported  the  advance. 


1 16  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

The  mounted  infantry  occupied  the  hills  north  of  Colenso, 
and  at  noon  the  5th  division  crossed  the  ponton  bridge,  fol- 
lowed by  Hart's  brigade,  while  a  battalion  of  the  10th  brig- 
ade (Coke's)  advanced  against  Grobelaar's  Kloof.  The  Boers, 
however,  forced  back  the  attack.  On  the  22d  the  struggle 
was  renewed.  This  time  the  attack  was  directed  on  Pieters 
Hill,  but  again  without  success.  The  whole  of  Buller's  army 
was  now  over  the  Tugela  near  Fort  Wylie,  the  Boer  position 
in  a  semicircle  before  it.  On  the  23d  another  effort  was 
made  to  take  Pieters  Hill,  but  this  also  failed.  Buller  in- 
trenched his  infantry,  and  on  the  24th  moved  with  his  artil- 
lery back  over  the  Tugela,  followed  by  the  infantry;  he  de- 
stroyed this  ponton  bridge,  and  in  the  night  threw  another 
ponton  bridge  over  the  Tugela  nearer  Pieters  Station  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Langverwacht  Spruit.  On  the  morning  of  the 
27th,  Barton's  brigade  crossed  the  bridge  and  stormed  Pieters 
Hill.  Meanwhile,  Warren  (with  the  4th  and  llth  brigades)  at- 
tacked the  western  heights,  and  Dundonald,  with  four  squad- 
rons of  cavalry,  moved  on  to  Ladysmith,  which  he  entered  on 
the  28th,  thus  relieving  this  city  after  120  days'  investment. 

The  Boers  retired  from  their  positions  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  town  towards  the  mountain  passes,  and  Buller  moved  on 
Nelthorpe  on  the  28th.  The  Boer  forces  had  been  greatly 
weakened  by  reinforcements  sent  to  the  western  theatre. 

Buller's  losses  between  February  16th  and  27th  amount- 
ed to  1,859:  252  killed,  1,512  wounded  and  95  missing. 

The  total  casualties  in  Ladysmith  during  its  investment 
were  24  officers  and  235  men  killed,  70  officers,  520  men 
wounded,  6  officers  and  340  men  died  of  disease. 

On  February  27th  Hart  was  placed  in  command  )f  the 
2d  Division,  Clery  having  been  injured;  Colonel  Kitchener 
(a  brother  to  Lord  Kitchener)  received  the  llth  brigade, 
Wynne  having  been  wounded;  and  Colonel  Norcott  the  5th 
brigade  in  place  of  Hart,  promoted. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  117 

Buller  moved  his  troops  up  to  Nelthorpe  on  the  28th  of 
February. 

Comments. 

In  this  campaign  the  great  principles  of  strategy  and 
tactics  appeared  in  some  cases  to  be  violated  at  the  outset, 
but  closer  inspection  and  further  developments  invariably 
showed  the  fallacy  of  such  a  conclusion.  One  of  these  great 
principles  is  the  old-established  maxim  that,  in  spite  of  all  the 
boasted  defensive  power  of  modern  intrenchments  and  the 
immensely  increased  effect  of  modern  fire-arms,  only  the 
offensive  (strategical  and  tactical)  can  lead  to  decisive  results. 

With  the  British  the  spirit  of  the  strategical  and  tac- 
tical offensive  was  innate,  and  the  'reason  it  did  not  make 
itself  felt  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  campaign  was  due  to 
several  causes.  In  the  first  place,  their  entire  system,  both 
as  regards  organization  and  practical  field  training,  was  some- 
what imperfect.  Their  field  maneuvers  were  inadequate  to 
teach  practically  either  the  proper  tactical  employment  of  the 
separate  arms,  or  that  of  the  three  arms  combined,  to  impart 
a  knowledge  of  correct  estimation  of  their  own  or  the  enemy's 
fire-effect,  or  to  impress  the  troop  leaders  with  the  necessity 
for  flank  attacks  in  proper  form  in  modern  battle  tactics. 

This  accounts  for  the  fact  that  the  offensive  of  the  Brit- 
ish was  strategically  unsound,  in  that  the  forces  were  too  much 
subdivided,  too  greatly  scattered,  and  not  applied  with  the 
best  effect;  and  in  that  the  enemy  was  greatly  underrated 
and  the  general  situation  very  imperfectly  known.  More- 
over, tactically  the  execution  was  poor,  in  spite  of  great  brav- 
ery on  the  part  of  the  officers  and  men,  on  account  of  anti- 
quated battle  formations  and  tactics. 

The  service  of  reconnoissance  and  the  mobility  of  the 
troops  were  no  doubt  affected  by  the  climate  and  the  terrain,, 
and  the  difficulties  of  the  former  were  greatly  increased  by 


118  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

the  character  of  the  ground,  the  lack  of  good  maps,  the  use 
of  smokeless  powder  and  the  manner  of  fighting  of  the  Boers, 
and  these  causes  also  interfered  with  the  best  use  of  the  artil- 
lery; nevertheless,  as  will  appear  later,  the  well-planned  and 
prepared  offensive  advance  (that  of  General  Roberts),  exe- 
cuted with  rapidity  and  energy,  promptly  compelled  the 
Boers  to  give  up  their  fastness  at  Magersfontein,  so  that  it 
was  evidently  previous  mistakes  in  strategy  and  tactics  that 
caused  the  failure  of  so  many  efforts,  not  the  climate  or  the 
terrain,  much  as  they  may  have  increased  the  difficulties. 

The  Boers,  on  the  other  hand,  in  spite  of  their  original 
offensive  advance  with  its  brilliant  results,  do  not  really  pos- 
sess the  spirit  of  the  offensive  strategically,  and  are  not  capa- 
ble of  executing  the  offensive  tactically,  as  shown  by  the  sub- 
sequent events.  On  a  small  scale  there  were,  on  the  part  of 
the  Boers,  occasional  offensive  attacks  and  pursuits,  as  in 
some  of  the  actions  in  Cape  Colony,  but  never  with  large  bod- 
ies of  troops.  For  cohesive  attack  they  lack  the  necessary 
leaders,  training,  discipline  and  tactical  organization,  and  for 
energetic  and  prompt  pursuit  they  lack  cavalry,  for  al- 
though every  Boer  is  mounted,  he  is  not  in  a  true  sense  a 
cavalryman. 

The  Defensive  and  the  Offensive. 

At  first  sight  it  would  appear  that  the  plainest  lesson 
taught  by  the  Boer  war  is  the  apparent  impossibility  of  at- 
tacking successfully  in  front  a  fortified  position — in  other 
wrords,  the  impossibility  of  so  silencing  even  a  weak  artillery 
on  the  defensive,  and  so  demoralizing  a  good  infantry  line 
on  the  defensive,  as  to  enable  the  attacking  infantry,  with- 
out too  great  loss,  to  move  to  the  attack  over  open  ground. 

Both  at  Magersfontein  and  af  Colenso  the  English  artil- 
lery was  superior  to  that  of  the  Boers,  and  especially  was 
this  the  case  in  the  later  actions  on  the  upper  Tugela  and 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  119 

oil  the  Vaal  Kranz.  In  all  these  cases  the  British  artillery 
could  not  dominate  that  of  the  Boers,  and  in  the  first  two 
actions  referred  to  the  British  greatly  overrated  the  effect 
of  their  artillery.  At  the  last  mentioned  action  the  infantry 
advance  was  indeed  prevented  by  the  Boer  artillery  alone. 

Many  authorities  conclude,  therefore,  that  our  ideas  on 
this  point  of  tactics  must  be  modified  accordingly.  It  is  at 
present  stated  in  all  tactics  that  the  first  duty  of  the  attack- 
ing army  is  to  silence  by  means  of  its  artillery  that  of  the 
enemy;  then  to  concentrate  its  artillery  fire  on  the  enemy 's. 
infantry  at  the  point  of  principal  attack.  But  fiom  the  above 
it  appears  that  the  artillery  of  the  defense  may  withdraw  tem- 
porarily (be  apparently  silenced)  and  then  turn  up  in  full 
power  at  the  moment  of  the  decisive  infantry  attack.  But 
these  conclusions  must  not  be  arrived  at  hastily.  There  are 
many  considerations  that  must  first  be  settled  before  we  can 
determine  whether  the  English  artillery  actually  followed 
modern  tactics  in  its  employment  of  this  arm.  It  appears, 
on  the  contrary,  that  the  batteries  were  brought  into  action 
separately,  and  seldom  really  attained  concerted  fire-action 
on  the  decisive  point  of  attack ;  moreover,  they  had  at  first  no 
pieces  for  curved  fire  (recognized  everywhere  as  essential 
nowadays  in  the  attack  on  intrenchments) ;  and  finally,  the 
difficulties  of  the  ground  were  such  as  to  exclude  anything  ap- 
proaching ideal  action  as  a  general  rule.  Consequently,  it  is 
better  to  wait  till  more  complete  data  are  available,  before 
laying  too  great  stress  on  the  power  and  advantages  of  the 
defensive. 

In  fact,  if  there  is  one  lesson  that  does  stand  out  promi- 
nently and  definitely,  throughout  the  Boer  war,  it  is  the  ne- 
cessity for  adopting  the  offensive  in  order  to  secure  decisive 
results.  In  other  words,  the  exact  opposite  of  the  conclusion 
above  suggested,  which  would  give  the  preference  to  the 
defensive. 


120  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

The  indecisive  results  even  of  the  Boer  victories  can  only 
be  attributed  to  their  lack  of  offensive  power,  either  in  attack- 
ing the  British  in  intrenched  positions  (as  at  Ladysmith),  or, 
after  defeating  the  British  attack  (as  at  Dundee,  Colenso 
and  Magersfontein),  in  taking  up  a  proper  offensive  counter- 
attack, thereby  making  their  victory  complete.  An  active 
and  energetic  offensive  at  Ladysmith  and  on  the  Tugela 
would  have  led  to  results  very  different  from  the  passive  de- 
fensive actually  adopted,  and  the  Boers  could  have  met  the 
advance  of  Roberts  with  very  different  forces  from  those 
which  they  were  actually  enabled  to  assemble.  Moreover,  a 
more  energetic  offensive  south  of  the  Orange  River  would 
have  made  it  possible  to  penetrate  farther  into  the  British  do- 
main, and  would  have  afforded  a  better  chance  of  encouraging 
the  Dutch  inhabitants  to  rise  and  join  their  Boer  countrymen. 

The  old  principle  of  strategy,  therefore,  still  holds  true; 
viz.:  that  the  best  mode  of  action  for  decisive  results  is  the 
strategical  and  tactical  offensive.  The  resorting  to  mere 
frontal  attacks  and  the  remaining  on  the  tactical  defensive 
and  indulging  in  mere  position  actions  are  signs  of  mediocre 
ability.  If  the  enemy  adopts  the  tactical  defensive,  the  ad- 
vantages of  his  mode  of  action  must  be  overcome  by  proper 
strategic  deployment  and  advance  and  by  increased  mobility, 
to  force  him  from  his  positions,  to  obtain  the  superiority  in 
numbers,  not  at  all  points  of  the  line,  but  at  the  decisive 
points,  and  to  keep  him  moving,  thus  preventing  him  from 
occupying  continually  strong  positions.  All  this  requires 
a  well-trained  cavalry  for  reconnoissance,  an  artillery  with 
proper  material  as  well  as  one  trained  in  the  correct  tactical 
employment  of  this  arm  'and  in  hitting,  and,  finally,  an  in- 
fantry instructed  to  shoot  accurately  and  move  rapidly. 

Railways. 

One  of  the  characteristic  features  of  modern  warfare  is 
the  part  played  by  railroads.  The  power  of  effecting  rapid 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  121 

concentration  which  they  confer  causes  their  direction  and 
location  to  determine  the  lines  of  advance  of  the  main  armies, 
and  their  points  of  crossing  or  branching  fix  the  strategical 
points  in  the  theatre  of  war  where  the  great  battles  must  be 
fought.  The  side  that  possesses  or  commands  the  main  lines 
at  the  opening  of  a  campaign  has  an  immense  advantage, 
and  this  advantage  in  the  present  war  was  with  the  Boers. 

Pretoria,  the  Transvaal  capital,  has  radiating  from  it 
three  main  lines :  one  to  Lorenzo-Marques,  one  to  Durban,  and 
one  to  Port  Elizabeth;  the  latter  with  a  branch  from  north  of 
the  Orange  River  to  East  London;  a  fourth  main  line  runs 
west  of  the  two  Republics  from  Buluwayo  to  Cape  Town. 
There  are  also  two  minor  lines,  one  from  Pretoria  northward 
to  Pietersburg,  and  one  from  Johannesburg  southwestward 
to  Klerksdorp. 

The  Boers,  of  course,  made  full  use  of  these  lines  fn 
their  strategic  deployment  on  the  border,  and  in  their  subse- 
quent advance,  but  the  original  disposition  of  their  troops 
resulted  mainly  from  the  British  forces  at  Dundee,  Lady- 
smith,  Mafeking  and  Kimberley;  hence  they  concentrated 
the  bulk  of  their  armies  on  the  Natal  and  the  western  frontier, 
neglecting  the  important  points  on  the  Orange  River  border. 
Had  the  British  been  able  to  conduct  their  campaign  on  pure- 
ly military  principles,  untrammeled  by  political  reasons  for 
relieving  these  isolated  points  (Ladysmith,  Kimberley  and 
Mafeking),  this  neglect  might  have  been  at  once  fatal  to  the 
Boer  strategy,  for  the  military  plan  was,  it  is  stated,  to  ad- 
vance from  the  south  directly  on  Bloemfontein  and  Pretoria 
over  the  Orange  River. 

The  holding  on  to  the  isolated  points  above  mentioned, 
had  the  same  crippling  effect  on  the  Boers,  therefore,  that  it 
had  on  the  British  movements,  for  it  prevented  the  former 
also  from  carrying  out  their  original  plan  of  invading  Cape 
Colony,  concentrating  in  Natal  at  Pietermaritzburg,  and 


122  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

forcing  the  point  of  main  attack  in  the  West  far  south  of 
Kimberley.  Had  they  carried  out  this  plan,  the  problem 
for  the  British  would  have  been  a  far  more  difficult  one. 

The  Strategy  of  Butter's  Campaign. 

General  Buller's  plan  to  turn  the  Boer  right  flank  over 
the  upper  Tugela  is  based  on  a  correct  strategical  principle, 
but  its  success  must  depend  on  the  forces  available,  for  this 
was  not  a  mere  tactical  meneuver,  but  a  strategic  operation 
on  a  large  scale,  involving  an  extension  of  the  British  base 
from  Frere  over  Springfield  to  Trichards  Drift,  about  20 
miles,  before  the  actual  turning  maneuver  can  begin. 

The  Boer  position  was,  moreover,  naturally  very  strong 
and  was  occupied  in  force.  Ultimate  success  in  the  turning 
movement  depended  on  the  rapidity  of  its  execution,  and  this, 
ia  the  face  of  all  the  difficulties  of  the  situation,  was  practi- 
cally impossible. 

However,  the  left  flank  was  the  critical  point  of  the 
British  line,  and  there,  north  of  Trichards  was  Buller's  place, 
and  not  at  Spearman's  camp.  The  tactical  value  of  that  part 
of  the  Spion  Kop  which  was  the  object  of  the  attack  was 
greatly  overrated,  on  account  of  imperfect  reconnoissance  and 
poor  maps,  and,  had  Buller  been  originally  with  Warren's 
force,  he  probably  would  not  have  permitted  the  assault  on 
this  point. 

The  Boers,  xafter  Warren's  failure,  again  neglected  a 
splendid  opportunity  to  reap  the  rewards  of  success  in  not 
pursuing.  Even  admitting  that  they  were  economizing  their 
men,  it  is  plain  that  an  energetic  pursuit  might  have  almost 
annihilated  Warren's  command,  in  which  case  the  Boers 
would  have  been  spared  the  battles  of  the  5th  and  7th  of 
February,  which  also  involved  considerable  losses  to  them. 
As  it  was,  Buller's  plan  failed,  but  his  strength  was  not  bro- 
ken, and  he  immediately  proceeded  to  make  and  execute 
other  plans  for  breaking  through  the  Boer  lines. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  123 

The  Tactics  of  Butter's  Campaign. 

General  Buller's  third  attempt  to  relieve  Ladysmith 
was  justified  by  the  circumstances,  for  it  promised  success, 
and  even  if  it  failed,  it  held  a  certain  number  of  Boers  in 
Natal,  and  therefore  away  from  Roberts'  front.  Nevertheless, 
there  are  several  points  in  the  plan  and  its  execution  which 
are  subject  to  criticism. 

Once  more  imperfect  reconnoissance  led  to  overrating 
the  tactical  value  of  the  Vaal  Kranz,  and  consequently  it  was 
not  known  until  after  it  was  taken  that  it  could  not  be  held. 

The  two  key  points  to  the  Boer  position  on  the  upper 
Tugela  were  the  Bpion  Kop  and  the  Doom  Kloof,  and  yet  in 
the  two  separate  attacks  on  these  points  Buller  did  not  put 
in  all  his  available  forces,  nor  did  he  act  with  the  requisite 
energy  in  pushing  the  attack.  In  both  cases  the  Boers  were 
at  first  surprised,  but  the  inadequacy  of  the  forces  employed 
prevented  a  rapid  advance  and  gave  them  time  to  reorganize 
their  lines,  and  repel  the  attack. 

Buller's  attack,  moreover,  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
supported  in  the  least  by  any  demonstration  on  the  part  of 
Barton  in  front  of  Colenso. 

This  appears  to  have  been  the  fault  with  all  of  Buller's 
battles.  When  he  attacked  the  key  point  of  a  position  he 
made  no  general  attack  along  the  entire  line  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  reinforcing  the  threatened  point — in  fact,  he  al- 
lowed them  every  opportunity  to  do  so  at  their  leisure — Spion 
Kop,  at  the  Vaal  Kranz,  at  Pieters  Hill.  An  energetic  at- 
tack along  the  entire  line  would  have  prevented  that  con- 
stant shifting  of  forces  by  the  Boers  which  enabled  them  to 
make  such  good  use  of  their  small  force  and  their  interior 
lines. 

The  Boers  took  no  measures  to  reap  the  rewards  of  their 
victory.  They  neither  pursued  Buller's  army  over  the  Tugela. 


124  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

nor  made  any  effort  to  defeat  Barton  and  so  cut  off  Buller's 
line  of  retreat. 

The  Strategy  and  Tactics  of  Roberts'  Campaign. 

General  Roberts  could  have  divided  the  reinforcements 
he  received  in  the  6th  and  7th  divisions,  but  it  would  have 
been  another  case  of  splitting  up  the  forces,  so  he  decided  to 
add  them  all  to  the  left  column. 

The  new  troops  amounted  to  30,000  men  and  9  batteries. 
Had  one  division  only  been  added  to  Lord  Methuen's  army, 
he  wrould  have  had  25,600  men  and  78  guns;  and  had  the 
other  division  been  assigned  to  French's  command,  and  Gat- 
acre's  also  added,  this  column  would  have  had  24,000  men 
and  60  guns;  Brabant's  division  would  have  been  available 
to  reinforce  either  column.  The  total  of  the  British  field 
forces  in  this  theatre  would  have  been  about  60,000  men  and 
138  guns. 

The  Boers  had  about  20,000  at  Magersfontein,  15,000  at 
Oolesberg,  and  6,000  at  Stormberg,  or  a  total  of  41,000. 

Evidently,  Roberts  could  have  advanced  on  both  lines, 
but  by  combining  all  his  reinforcements  on  one  the  results 
were  more  decisive  and  also  more  rapid. 

General  Buller  on  the  Tugela  was  compelled  to  inaction. 
It  was  very  difficult  for  Roberts  to  leave  this  army  of  30,000 
men  and  78  guns  inactive,  but  had  Ladysmith  fallen,  the  be- 
siegers, 20,000  in  number,  would  have  been  at  once  available 
in  other  theatres  and  the  British  would  have  lost  the  chance 
of  having  the  garrison  of  8,000  added  to  their  ranks  in  case  of 
a  successful  sortie.  Therefore,  there  was  nothing  else  to  do 
but  let  Buller  detain  as  many  of  the  enemy  as  possible  in  his 
front. 

The  results  of  Lord  Roberts'  victory  stand  out  in  marked 
contrast  with  the  early  successes  of  the  Boers  on  the  Modder, 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  125 

at  Colenso  and  at  Stormberg:  whereas  the  latter  were  iso- 
lated successes,  with  no  decisive  effect  on  the  general  situa- 
tion, the  former  entailed  the  retreat  of  the  Boers  along  their 
entire  line  of  defense  as  far  east  as  Natal.  The  cause  is  not 
far  to  seek,  and  illustrates  on  the  one  hand  the  weakness  of 
the  purely  defensive,  and  on  the  other  the  power  of  the  strate- 
gical and  tactic  offensive  combined  with  a  definite  plan  of 
action. 

The  Strategy  and  Tactics  of  the  Boers. 

The  strategic  deployment  of  the  Boers  and  their  advance 
over  such  widely  separated  lines  (Natal,  Cape  Colony  and  the 
West)  was  in  accordance  with  sound  principles  of  strat- 
egy. The  advance  into  Natal  \vas  demanded  because  of  the 
presence  there  of  the  main  British  force  and  the  short- 
ness of  their  line  of  communications;  that  into  Cape  Colony 
and  the  West  was  necessitated  by  the  immense  importance 
of  gaining  possession  of  the  railroad  net-work,  which  was  so 
essential  for  the  rapid  advance  of  the  British,  and  also  the 
desire  to  gain  reinforcements  from  the  Afrikander  population 
in  these  districts.  Nevertheless,  the  three  lines  should  have 
been  treated  differently  in- a  tactical  sense,  for,  while  a  tac- 
tical, as  well  as  strategical,  offensive  was  quite  in  place  in 
Natal,  the  southern  and  western  theatres  warranted  (and  in 
view  of  the  limited  Boer  force,  commanded)  the  tactical 
defensive,  provided  the  strategic  measures  were  sufficient. 
But  the  latter  was  hardly  the  case,  for  the  Boer  efforts 
against  the  line  De  Aar — Kimberley  were  not  on  a  scale 
corresponding  to  its  vast  importance  to  the  British.  In  the 
early  stages  of  the  campaign  this  line  was  occupied  by  such 
weak  British  forces  that  it  would  have  been  very  easy  to 
have  destroyed  considerable  stretches  of  it;  moreover,  even  in 
the  later  stages  there  were  many  points  vulnerable  to  such 
attacks.  An  effective  destruction  of  this  road,  requiring  con- 


126  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

siderable  time  to  repair,  might  have  fatally  delayed  Roberts' 
advance,  or  caused  him  to  alter  his  plan.  In  addition,  con- 
stant attempts  to  interfere  with  this  all-important  line  would 
have  revealed  to  the  Boers  the  plan  of  the  British,  and  prob- 
ably prevented  Cronje's  surprise. 

However,  the  fact  that  in  general  the  tactical  defensive 
was  the  proper  role  for  the  Boer  troops  in  the  West,  should 
not  have  prevented  them  from  taking  up  the  tactical  offensive 
after  the  defeats  of  Lord  Methuen  on  the  Modder  River. 
Such  an  offensive  after  the  battle  of  Magersfontein,  when 
Lord  Methuen  still  had  the  river  in  his  rear,  promised  deci- 
sive results,  and  his  further  defeat  would  have  prevented 
Lord  Roberts  from  assembling  his  army  in  Cronje's  imme- 
diate front,  and  would  consequently  have  prevented  him", 
from  surprising  Oronje  by  his  flank  movement. 

The  great  weakness  of  the  Boers,  however,  was  the  lack 
of  the  tactical  offensive  in  Natal,  where  it  was  more  partic- 
ularly in  place.  This  lack  of  the  tactical  offensive  neutral- 
ized all  the  advantages  of  their  strategical  offensive  advance, 
and  enabled  the  British  to  transfer  the  decisive  theatre  to  the 
West.  Had  the  Boers  followed  up  their  strategic  deployment 
and  advance  in  Natal  with  an  energetic  tactical  offensive,  the 
British  would  have  been  forced  to  accept  Natal  as  the  decisive 
theatre,  and  all  the  advantage  of  topography  and  situation 
of  the  troops  would  have  been  with  the  Boers ;  or,  in  case  the 
Boers  won  a  decisive  victory  there,  sufficient  Boer  forces 
might  have  been  liberated  to  turn  the  tide  in  the  West. 

This  tendency  of  the  Boers  to  avoid  the  tactical  offensive 
is  apparent  even  in  the  selection  of  their  defensive  positions, 
which  rarely  admit  of  easy  advance  toward  the  front,  and  is 
further  emphasized  by  their  neglect  of  proper  pursuit  after 
victory. 

The  offensive  requires  a  far  higher  capacity  in  the  troop 
leaders  than  the  defensive,  and  the  Boer  commanders  were 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  127 

evidently  not  sufficiently  trained  in  the  art  of  war  to  meet 
these  requirements.  The  defensive  may  be  the  stronger 
form,  but  the  offensive  is,  nevertheless,  the  most  effective. 
So  long  as  the  Boer  defensive  remained  intact  at  all  points 
of  their  line  it  succeeded,  but  the  moment  the  British  offens- 
ive broke  that  line  at  a  single  point  the  entire  line  was 
broken. 

The  Artillery  Tactics  of  tlie  Boers. 

It  is  a  principle,  definitely  established  long  before,  but 
especially  emphasized  by  the  experiences  of  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war,  that  artillery  fire,  to  be  effective,  must  be 
concentrated. 

The  Boers  seem  at  first  sight  to  have  upset  this  principle. 
They  were  able  to  select  their  ground,  conceal  their  guns, 
and  prepare  their  positions,  and  this,  combined  with  the  use 
of  smokeless  powder,  which  assisted  the  concealment,  and 
the  longer  range  of  their  guns,  gave  them  such  an  advantage 
that  military  men  began  to  think  that  isolated  guns  in  well- 
concealed  positions  were  better  than  masses  of  artillery, 
But,  in  reality,  the  old  principle  is  still  true,  and  it  is  only  a 
question  of  modifying  the  application.  The  Boers,  although 
adepts  in  hiding  their  artillery,  never  succeeded  in  concen- 
trating its  fire,  and  this  is  one  of  the  secrets  of  their  want  of 
success. 


128  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


IV. 

The  third  act  iu  the  drama  has  closed,  the  decisive  bat- 
tle of  the  war  has  been  fought,  but  there  are  still  many  ele- 
ments of  strife  to  be  subdued,  and  finally  the  contending 
elements  must  be  harmonized  to  restore  peace  and  quiet 
permanently. 

The  third  act  closed  with  the  defeat  of  Cronje,  the 
advance  of  the  British  into  the  Orange  Free  State  from  the 
west,  the  relief  of  Kimberley,  the  retreat  of  the  Boers  from 
Cape  Colony  and  in  Natal,  and  the  relief  of  Ladysmith. 

The  weakening  of  the  Boer  forces  in  Natal  was  very 
poor  policy,  for  it  failed  to  help  Cronje  on  the  one  handf 
and  left  the  road  to  Ladysmith  open  on  the  other ;  moreover, 
it  indicates  a  weakness  in  the  leadership  of  the  troops,  for 
the  proper  course  was  undoubtedly  to  fall  upon  General  Bui- 
ler  with  all  available  forces,  and  to  strike  a  blow  there  to 
counteract  the  disastrous  events  in  the  West.  This  separa- 
tion of  the  forces  was  a  serious  mistake  in  strategy,  but  may 
have  been  called  forth  by  the  fact  that  the  coalition  between 
the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Free  State  was  none  too  strong, 
and  the  discipline  of  the  Boers  comparatively  weak,  so  that 
the  Orange  Boers  preferred  to  protect  their  own  land  rather 
than  help  the  Transvaal  Boers  to  finish  the  campaign  for 
both. 

The  forces  at  the  opening  of  the  fourth  act  (about  the 
beginning  of  March)  were  distributed  as  follows: 

In  the  Western  Theatre. 

Lord  Roberts,  after  Cronje's  capitulation,  took  up  a 
position  fronting  to  the  east,  on  both  sides  of  the  Modder 
River,  his  headquarters  at  Osfontein  (about  5  miles  east  of 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  129 

Paardeberg),  the  6th  division  (Kelly-Kenny)  on  the  right 
holding  all  kopjes  to  a  distance  5  miles  south  of  the  Mod- 
der,  the  7th  division  (Tucker)  at  the  center  close  to  the 
river,  the  9th  division  (Colville)  on  the  north  bank,  the  cav- 
alry (French)  on  the  extreme  left,  and  the  mounted  infant- 
ry (Colonel  Kidley-Martyr)  on  the  right.  The  troops  were 
given  a  rest  of  several  days,  with  a  view  to  supplying  them 
with  full  rations  once  more,  reestablishing  the  communica- 
tions and  preparing  for  the  advance  on  Bloemfontein. 

The  reconnoissance  of  the  cavalry  had  developed  the 
fact  that  the  Boers  were  intrenching  themselves  on  a  series 
of  kopjes  about  8  miles  east  of  Roberts'  position,  their  posi- 
tion extending  several  miles  north  and  south  of  the  Modder. 
These  troops  were  under  the  command  of  Delarey  and  De 
Wet,  and  numbered  about  14,000.  Other  Boer  columns 
were  reported  coming  from  the  northwest  of  Kimberley 
and  from  the  southeast  towards  Petrusburg. 

Lord  Methuen,  from  Kimberley,  had  occupied  Boshof 
on  the  road  to  Bloemfontein,  and  had  sent  a  column  to  re- 
lieve Mafeking. 

In  the  Southern  Theatre. 

In  Cape  Colony  the  Boers  (8,000)  retreated  towards  the 
Orange  River,  followed  by  the  columns  of  Generals  Bra- 
bant, Gatacre  and  Clements.  The  forces  confronting  Rob- 
erts were  partly  these  troops  from  the  south.  West  of  the 
De  Aar — Hopetown  line  and  in  Griqualand  West  a  serious 
uprising  of  the  inhabitants  took  place,  but  Lord  Kitchener, 
who  was  in  charge  of  the  lines  of  communication,  with  head- 
quarters at  De  Aar,  readily  suppressed  it. 

In  the  Eastern  Theatre. 

In  Natal,  General  Buller  rested  and  reorganized  his 
troops  in  Ladysmith  camp,  assembling  a  large  force  near 

—9- 


130  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Helpmakaar  with  a  view  to  resuming  the  offensive  at  an 
early  date,  as  soon  as  White's  division  would  be  ready  for 
service  again.  The  Boers  under  Joubert  (20,000)  occupied  a 
position  on  the  Biggarsberg,  north  of  Ladysmith,  their  left 
near  Dundee,  with  detachments  in  the  passes  of  the  Drakens- 
berg  as  far  south  as  Bezuidenhout  Pass.  This  was  still 
the  main  Boer  army. 


Such  wras  the  general  situation  at  the  opening  of  the 
fourth  act.  The  country  between  Osfontein  and  Bloemfon- 
tein  is  not  especially  favorable  for  the  Boer  tactics,  but 
their  purpose  probably  was  to  delay  Roberts  as  much  as 
possible  along  this  route,  thus  giving  time  for  the  main 
army  to  reorganize  and  establish  itself  on  more  favorable 
ground  north  of  Bloemfontein,  where  the  country  is  more 
hilly  and  broken,  the  crests  often  rising  to  a  height  of  8,000 
feet  above  the  sea. 

For  the  British  the  campaign  thus  far  had  been  a  very 
severe  one,  especially  on  the  horses  of  the  cavalry,  and  some 
time  was  needed  for  their  recuperation;  moreover,  the  sup- 
plies had  been  short,  owing  to  the  loss  of  a  considerable 
part  of  their  train  as  well  as  the  natural  consequences  of 
such  strenuous  efforts  as  the  army  recently  made  in  the  way 
of  marching  and  fighting,  and  time  was  required  to  bring 
the  supply  of  food  and  forage  to  the  normal  state  again. 
The  country  was  very  poor  in  water  and  the  army  was 
therefore  tied  to  the  vicinity  of  the  river. 

The  natural  consequence  of  the  British  invasion  of  the 
Orange  Free  State  was  that  many  of  the  burghers  left  the 
Army  to  defend  their  own  houses,  and  thus  the  Boer  Army 
was  greatly  reduced  in  a  comparatively  short  time,  and  the 
resistance  to  Roberts'  advance  was  gradually  weakened. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  131 

GENERAL  ROBERTS'  CAMPAIGN. 

Battle  of  Poplar  Grove. 

On  March  7th  General  Roberts  continued  his  advance. 
French's  division,  composed  of  3  brigades  of  cavalry,  2  of 
mounted  infantry  and  7  batteries,  started  at  1  a,  m.  in  a 
southeasterly  direction,  followed  by  Kelly-Kenny's  division, 
and  at  daybreak  struck  the  left  of  the  Boer  lines,  posted  on 
a  group  of  seven  hills,  near  Poplar  Grove.  French  attempted 
to  turn  the  left  flank  of  the  Boers  by  means  of  Porter's  bri- 
gade and  several  guns.  The  British  guns  soon  silenced 
those  of  the  Boers,  and  Porter  continued  his  advance,  but 
came  upon  a  second  Boer  position,  farther  to  the  rear,  from 
which  he  received  heavy  musketry  fire.  He  sent  cavalry 
and  mounted  infantry  against  this  position,  but  ne  had  the 
enemy  on  two  sides  of  him  and  so  found  himself  in  a  diffi- 
cult situation.  However,  the  howitzers  and  guns  of  Kelly- 
Kenny's  division  came  into  play  soon  after  this  and  forced 
the  enemy  in  the  advanced  position  to  retire  from  the*  hills 
in  a  northerly  direction,  thus  freeing  Porter. 

The  artillery  of  Kelly-Kenny  advanced  and  attacked 
the  second  or  actual  Boer  position,  while  the  cavalry  worked 
on  the  flanks.  The  Boers  were  gradually  driven  back,  and, 
finally,  when  the  cavalry  threatened  their  line  of  retreat, 
they  fled  in  confusion  towards  the  north  and  east,  pursued 
by  the  cavalry. 

The  British  lost  1  officer  killed  and  4  wounded,  3  men 
killed,  46  wounded  and  1  missing. 

The  British  horse  artillery  did  excellent  service,  and  the 
fighting  was  practically  confined  to  the  cavalry,  which  was 
very  nearly  exhausted.  The  British  captured  1  gun  and 
great  quantities  of  forage,  stores,  tentage,  etc. 

Roberts  moved  his  headquarters  to  Poplar  Grove. 

The  infantry  on  the  north  of  the  Modder  River  crossed 


132 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


to  the  south  at  Poplar  Drift  (opposite  Poplar  Grove),  and 
General  Roberts'  further  advance  was  continued  along  the 
south  bank.  The  7th  division  (Tucker)  on  the  right,  moving 
on  the  Petrusburg,  road  towards  Aasvogel  Kop;  the  left  of 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  133 

the  Boer  position  covering  Bloeinfontein.  The  6th  division 
(Kelly-Kenny)  in  the  center,  over  the  open  country.  The 
cavalry  division  (French)  on  the  left,  close  to  the  river,  fol- 
lowed by  the  rest  of  the  troops. 

The  Battle  of  Driefontein. 

On  the  morning  of  March  10th  Broadwood's  brigade  of 
French's  division  came  in  contact  with  the  Boers  at  Drie- 
fontein, 8  miles  south  of  Abrahams  Kraal,  and  drove  their 
outposts  back,  attempting  then  to  outflank  the  position. 
The  Boers  kept  up  a  heavy  artillery  fire.  About  1  p.  m. 
Kelly-Kenny's  division  arrived  before  the  center  and  left 
of  the  Boers,  and  then  Broadwood  took  his  brigade  to  his 
left,  made  a  wide  detour  and  came  upon  the  rear  of  the 
enemy  before  nightfall.  Meanwhile,  Kelly-Kenny's  division 
attacked  at  the  center  and  worked  around  the  enemy's  right 
flank.  By  2  p.  m.  the  horse  batteries  cleared  the  way  for 
the  infantry,  which  advanced  to  the  attack.  Finally,  they 
stormed  the  kopjes  at  the  charge,  and  took  the  heights  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet,  but  not  until  after  a  hard  fight, 
lasting  six  hours. 

The  Boers  were  commanded  by  Delarey,  and  were 
mainly  those  from  Colesberg.  They  had  no  time  to  intrench, 
although  the  heights  afforded  good  natural  positions,  and 
scattered  rocks  gave  some  shelter. 

The  British  lost  7  officers  killed  and  16  wounded,  66  men 
killed  and  313  wounded.  The  Boers  left  173  dead  on  the 
field  and  20  prisoners. 

The  strength  of  the  British  forces  was  about  45,000; 
that  of  the  Boers  about  12,000. 

Lord  Roberts  reported  to  the  Presidents  of  the  two  Re- 
publics that  their  troops  had  abused  the  privilege  of  the  white 
flag,  and  of  the  signal  of  holding  up  the  hands  in  token  of 
surrender;  and  also  that  he  had  captured  large  quantities 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

of  explosive  bullets,  which  are  being  used  by  the  Boers. 
Lord  Koberts  reported  to  the  War  Office  that  the  wounds, 
as  a  rule,  are  more  serious  than  usual,  owring  to  expanding 
bullets  having  been  freely  used  by  the  Boers. 

The  Occupation  of  Bloemfontein. 

After  the  battle  Brief ontein,  Lord  Roberts,  instead  of 
following  the  retreating  Boers,  turned  to  the  southeast, 
along  the  Kaal  Spruit,  in  the  direction  of  Bloemfontein,  the 
capital  of  the  Orange  Free  State.  On  the  llth  he  reached 
Aasvogel  Kop,  and  on  the  12th  Venters  Vallei,  18  miles 
southwest  of  the  capital,  and  about  10  miles  west  of  the 
railroad.  The  cavalry  division  was  ordered  to  push  on  and 
seize  the  railroad  station  and  its  rolling  material.  French 
struck  the  railroad  six  miles  below  Bloemfontein  in  the 
morning,  and  by  evening  succeeded  in  taking  two  hills  close 
to  the  station,  which  commanded  the  town.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  13th,  the  3d  cavalry  brigade  and  mounted  infantry 
from  the  7th  division  were  sent  to  support  French,  and  the 
town  was  called  upon  to  surrender,  on  pain  of  being  bom- 
barded; the  white  flag  was  raised  at  noon,  and  a  few  hours 
afterwards  Lord  Roberts  entered  and  took  possession. 

The  President,  Mr.  Steyn,  and  the  officials  fled  to 
Kroonstad,  which  was  proclaimed  as  the  new  capital. 

The  British  captured  8  locomotives  and  much  rolling 
stock. 

Lord  Roberts  set  to  work  at  once  to  reestablish  the 
government  of  the  district  south  of  the  Modder  River.  Gen- 
eral Pretyman  was  designated  as  military  governor.  The 
civil  affairs  were  turned  over  to  Mr.  Fraser,  a  member  of 
the  former  government,  but  a  friend  of  the  English.  Many 
of  the  former  officials  who  remained  were  retained,  and  the 
burghers  were  allowed  to  retire  peaceably  to  their  homes. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  135 

on  condition  that  they  would  not  take  up  arms  again  in  the 
present  struggle. 

The  result  of  this  tolerance  was  that  the  Boer  line  on 
the  Orange  River  broke  down  at  once.  Of  course,  the  fact 
that  Lord  Roberts  had  penetrated  to  the  rear  of  this  line  had 
its  natural  effect,  but  its  immediate  collapse  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  many  of  the  burghers  preferred  to  accept  Lord 
Roberts'  conditions. 

The  moral  effect  of  the  occupation  of  Bloemfontein  was 
of  course  very  great,  not  only  on  the  Boers  of  the  Orange 
Free  State  as  well  as  the  Transvaal,  but  also  on  the  native 
uprisings  in  western  and  northern  Cape  Colony;  but  the 
strategic  effect  was  far  greater,  as  it  gave  the  British  con- 
trol of  the  important — nay,  indispensable — railroad  line 
from  Colesberg  to  Bloemfontein,  a  line  not  only  necessary 
to  supply  the  army  in  its  present  position,  but  absolutely 
required  for  any  further  advance  northward.  Besides, 
Bloemfontein,  with  its  natural  advantages  and  its  gener- 
ous water  supply,  formed  an  excellent  base  of  supply  for 
the  subsequent  movements  of  the  army. 

Lord  Roberts  had  another  problem  to  solve  before  he 
could  advance;  viz.:  to  transfer  his  base  at  Modder  River 
Station  and  his  overland  line  of  communications  to  the  rail- 
road. The  Boers  had  destroyed  the  bridge  at  Norvals  Pont, 
but  as  the  British  had  previously  prepared  the  necessary 
parts  for  repairing  it  and  held  them  all  ready  to  ship  to  that 
point,  this  work  would  not  require  over  two  weeks.  Mean- 
while, 2,000  Kaffirs  had  been  ordered  there  to  effect  the 
transportation  of  supplies  and  material  over  the  Orange 
River. 

The  security  of  the  lines  of  communications  was  left  to 
Lord  Kitchener,  a  master  in  that  art.  Lord  Roberts  also  rec- 
ognized the  danger  of  the  uprising  in  the  Southwest,  and  on 
March  19th  sent  Lord  Kitchener  to  the  Prieska  and  Carnar- 


136  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

von  districts  to  suppress  it.  General  Settle  was  sent  to 
Prieska  (85  miles  west  of  Hopetown,  on  the  Orange  River) 
with  a  force  of  mounted  infantry,  and  Sir  Parsons  to  Van 
Wyks  Vlei  (215  miles  west  of  Colesberg). 

Another  care  of  General  Roberts  was  to  insure  his 
junction  with  Generals  Brabant,  Gatacre  and  Clements, 
coming  ifp  from  Cape  Colony,  to  facilitate  which  he  sent 
General  Pole-Carew  with  a  brigade  by  rail  to  Springfontein, 
the  junction  of  the  railroads  from  Norvals  Pont  and  from 
Bethulie,  where  the  advancing  British  troops  could  be  sup 
ported  against  any  Boer  resistance  on  the  Orange  Kiver  by 
threatening  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 

The  troops  were  greatly  in  need  of  rest  and  reorganiza- 
tion, especially  the  arm  in  which  the  British  Army  excelled, 
and  which  had  increased  in  importance  as  the  army  ad- 
vanced— viz.,  the  cavalry;  moreover,  the  supply  trains,  on 
account  of  the  great  loss  of  pack  animals  en  route  from  Mod- 
der  River  Station,  were  not  in  condition  for  any  farther 
advance,  and  so,  for  all  these  reasons,  it  became  imperative 
to  give  the  troops  a  long  rest,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  such 
a  delay  would  also  afford  the  Boers  time  to  gather  their 
forces  at  some  advantageous  point  and  prepare  a  strong 
defensive  position.  The  raid  to  Kimberley  broke  down 
nearly  20  per  cent  of  the  British  horses,  and  over  1,700 
horses  were  disabled.  On  the  wray  from  Kimberley  to 
Bloemfontein,  over  the  hot  plain,  a  large  number  were  foun- 
dered or  died,  so  that  in  all  the  cavalry  was  short  about 
10,000  horses,  and  remounts  had  to  be  awaited. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  SOUTHERN  THEATRE. 

At  the  beginning  of  March  Generals  Brabant,  Gatacre 
and  Clements,  meeting  with  no  resistance  in  their  front, 
began  to  advance  from  Jamestown,  Molteno  and  Colesberg 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  137 

behind  the  retiring  Boers.  They  moved  slowly  in  order  to 
take  on  the  way  the  measures  necessary  for  quieting  the 
inhabitants  of  the  districts  through  which  they  passed. 

General  Brabant  moved  from  Dordrecht  on  the  3d,  with 
about  1,800  men,  on  the  4th  took  possession  of  the  Boer 
position  at  Labuschagnes  Nek,  about  6  miles  north  of  Dor- 
drecht. On  the  5th  he  attacked  the  Boers  north  of  this  posi- 
tion, and,  after  an  all-day  fight,  defeated  them.  The  British 
lost  about  30  killed  and  wounded,  and  captured  wagons, 
rifles  and  cattle  in  large  quantities. 

General  Gatacre  reoccupied  Stormberg  on  the  5th  of 
March,  and  thus  came  in  railway  communication  with  Gen- 
eral Clements  at  Colesberg;  on  the  7th  he  occupied  Bur- 
ghersdorp,  while  Brabant  reached  Jamestown,  and  Clements 
advanced  to  Norvals  Pont,  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Orange 
River.  At  the  last-mentioned  place  the  enemy,  after  retir- 
ing over  the  river  on  the  6th,  blew  up  the  bridge. 

On  March  12th,  Brabant  was  at  Aliwal  North,  Gatacre 
at  Bethulie  bridge  and  Clements  at  Norvals  Pont.  When 
Gatacre  reached  the  Orange  Eiver,  the  railway  bridge  had 
been  destroyed,  and  the  enemy  were  preparing  to  demolish 
the  road  bridge,  but  were  driven  off  before  they  could  accom- 
plish their  purpose.  On  the  15th  he  occupied  Bethulie.  Pa- 
trols of  Clements'  force  effected  a  juncture  with  Gatacr^'s 
troops  near  Burghersdorp,  and  a  patrol  from  Bethulie 
bridge  effected  a  union  with  Brabant's  column. 

On  March  4th,  on  which  day  Brabant  defeated  the  rear 
guard  of  the  Boer  column  from  Dordrecht  at  Aliwal  North, 
the  three  columns  were  practically  in  touch  with  one  an- 
other. It  appears  that  the  Boers  in  their  retreat  had  become 
demoralized,  failed  to  take  proper  measures  to  insure  the 
service  of  security  and  information,  and  were  consequently 
completely  surprised  by  the  rapid  advance  of  the  British. 
As  a  result,  they  were  unable  to  make  a  firm  and  concerted 


138  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

stand  on  the  Orange  River.  On  the  16th  the  three  British 
columns  crossed  the  river  without  opposition. 

The  Boer  column  retiring  over  Aliwal  North,  com- 
manded by  Grobeler,  assembled  at  Smithfield;  that  over 
Bethulie,  under  Olivier,  joined  them  at  Smithfield,  thus 
combining  to  a  force  of  about  5,000  men  and  16  guns.  The 
combined  columns,  under  Olivier,  then  moved  over  Wepener 
on  Winburg,  to  join  the  Boer  forces  there.  The  column 
over  Norvals  Pont  (600),  under  Van  der  Post,  assembled  at 
Fauresmith. 

On  the  18th,  Clements  was  advancing  on  Philippolis  and 
Fauresmith;  Gatacre  was  established  at  Springfontein,  with 
a  detachment  at  Springfield  and  the  Scots  Guards  holding 
the  railway  at  Edensburg;  and  Brabant  occupied  Rouxville, 
preparing  to  move  along  the  Basutoland  border. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  WESTERN  THEATRE. 

Lord  Kitchener  remained  in  the  Prieska  and  Carnarvon 
districts,  southwest  of  Orange  River  Station,  pacifying  the 
uprisings  kindled  by  roaming  bodies  of  Boers,  until  March 
27th,  when  he  returned  to  De  Aar.  About  200  rebels  made 
their  submission,  and  others  retired  over  the  Orange  River. 

Cronje  left  Modder  River  Station  on  March  4th  for 
Cape  Town.  He  was  to  be  held  a  prisoner  at  St.  Helena  till 
the  close  of  the  war. 

The  Transvaal  Boers,  augmented  in  number  since  the 
relief  of  Kimberley,  reoccupied  Griquatown.  Bodies  of 
rebels  wrere  reported  at  various  points,  commandeering  and 
looting.  A  body  of  800  Boers  with  4  guns  held  the  north 
bank  of  the  Vaal  at  Fourteen  Streams,  and  attacked  the 
British  at  Warrenton,  but  without  success.  Lord  Methuen, 
who  had  gone  to  Barkly  West  to  restore  order,  returned  to 
Ivimberlev  on  the  27th. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


139 


General  Snyman  was  still  investing  Haf eking  in  the 
month  of  March.  Colonel  Plumer's  force  was  checked  at 
Lobatsi  by  an  offensive  advance  of  the  Boers  on  March  16th; 
whereupon  he  made  a  raid  to  within  12  miles  of  Zeerust 
against  the  line  of  communications  of  Snyman's  force,  and 
returned  to  Ramathlabama,  only  six  miles  from  Mafeking. 
The  Boers,  however,  drove  him  back  with  heavy  loss  to 
Gaberones. 


EVENTS  IN  NATAL. 

The  relieving  force  under  Sir  Bedvers  Buller  marched 
through  Ladysmith  on  March  3d.  On  the  9th  the  naval  bri- 
gade of  the  Powerful  returned  from  Ladysmith  to  Durban. 
The  line  between  Colenso  and  Ladysmith  was  clear,  but 
the  Boers  began  entrenching  on  the  Biggarsberg,  as  proven 
by  a  reconnoissance  to  Pomeroy  on  the  road  to  Helpmakaar, 
by  Bethune's  Horse. 

The  British  army  occupied  a  line  extending  from  Acton 
Homes  and  Dewdrop  in  the  west  to  Elandslaagte  and  Sun- 


ARMQRED  TRACTION  TRAIN  —Engineering. 


140 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


ARMORED  TRACTION  TRAIN. -Engineering. 


ARMORED  TRACTION  TRAIN.— Engineering. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  141 

days  River  in  the  east,  with  outposts  along  a  line  from  Van 
Reeuens  Pass  to  Helpmakaar.  The  Boers  occupied  the 
Biggarsberg  with  about  14,000  men  and  20  guns,  and  had 
strong  detachments  in  De  Beers,  Tintwa  and  Van  Reenens 
passes.  The  cavalry  of  Dundonald  reconnoitered  continu- 
ally on  the  left  flank,  while  Bethune's  Horse  guarded  the 
right,  and  felt  its  way  forward. 

Pomeroy,  on  the  Zululand  border  road,  was  burned  by 
the  Boers  on  March  23d. 

LORD  ROBERTS'  CAMPAIGN. 

Pacification  of  Conquered  Territory. 

As  soon  as  the  army  had  rested  and  sufficiently  recu- 
perated, and  the  system  of  supply  was  in  normal  working 
order  again,  Lord  Roberts  directed  his  attention  more  par- 
ticularly to  pacifying  the  conquered  territory — the  south- 
ern part  of  the  Orange  Free  State — and  to  secure  his  lines 
of  communication. 

His  first  move  was  to  intercept,  if  possible,  the  retreat- 
ing Boer  columns  from  Cape  Colony,  the  principal  of  which 
was  that  under  Olivier  (5,000  men  with  16  guns)  retreating 
over  Smithfield  and  Wepener  towards  Winburg.  For  this 
purpose  Lord  Roberts  sent  General  French  with  his  division 
to  cut  Olivier  off  on  the  Thaba  'Nchu — Ladybrand  road.  A 
brigade  of  cavalry  had  been  sent  to  Thaba  'Nchu  as  early  as 
March  18th,  to  quiet  the  inhabitants,  but  on  the  26th  Gen- 
eral French's  division  advanced  towards  Ladybrand,  which 
his  advance  guard  occupied.  He  was  too  late,  however,  as 
Olivier  had  already  passed  that  point  on  his  way  north, 
gathering  to  his  standard  many  of  the  Boers  who  had  re- 
turned to  their  homes. 

The  rejection  of  the  peace  propositions  of  Presidents 
Kriiger  and  Steyn  by  the  British  government  was  followed 


142  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

by  flaming  proclamations  by  both  these  rulers  calling  upon 
the  Boers  to  continue  the  struggle  to  the  end.  In  conse- 
quence of  this,  many  returned  to  the  army. 

French's  movement  was  observed  by  a  Boer  outpost 
near  Brandfort,  and  a  commando  under  Crowther  was 
promptly  sent  to  Ladybrand  to  hold  the  road  open  for  Oli- 
vier. Crowther  drove  French's  advance  guard  back  and 
compelled  him  to  give  up  his  mission,  as  he  had  no  infantry 
with  which  to  dispute  the  ground.  French  left  Broad- 
wood's  brigade  at  Thaba  'Nehu,  and  returned  with  the  rest 
to  Bloemfontein. 

The  Boer  force  at  Fauresmith,  under  Van  der  Post, 
slipped  through  to  the  north  at  Petrusberg  and  Poplar 
Grove,  reaching  the  Boer  lines  at  Bultfontein. 

The  British  columns  from  Cape  Colony,  after  uniting 
with  Pole-Carew's  brigade,  moved  northward  on  a  broad 
front,  taking  all  necessary  measures  to  pacify  the  inhab 
itants  and  to  restore  peace  and  order.  One  of  the  great 
objects  of  Lord  Roberts — the  junction  of  his  main  army 
with  the  scattered  columns  in  Cape  Colony — had  thus  been 
accomplished. 

Clements  entered  Fauresmith  and  Jiigersfontein  on  the 
27th,  and,  leaving  a  garrison  at  the  latter  place,  reached 
Bloemfontein  on  the  8th  of  April;  Gatacre  made  his  head- 
quarters at  Springfontein,  and  Brabant  remained  at  Aliwal 
North.  Gatacre  and  Brabant  were  required  to  preserve 
order  in  this  portion  of  the  captured  district,  and  to  secure 
the  lines  of  communication. 

Preparations  for  Advance. 

Depressing  as  were  the  consequences  of  Cronje's  sur- 
render for  the  Boers,  there  were  many  indications  at  this 
time  that  their  spirit  was  not  yet  broken,  and  that  Lord 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  143 

Roberts  had  still  a  numerous  and  active  enemy  to  contend 
with. 

The  first  element  was  the  Afrikander  uprising,  which 
was  still  going  on  in  the  rear  of  Roberts'  army,  and  along 
his  long  lines  of  communication.  In  the  next  place,  the 
success  of  Olivier  in  eluding  the  British,  combined  with 
President  Steyn's  determination  to  stand  by  the  treaty  of 
alliance  with  the  Transvaal,  and  President  Krtiger's  to 
carry  on  the  war  to  the  end,  had  given  the  Boers  new  cour 
age  and  inspired  them  with  a  new  enthusiasm.  Their  num- 
bers, due  to  the  return  of  many  on  the  call  of  the  Presidents, 
had  risen  considerably,  and  but  few  of  the  reinforcements 
Lord  Roberts  received  had  been  available  at  the  front.  As 
regards  war  supplies,  arms  and  ammunition,  the  Boers  were 
well  prepared  and  had  enough  for  a  long  war.  In  losing 
Joubert  and  Cronje,  on  the  other  hand,  they  suffered  most, 
for  they  had  no  leaders  to  fully  replace  them,  although 
Botha  and  De  Wet,  for  the  kind  of  warfare  they  decided  to 
wage,  >were  remarkably  well  fitted.  Finally,  their  tendency 
to  assume  the  tactical  offensive  in  small  bodies  seemed  always 
to  have  been  greater  than  on  a  large  scale;  consequently 
their  new  mode  of  warfare  benefited  thereby. 

Before  resuming  his  advance,  therefore,  it  was  not  only 
necessary  to  reorganize  the  troops,  remount  the  cavalry,  and 
secure  the  lines  of  communication,  but  also  to  quell  disturb- 
ances in  and  to  pacify  the  conquered  districts,  to  clear  the 
country  of  the  numerous  smaller  bodies  of  Boers,  or  at  least 
to  locate  them  and  determine  their  strength,  with  a  view 
to  leaving  behind  detachments  to  watch  them,  and  to  coun- 
teract the  effects  of  Krtiger's  and  Steyn's  proclamations  by 
such  measures  of  leniency  or  severity  as  might  be  found  most 
effective. 

Evidences  of  this  new  energy  of  the  Boers  were  felt  in 
all  directions.  Some  of  these  have  already  been  referred  to ; 


144  TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

namely,  the  repulse  of  Methuen  at  Fourteen  Streams,  and  of 
Plumer  at  Lobatsi,  the  attack  on  French's  advance  guard 
and  its  expulsion  from  Ladybrand,  and,  in  Natal,  the  burn- 
ing of  Pomeroy.  Other  evidences  made  themselves  felt,  and 
gradually  on  a  larger  and  larger  scale. 

On  March  20th  the  two  railroad  bridges  north  of  Bloem- 
fontein  (over  the  Modder  and  the  Vet  rivers,  respectively) 
were  destroyed  by  the  Boers. 

Roberts'  army  near  Bloemfontein  was  posted  as  fol- 
lows: 7th  division,  1st  and  3d  cavalry  brigades,  at  Glen, 
near  the  Modder  River;  6th  division  in  Bloemfontein;  2d 
cavalry  brigade  at  Thaba  'Nchu;  9th  division  in  Bloemfon- 
tein; 1st  and  2d  brigades  mounted  infantry  near  Karree  Sid- 
ing, with  portions  at  Thaba  'Nchu  and  other  points. 

On  March  25th  the  British  reconnoitering  towards 
Brandfort  had  a  small  skirmish  with  the  Boers. 

Action  at  Karree  Siding. 

On  the  31st  General  Roberts  found  it  necessary,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  activity  of  the  Boers,  under  General  Smets, 
in  his  immediate  front,  to  drive  them  from  some  kopjes 
they  occupied  near  Karree  Siding  Station,  a  few  miles  south 
of  Brandfort.  The  operation  was  conducted  by  the  7th 
division,  assisted  by  the  1st  and  3d  cavalry  brigades  under 
French,  and  Le  Gallais'  regiment  of  mounted  infantry. 

The  group  of  isolated  hills  at  Karree  Siding  trends  east 
and  west,  extending  over  about  5  miles  of  ground.  The  line 
was  occupied  by  about  3,000  Boers. 

Tucker's  division  was  sent  to  Glen.  French,  with  his 
cavalry  division,  was  sent  to  the  west  to  turn  the  Boer  posi- 
tion, while  Le  Gallais,  with  the  mounted  infantry  and  3 
guns  (37  mm.),  was  to  do  the  same  by  the  east.  Tucker 
was  to  attack  in  front  after  the  turning  movements  were 
completed. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  145 

At  10  a.  m.  French  sent  a  heliograph  message  that  he 
was  in  position  in  rear  of  the  hills,  and  Tucker  advanced  to 
the  attack. 

The  infantry  pushed  the  Boers  back  gradually,  but  they 
resisted  with  some  energy  till  about  4  p.  m.,  when  French's 
artillery  opened  on  them  from  the  rear.  The  Boers  then 
retired  precipitately.  The  mounted  infantry  did  not  reach 
their  rear  in  time  to  cut  them  off. 

The  British  took  the  kopjes  after  a  six-hour  fight  and 
held  them.  They  lost  2  officers  killed,  7  wounded;  and  about 
100  men  killed,  wounded  and  missing. 

The  success  of  the  British  was  due  to  the  enveloping 
attack  {around  both  flanks)  made  by  the  cavalry,  but  the 
fact  that  no  pursuit  was  attempted  indicates  that  the  lat- 
ter was  not  yet  in  proper  condition  for  active  operations. 

Action  Near  Bloemfontein  Waterworks,  on  the  Koorn  Spruit. 

On  March  30th,  Broadwood,  who  had  been  left  at 
Thaba  'Nchu,  38  miles  east  of  Bloemfontein,  having  received 
information  that  two  strong  forces  from  the  north  and  east 
were  approaching  his  position,  retired  to  the  waterworks, 
which  were  17  miles  nearer  Bloemfontein,  and  where  he  had 
a  detachment  of  two  companies  of  mounted  infantry  for  the 
protection  of  the  \vorks,  near  Sauna's  Post.  General  Bob- 
erts  sent  the  9th  division  to  his  support. 

Broadwood's  force  consisted  of  the  Household  Cavalry,, 
the  10th  Hussars,  Q  and  U  batteries  horse  artillery,  and 
Pilcher's  battalion  mounted  infantry,  in  all  about  1,400  men.. 

De  Wet,  hearing  on  the  30th  that  Broadwood  had  re- 
tired from  Thaba  'Nchu.  decided  to  intercept  him,  and  by  a, 
forced  night  march,  with  a  force  of  about  8,000  men,  reached 
the  British  camp  before  daybreak,  and  made  his  dispositions, 
for  attack. 

At  dawn  Broadwood  found  himself  attacked  on  three- 
-10- 


146  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

sides.  He  immediatetly  despatched  his  two  horse-artillery 
batteries  and  his  baggage  towards  Bloemfontein,  covering 
them  with  his  mounted  troops.  At  the  point  where  the  road 
crosses  the  Koorn  Spruit  about  2  miles  from  the  water- 
works, a  Boer  force  was  so  well  concealed  that  the  scouts 
had  not  discovered  them,  but  as  the  artillery  and  the  train 
entered  the  drift,  the  Boers  opened  fire  at  short  range,  shoot- 
ing down  drivers  and  horses.  Such  as  were  able  galloped 
away,  covered  by  Roberts'  Horse.  Meanwhile,  another  pas 
sage  was  found  where  the  remainder  of  Broad  wood's  forcx- 
crossed  and  re-formed.  The  horse-artillery  guns  that  got 
out  formed  at  Klip  Kraal,  a  group  of  ten  houses  over  the 
Koorn  Spruit,  and  opened  on  the  Boers,  but  they  were  soon 
driven  back  by  cross-fire.  The  9th  division,  after  a  magnifi- 
cent march,  arrived  on  the  scene  of  action  at  about  2  p.  m. 
French  with  2  brigades  had  also  been  ordered  up,  but  did 
not  arrive  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  action. 

The  Boers  retired  towards  Ladybrand,  leaving  20 
wounded  officers  and  70  wounded  men.  Broadwood  lost  7 
guns  and  all  his  baggage,  about  150  killed  and  wounded,  and 
200  missing. 

Action  at  Pietfontein,  Near  Boshof. 

The  column  of  Boers  under  Van  der  Post,  which  slipped 
through  the  British  lines  from  Fauresmith  north,  remained 
in  that  vicinity  and  sent  out  detachments  from  Koodoos 
Rand,  in  the  direction  of  Poplar  Grove,  to  disturb  the  Brit- 
ish communications  between  Modder  River  Station  and 
Bloemfontein.  One  of  his  outposts,  to  protect  his  rear  in 
the  direction  of  Kiinberley,  70  men  strong,  was  surrounded 
by  Methuen's  troops  from  Boshof  on  April  5th  and  captured, 
the  French  colonel  of  engineers,  Villebois,  being  among 
those  who  fell  in  the  attack.  The  British  lost  1  officer  and 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  147 

1  man  killed,  10  men  wounded.    The  Boers  lost  8  killed,  8 
wounded  and  54  prisoners. 

Action  at  Reddersburg. 

The  Boer  columns  under  De  Wet  and  Olivier  again  took 
up  their  offensive  movement  southward  early  in  April.  On 
the  3d  De  Wet  reached  Reddersburg,  where  he  fell  upon  a 
small  British  force  and  captured  it. 

This  force,  composed  of  3  companies  2d  Royal  Irish 
Rifles  and  2  companies  9th  Regiment  Mounted  Infantry,  had 
been  sent  to  Dewetsdorp,  40  miles  east  of  the  railway,  to 
receive  arms  of  the  burghers,  and  on  the  way  back  to  Beth- 
any it  found  its  way  intercepted  a  few  miles  east  of  Red- 
dersburg by  a  large  force  with  guns.  The  British  detach- 
ment rushed  to  a  kopje  near  by,  and  held  it  for  18  hours, 
when,  all  hope  of  reinforcement  being  abandoned,  they  sur- 
rendered. The  battle  opened  in  the  afternoon  of  the  3d, 
and  the  English,  without  artillery,  defended  themselves  till 
2  a.  m.  on  the  4th,  at  which  time  all  their  ammunition  was 
expended.  At  daybreak,  therefore,  they  were  compelled  to 
surrender. 

Gatacre,  at  Springfield,  in  spite  of  the  thunder  of  the 
Boer  artillery  all  the  afternoon,  was  not  informed  of  the 
battle  until  late  in  the  evening,  when  he  received  an  order 
from  Lord  Roberts  to  send  reinforcements.  The  latter  he 
took  by  rail  to  Bethany,  and  then  marched  across  country, 
but  did  not  reach  the  field  till  noon  of  the  4th — too  late  to 
be  of  any  use.  He  therefore  retired  to  Bethanie. 

In  consequence  of  this  mishap,  General  Gatacre  was 
relieved  from  command  on  the  9th  and  ordered  home.  Gen- 
eral Pole-Carew  was  placed  in  command  of  his  troops. 

The  British  lost  2  officers  killed,  4  wounded  and  9  cap- 
tured; 10  men  killed,  33  wounded  and  about  400  captured. 


148  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

THE  GENERAL  SITUATION. 

Before  discussing  the  movements  of  Olivier's  column, 
which  began  at  the  same  time  as  those  of  De  Wet's  against 
Reddersburg,  and  which  resulted  in  the  siege  of  Wepener, 
a  glance  at  the  general  situation  will  enable  us  to  obtain  a 
clearer  understanding  of  Lord  Roberts'  preliminary  move- 
ments and  his  resumption  of  the  advance. 

The  Boers  were  distributed  somewhat  as  follows:  around 
Ladybrand,  10,000;  on  the  Vaal,  from  Fourteen  Streams  to 
Christiana,  6,000;  at  Brandfort,  about  6,000;  near  Boetsap 
(Barkly  West),  400;  near  Witrand  (Barkly  West),  700;  about 
Kroonstad,  5,000;  and  in  the  eastern  theatre  (Natal),  about 
14,000. 

The  general  plan  of  the  Boers  was  evidently  to  attack 
Roberts  at  the  center  near  Brandfort,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  make  a  raid  around  his  right  flank  over  Wepener  against 
his  communications  in  rear,  and  another  against  his  left 
flank  over  Paardeberg,  and  to  threaten  the  extreme  left  at 
Kimberley  by  an  advance  from  Barkly  West  and  Fourteen 
Streams. 

The  British  had  nearly  completed  their  reorganization 
and  remounts,  the  bridges  at  Bethulie  and  Norvals  Pont  had 
been  repaired,  and  the  uprisings  in  Cape  Colony  subdued. 
General  Clements  had  reached  Bloemfontein,  while  Gener- 
als Gatacre  and  Brabant  were  moving  gradually  on  Lady- 
brand  to  secure  Roberts'  right  flank. 

In  Natal,  Botha  held  his  intrenched  position  in  the  Big- 
garsberg  with  about  12,000  men,  his  main  body  north  of 
Helpmakaar,  with  strong  detachments  at  Glencoe  and  One 
Tree  Hill  (Road  Junction  Pass),  while  2,000  Orange  Boers 
held  the  Drakensberg  passes. 

General  Buller,  with  40,000  men,  occupied  a  position 
north  of  Elandslaagte  and  on  the  Sundays  River.  His  ad- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  149 

vanced  position  was  of  great  importance,  as  it  was  geo- 
graphically 60  miles  farther  north  than  Bloemfontein. 

In  the  north  of  the  Transvaal  a  new  movement  was 
being  planned.  With  the  consent  of  Portugal,  the  Rhode- 
sian  Feld  Force,  under  General  Sir  F.  Carrington,  5,000 
strong,  composed  of  Colonial  Horse,  mostly  Australian 
bushmen,  was  to  land  at  Beira  and  be  transported  by  rail 
to  Rhodesia. 

The  army  was  entirely  reorganized,  both  the  divisions 
under  General  Roberts  and  those  in  Natal  (see  Appendix); 
and  Hart's  brigade  was  sent  from  Natal  to  reinforce  Bra 
bant  in  the  Orange  Free  State,  while  Barton's  was  sent  to 
the  extreme  west  at  Kimberley  a  little  later. 

Lord  Roberts'  original  plan  appears  to  have  been  to 
advance  from  Bloemfontein  with  the  main  army  against  the 
left  flank  of  the  enemy  at  Kroonstad,  uniting  on  the  way 
with  a  part  of  Buller's  army,  opening  a  way  from  Natal 
through  the  Drakerisberg  passes,  while  Methuen  was  to 
advance  over  Boshof  and  Hoopstad  on  Kroonstad,  thus  mak 
ing  a  concentric  march  in  three  columns.  But  the  enemy's 
dispositions  showed  that  a  very  small  force  was  concen- 
trated at  Kroonstad,  whereas  the  right  flank  of  the  British 
was  seriously  threatened,  and  in  Natal,  as  soon  as  they 
learned  of  the  transfer  of  a  part  of  the  10th  division  (Hart's 
brigade)  to  the  western  theatre,  the  Boers,  on  the  10th  of 
April,  attacked  Buller,  and  took  Clery's  camp,  on  the  south 
side  of  Sundays  River,  completely  by  surprise,  only  the  arri- 
val of  reinforcements  saving  the  situation,  but  not  until 
after  a  three-days  struggle. 

Methuen's  force,  it  is  true,  advanced  on  its  route  to- 
wards Hoopstad,  and  reached  Zwartskopjefontein.  His 
march  was  opposed  by  a  detachment  of  2,000  under  Delarey. 
On  the  20th  Lord  Methuen  retired,  followed  by  Delarey,  a 


150  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

serious  skirmish  taking  place  between  the  latter  and  Me- 
thuen's  rear  guard. 

Evidently,  then,  Lord  Roberts  could  not  count  on  a 
junction  with  Buller  from  Natal,  and  even  Lord  Methuen 
would  have  difficulty  in  taking  part  in  the  march  northward. 
Moreover,  the  main  force  of  the  Boers,  now  east  of  Bloem- 
fontein,  demanded  attention  before  any  march  north  could 
be  made. 

The  total  British  forces  in  South  Africa  numbered  at 
this  time  about  200,000  men,  distributed  over  a  front  of  300 
miles,  and  guarding  nearly  1,800  miles  of  railway.  Lord 
Roberts'  army  at  the  center  was  posted  in  and  around 
Bloemfontein,  occupying  also  other  strategic  points,  and 
numbered  about  60,000  combatants  with  216  guns  and  how- 
itzers (3J  guns  per  1,000  men).  The  army  of  Natal  numbered 
about  36,000  combatants,  with  96  field  guns  and  howitzers 
(2}  pieces  per  1,000  men),  besides  a  number  of  naval  guns. 

Lord  Methuen,  in  the  extreme  west,  had  about  14,000 
combatants.  The  railways  arid  towns  of  Cape  Colony  and 
Natal  were  protected  by  about  35,000  combatants.  The 
other  fighting  forces  were  those  of  General  Brabant  in 
southern  Orange  Free  State,  Colonel  Plumer  at  Gaberones, 
the  garrison  of  Mafeking,  Colonel  Parsons  at  Carnarvon  in 
western  Cape  Colony,  and  the  new  force  under  Carrington 
landing  at  Beira. 

Tlie  Siege  and  Relief  of  Wepener. 

At  the  same  time  that  De  Wet  fell  upon  Reddersburg 
(April  4th),  Olivier  with  his  column  arrived  before  Wepener. 
The  latter  had  been  occupied  by  a  detachment  of  Brabant's 
force  under  Dalgetty,  composed  of  a  company  of  Scotch 
mounted  infantry,  the  Cape  Mounted  Scouts,  the  1st  and  2d 
Kaffrarian  Scouts — about  2,000  men  in  all,  with  7  guns. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  151 

The  success  of  De  Wet  at  Keddersburg  should  naturally 
have  led  to  an  attempt  on  Roberts'  communications  on  the- 
Springfield— Bloemfontein  railroad,  but  the  appearance  of 
small  detachments  from  Brabant's  force,  and  the  approach 
of  the  new  3d  division  under  Pole-Carew,  induced  the  Boers 
to  turn  eastward. 

Olivier,  finding  Wepener  already  occupied,  left  a  de- 
tachment in  front  of  it,  which  was  joined  by  two  other  com- 
mandoes retiring  from  Rouxville  and  Smithfield,  respect- 
ively. With  the  rest  of  his  force  Olivier  moved  southward,, 
and  on  the  6th  of  April  attacked  a  detachment  of  Brabant's 
troops,  composed  of  4  companies  Irish  Fusiliers,  2  companies 
volunteers  and  2  squadrons  border  scouts,  between  Bush- 
mans  Kop  and  the  Caledon  River,  the  Witte  Spruit  and  the 
Basutoland  border,  opposite  Mafeteng,  and  forced  them 
back  on  Aliwal  North,  reoccupying  Smithfleld  with  a  detach- 
ment of  his  force.  On  the  9th  the  Boers  besieging  Wepener 
began  the  attack  on  that  place,  the  British  force  occupying 
the  town  and  the  Jammerberg  Drift.  On  the  10th  the  lat- 
ter made  a  spirited  sortie,  inflicting  severe  loss  on  the  Boers^ 
The  attack  of  the  Boers  was  continued,  however,  and  was. 
covered  by  Olivier  at  Rouxville  and  Smithfield  against  Bra- 
bant at  Aliwal  North,  and  by  De  WTet,  who  concentrated  his 
force  at  Dewetsdorp  after  the  action  at  Reddersburg,  against 
a  British  approach  from  the  northwrest. 

Meanwhile,  for  the  relief  of  Wepener,  Roberts  ordered* 
Rundle's  8th  division  by  rail  to  Bethanie,  thence  due  east 
over  Reddersburg,  by  way  of  Rosendal  and  Vorlogspoort,  oni 
Dewetsdorp;  while  Brabant,  recently  reinforced  by  Hart's^ 
brigade  from  Natal,  was  directed  over  Rouxville  on  Boes- 
mans  Kop  to  force  back  Olivier's  troops.  To  cover  Run- 
die's  left  flank,  Chermside's  division  (stationed  between* 
Bloemfontein  and  Bethanie)  was  concentrated  at  Redders- 
burg and  ordered  to  Marshoutfontein  (17  miles  east  of  the 


152  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

railroad),  Knox's  brigade  holding  the  railroad  in  rear,  in 
support. 

Bundle  left  Bethanie  on  the  13th  of  April,  and  Redders- 
burg  on  the  16th,  but  heavy  rains  made  the  roads  almost 
impassable,  so  that  he  did  not  reach  Wakkerstroom  till  the 
19th,  and  only  come  in  contact  with  the  Boers  (4  miles  south 
of  Dewetsdorp)  on  the  morning  of  the  20th.  Chermside  oc- 
cupied Marshoutfontein  on  the  14th.  Brabant  reoccupied 
Rouxville  on  the  15th. 

The  vicinity  of  Dewetsdorp  is  comparatively  high 
ground,  containing  the  sources  of  the  Modder,  the  Kaffir, 
the  Koorn  Spruit  and  of  several  branches  of  the  Caledon 
emptying  into  the  Orange  River.  It  is  much  cut  up,  very 
difficult  for  cavalry,  favoring  the  defense  and  offering  many 
obstacles  for  the  attack.  The  Boers  recognized  the  fact  that 
it  covered  their  line  of  retreat  to  Thaba  'Nchu  and  Lady- 
ftrand,  and  consequently  fortified  it  with  great  care.  The 
right  of  their  position  was  protected  against  an  attack  from 
Bloemfontein  by  the  Leeuw  Kop  (16  miles  southeast  of 
Bloemfontein),  which  was  occupied  by  the  left  flank  of  the 
Boer  forces  encircling  Bloemfontein  on  the  east.  The  front 
of  their  position  at  Dewetsdorp  faced  southwest.  The  total 
Boer  forces  at  Wepener  and  Dewetsdorp  amounted  to  8,000 
men,  with  15  guns. 

Rundle,  deciding  that  the  position  was  too  strong  to 
attack  in  front,  deployed  the  mounted  infantry  and  yeo- 
manry in  front,  and  sent  Brabazon  with  the  cavalry  to  out- 
flank the  left  of  the  Boer  position.  The  Boers  retired  their 
left  wing,  but  took  up  a  new  defensive  position,  while  Run- 
die  entrenched  on  the  ground  gained. 

Meanwhile,  Brabant  reached  the  enemy's  position  at 
Bushmans  Kop,  18  miles  south  of  Wepener,  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  21st. 

De  Wet's  force  at  Dewetsdorp  resisted  Bundle's   ad- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  153 

vanee;  consequently  Roberts  despatched  Pole-Carew's  divi- 
sion from  Bloemfontein  on  the  22d,  and  two  brigades  of  cav- 
alry under  French,  to  relieve  the  situation.  They  reached 
Leeuw  Kop  (near  Bloemfontein)  the  same  day,  the  latter 
being  abandoned  by  the  Boers  on  their  approach,  and  con- 
tinued to  Tweede  Geluk  (24  miles  northwest  of  Dewetsdorp). 

Brabant  turned  the  flank  of  the  Boers  at  Bushmans 
Kop  and  pushed  on  to  within  8  miles  of  Wepener. 

At  this  time  (23d)  General  Roberts  instituted  a  general 
movement  against  the  Boer  position  to  the  east  of  Bloem- 
fontein, sending  the  mounted  infantry  under  Hamilton 
against  the  waterworks  and  Thaba  'Nchu,  supported  by 
Smith-Dorrien's  brigade. 

To  occupy  the  enemy  in  front  and  to  prepare  for  his 
advance  toward  Kroonstad,  Maxwell's  brigade  of  the  7th 
division  at  Karree  Siding  moved  eastward  and  took  posses- 
sion of  the  hills  commanding  the  wagon  bridge  over  the 
Modder  River  at  Kranz  Kraal,  8  miles  east  of  the  railway, 
on  the  23d  of  April. 

On  the  24th  Hamilton  occupied  the  waterworks  at 
Sanna's  Post,  Smith-Dorrien's  brigade  10  miles  in  rear,  the 
rest  of  the  9th  division  in  Bloemfontein  ready  to  march  east- 
ward, the  object  being  to  cut  off  the  line  of  retreat  of  the 
Boers  in  the  south.  Brabant  made  little  progress,  the  Boers 
holding  their  own  against  him  and  renewing  the  attack  on 
Dalgetty.  Pole-Carew  reached  Roode  Kop,  14  miles  from 
Dewetsdorp,  on  the  24th,  French  pushing  on  to  the  east  as 
far  as  Grootfontein,  in  order  next  day  to  sieze  the  Boer  line 
of  retreat  on  Thaba  'Nchu  at  Vaalbank,  9  miles  northeast 
of  Dewetsdorp.  Bundle's  scouts  also  came  in  touch  with 
Brabant's  outposts  on  the  Caledon. 

The  Boers,  on  the  night  of  the  24th,  however,  abandoned 
their  positions  at  Dewetsdorp  and  Wepener  and  retired  on 
Thaba  'Nchu  and  Ladybrand,  respectively.  Brabant  pur- 


154  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

sued  along  the  Basutoland  border,  while  French  and  Bun- 
dle followed  along  the  Dewetsdorp — Thaba  'Nchu  road.  Pole- 
Carew  returned  to  Bloemfontein,  as  reserve.  On  the  27th 
French  reached  Thaba  'Nchu,  joining  there  the  forces  of 
Hamilton  and  Sniith-Dorrien,  Bundle  also  arriving  later  in 
the  day.  The  Boers,  however,  made  good  their  escape  and 
joined  their  forces  near  Ladybrand. 

The  pursuit  of  the  Boers  was  continued  during  the  26th 
and  27th  of  April.  The  district  of  Moroka,  through  which  the 
Thaba  'Nchu — Ladybrand  road  passes,  is  mountainous  coun- 
try in  the  form  of  a  bastion  with  its  base  and  higher  ground 
near  Ladybrand,  its  point  and  lower  ground  towards  Bloem- 
fontein. East  of  Thaba  'Nchu  the  ground  changes  from  its 
comparatively  low  hilly  character  to  the  westward  to 
broader  and  higher  reaches  to  the  eastward,  the  latter  form- 
ing excellent  defensive  positions,  very  difficult  for  cavalry. 
In  the  latter  the  Boers  (under  De  Wet),  retiring  from  Thaba 
'Nchu,  took  up  a  strong  position.  French,  with  his  usual  en- 
ergy, attacked,  but  was  compelled,  after  a  fruitless  engage- 
ment, to  retire  on  Thaba  'Nchu.  On  the  28th  and  29th  the 
advance  was  continued,  but  this  frontal  attack  was  effect- 
ively resisted  by  the  Boers.  The  British  attempted  to  turn 
the  Boer  left  flank,  but  the  right  flank  of  the  latter  was  sa 
active  that  little  headway  could  be  made,  until  the  British 
decided  to  make  a  wide  detour  and  attempted  to  strike 
through  the  Houtnek  Pass,  about  12  miles  north  of  f Thaba 
'Nchu,  which  was  held  by  a  Boer  force  under  Botha.  This 
was  accomplished  by  Hamilton  with  the  mounted  infantry, 
supported  by  Broadwood's  brigade,  and  Bruce  Hamilton's* 
infantry  brigade  (21st),  on  the  2d  of  May,  and  the  Boers 
retired  towards  Winburg.  In  this  action  the  Boers  lost  12 
killed,  40  wounded  and  26  prisoners.  Hamilton  rested  at 
Jacobsrust  by  Lord  Roberts'  orders,  as  he  had  been  fighting 
for  seven  days  out  of  the  past  ten. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  155 

Meanwhile  Roberts  resumed  the  general  advance  on 
Kroonstad,  and  these  troops  joined  his  right  flank.  The 
Boers,  on  the  3d  and  4th,  retired  over  the  Leeuw  River  (east 
of  Thaba  'Nchu),  followed  by  Rundle  and  Brabazon  to  that 
stream,  when  the  latter  came  in  touch  with  Brabant.  The 
parts  of  the  3d  division  left  at  Thaba  'Nchu  returned  to  take 
charge  of  the  line  of  communications. 

LORD  ROBERTS'  CAMPAIGN. 

The  Advance  on  Kroonstad. 

The  country  between  Bloemfontein  and  the  Vaal  River 
is  a  rolling  plain,  with  low  ridges  crossing  in  the  northern 
portion,  showing  occasionally  the  characteristic  South  Afri- 
can table  mountain. 

The  railroad  runs  in  a  northeastern  direction  for  125 
miles  without  a  curve,  over  nearly  level  country,  which  is 
treeless,  with  streams  only  in  the  rainy  season,  and  only 
grass  and  low  bushes  visible  over  the  broad  plain.  Few 
houses,  and  these  only  isolated  dwellings  and  kraals,  are 
met  with,  and  the  country  furnishes  nothing  for  the  support 
of  troops. 

But,  while  the  British  army  will  have  to  depend  entirely 
on  the  supplies  it  carries  along,  the  advance  offers  no  diffi- 
culties, since  the  railroad,  wherever  it  has  been  destroyed 
(as  at  the  low  bridges  over  the  Modder,  Vet  and  Zand  rivers), 
is  easily  repaired.  There  are  no  places  for  defensive  posi- 
tions except  at  Brandfort,  Winburg  and  Ventersburg,  where 
there  are  considerable  elevations;  but  all  these  can  be 
turned,  especially  since  the  entire  country  is  practicable  for 
cavalry  or  mounted  infantry.  The  innumerable  spruits  are 
far  more  troublesome  to  an  army  than  the  kopjes,  because 
in  the  rainy  season  they  swell  so  suddenly,  and  are  rarely 


156  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

bridged,  while  in  the  dry  season  they  form  excellent  defens- 
ive positions  for  the  Boers. 

The  total  number  of  British  troops  in  South  Africa  on 
the  21st  of  April  amounted  to  about  210,759,  including  offi- 
cers, but  after  deducting  the  non-combatants  (13,000),  the 
troops  on  the  lines  of  communications  (40,000)  and  the  sick 
(about  23,670),  the  total  fighting  strength  was  about  134,000, 
stationed  as  follows: 

Under  Roberts,  directly  in  Orange  Free  State 

(including  garrisons) 66,000 

Under  Methuen  and  Hunter,  at  Kimberley, 

Boshof  and  Fourteen  Streams 20,000 

Under  Parsons,  in  western  Cape  Colony 10,000 

Under  Plumer,  north  of  Maf eking 2,000 

Under  Baden-Powell,  in  Mafeking 1,000 

Under  Carrington,  in  Rhodesia 5,000 

Under  Buller,  in  Natal 30,000 

The  total  Boer  forces  in  the  field  amounted  to  about 
50,000  men,  distributed  as  follows : 

Southeast  of  Bloemf ontein 8,000 

At  Smaldeel 3,000 

At  Brandfort  and  Karree  Siding 5,000 

Ladybrand 1,500 

East  of  Bloemf  ontein— Springf  ontein  R.  R.  . .  2,000 
Between  Kroonstad  and  Winburg 5,000 


24,000 

The  rest  at  Fourteen  Streams  (6,000),  in  Natal  (14,000), 
in  Barkly  West  and  in  reserve. 

Roberts'  immediate  army  was  posted  as  follows,  previ- 
ous to  the  resumption  of  the  advance  from  Bloemf  ontein  : 
7th  Division,  14th  Brigade  (Maxwell)  at  Modder  River 

bridge,  beyond  Glen. 

15th  Brigade  (C.  E.  Knox)  between  the 
Modder  River  and  Karree  Siding. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  157 

6th  Division,  12th  Brigade  (Clements)  on  outpost  duty. 
13th  Brigade  (Wavell)  north  of  Modder 
River,  south  of  Karree  Siding. 

llth  Division,  in  Bloemfontein. 

21st  Brigade  (newly  formed),  at  Glen. 

The  position  of  the  cavalry  and  mounted  infantry 
changed  constantly. 

The  Boers  were  known  to  be  in  force  at  Karree  Siding 
and  on  three  kopjes  southeast  of  that  point,  guarding  the 
road  to  Winburg. 

On  April  30th  Maxwell's  brigade,  assisted  by  Broad- 
wood's  cavalry  brigdae,  then  at  Holzhuisfontein,  was  or- 
dered to  take  these  kopjes,  which  was  accomplished  before 
nightfall. 

Broadwood's  brigade  was  then  directed  to  move  out  well 
to  the  east,  while  Button  was  sent  to  the  west,  to  outflank 
the  Boer  position  at  Brandfort  The  6th  and  llth  divisions 
and  the  21st  brigade  were  ordered  to  advance,  following  the 
general  direction  of  the  railroad,  and  to  attack  the  enemy 
at  Brandfort. 

On  May  2d  Broadwood  reached  Isabelfontein,  16  miles 
east  of  Brandfort,  and  the  Boers  retired.  The  British  occu- 
pied the  position  on  the  3d. 

The  9th  division,  Hamilton's  mounted  infantry  and 
French's  cavalry,  which  had  moved  on  Houtnek  Pass  and 
compelled  the  Boer  forces  there  to  retire  on  Winburg,  hav- 
ing accomplished  their  purpose,  joined  the  movement  of  ad- 
vance of  Roberts'  main  army.  Hamilton  reached  Welcome 
(12  miles  south  of  Winburg)  on  May  4th,  and  had  a  skirmish 
with  a  retiring  Boer  column  there;  on  the  5th  he  crossed  the 
Little  Vet  and  took  Winburg. 

Meanwhile,  Roberts  had  engaged  the  Boers  at  the  rail- 
road crossing  of  the  Little  Vet,  south  of  Winburg.  Pole- 
Carew's  division  (llth)  was  deployed  for  the  attack,  the 


158  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Boers  (under  Delarey)  on  the  right  bank  opposing  its  ad- 
yance,  bringing  several  guns  in  position.  The  British  devel- 
oped a  superior  artillery  fire,  bringing  2  batteries  of  field 
guns,  4  navy  guns  and  2  siege  guns  into  action,  and  soon 
silenced  the  Boer  artillery,  but  kept  up  the  fire  all  the  after- 
noon (May  5th).  Eoberts  again  turned  the  enemy's  flank, 
without  making  a  strong  frontal  infantry  attack,  by  send- 
ing Hutton  with  his  mounted  infantry  and  some  cavalry 
and  artillery  down  stream  to  a  ford.  The  latter  was  held 
by  a  small  Boer  force  with  2  field  guns,  a  howitzer  and  a 
Maxim  gun,  but  their  artillery  was  silenced  by  the  British 
guns,  and  the  Boers  retired,  losing  their  Maxim  gun  and  a 
number  of  prisoners. 

Hamilton  reached  Winburg  about  the  same  time  as 
Broadwood  (who  advanced  along  the  Bloemfontein — Win- 
burg  road).  The  Boers  united  their  forces,  however,  and  in 
the  night,  with  the  aid  of  the  railroad,  effected  their  retreat. 
On  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  May  Button's  patrols  destroyed 
the  railroad  at  Smaldeel,  but  his  force  was  too  late  to  cut  off 
the  Boers,  although  it  secured  some  rolling  material  for 
Roberts'  further  advance. 

At  Smaldeel  the  British  were  compelled  to  halt  for  a 
short  period,  in  order  to  repair  the  bridge  over  the  Little 
Vet,  to  rearrange  the  strategic  front  and  the  columns  of 
march,  and  to  await  supplies.  Hamilton  with  one  brigade 
of  mounted  infantry,  Broadwood's  cavalry  brigade  and  the 
9th  division  constituted  the  right  wing  and  moved  over  the 
Winburg — Kroonstad  road;  the  7th  and  llth  divisions  and 
the  21st  brigade  formed  the  center  along  the  railroad;  and 
Button's  brigade  of  mounted  infantry  and  the  other  three 
cavalry  brigades  under  French,  the  left,  west  of  the  railroad. 

On  May  7th  Roberts  had  the  entire  country  to  the  Zand 
River  cleared  up  by  his  cavalry  and  mounted  infantry,  and 
found  the  Boers  strongly  intrenched  on  the  north  bank  of 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


159 


160  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

the  Zand;  but  indications  of  retreat  induced  Button  to 
attack  with  his  artillery  at  Virginia,  near  the  railroad,  south 
of  the  river,  and  established  the  fact  that  the  Boers  were 
abandoning  the  position. 

On  May  9th  the  general  advance  was  resumed  by  Rob- 
erts' army,  and  on  the  10th  the  Zand  was  crossed,  the  troops 
advancing  that  day  to  Ventersburg.  On  the  llth  the  army 
reached  the  Bloem  Spruit,  and  on  the  12th  Kroonstad.  The 
Boers  retired  over  the  Vaal.  President  Steyn  moved  the 
seat  of  government  to  Heilbron. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  SOUTH. 

The  8th  division  (Bundle's),  it  will  be  remembered,  fol- 
lowed the  retiring  Boers  east  of  Thaba  'Nchu  as  far  as  the 
Little  Leeuw  Spruit.  On  the  9th  of  May,  not  being  able 
to  penetrate  to  Ladybrand  eastward,  Bundle  turned  north 
along  the  Leeuw,  and  after  a  number  of  minor  affairs  with 
stray  Boer  commandoes,  reached  Mequathings  Nek  (18  miles 
northwest  of  Ladybrand)  on  the  16th,  and  Clocolan  (20  miles 
northeast  of  Ladybrand)  on  the  17th.  After  these  points 
were  taken,  Brabazon  with  the  yeomanry  was  able  to  push 
forward  to  Ladybrand. 

EVENTS  IN  NATAL. 

Buller  also  resumed  the  offensive  on  the  9th,  and  ad- 
vanced against  the  Boer  position  in  the  Biggarsberg.  The 
2d  division  and  Dundonald's  cavalry  marched  towards  Help- 
makaar,  while  Bethune's  mounted  force  was  sent  in  the 
direction  of  Greytown  to  mislead  the  enemy.  On  the  12th, 
the  5th  division  moved  eastward  from  Elandslaagte  and 
occupied  Indoda  Mountain,  11  miles  away,  to  cover  and  sup- 
port Buller's  movement,  while  Bethune,  turning  northward, 
made  for  Pomerov. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  161 

The  enemy's  position  was  a  few  miles  southwest  of  Help- 
makaar.  On  the  13th  the  British  infantry  attacked  it  in 
front,  the  cavalry  turning  the  right  flank,  and  Bethune's  force 
operating  on  the  left  and  rear. 

The  Boers  (now  about  7,000  strong)  retired  over  Helpma- 
kaar,  firing  the  dry  grass  as  they  went.  Dundonald's  cavalry 
pursued,  and  the  army  occupied  Dundee  and  Glencoe  on  the 
15th;  on  the  17th  it  reached  Dannhauser,  with  its  advanced 
patrols  at  Newcastle.  The  Boers  fell  back  over  Laings  Nek 
and  De  Jagers  Drift  on  the  Buffalo  Kiver.  They  destroyed 
the  waterworks  at  Newcastle,  and  the  bridge  over  the  Ingogo, 
and  blew  up  the  tunnel  at  Laings  Nek.  Buller  sent  Clery 
and  Dundonald  as  advance  guard  towards  Laings  Nek  (Clery 
detaching  Hildyard's  brigade  towards  Utrecht),  and  ordered 
Lyttleton  towards  Vryheid  to  turn  the  Boer  left  flank. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  EXTREME  WEST. 

Towards  the  end  of  April  Douglas'  brigade,  which  had 
advanced  as  far  as  Zwartskopjefontein  had  been  forced  to 
return  to  Boshof  by  Delarey,  and  Paget's  brigade  was  still 
striving  to  force  a  passage  over  the  Vaal  near  Fourteen 
Streams.  Meanwhile,  a  detachment  of  mounted  troops,  about 
1,500  strong,  under  Colonel  Mahon,  attempted  to  cross  the 
Vaal  below  Barkly  West,  in  order  to  turn  the  Boer  west  flank 
and  thus  reach  Maf eking  by  forced  marches;  this  force 
reached  Taungs  on  May  7th,  and  Vryburg  on  the  9th. 

Colonel  Mahon's  force  consisted  of  picked  cavalry  and 
included  a  detachment  of  Queenslanders  and  Canadians 
drawn  from  Carrington's  Buslimen  at  Beira.  This  detach- 
ment left  Beira  on  May  5th,  went  by  rail  to  Salisbury  and  by 
coach  to  Buluwayo,  where  it  arrived  May  8th,  then  by  train 
to  Oatsi,  arriving  May  llth,  then  marched  for  twenty-two 

hours  to  join  the  main  column  on  the  12th. 
-11- 


162  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Early  in  April  Hunter's  division  (10th)  was  taken  from 
Natal  and  transferred  to  the  western  theatre,  Hart's  brigade 
sent  to  reinforce  Brabant  at  Aliwal  North,  while  Barton  and 
the  artillery  were  sent  to  Kimberley,  where  they  were  joined 
by  Hart  after  the  relief  of  Wepener.  The  object  of  thus  rein- 
forcing Methuen  was  to  enable  him  to  cross  the  Vaal  and 
relieve  Mafeking. 

While  Paget  made  a  demonstration  at  Warrentonr 
Hunter  endeavored  to  cross  the  Vaal  farther  west,  at  Wind- 
sorton,  about  27  miles  below  Fourteen  Streams,  then  to  turn 
on  Fourteen  Streams  and  roll  up  the  Boer  position.  On  the 
5th  of  May  he  effected  a  crossing,  and  on  the  9th  he  attacked 
the  right  flank  of  the  Boer  position  at  Fourteen  Streams, 
while  Paget  advanced  against  its  front  at  Warrenton.  The 
Boers  were  forced  to  retire.  Hunter  sent  Barton's  brigade 
towards  Mafeking,  while  he  with  the  other  brigade  moved 
towards  Bloemhof,  and  at  the  same  time  Methuen  advanced 
in  the  direction  of  Hoopstad.  Delarey  from  Zwartskopje- 
fontein  moved  north  towards  Mafeking,  while  the  Boers  from 
Fourteen  Streams  retired  on  Klerksdorp.  Hunter  occupied 
Christiana  on  the  13th  of  May. 

The  Relief  of  Mafelcing. 

Meanwhile,  the  column  under  Mahon  advanced  by  forced 
marches  to  the  relief  of  Mafeking.  After  passing  Vryburg, 
the  column  made  a  detour  to  the  west  to  avoid  a  Boer  force 
at  Pudimoe  Siding,  10  miles  north  of  Taungs,  and  again  on 
the  13th,  at  Setlacoli,  a  similar  detour  was  made  to  avoid 
a  column  from  Maritsani  Station,  which  was  that  of  Delarey, 
who  had  moved  north  to  cover  the  siege.  At  Kraiipan  the 
British  column  was  heavily  attacked,  but  the  Boers  were 
finally  repulsed.  On  the  15th  Mahon  joined  Plumer  at  Jan- 
masibi,  20  miles  west  of  Mafeking,  and  on  the  16th  they  at- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  163 

tacked  a  Boer  force  of  1,500,  9  miles  west  of  the  investing 
lines.  The  Boers  were  defeated  and  retreated  eastward,  and 
on  the  17th  Mahon  entered  Mafeking.  The  Boers  had  made  a 
last  attack  on  Mafeking  on  the  12th,  in  which  they  were  com- 
pletely defeated,  El  off,  the  commander,  and  120  men  being 
taken  prisoners. 

The  siege  of  Mafeking  had  lasted  217  days. 

On  the  same  day,  May  17th,  Methuen  entered  Hoopstad, 
and  Hunter  left  Christiana  for  Bloemhof. 

LORD  ROBERTS'  CAMPAIGN. 

The  Advance  on  Pretoria. 

At  Kroonstad  the  army  of  invasion  rested  in  order  to 
secure  its  lines  of  communication,  first,  as  regards  their  or- 
ganization ;  secondly,  as  regards  their  protection,  since  a  num- 
ber of  commandoes  still  hovered  about  the  flanks  of  the 
British  front  as  well  as  their  line  of  advance. 

In  the  movements  instituted  for  the  protection  of  the 
flanks,  Hutton  on  the  left  succeeded  in  capturing  a  small 
Boer  detachment  at  the  mouth  of  the  Olter  Spruit,  on  the 
Vaal,  while  Broadwood  on  the  right  occupied  Lindley  on  the 
17th.  These  mounted  troops  on  the  extreme  flanks  pushed 
out  detachments  toward  the  Rhenoster  River,  and  found  the 
Boers  on  its  north  bank.  Hamilton  and  Broadwood  moved 
out  from  Lindley  on  the  9th  and  had  a  series  of  engagements 
with  a  Boer  force  under  De  Wet  retiring  before  them,  reach- 
ing Heilbron  on  the  22d.  French  and  Hutton  on  the  left 
reached  Borman  on  the  Rhenoster  on  the  same  day,  and  Pros- 
pect, 5  miles  north  of  the  river,  on  the  23d. 

At  the  same  time  Hunter  in  the  West  advanced  to  Vry- 
burg,  wrhich  he  reached  on  the  23d. 

The  general  advance  was  resumed  on  the  22d,  the  army 


1(54  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

reaching  Honing  Spruit  Station,  20  miles  north  of  Kroonstad, 
on  that  day,  and  continuing  the  advance  on  the  23d.  The 
Boers,  threatened  on  both  flanks,  retired,  after  destroying  the 
Ehenoster  bridge  and  the  railroad. 

After  passing  the  Rhenoster,  Lord  Roberts  decided  to 
concentrate  his  army  more,  and  to  put  all  the  cavalry  on  the 
left  flank.  The  interval  between  the  two  flanking  columns 
(nearly  50  miles)  had  proven  too  great  for  concerted  action,  so 
that,  although  the  Boers  were  easily  maneuvered  out  of  their 
positions,  they  were  always  enabled  to  retire  with  all  their 
artillery  and  baggage.  Hamilton  and  Broadwood  were  di- 
rected to  join  French  and  Hutton  on  the  left  wing,  the  right 
being  covered  by  Colonel  Henry's  mounted  infantry  only. 

French  and  Hutton  reached  Parys  on  the  24th,  and  part 
of  their  forces  crossed  the  Vaal  there;  Hamilton  and  Broad- 
wood  stood  at  Wolvehoek  north  of  Heilbron  Station,  and 
Roberts  was  close  up  to  Wolvehoek.  On  the  25th  the  main 
part  of  the  forces  of  French  and  Hutton  crossed  at  Linde- 
quees  Drift,  10  miles  west  of  Vereeniging,  Broadwood  crossed 
at  Wonder  Water  Drift  north  of  Boschbank  (8  miles  west  of 
Vereeniging),  while  Hamilton  stood  at  Boschbank;  Roberts 
swung  away  from  the  railroad,  moving  on  Boschbank. 
Broadwood's  brigade  secured  Wonder  Water  Drift,  3  miles 
above  Lindequees  Drift,  and  there  covered  the  passage  of 
Hamilton's  column  on  the  26th. 

Colonel  Henry,  constituting  the  advance  guard,  seized 
Viljoens  Drift  (south  of  Vereeniging),  but  one  span  of  the 
railway  bridge  was  blown  up  by  the  Boers,  here  commanded 
by  Lemmer.  On  the  27th  Roberts'  army  crossed  the  Vaal 
there,  the  3d  cavalry  brigade  (Gordon)/  which  had  crossed 
at  Engelbrecht  Drift  the  day  before,  covering  the  right  flank. 

The  extent  of  the  front  of  Roberts'  army  by  these  move- 
ments was  reduced  to  25  miles. 

Immediately  after  passing  the  Vaal,  and  entering  the 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  165 

Transvaal  or  South  African  Republic.  Lord  Roberts  an- 
nounced the  annexation  by  Great  Britain  of  the  Orange  Free 
State  under  the  name  of  the  Orange  River  Colony. 

On  the  27th  French  and  Hamilton,  operating  to  the  west- 
ward, reached  Vanwyksrust,  30  miles  southwest  of  Johan- 
nesburg, while  Roberts'  main  army  on  the  28th  advanced  to 
Klip  River,  15  miles  from  Johannesburg,  continuing  on  the 
29th  to  Germiston,  10  miles  east  of  Johannesburg.  There 
Roberts  secured  possession  of  the  junction  of  the  road  to  Na- 
tal over  Heidelberg,  and  that  of  the  Johannesburg — Klerks- 
dorp  road. 

Colonel  Henry  with  his  mounted  infantry,  supported  on 
the  right  by  the  3d  cavalry  brigade,  had  orders  to  seize  Natal 
Spruit  and  Ekmdsfontein  at  all  cost.  Pole-Car ew  and  Tucker 
advanced  along  the  railroad.  Natal  Spruit  was  first  taken, 
then  Elandsfoutein,  thus  turning  the  Boer  right. 

Roberts  here  detached  the  9th  division  for  seivice  in 
guarding  the  communications,  retaining  only  the  llth  and 
7th  divisions. 

On  the  30th  Lord  Roberts'  army  surrounded  the  city: 
the  7th  division  and  Gordon's  cavalry  on  the  north,  Hamilton 
on  the  west  at  Florida,  French  on  the  northeast,  the  llth 
division  and  the  heavy  'artillery  remaining  in  Germiston. 
On  the  31st  the  city  surrendered,  Roberts  having  agreed  to 
allow  its  complete  evacuation  by  the  armed  burghers.  The 
Boers  had  left  much  rolling  material  and  even  a  train- 
load  of  coal  in  their  hasty  retreat,  and  the  mines  were  found 
undisturbed. 

The  British  army  had  covered  the  distance  between 
Kroonstad  and  Germiston,  nearly  160  miles,  in  8  days,  at  the 
rate  of  nearly  20  miles  a  day,  repairing  roads,  railroads  and 
bridges  as  they  went,  a  remarkable  performance. 

In  Pretoria  Lord  Roberts'  victorious  advance  created  con- 
sternation. President  Kriiger  and  the  principal  officials  fled 


166  TRE  SECOND  BOER  WAlt. 

on  the  29th  of  May  to  Machadodorp,  a  station  on  the  rail- 
road to  Lorenzo-Marques.  General  Botha,  however,  was  in 
Pretoria  on  the  31st,  encouraging  the  Boers  and  endeavoring 
to  incite  them  to  further  resistance,  but  with  poor  success. 

Roberts,  therefore,  hastened  his  advance  in  order  to  take 
advantage  of  the  confusion  and  to  prevent  the  Boers  from 
forming  and  executing  new  plans  of  resistance.  His  army 
rested  on  June  1st,  and  on  the  2d,  leaving  the  14th  brigade 
(Wavell's)  in  Johannesburg,  he  resumed  his  advance,  the 
left  flank  covered  by  Hamilton,  the  extreme  left  guarded  by 
French  and  Hutton  pushed  out  towards  Schoewan. 

On  June  4th  the  British  came  in  contact  with  the  Boers 
at  Six  Mile  Spruit  (Hennops  River),  just  south  of  Pretoria. 
The  mounted  infantry  and  yeomanry  dislodged  the  Boers 
from  their  first  position,  but,  after  pursuing  them  for  nearly 
a  mile,  came  upon  their  real  position,  protected  by  guns.  The 
British  heavy  guns,  which  had  been  placed  well  to  the  front 
for  that  purpose,  came  into  action,  supported  by  Stephenson's 
brigade,  and  drove  the  Boers  out  of  their  position. 

The  latter  then  attempted  to  turn  the  British  left  flank, 
but  were  resisted  by  the  mounted  infantry  and  yeomanry 
and  Maxwell's  brigade,  and  finally  Roberts  directed  Hamil- 
ton, 3  miles  to  the  west  at  that  time,  to  turn  into  the  gap 
between  the  two  columns.  The  Boers  were  driven  back  to 
Pretoria.  Roberts  bivoucked  on  the  field,  4  miles  from  Pre- 
toria. French,  with  the  3d  and  4th  cavalry  brigades  and 
Huttou's  mounted  infantry,  was  north  of  Pretoria,  Broad- 
wood  between  French  and  Hamilton,  and  Gordon  was  watch- 
ing the  right,  near  the  railway  bridge  at  Irene  Station,  which 
had  been  destroyed  by  the  Boers. 

The  strength  of  the  latter  at  Six  Mile  Spruit  was  still 
about  10,000. 

Hamilton  pursued  the  Boers  on  the  evening  of  the  4th 
to  within  2,000  yards  of  the  town,  through  which  they  re- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  167 

treated.  In  the  morning  the  town  was  surrendered.  The 
Boer  forces,  under  Louis  Botha,  taking  their  guns  with  them, 
had  retired  to  the  eastward  and  northward.  Most  of  the 
English  prisoners  (4,500)  were  left  by  them  at  Waterval. 

The  surrender  of  the  Transvaal  capital  closes  the  fourth 
act  of  the  drama. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  SOUTH. 

The  guarding  of  the  railway  south  of  the  Vaal  was  con- 
ducted by  Bundle,  Brabant,  Clements  and  Methuen,  holding 
a  chain  of  posts  from  Heilbron  to  Ficksburg,  110  miles. 

Kelly-Kenny  remained  at  Bloemfontein. 

Bundle  and  Brabant  continued  maneuvering  against  the 
Boer  commandoes  between  Ficksburg  and  Bethlehem.  On 
May  24th,  Colville  standing  at  Winburg,  they  reached  Trom- 
mel, and  on  the  28th  they  had  a  sharp  engagement  with  a 
Boer  force  at  Senekal.  On  the  29th  Rundle  advanced  south- 
east from  Senekal  to  draw  the  Boer  forces  from  Lindley, 
where  a  force  of  yeomanry  was  hard  pressed.  Lindley  was  oc- 
cupied by  the  British,  but  on  the  31st  of  May  the  13th  bat- 
talion yeomanry  under  Colonel  Spragge  was  surrounded  and 
captured  by  a  superior  Boer  force.  Methuen  from  Kroonstad 
had  been  ordered  to  the  rescue  and  marched  44  miles  in  25 
hours,  but  arrived  too  late.  He  attacked  the  Boers,  however, 
and  routed  them. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  EXTEEME  WEST. 

In  Griqualand  West  a  revival  of  the  rebellion  so  recently 
stamped  out  took  place.  Warren,  with  700  men,  was  sur- 
rounded at  night  on  May  29th,  surprised  and  attacked  by 
1,000  rebels,  while  encamped  at  Faber  Spruit,  12  miles  from 
Douglas.  The.  Boers  were  finally  repulsed,  but  with  heavy 
loss  to  the  British. 


168  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Hunter  was  occupied  in  repairing  the  railway  to  Mafe- 
king.  On  May  24th  Hart  was  at  Fourteen  Streams  on  the 
Vaal,  Barton  at  Taungs,  Hunter  at  Vryburg,  Baden-Powell 
at  Mafeking,  and  Carrington  at  Marandellas.  On  May  28th 
Plumer  occupied  Zeerust,  and  on  the  30th  Hunter  was  at 
Khunwana,  40  miles  south  of  Mafeking,  and  early  in  June 
was  marching  unopposed  over  Ventersdorp  on  Pretoria. 

EVENTS  IN  NATAL. 

Buller  was  detained  at  Newcastle  repairing  the  railroad. 

On  May  18th  a  squadron  of  Bethune's  horse  (500  men) 
was  detached  to  march  from  Dundee  by  Vantis  Drift,  show- 
ing their  force  in  Nqutu,  then  to  rejoin  the  main  body  at 
Newcastle.  On  their  return  they  were  ambushed  by  the 
Boers  and  lost  27  killed  and  11  prisoners. 

On  May  19th  Clery's  division  encamped  at  Ingogo,  12 
miles  north  of  Newcastle,  while  Dundonald  reconnoitered  to 
Laings  Nek.  On  the  21st  Buller's  scouts  crossed  the  Buffalo 
into  the  Transvaal. 

Hildyard's  (5th)  division  joined  Buller  at  Newcastle  on 
the  27th  of  May,  and  was  at  once  sent  out  to  seize  Utrecht, 
while  Lyttleton  was  ordered  to  move  on  Doornberg  and  Vry- 
heid.  The  object  of  these  movements  was  to  turn  the  strong 
Boer  position  beyond  Laings  Nek. 

The  defile  at  Laings  Nek  was  opened  and  the  tunnel 
there  repaired. 

One  June  2d  Hildyard  joined  the  main  force  from 
Utrecht.  Lyttleton  was  at  Coetzees  Drift,  protecting  the 
right  flank. 

The  Boers,  under  Christian  Botha,  still  numbered  10,000 
men,  and  successfully  opposed  Buller's  advance. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  169 

COMMENTS. 

The  Advance  on  Bloemfontein. 

The  battles  of  the  war  thus  far,  not  including  that  of 
Paardeberg,  fall  into  three  groups  of  four  each. 

The  first  group  embraced  the  actions  in  Natal  at  Glencoe, 
Elandslaagte,  Rietfontein  and  Nicholsons  Nek — three  tac- 
tical successes  culminating  in  a  grave  disaster.  The  second 
included  the  encounters  in  the  West,  of  Belmont,  Graspan, 
Modder  Eiver  and  Magersfontein— again  three  victories  fol- 
lowed by  a  serious  repulse.  The  third  group  comprised  the 
battles  on  the  Tugela,  Colenso,  Spion  Kop,  Vaal  Kranz  and 
Pieters  Hill — three  desperate  repulses,  succeeded  by  a  final 
victory. 

The  invasion  of  the  Free  State  by  Lord  Roberts  rendered 
possible  the  forcing  of  the  Boer  lines  on  the  Tugela,  by  draw- 
ing off  a  portion  of  Joubert's  army,  but  the  capture  of  Pieters 
Hill  decided  the  campaign  in  Natal.  In  tactics  this  battle 
also  illustrates  the  best  modern  ideas  on  the  subject — namely, 
the  combined  frontal  and  flank  attack,  and  is  a  perfect  ex- 
ample of  the  proper  execution  of  such  a  movement  and  action. 

After  Cronje's  defeat  the  Boer  Army  should  either  have 
struck  a  decisive  blow  in  Natal  to  counteract  Lord  Roberts' 
victory  at  Paardeberg,  or,  if  they  had  to  give  up  the  siege  of 
Ladysmith,  their  only  chance  for  any  decisive  results  was  to 
concentrate  all  their  available  forces  as  rapidly  as  possible 
at  Brandfort  and  Winburg  in  order  to  strike  a  decisive  blow 
against  the  victorious  army  of  Lord  Roberts. 

The  occupation  of  Bloemfontein — turning  aside  from  the 
direct  route  against  the  enemy's  army — by  Lord  Roberts  was 
a  sound  movement  strategically,  in  which  the  moral  effect 
of  occupying  the  enemy's  capital  played  but  a  secondary  part. 
His  strategic  purpose  was  to  get  in  communication  with  the 
columns  of  Brabant,  Gatacre  and  Clements,  to  secure  a  strong 


170  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

base  and  the  railroad  as  a  line  of  supply  and  communication, 
and  to  reestablish  on  a  normal  footing  the  system  of  relays 
and  intercommunication  of  the  parts  of  his  army.  Moreover, 
by  taking  the  southerly  direction  along  the  Kraal  Spruit  any 
further  intrenched  positions  of  the  enemy  would  be  turned  by 
the  mere  advance  of  the  army. 

Knowing  the  state  of  French's  cavalry,  it  is  difficult  to 
criticise  the  tactics  of  the  advance  on  Bloemfontein.  Their 
deeds,  considering  the  circumstances,  are  rather  the  subject 
for  praise  and  wonder.  Nevertheless,  it  was  a  mistake  in  re- 
connoissance  to  allow  Porter's  brigade  at  Poplar  Grove  to  fall 
into  the  zone  of  a  Boer  position  which  had  not  been  properly 
reconnoitered.  Moreover,  as  another  result,  his  turning 
movement  was  not  at  first  sufficiently  extended  to  strike  the 
actual  rear  of  the  Boer  flanks  in  the  first  place,  so  that  Rob- 
erts' success  was  not  complete,  and  the  Boers  were  ready  to 
oppose  him  again  on  the  10th. 

Again,  at  Driefontein,  the  British  came  upon  the  Boer 
position  unexpectedly,  and  were  forced  at  first  to  make  a 
frontal  attack.  They  failed  again  to  cut  off  the  Boers,  or  to 
gain  a  decisive  victory.  One  great  cause  of  the  British  diffi- 
culties in  reconnoissance,  aside  from  the  worn-out  condition 
of  the  cavalry,  is  the  lack  of  good  maps,  those  of  the  Intelli- 
gence Division  being  remarkably  poor;  but  the  greatest  ele- 
ment in  their  failure  to  bring  about  decisive  actions  is  the  re- 
markable mobility  of  the  Boer  troops,  wThich  they  made  full 
use  of  at  this  time  in  the  tactics  which  they  adopted — namely, 
to  stand  and  fight  till  the  tide  begins  to  turn  against  them, 
and  then  rapidly  to  retire  beyond  reach.  The  forced  march 
of  the  division  of  Kelly-Kenny  across  the  hot  plains,  followed 
by  six  hours  of  hard  fighting,  was  a  performance  deserving 
to  rank  among  the  finest  of  this  kind. 

After  the  fall  of  Bloemfontein  there  were  three  positions 
available  for  the  Boer  forces  to  make  a  defensive  stand:  at 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  171 

Brandfort,  about  35  miles  north  of  Bloemf ontein ;  near  Win- 
burg,  about  30  miles  farther  north;  and  at  Ventersburg, 
about  30  miles  still  farther. 

On  the  east  these  positions  rest  on  considerable  heights, 
but  on  the  west  they  can  all  be  turned,  for  which  purpose 
the  numerical  superiority  of  the  British  would,  of  course,  be 
taken  advantage  of.  The  first  position  (at  Brandfort)  could 
have  been  occupied  immediately  after  Cronje's  defeat,  but 
after  the  fall  of  Bloemfontein  it  was  no  longer  possible  to 
concentrate  the  Boer  army  from  Natal  there,  but  it  was  still 
practicable  to  assemble  it  at  Ventersburg  or  Kroonstad, 
holding  the  passes  of  the  Drakensberg  by  a  few  thousand 
men.  Moreover,  after  the  occupation  of  Bloemfontein,  the 
flanks  of  the  position  at  Brandfort  could  readily  have  been 
threatened  from  Boshof,  which  Roberts  had  previously  or- 
dered occupied. 

It  is  evident  that,  unless  a  decisive  blow  could  be  struck 
at  once  in  Natal,  it  was  useless  for  the  Boers  to  hold  on  there, 
because  the  advance  of  Lord  Roberts  north  from  Bloemfon- 
tein would  at  once  render  the  position  of  the  Boer  army  on 
the  Biggarsberg  untenable,  and  force  the  latter  to  retreat 
over  Laings  Nek  into  the  Transvaal  domain.  No  doubt,  the 
desire  to  hold  the  British  beyond  their  own  borders  as  long 
as  possible  influenced  the  Transvaal  Boers  to  keep  their  main 
army  in  front  of  Buller,  and  to  attempt  to  delay  Roberts  by 
means  of  a  small  but  active  force  in  the  West. 

The  Strategy  of  the  Boers. 

The  Boers,  however,  contrary  to  all  expectation,  adopted 
a  more  daring  plan  than  that  of  concentrating  at  Kroonstad. 
They  occupied  the  difficult  hill  country  to  the  east  and  south- 
east of  Bloemfontein,  not  over  40  or  50  miles  from  that  capi- 
tal. This  was  a  bold  step  to  take,  but  it  promised  results, 
for  it  placed  on  Lord  Roberts'  flank  a  force  which  would 


172  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

either  compel  him  to  give  up  his  advance  and  turn  against  it 
towards  Ladybrand,  or,  if  he  persists  in  advancing,  to  leave 
his  long  line  of  communications  exposed  to  a  flank  attack. 
The  moral  effect  of  occupying  a  position  so  near  to  the  Brit- 
ish army  was  also  very  great,  and  restored  the  courage  of 
the  Orange  Free  State  Boers. 

By  the  death  of  Joubert  the  Boers  lost  their  ablest  gen- 
eral, and,  coming  as  it  did  just  after  the  capture  of  Cronje,  the 
blow  fell  doubly  hard.  But  the  new  generals,  Botha,  Olivier, 
De  Wet  and  others,  appeared  to  fill  their  places  remarkably 
well,  as  shown  by  the  actions  immediately  after  Joubert's 
death  and  forborne  time  thereafter;  indeed,  the  fact  that  they 
were  younger  men  in  general  probably  was  an  advantage  in 
itself,  considering  the  new  and  more  active  mode  of  warfare 
demanded  by  the  circumstances  and  adopted  by  the  Boers. 

This  new  strategy  of  the  Boers  led  to  innumerable  minor 
engagements,  but  finally,  early  in  April,  they  began  a  move- 
ment on  a  larger  scale.  While  part  of  their  forces  made  an 
attack  at  Brandfort  against  the  center  of  Lord  Roberts'  liney 
a  large  force  undertook  a  raid  around  his  right  flank  towards 
Wepener,  with  a  view  to  striking  the  British  communica- 
tions in  rear  and  to  gather  up  as  many  of  the  burghers  as  pos- 
sible to  swell  the  ranks  of  their  army,  while  at  the  same  time 
another  force  was  gathering  in  the  west  at  Paardeberg  to 
move  against  Roberts'  left  flank.  Moreover,  farther  west  still, 
at  Barkly  West,  Fourteen  Streams,  and  along  the  north  bank 
of  the  Vaal,  the  Boers  were  threatening  an  advance  on  Kim- 
berley.  Another  great  object  of  this  movement  to  the  rich 
country  of  southern  Orange  Free  State  was  to  gather  in 
supplies,  especially  the  harvest  for  which  the  district  is  noted. 

While  the  spirit  of  this  movement  wras  strategically 
offensive,  even  to  actual  contact  with  the  enemy  (as  at  Red- 
dersburg  and  Smithfield),  its  tactical  execution  failed  entirely, 
for,  instead  of  taking  up  the  tactical  offensive  and'  attacking 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  173 

the  British  with  determination,  they  split  up  their  forces 
and  engaged  in  a  number  of  minor  affairs  which  had  no  real 
connection  with  the  original  object  of  their  strategical  ad- 
vance. Again  did  their  tendency  to  a  tactical  defensive 
prevent  them  from  reaping  the  rewards  of  their  strategic 
offensive. 

The  Actions  Around  Bloemfontein. 

The  escape  of  Van  der  Post's  column  through  the  British 
lines  at  Poplar  Grove,  and  that  of  Olivier's  and  Grobeler's 
along  the  Basutoland  border  must  be  attributed,  first,  to  the 
fact  that  Roberts'  cavalry  was  used  up  and  the  necessary  re- 
mounts had  not  yet  arrived,  and,  secondly,  to  the  necessity  of 
slow  movement  of  the  British  columns  following  them  from 
Cape  Colony,  this  slowness  being  demanded  in  order  to  pacify 
the  country  passed  over.  The  British  columns  were  thus 
prevented  from  keeping  in  touch  with  the  Boer  columns, 
which  enabled  the  latter  to  escape. 

In  the  action  at  Karree  Siding  the  condition  of  the  cav* 
;alry  evidently  prevented  a  more  complete  victory. 

The  surprise  of  Broadwood's  train  at  Koorn  Spruit  and 
his  command  at  the  waterworks*  is  another  example  of  neg- 
lect of  outpost  and  reconnoissance  duty,  at  least  of  an  effect- 
ive kind.  Broadwood  knew  that  the  enemy  was  in  the  vicin- 
ity in  force,  for  he  had  himself  reported  the  fact  to  .General 
Roberts  and  had  acted  on  the  information  by  retiring  from 
Thaba  'Nchu. 

The  capture  of  the  command  at  Reddersburg  was  due 
to  insufficient  equipment  at  the  outset,  since  no  artillery  was 
assigned  to  this  column,  and  for  this  neglect  General  Gatacre 
was  properly  held  responsible.  Moreover,  it  would  seem 
that  with  a  proper  system  of  transmitting  information  Gen- 
eral Gatacre  should  have  known  of  the  action  going  on  within 
8  miles  of  one  of  his  permanent  posts  (at  Bethanie)  long  be- 


174  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

fore  he  received  his  order  from  General  Roberts;  and  after 
he  received  that  order,  since  he  had  the  railroad  available  to 
Bethanie,  and  only  8  miles  to  march,  it  would  seem  that  the 
relief  force  should  also  have  arrived  earlier.  In  addition, 
however,  there  was  again  the  usual  neglect  of  proper  outpost 
duty;  otherwise  so  complete  a  surprise  would  have  been 
impossible. 

The  Relief  of  Wepener. 

The  measures  taken  by  Lord  Roberts  for  the  relief  of 
Dewetsdorp  and  Wepener  were  finally  effective  so  far  as  to 
cause  the  retreat  of  the  Boers  as  soon  as  their  line  of  retreat 
was  threatened,  but  failed  in  effecting  their  capture.  This 
was  mainly  due  to  the  condition  of  the  British  troops,  and  it 
is  to  be  noted  that  other  indications  point  in  the  same  direc- 
tion. A  careful  analysis  of  the  events  will  make  this  clear. 

In  the  first  place,  the  ordering  of  Brabant,  Hart  and 
Rundle  against  Wepener  and  Dewetsdorp  was  not  dictated 
by  strategical  considerations,  but  merely  to  relieve  the  Brit- 
ish  force  at  the  former  of  these  two  points,  and  to  support  it 
against  great  odds.  The  reinforcement  of  Rundle's  troops  by 
Pole-Carew  and  French  was  originally  of  a  similar  character. 

In  the  next  place,  the  movement  finally  made  against 
the  Boer  lines  of  retreat  (by  Hamilton's  command)  was  made 
by  an  entirely  inadequate  force  and  too  late  to  be  effective  in 
capturing  the  agile  Boers.  It  is  evident  that  Roberts  simply 
did  not  have  his  troops  ready  any  sooner  for  taking  the  field, 
and  this  view  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  troops  first 
selected  were  those  which  had  not  participated  in  the  hard 
march  to  Bloemfontein,  and  also  by  the  fact  that  as  soon  as 
possible  Pole-Carew  was  sent  back  as  a  reserve  to  Bloemfon- 
tein to  be  available  for  any  possible  movement  of  the  Boers 
from  the  northeast  or  northwest,  or  to  meet  any  emergency 
in  the  east  or  southeast. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  175 

Finally,  the  pursuit  by  the  British  after  the  Boers  aban- 
doned Dewetsdorp  and  Wepener  was  too  slow  to  insure  suc- 
cess, and  this  again  must  be  attributed  to  the  condition  of 
the  troops,  more  especially  as  to  supplies. 

The  explanation  of  this  state  of  affairs  after  so  long  a 
rest  in  the  case  of  the  troops  at  Bloemfontein  is  to  be  sought 
not  only  in  the  effects  of  the  hard  marches  from  Modder  River 
to  Bloemfontein,  but  more  especially  (and  this  applies  also 
to  the  new  reinforcements  recently  arrived)  to  the  fact  that 
the  British  rolling  material  for  the  narrow-gauge  road  of  sup- 
ply had  all  to  be  prepared  before  the  system  of  supply  could 
be  fully  organized. 

Nevertheless,  some  share  of  the  blame  must  fall  on  the 
apparent  lack  of  good  training  of  the  new  troops  in  modern 
war  movements. 

The  Advance  on  Kroonstad. 

The  decision  of  Lord  Roberts  to  advance  again  after  the 
capture  of  the  kopjes  southeast  of  Brandfort  on  the  4th  of 
May  was  good  judgment  and  fine  strategy.  The  movements 
of  his  entire  army  were  thus  combined  on  a  singly  object,  and 
no  time  was  lost  in  forming  a  new  front,  but  the  parts  came 
up  into  line  as  they  moved  forward  on  their  natural  routes, 
and  in  such  a  way  as  to  embody  a  turning  movement  at  the 
same  time. 

But  in  turning  the  enemy's  position  at  Vet  River  with 
cavalry  (or  mounted  troops)  on  both  his  flanks  it  does  not  ap 
pear  clear  why  Hamilton  or  Hutton  did  not  strike  the  rear 
of  the  enemy  and  break  up  the  railroad  to  prevent  his  retir- 
ing. In  all  probability  Hamilton  was  not  sufficiently  in- 
formed on  reaching  Winburg  of  the  position  in  front  of  Rob- 
erts, and  so  could  not  know  how  effective  such  a  measure 
might  be,  and  Hutton  evidently  obeyed  his  orders  too  liter-' 


176  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

ally,  and  did  not  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  ottered 
till  too  late. 

At  Smaldeel  the  question  naturally  arose  as  to  the  pro 
priety  of  attacking  in  rear  the  Boer  detachments  occupying 
the  Drakensberg  passes,  because  Winburg,  on  account  of  the 
connections  and  communications,  was  the  nearest  point  alon^ 
the  railway  from  which  to  accomplish  this.  To  have  done 
this,  however,  would  have  necessitated  leaving  the  railway 
again,  and,  besides,  would  have  offered  the  Boers  an  opportu> 
nity  to  attack  the  British  in  flank.  In  view  of  these  facts, 
then,  and  the  additional  one  that  Buller  was  holding  a  large 
Boer  force  idle  in  front  of  him,  the  strategy  of  Lord  Roberts 
in  continuing  his  advance  along  the  railroad  must  be  regard- 
ed as  sound. 

Of  course,  the  latter  movement  still  presented  some  dif 
ficulties,  because  the  Boers  retiring  from  the  Moroka  district 
might  effect,  in  the  vicinity  of  Bethlehem,  a  junction  with 
those  opposing  Roberts'  advance  directly,  and  then  compel 
the  British  to  fight  with  their  front  to  a  flank.  But  the  char- 
acter of  the  opposition  thus  far  met  with  did  not  indicate 
such  mobility,  determination  or  strategic  ability  on  the  part 
of  the  Boers.  It  was  with  a  view  to  preventing  such  action 
on  the  part  of  the  latter  that  Roberts,  on  May  7th,  had  such 
an  extended  reconnoissance  made  by  his  cavalry  and  mounted 
infantry  to  make  sure  that  the  Boers  were  retiring  northward 
beyond  the  Zand  River. 

The  prompt  advance  of  Lord  Roberts  beyond  Smaldeel 
was  masterful  strategy.  The  moral  effect  was  in  itself  very 
great :  most  of  the  Orange  Boers  returned  to  their  farms,  and 
the  Transvaal  Boers  declined  to  fight  any  longer  in  the 
Orange  Free  State.  But  the  strategic  results  were  greater 
still,  because  it  gave  Roberts  practically  control  of  the  lines 
Durban — Bethlehem,  and  Durban — Johannesburg.  The  ad- 
vance, moreover,  put  these  three  theatres  in  actual  strate- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  177 

gical  relation  with  one  another,  for  Buller  in  Natal,  and  Hun- 
ter and  Methuen  in  the  vicinity  of  Kimberley,  moved  out  at 
the  same  time,  and  Roberts'  short  halt  in  Kroonstad  was 
mainly  to  adjust  the  parts  of  this  line. 

The  Advance  on  Pretoria. 

The  advance  of  Roberts  from  Kroonstad  to  Johannes- 
burg was  conducted  at  first  on  a  broad  front  (about  50  miles), 
but  it  soon  became  evident  that,  while  such  an  extent  of  front 
facilitated  the  turning  of  the  Boer  positions  strategically, 
it  did  not  fulfil  the  tactical  conditions  necessary  for  capturing 
the  Boers  or  for  forcing  them  to  stand  and  fight  a  decisive 
action,  because  concerted  action  between  the  turning  wings 
was  impossible.  Consequently,  after  passing  the  Rhenoster, 
the  width  of  front  was  reduced  to  25  miles,  and  all  the  cavalry 
was  put  on  the  left  flank.  The  Boers  then  could  escape  only 
by  giving  up  practically  all  resistance. 

This  march  to  Johannesburg,  considering  its  distance, 
the  character  of  the  country,  the  size  of  the  army  and  the 
destroyed  bridges,  railroads  and  roads,  was  a  splendid  achieve- 
ment, and  illustrates  the  grand  qualities  of  the  British  in 
marching  capacity  in  their  ability  to  repair  bridges,  railroads 
and  wagon  roads,  in  their  utter  contempt  for  the  danger  of 
an  enemy  hovering  on  their  lines  of  communication  in  rear, 
and  in  their  determination  to  reach  their  objective. 

The  turn  to  the  west  before  crossing  the  Vaal  was  sound 
strategy,  for  the  Vaal,  unlike  other  rivers  in  this  section  in 
the  dry  season,  is  not  fordable  except  at  a  few  points,  and 
the  position  at  Vereeniging  was  a  very  strong  one  to  force, 
and  required  passage  over  the  bridge  there. 

The  strategy  of  Roberts'  campaign  was  brilliant  and 
effective,  and  the  opening  of  Laings  Nek  by  Buller  and  the 
advance  of  Hunter  over  Ventersdorp  on  Pretoria  promised  to 
-12- 


178  TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

furnish  him  the  necessary  reinforcements.  Nevertheless,  the 
escape  of  the  Boers  at  Johannesburg  and  again  at  Pretoria 
give  to  the  results  an  element  of  incompleteness,  especially 
as  the  enemy  retired  to  the  difficult  mountain  country — the 
Lyndenburg  District. 

Roberts'  turning  movement  in  both  these  cases  was  by 
his  left;  had  he  turned  to  the  east,  he  would  have  forced  them 
to  fight  at  both  places.  However,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  Roberts  counted  on  Buller's  advance  from  Natal,  which 
the  latter  was  unable  to  effect;  moreover,  his  main  object  was 
to  keep  the  Boers  moving  by  the  rapidity  of  his  strokes,  and 
at  both  the  above  mentioned  places  the  turning  of  the 
western  flank  was  far  the  easier,  hence  the  more  quickly 
accomplished. 

Strategically,  then,  his  march  marked  the  great  command- 
er who  takes  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  entire  situation, 
and  retains  his  object,  in  spite  of  mishaps  in  isolated  parts 
of  the  theatre.  Tactically  he  could  not  reap  the  full  harvest 
of  his  strategy  because  of  Buller's  difficult  advance  from 
Natal  and  the  disturbances  around  Lindley  threatening  his 
line  of  communications  in  rear:  the  necessity  for  rapidity  of 
action  was  greater  than  that  for  perfection  in  tactical 
disposition. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAlf.  179 


V7. 

The  fourth  act  in  the  South  African  war  closed  with 
the  brilliant  campaign  of  Roberts,  ending  with  the  occupa- 
tion of  Pretoria,  the  Transvaal  capital. 

Pretoria  had  been  well  fortified  with  seven  strong  forts, 
but  only  five  of  these  had  their  armament.  Fort  Signal, 
about  5^  miles  south  of  Pretoria,  commanded  the  railroad 
to  Johannesburg,  and  was  well  armed,  and  at  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  fully  garrisoned;  and  Fort  Wonder-boom,  about 
5  miles  south  of  the  capital,  was  one  of  the  best  of  modern 
forts.  The  garrisons,  however,  had  been  sent  into  the  field, 
and  were  never  replaced.  Moreover,  the  entire  line  of  de- 
fense was  too  extended  for  the  10,000  men  left  to  hold  it. 
For  these  reasons  the  Boers  gave  up  this  important  point, 
and  retired  to  Middelburg  on  the  railroad,  leaving  a  strong 
rear  guard  at  Hatherley,  12  miles  east  of  Pretoria. 

They  had  decided  to  defend  the  mountain  district  of 
Lydenburg,  and  had  for  some  time  been  sending  daily  from 
Pretoria  50  trains  with  supplies  into  this  region.  Neverthe- 
less, they  had  not  yet  made  up  their  minds  to  limit  them- 
selves to  guerrilla  warfare,  but  proposed  to  make  a  stand  at 
any  good  available  defensive  positions,  such  as  Hatherley, 
Middelburg  and  Yolksrust. 

In  the  northern  part  of  the  Orange  Free  State  their  re- 
sistance was  not  yet  subdued,  but  there  guerrilla  warfare  was 
exclusively  adopted,  and  proved  effective. 

Events  in  Orange  River  Colony. 

Lord  Roberts  reached  the  end  of  his  march  with  about 
25,000  men— 10,000  cavalry  and  15,000  infantry,  so  that  he 
still  had  enough  to  cope  with  Botha,  and  had  reason  to  hope 
that  Buller  and  Hunter  could  advance  to  Pretoria.  But  the 


180  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

great  danger  was  that  threatening  his  lines  of  communica- 
tion, especially  as  Buller's  advance  was  too  slow  to  enable 
him  to  count  on  a  line  through  Natal  in  time,  and  to  dispense 
entirely  with  the  line  through  Kroonstad. 

Roberts  took  with  him  into  the  Transvaal  about  46,000 
men.  Hunter,  Mahon  and  Plumer  had  about  11,500.  In 
Orange  River  Colony  there  were  about  41,500. 

His  immediate  army  comprised  Pole-Carew's  (llth) 
division,  Smith-Dorrien's  brigade  of  Colville's  division,  and 
Maxwell's  of  Tucker's  division;  also  French's  cavalry,  and 
Hamilton's  mounted  infantry. 

The  following  troops  had  been  assigned  to  the  protection 
of  the  lines  of  communication  in  rear  of  Roberts'  army,  viz.: 

1st  division,  Lord  Methuen,  on  the  Rhenoster  (Paget's 
Brigade  at  Lindley). 

3d  division,  Chermside,  near  Senekal. 

6th  division  (J),  Kelly-Kenny,  at  Bloemfontein. 

8th  division,  Rundle,  at  Hammonia. 

8th  division,  Colville,  at  Heilbron. 

Colonial  division,  Brabant,  at  Ficksburg. 

West  of  Johannesburg  the  detachments  of  Hunter  and 
Colonel  Mahon  had  joined  forces  at  Ventersdorp.  Troops 
from  Cape  Colony  and  half  of  Kelly-Kenny's  division  (Max- 
well's brigade  from  Johannesburg)  had  been  sent  to  Kroon- 
stad to  strengthen  the  line  of  communications. 

Buller  in  Natal  had  Clery's,  Lyttleton's  and  Warren's 
divisions,  as  well  as  three  Natal  cavalry  brigades. 

The  Boers  were  still  about  27,000  strong:  10,000  at 
Hatherley — Middelburg  (east  of  Pretoria),  8,000  under 
Stein  at  Heilbron — Bethlehem — Harrismith — Ficksburg — 
Vreede,  9,000  at  Laings  Nek. 

De  Wet,  who  had  retired  into  the  Elandsberge,  between 
Lindley  and  Frankfort,  soon  began  to  display  great  activity. 
Utilizing  the  difficult  mountain  district  as  his  base,  he  made 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  181 

constant  forays  against  the  railroad  between  Kroonstad  and 
Vereeniging.  In  the  early  art  of  June  he  succeeded  in  de- 
stroying the  telegraph  line  and  the  railroad,  near  Eoodeval 
and  American  Station,  for  a  distance  of  20  miles. 

The  advance  of  Methuen  from  Lindley  towards  Heil- 
bron,  and  of  the  troops  of  the  lines  of  communication  under 
Lord  Kitchener  from  Vereeniging,  prevented  their  gaining 
a  permanent  foothold,  but  constant  forays  were  made 
against  this  long  line  of  railroad.  Lord  Kitchener  joined 
torces  with  Methuen  at  Heilbron,  and  the  united  forces 
marched  to  the  Ehenoster  Eiver,  where  they  completely 
defeated  De  Wet,  and  then  marched  to  Kroonstad.  During 
the  repair  of  the  road  between  Roodeval  and  American  Sta- 
tion the  Boers  captured  a  number  of  workmen,  detachments 
of  troops,  convoys,  and  in  one  case  even  an  entire  battalion 
—the  4th  of  the  Derbyshire  Militia  Regiment.  The  Boers 
were  especially  active  against  Honing  Spruit  Station. 
Whenever  successful  they  retired  to  their  fortresses  in  the 
Elandsberge. 

On  June  19th,  De  Wet  with  5,000  men  attacked  Meth- 
uen's  force,  escorting  a  transport  train  to  Heilbron,  but  was 
defeated.  Nevertheless,  on  the  23d,  he  cut  off  a  British  de- 
tachment on  the  Kroonstad — Honing  Spruit  Section,  at- 
tacked the  camp  of  the  Shropshire  Regiment  and  the 
Canadian  Contingent,  captured  a  train  going  south,  tore  up 
the  track  for  some  distance,  and  only  retired  before  superior 
forces  coming  from  Kroonstad. 

In  the  vicinity  of  Ficksburg,  where  General  Brabant 
had  remained,  and  at  Hammonia,  whither  Rundle  was  has- 
tening in  support,  the  Boers  under  De  Villiers  were  also  act- 
ive. In  the  middle  of  June,  Brabant  disarmed  a  Boer  com- 
mando of  1,500  men  near  Ficksburg,  but  the  Boers  received 
considerable  reinforcements  from  the  northern  part  of  the 
Orange  River  Colony.  President  Stein  had  moved  his  seat 


182  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

of  government  to  Bethlehem,  so  as  to  be  between  De  Wet 
and  De  Villiers,  in  order  to  incite  both  to  desperate  and  con- 
stant resistance. 

These  engagements  have  no  effect  on  the  general  situa- 
tion, and  the  fact  remains  that  a  large  part  of  the  inhabit- 
ants of  the  Orange  River  Colony  have  retired  to  their  farms, 
leaving  the  forces  in  the  field  too  weak  to  accomplish  any- 
thing decisive. 

Events  in  Natal. 

The  advance  of  Buller  in  Natal  against  the  extremely 
strong  position  of  the  Boers  had  been  necessarily  slow,  so 
that  he  was  not  able  to  take  part  in  the  proposed  concentric 
advance  on  Johannesburg.  His  efforts  were  directed  to 
turning  the  Boer  position,  and  in  this  he  showed  that  he  had 
learned  well  the  lesson  of  the  Tugela. 

His  attempt  to  turn  the  Boer  left  flank,  by  detaching 
Lyttleton  to  Vryheid  and  Hildyard  to  Utrecht,  failed.  His 
next  step  was  to  secure  favorable  artillery  positions  to  com- 
mand Majuba  Hill  and  Laings  Nek,  operating  against  the 
right  flank  of  the  Boer  position. 

The  advance  of  Lord  Roberts  to  Johannesburg  had  had 
its  effect  on  the  Boer  troops,  and  their  forces,  previously 
given  at  10,000,  were  considerably  reduced.  Their  leader, 
Christian  Botha,  had  asked  for  a  three-days  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities, but  Buller's  demand  for  unconditional  surrender 
ended  the  correspondence. 

Oh  June  3d,  Buller  resumed  his  advance,  his  plan  being 
to  hold  the  Boer  front  and  to  roll  up  the  flanks.  For  this 
purpose  he  made  a  reconnoissance  over  Bothas  Pass  towards 
Gansvlei  Spruit,  a  branch  of  the  Klip  River,  and  then  assem- 
bled his  forces  behind  his  left  wing  for  a  decisive  attack. 

Meanwhile,  Lord  StrathconaV  Horse  (from  Canada)  was 
sent  out  to  the  north  to  threaten  the  rear  of  Botha's  force 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  183 

and  his  railway  communications  with  Delagoa  Bay  o\r(jr 
Komatipoort. 

General  Coke,  with  the  10th  brigade  and  the  South 
African  Light  Horse,  took  the  Van  Wyk  Berg,  a  spur  of 
Mount  Prospect,  with  little  loss;  and  in  the  night  of  the  7thr 
the  Van  Wyk  Berg  and  the  southwestern  spurs  of  the  Ink- 
welo  Berg  were  occupied  by  artillery.  Under  the  protection 
of  the  fire  of  the  latter,  General  Hildyard  on  the  8th  attacked 
the  heights  between  the  Inkwelo  and  Bothas  Pass  and  car- 
ried them  in  excellent  form,  winning  thereby  his  promotion 
to  lieutenant-general.  Almonds  Nek,  the  last  pass  before 
Charlestown,  was  taken,  and  the  road  to  the  enemy's  rear 
was  opened. 

On  the  9th  Buller  resumed  the  offensive,  moving  in  the 
direction  of  the  Gansvlei  valley,  pushing  along  the  Transvaal 
and  Natal  border  in  a  northeastern  direction,  to  turn  Laings 
Nek.  The  Boers  in  his  front  retired  towards  Paarde  Kop, 
and  on  the  llth  of  June,  after  the  'further  advance  of  the 
British  on  Volksrust,  the  Boers  (3,000),  occupying  Laings 
Nek  and  Majuba  Hill,  abandoned  this  strong  position,  re- 
tiring on  \Yakkerstroom.  They  were  thus  separated  into 
two  parts,  but  in  spite  of  the  success  of  Buller's  strategical 
maneuvers,  the  Boers  were  enabled  to  retire  without  loss, 
taking  their  artillery  and  train  with  them. 

On  June  12th  Buller,  on  account  of  the  scarcity  of  water, 
retired  from  Volksrust  to  Charlestown,  where  he  joined 
Clery,  who  had  come  from  Ingogo. 

The  interruption  of  the  railroad  at  Laings  Nek  was  soon 
repaired,  and  by  the  17th  of  June  the  first  train  was  running 
through  this  point. 

On  the  19th  Lord  Strathcona's  Horse  (sent  out  about 
the  9th)  destroyed  a  railway  bridge  near  Komatipoort,  cut- 
ting Botha's  communications  in  that  direction. 


184  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  TRANSVAAL. 

First  Campaign  Against  Louis  Botha. 

Reconnoissances  from  Roberts'  main  army  at  Pretoria 
had  established  the  fact  that  Louis  Botha's  army  was  at 
Eerste  Fabrieken  (Hatherley  and  Donkerholk),  about  16  miles 
east  of  Pretoria,  on  both  sides  of  the  Middelburg  road.  The 
position  was  a  strong  one,  but  too  extended  for  the  troops 
occupying  it— about  12,000. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  everything  was  quiet  and  peace- 
ful in  Pretoria  and  Johannesburg,  the  close  proximity  of  so 
strong  a  Boer  army  was  a  constant  menace,  and  Roberts  de- 
cided to  attack  it.  Reinforcements  could  not  be  expected 
for  some  time,  as  Buller  was  still  at  Laings  Nek,  Hunter  at 
Potchef stroom,  Baden-Powell  at  Rustenburg,  and  no  troops 
could  be  spared  from  the  line  of  communications.  He  there- 
fore decided  to  make  the  attack  with  what  troops  he  had  in 
hand. 

The  Battle  of  Diamond  Hill 

Botha  had  concentrated  his  forces  on  the  flanks  of  his 
position,  leaving  the  center  comparatively  weak.  Roberts, 
following  his  usual  course,  advanced  on  the  llth  of  June 
with  a  broad  front,  intending  to  enclose  the  Boers  with  both 
flanks;  French's  cavalry  division  on  the  left  to  turn  the  Boer 
right  flank;  Hamilton,  with  the  mounted  infantry  and  Broad- 
wood's  brigade  on  the  right,  to  turn  the  Boer  left;  while  Pole- 
Carew,  with  some  mounted  infantry,  under  Colonel  Henry, 
held  the  enemy  at  the  center.  Roberts,  however,  soon  found 
Botha's  flanks  too  strong,  and  directed  his  efforts  on  the 
center,  ordering  Hamilton  to  attack  Diamond  Hill,  which 
was  accomplished  with  little  loss  on  the  12th  by  the  aid  of 
Pole-Carew's  division,  the  Boers  retiring  towards  Middel- 
burg. The  British  troops  did  not  pursue,  but  returned  to 
Pretoria. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  185 

Roberts  decided  to  await  the  arrival  of  reinforcements 
before  inaugurating  a  definite  campaign  against  the  forces 
in  northern  Orange  River  Colony,  threatening  his  line  of  com- 
munications. With  this  object  in  view,  he  drew  in  the  Natal 
army  along  the  Laings  Nek — Johannesburg  railroad,  to  sep- 
arate completely  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Boers.  Buller 
reached  Standerton  on  the  17th,  and  Hunter  turned  off  at 
Kriigersdorp  (west  of  Johannesburg)  towards  Frankfort. 
Baden-Powell  reached  Pretoria  on  the  18th.  On  the  21st 
Buller  reached  Paarde  Kop;  Hamilton's  column  from  Pre- 
toria reaching  Springs  on  the  same  day,  ready  to  join  hands 
with  Buller  at  Heidelberg  on  the  24th  of  June,  but  Buller 
was  forced  to  halt  at  Standerton,  which  he  reached  on 
the  23d,  because  the  Boers  had  destroyed  the  bridge  there, 
and  their  forces  to  the  eastward  threatened  his  line  of 
communications. 


EVENTS  IN  ORANGE  RIVER  COLONY.* 

Roberts,  towards  the  end  of  June,  directed  his  attention 
to  the  Boers  under  Steyn  and  De  Wet,  threatening  his  line 
of  communications.  The  enveloping  movement  already  be- 
gun was  gradually  completed. 

A  glance  at  the  general  situation  at  this  time  will  aid 
materially  in  comprehending  the  movements  about  to  follow : 

Baden-Powell,  Hutton  and  Plumer  held  Rustenburg; 
Pole-Carew,  Tucker  and  French  formed  the  garrisons  of  Pre- 
toria and  Johannesburg;  Smith-Dorrien  was  at  Vredefort 
(southwest  of  Johannesburg),  to  guard  the  west  of  the  rail- 
road; Methuen,  Knox,  Kelly-Kenny,  Clements,  Paget,  and 

*In  Cape  Colony,  on  June  23d,  De  Villier's  commando,  200  men, 
280  horses,  18  wagons,  260  rifles,  and  over  100,000  rounds  of  ammu- 
nition, arrived  at  Blikfontein  and  surrendered  to  Sir  Charles  Warren. 
De  Villiers  in  person  escaped  eastward. 


186  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Colville  were  stationed  at  Rhenoster,  Kroonstad,  Bloemfon- 
tein,  Senekal,  Lindley  and  Heilbron,  respectively,  to  guard 
the  railroad  on  the  east;  Bundle  and  Brabant  completed  the 
cordon  along  the  northwest  border  of  Basutoland,  at  Ham- 
monia  and  Ficksburg,  respectively;  Hamilton  and  Hunter 
occupied  Heidelberg;  and  Buller  had  reached  Standerton. 

The  Boers,  still  numbering  20,000,  had  about  two-thirds 
of  their  forces  south  of  the  Vaal,  divided  into  four  com- 
mandoes, under  Piet  and  Christian  De  Wet,  Limmer  and 
Olivier. 

Buller,  after  occupying  Standerton,  sent  mounted  troops 
forward  to  Greylingstad.  Vilj eon's  commando,  which  had 
held  the  place,  retired  towards  Middelburg.  Buller  had  left  a 
strong  detachment  under  Hildyard  at  Volksrust  and  Laings 
Xek  to  guard  the  pass  and  railroad  against  any  efforts  of  the 
Boers  who  had  retired  from  that  point  on  Wakkerstroom. 
During  his  advance  his  outposts  had  met  numerous  small 
bodies  of  Boers,  indicating  the  presence  of  the  latter  on  all 
sides.  A  Boer  force  of  1,000  from  Wakkerstroom  took  up  a 
strong  position  at  Gras  Kop,  northwest  of  Volksrust,  and  fif- 
teen miles  from  Sand  Spruit  Station,  threatening  the  railway 
line. 

On  June  29th  General  Coke,  sent  on  a  reconnoissance 
with  the  10th  brigade  to  Amersfoort  (12  miles  north  of  the 
railroad),  discovered  a  force  of  2,000  Boers  with  guns  in  a 
strong  position  there,  which  he  did  not  attack.  In  view  of 
these  facts,  Buller  strengthened  his  outpost  at  Greylingstad 
with  a  brigade  on  July  3d,  and  early  in  July  pushed  out 
Clery  to  the  vicinity  of  Heidelberg,  where  he  joined  Hart's 
brigade  on  the  4th.  Thus  it  is  evident  that  nearly  all  of 
Buller's  troops  were  needed  to  guard  the  railroad.  How- 
ever, on  July  Tth,  he  reported  that  the  railroad  was  service- 
able as  far  as  Pretoria. 

Buller's  portion  along  the  railroad  completed  the  sepa- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  187 

ration  of  the  Orange  from  the  Transvaal  Boers  and  brought 
his  forces  in  contact  with  those  of  Roberts. 

The  Campaign  Against  De  Wet. 

As  soon  as  Roberts  had  organized  his  cordon  around  the 
Orange  Boers,  and  had  completed  their  separation  from  the 
Transvaal  Boers,  he  proceeded  to  institute  a  decisive  cam- 
paign against  De  Wet,  ensconced  in  the  Elandsberge. 
whence  he  had  made  numerous  successful  sorties  against  the 
troops  guarding  the  lines  of  communication. 

The  general  movements  were  inaugurated  on  July  1st 
by  sending  Hunter  (exclusive  of  Hart's  brigade,  which  wras 
left  at  Heidelberg),  as  well  as  Broadwood's  and  Little's  cav- 
alry brigades,  to  Frankfort. 

As  soon  as  these  troops  were  in  position,  the  following 
changes  in  organization  and  command  were  instituted : 

Colville's  division  (!>th)  was  broken  up,  and  its  comman- 
der relieved;  Macdonald's  (Highlander)  brigade  being  as- 
signed to  Hunter's  (10th)  division,  in  place  of  Hart's,  joining 
Hunter  on  July  3d  in  Frankfort;  Smith-Dorrien's  being  trans- 
ferred to  Methuen's  (1st)  division,  then  at  Paarde Kraal,  north 
of  Kroonstad,  the  latter  sending  Paget's  brigade  to  operate 
against  De  Wet.  Broadwood's  and  Little's  brigades,  first 
attached  to  Hunter's  division,  were  now  attached  to  Paget's 
brigade,  which  was  to  constitute  Hunter's  advance  guard. 
The  mounted  infantry,  which  had  been  sent  from  Roberts' 
immediate  command,  reached  Heilbron  on  the  8th  of  July, 
but  was  afterwards  called  back  to  relieve  Methuen  on  the 
lines  of  communication,  when  the  latter  was  sent  on  July 
llth  to  the  relief  of  Rustenburg. 

The  general  plan  was  a  concentric  advance  of  Hunter 
from  Frankfort,  Paget  from  Kroonstad,  and  Clements  from 
Winburg,  against  De  Wet,  in  order  to  surround  and  capture 
him  in  the  mountains  near  Lindlev. 


188  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Paget  moved  rapidly,  reached  Pleiserfontein,  east  of 
Lindley,  on  July  3d,  and  had  an  engagement  with  the  Boers 
there.  The  latter  were  defeated  and  followed  by  Paget  on 
the  4th  to  a  point  half  way  between  Lindley  and  Bethlehem 
(the  temporary  seat  of  the  Orange  Boer  government,  which 
was  now  moved  to  Reitz).  De  Wet  had  taken  up  a  strong 
position  at  Bethlehem,  consequently  Paget  hesitated  to  at- 
tack him,  and  decided  to  await  the  arrival  of  Clements.  On 
the  7th  their  combined  forces  continued  the  advance,  and 
compelled  the  Boers  to  retire  into  the  mountains  south  of 
Bethlehem. 

Meanwhile  Broadwood  and  Little  arrived  at  Bethlehem, 
while  Hunter  was  still  on  the  march  from  the  north,  some 
distance  away.  The  original  concentric  advance  of  three 
columns  had  thus  become  the  simple  advance  of  a  single 
column. 

De  Wet,  after  retiring  into  the  Roode  Berge  south  of 
Bethlehem,  found  himself  between  the  forces  at  Bethlehem 
and  the  Basutoland  border,  threatened  in  his  left  flank  by 
Brabant  and  Bundle,  and  cut  off  in  the  west. 

Meanwhile,  Bundle  and  Brabant  continued  their  ad- 
vance, reaching  Rooikrans  (northwest  of  Ficksburg),  where 
they  drove  off  a  small  Boer  detachment,  and  establishing  the 
fact  that  a  strong  Boer  force  was  posted  east  of  that  place. 

On  July  16th,  meeting  with  little  resistance,  De  Wet 
was  enabled  to  break  through  the  left  flank  of  Rundle's  line, 
with  1,500  men  and  5  guns,  marching  on  Lindley. 

Broadwood  and  Little  (from  Bethlehem,  where  Bruce 
Hamilton  had  now  arrived)  followed  in  pursuit,  and  struck 
De  Wet  on  the  19th  at  Palmietfontein,  just  west  of  Lindley, 
and  defeated  him.  But  on  the  22d  he  turned  up  at  Serfon- 
tein,  just  north  of  Honing  Spruit,  took  a  transport  train 
with  its  guard  (1  officer,  100  men),  continuing  his  march  to 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  189 

Vredefort,  where  he  halted  on  the  23d  and  prepared  his  posi- 
tion for  defence. 

The  Boers  again  displayed  considerable  activity  at  other 
points.  A  reconnoitering  party  with  a  battery,  sent  out  from 
Bethlehem  by  Hunter  on  July  21st,  came  upon  a  strong  posi- 
tion 'held  by  Boers  about  20  miles  west  of  Bethlehem,  and 
was  forced  back.  On  the  22  minor  engagements  took  place 
with  Boer  forces  south  of  Bethlehem,  and  on  the  23d  Hunter 
moved  out  with  stronger  forces,  but  failed  to  carry  the  Boer 
position  on  that  day.  On  the  24th,  however,  he  succeeded 
in  turning  the  Boer  flanks,  the  latter  retiring  before  him. 
He  moved  south  in  pursuit,  reaching  Fouriesburg  on  the 
27th. 

Meanwhile  Rundle  continued  his  advance,  pushing  the 
retiring  Boers  in  his  front  before  him  towards  the  same  point. 
He  occupied  Kommando  Nek,  and  the  two  forces  of  Boers 
found  themselves  between  Hunter  and  Eundle.  The  result 
was  that  Prinsloo  with  about  4,140  men  surrendered  on  July 
30th.  -  Among  the  captured  were  commandants  Villiers  and 
Crowther,  and  three  other  commandants  of  less  note.  Gen- 
eral Olivier,  with  his  commando  and  five  guns,  however,  suc- 
ceeded in  breaking  through  in  the  direction  of  Harrismith. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  TRANSVAAL. 

The  renewed  activity  of  the  Boers  was  made  evident  not 
only  along  Roberts'  line  of  communications,  but  also  on  his 
immediate  front  and  flanks.  The  flanks  of  the  British  army 
at  Pretoria  are  covered  by  detachments  at  Rustenburg  (50 
miles  west  of  the  capital),  near  Bronkhorst  Spruit  (35  miles 
east)  and  at  Springs  (the  terminus  of  the  branch  line  from 
Johannesburg),  and  at  all  these  points,  as  well  as  at  others, 
the  Boers  made  more  or  less  energetic  attacks,  besides  that 
already  referred  to  at  Greylingstad. 


190  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Actions  at  Rustenburg  and  Olifants  Nek. 

On  July  8th  Lemmer  with  a  commando  of  Boers  sud- 
denly appeared  before  Rustenburg,  occupied  the  heights  com- 
manding the  town,  and  demanded  its  surrender.  Major 
Tracy,  in  command  there,  refused,  and'  opened  an  attack  on 
the  Boers.  Part  of  Carrington's  force  from  Zeerust  arrived 
in  time  to  take  part  in  the  action,  and  Lemmer  was  forced  to 
give  up  the  siege  and  retire.  A  few  days  later,  however, 
after  this  relief  force  moved  on  to  join  Lord  Roberts,  the  Boer- 
leader  Delarey  appeared  before  Rustenburg  and  resumed  the 
\siege.  The  garrison  was  too  weak  to  resist  him  for  any 
length  of  time,  so  Roberts,  to  relieve  his  threatened  left  flank 
and  restore  communication  with  Mafeking,  was  forced  to 
draw  Methuen  from  Paarde  Kraal  (north  of  Kroonstad)  to 
Rustenburg.  The  latter  reached  on  the  21st  the  vicinity  of 
Rustenburg  over  Kriigersdorp,  struck  the  Boers  at  Olifants 
Nek,  and  dispersed  them. 

Lord  Roberts  had  at  this  time  decided  on  a  grand  right 
wheel  of  his  army,  advancing  on  Middelburg,  and  Methuen 
was  left  at  Rustenburg  to  cover  his  rear.  But  on  the  25th  he 
was  ordered  to  march  over  Potchef  stroom  towrards  the  Vaal, 
to  join  Broadwood  and  Little  against  De  Wet,  who  had  in- 
trenched himself  at  Vredefort. 

In  Roberts'  immediate  front  the  army  of  Louis  Botha  had 
again  grown  to  a  strength  of  15,000  men,  and  had  taken  up 
its  position  at  Bronkhorst  Spruit,  35  miles  east  of  Pretoria. 

Action  at  Springs. 

Colonel  Mahon  had  occupied  writh  his  own  troops  and 
portions  of  Hamilton's  mounted  infantry,  which  had  been 
left  in  the  Transvaal,  the  important  end  station,  Springs,  on 
the  Johannesburg  branch.  He  was  the  first  to  feel  the  pres- 
sure of  this  strong  Boer  army  in  such  close  proximity  to 
Roberts'  front.  On  July  6th,  about  3,000  Boers  attacked  his 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  191 

position,  and  could  only  be  forced  back  over  the  Bronkhorst 
Spruit  after  a  hard  fight  on  the  7th.  But  this  attack  Avas  evi- 
dently merely  a  diversion  to  cover  a  more  determined  ad- 
vance of  the  Boers  by  the  north  and  west  of  Pretoria  to  act 
on  the  flank  of  Roberts'  line  and  gain  touch  with  the  Boers 
around  Rustenburg. 

Action  at  Uitvals  Nek. 

In  anticipation  of  such  a  movement  Roberts  had  sent  five 
companies  of  the  Lincolnshire  Regiment,  and  a  squadron  of 
Scots  Greys,  with  several  guns,  to  occupy  Uitvals  (Massili- 
katz)  Nek,  a  pass  about  18  miles  west  of  Pretoria,  to  cover 
his  left  flank.  These  troops  reached  their  destination  on 
July  10th,  and  occupied  a  position  directly  covering  the  pass 
with  three  companies,  the  other  twro  being  left  on  the  plain. 
On  the  llth,  at  dawn,  Boers  to  the  north  of  the  pass  opened 
fire  on  the  British  outposts,  and  at  the  same  time  a  heavy 
fire  was  opened  by  Boers  from  kopjes  to  the  east  of  the  pass, 
or  in  rear  of  the  British.  These  Boers  were  part  of  Dela- 
rey's  force.  The  fight  lasted  all  day,  and  although  reinforce- 
ments were  sent,  they  arrived  too  late,  the  three  companies 
in  the  pass  having  been  surrounded  and  captured.  The  Brit- 
ish lost  00  prisoners,  besides  the  killed  and  wounded.  The 
latter  amounted  to  1  officer  and  15  men  killed;  3  officers  and 
51  men  wounded. 

Action  at  Derdepoort. 

On  the  same  day,  July  llth,  Roberts'  outpost  at  Derde- 
poort (5  miles  northeast  of  Pretoria)  was  surprised  and  at- 
tacked by  the  Boers  under  Delarey,  resulting  in  the  retreat 
of  the  British  with  considerable  loss,  viz.:  1  officer  and  two 
men  killed;  2  officers  and  4  men  wounded;  and  19  men 
missing. 

Another  Boer  subdivision  occupied  a  ridge  running  east 
.and  west,  about  10  miles  north  of  Pretoria,  but  retired  before 


192  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

a  strong  detachment  *  sent  out  by  Roberts  on  July  16th,  since 
it  had  accomplished  its  object  of  drawing  British  troops  in 
that  direction,  in  order  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  direct  attack 
on  Roberts'  front. 

The  latter  was  directed  on  Pole-Carew's  left  flank  and 
the  left  wing,  commanded  by  Hutton,  but  the  excellent  han- 
dling of  the  British  artillery  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  the 
Boers.  An  attack  on  Springs,  at  the  same  time,  was  re- 
pelled by  the  fire  of  the  Royal  Irish  Regiment. 

Numerous  sallies  were  also  made  against  the  British 
detachments  at  Krtigersdorp. 

All  these  operations  of  the  Boers  indicated  their  pres- 
ence on  all  sides  of  Roberts'  army,  and  demanded  some  de- 
cided action  at  once. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  MIDDELBURG. 

Second  Campaign  Against  Louis  Botha. 

Roberts  determined  to  move  against  the  strongest  and 
most  active  of  the  Boer  armies — namely,  that  of  General 
Louis  Botha,  in  the  direction  of  Middelburg. 

On  July  19th  the  movement  began.  The  British  line 
was  formed  just  east  of  Pretoria,  facing  eastward:  French  on 
the  right  at  Treneestate,  Pole-Carew  in  the  center,  Button's 
mounted  infantry  on  the  left,  including  Hamilton's  mounted 
infantry  and  Mahon's  brigade,  which  had  been  sent  to- 
Springs. 

The  British  forces  numbered  about  22,000;  the  Boers  had 
about  12,000  men  in  position. 

He  first  moved  along  the  railroad  to  Bronkhorst  Spruit; 

*A  new  brigade  under  Colonel  Cunningham  was  formed,  com- 
prising 1st  battalion  King's  Own  Scottish  Borderers,  1st  battalion 
Royal  Berkshire  Regiment,  1st  battalion  Argyll  and  Sutherland  High- 
landers. Hickman's  mounted  infantry  (1,800)  was  attached. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  193 

during  the  advance  Button  was  sent  to  reinforce  French's 
right  wing,  while  Hamilton's  and  Mahon's  mounted  infantry 
moved  to  the  left  flank  behind  Pole-Carew's  division. 

On  July  22d  the  right  wing  was  south  of  Prinsloo,  on  the 
Bronkhorst  Spruit,  its  center  at  the  station ;  the  left  flank  at 
Russf  ontein  (6  miles  north  of  the  station) ;  giving  Pole-Carew 
a  very  advantageous  position  at  the  center.  On  the  23d, 
when  the  general  advance  began,  the  Boers  retired  eastward. 
French  reached  the  eastern  shore  of  Wilge  River,  7  miles 
south  of  Balmoral  Station  (5  miles  east  of  Wilge  River  Sta- 
tion), on  the  afternoon  of  the  24th;  the  leading  brigade  (Ste- 
phenson's)  of  Pole-Carew's  division  arrived  at  the  Elands 
River  station  (30  miles  east  of  Pretoria);  while  Hamilton  re- 
mained about  8  miles  in  rear,  as  a  left  flank  guard.  The 
Boers  had  offered  no  resistance  at  any  point. 

On  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Wilge  River,  however, 
French  found  a  Boer  commando  of  2,000  Boers  ready  to  resist 
his  advance.  Part  of  Button's  mounted  infantry  attacked 
the  right  flank  of  the  position,  while  French  endeavored  to 
pass  around  the  left  flank.  The  Boers  retired,  and  French 
and  Hutton  pursued,  but  failed  to  get  any  material  results. 

On  the  25th  the  center  reached  Balmoral  Station,  10 
miles  east  of  Elands  River.  French  and  Hutton  continued 
the  pursuit  over  the  Steenkoot  River,  where  the  condition  of 
their  horses  compelled  them  to  halt.  A  few  detachments 
crossed  the  Olifant  River,  and  reported  strong  columns  of 
Boers  in  full  retreat  on  Middelburg.  The  weather  was  very 
inclement,  the  rain  falling  in  torrents,  and  a  cold  east  wind 
blowing.  This,  together  with  the  condition  of  the  horses, 
prevented  Roberts  from  taking  advantage  of  the  situation. 

Roberts  in  person,  and  the  troops  of  Hamilton  and  Ma- 
hon,  returned  to  Pretoria,  which  they  reached  on  the  30th. 
French  and  Pole-Carew  (their  forces  amounting  to  about 
15,000  men)  continued  the  pursuit  as  far  as  Middelburg,  where 

-13- 


194  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

they  arrived  on  the  29th.  Louis  Botha  withdrew  into  the 
hills  of  Wonderfontein  with  his  main  army,  leaving  a  con- 
siderable force  on  the  Bothas  Berge,  north  of  Middelburg, 
threatening  the  left  flank  of  any  further  advance  eastward 
on  the  part  of  the  British. 

Meanwhile  Buller  (who  had  previously  moved  from 
Standerton  back  to  Paarde  Kop,  to  be  nearer  Hildyard,  who 
was  constantly  threatened  by  the  forces  under  Christian 
Botha  near  Volksrust)  sent  Lyttleton  and  two  cavalry  brig- 
ades to  threaten  the  Boer  left  flank  east  of  Middelburg,  these 
troops  reaching  Amersfoort  (25  miles  north  of  Volksrust) 
on  the  5th  of  August.  Clery  was  left  to  guard  the  rail- 
road between  Standerton  and  Heidelberg;  Hildyard  near 
Volksrust. 

Botha  at  first  retired  before  Buller,  but  finally  made  a 
stand  on  a  ridge  north  of  Amersfoort. 

On  August  6th  the  British  attacked  the  position:  Dun- 
donald  on  the  west  side,  the  infantry  on  the  east;  the  latter, 
with  the  King's  Royal  Fusiliers  on  the  right,  and  the  Gordon 
Highlanders  on  the  left,  continued  the  attack,  in  spite  of  the 
heavy  artillery  fire,  till  5  p.  m.,  when  the  Boers  retired.  The 
roads  were  so  bad  that  the  train  was  so  far  to  the  rear;  conse- 
quently Buller  was  compelled  to  remain  in  Amersfoort  on 
the  7th. 

On  the  8th  he  continued  his  advance,  reaching  Rood  (on 
the  Vaal)  on  the  9th,  and  on  the  12th  Ermelo,  in  rear  of  the 
forces  of  Christian  Botha,  who  were  retiring  on  Carolina. 
On  the  15th  he  reached  Twyfelaar,  near  Carolina,  Mean- 
while French's  reconnoitering  parties  from  Middleburg  over 
Wonderfontein  had  established  communication  with  Buller. 

The  Boers  made  several  attempts  on  Buller's  line  of  com- 
munications. In  the  vicinity  of  Ingogo,  south  of  Laings  Nek, 
they  brought  a  heavy  gun  into  position  with  a  view  to  destroy 
the  iron  railroad  bridge  there;  near  Lady  smith  they  made 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  195 

several  efforts  to  break  up  the  railroad;  and  finally,  on  Aug- 
ust 21st,  a  Boer  detachment  destroyed  the  bridge  9  miles 
north  of  Newcastle,  and  broke  up  the  railroad  south  of  that 
point.  West  of  Standerton  also  there  were  constant  skir- 
mishes with  Boer  detachments. 

These  interruptions  caused  Buller  to  delay  his  further 
advance. 

The  Chase  After  De  Wet. 

De  Wet  had  intrenched  himself  in  the  vicinity  of  Vrede- 
fort,  whither  he  had  been  pursued  by  Broadwood  and  Little. 
Methuen  had  been  ordered  down  from  Rustenburg  over  Pot- 
chef  stroom,  to  take  part  in  the  pursuit  of  De  Wet. 

This  Boer  leader  with  his  small  column,  with  which  was 
also  President  Steyn,  was  considered  of  such  importance 
that  Lord  Kitchener  wras  ordered  to  take  the  troops  from 
Springs,  reinforce  Broadwood  and  Little,  and  conduct  the 
operations,  but  Methuen  was  not  placed  under  his  orders, 
the  latter  retaining  independent  command  of  his  own  column 
from  the  northwest. 

De  Wet  remained  inactive  from  the  23d  of  July  to  the  7th 
of  August,  awaiting  the  approach  of  Methuen  from  Potchef- 
stroom,  and  Kitchener,  operating  south  of  the  Vaal.  On 
that  day,  however,  he  marched  his  main  column  to  Linde- 
quees  Drift,  20  miles  up  stream  from  Vredefort,  and  pro- 
tected himself  against  Kitchener,  sending  a  flank  column 
over  the  Vaal  at  Venterskroon,  7  miles  northwest  of  Vrede- 
fort, to  cover  his  position  against  a  flank  attack  by  Methuen, 
which  might  impede  his  passage  of  the  river.  This  flank 
column,  on  the  morning  of  August  7th,  had  an  action  with 
Methuen's  advanced  troops,  but  retired  in  good  order,  reach- 
ing Buffelshoek,  7  miles  northeast  of  Venterskroon,  on  Aug- 
ust 9th  (the  day  on  which  Lord  Kitchener  reached  Linde- 
quees  Drift,  and  had  a  slight  engagement  with  De  Wet's 
rear  guard),  and  was  attacked  again  by  Methuen.  Neither 


196  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

British  commander  knew  of  the  near  presence  of  the  other 
until  the  fighting  at  Lindequees  Drift  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Buffelshoek  on  the  other,  informed  them ;  otherwise  Methuen 
would  have  moved  by  his  right,  joined  hands  with  Kitchener, 
and  then  rolled  up  De  Wet's  flank.  De  Wet  drew  his  forces 
on  the  9th  from  the  two  rear-guard  actions,  combined  his 
forces,  and  retired  on  Welverdiend,  18  miles  northeast  of 
Potchefstroom,  whereas  Kitchener  and  Methuen  did  not  join 
forces  till  the  10th,  north  of  Buffelshoek. 

At  Welverdiend,  however,  De  Wet  found  Smith-Dorrien, 
whom  Lord  Methuen  had  left  behind  to  guard  the  railroad, 
and  who  now  blocked  his  way  northward.  He  had  little 
difficulty,  however,  in  slipping  by  these  troops,  following 
the  Mooi  River  towards  Rustenburg. 

Kitchener  and  Methuen,  moving  in  two  separate  col- 
umns, overtook  De  Wet  again  on  the  13th  of  August  east  of 
Ventersdorp,  Methuen  succeeding  in  capturing  one  gun.  On 
the- night  of  the  13th,  De  Wet  liberated  his  60  British  pris- 
oners, blew  up  three  ammunition  wagons  and  abandoned 
30  worn-out  horses,  and  escaped  from  his  pursuers. 

On  August  17th  De  Wet  reached  Kommando  Nek  in  the 
Magalies  Hills,  between  Pretoria  and  Rustenburg,  and  came 
here  upon  Baden-Powell,  who  happened  to  have  withdrawn 
to  this  point,  for  reasons  which  will  be  at  once  explained. 

The  British  had  posted  three  detachments  to  guard  the 
line  from  Mafeking  towards  Pretoria,  viz. :  Carrington  (who 
had  come  through  Rhodesia  and  taken  part  in  the  first  relief 
of  Rustenburg)  at  Zeerust;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hore,  with 
400  men  at  Elands  River,  40  miles  west  of  Rustenburg,  and 
Baden-Powell,  with  4,000  men,  at  the  latter  place,  where  he 
had  been  twice  besieged  and  relieved,  and  was  still  constant- 
ly threatened  by  Delarey  (who  had  recently  been  reinforced 
by  Grobeler's  commando). 

As  soon  as  Methuen  left  to  operate  against  De  Wet,. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  197 

Eustenburg  was  besieged  for  the  third  time,  and  this  ex- 
plains why  Lord  Roberts  brought  Hamilton's  and  Mahon's 
mounted  infantry  back  from  the  campaign  against  Middel- 
burg.  Hamilton  left  Pretoria  on  his  way  to  relieve  Eusten- 
burg  on  August  2d,  and  succeeded  in  joining  Baden-Powell, 
Delarey  retiring  without  resisting.  Hamilton  brought 
Baden-Powell  to  Komando  Nek,  where  the  latter  intrenched 
himself,  and  himself  started  southward  to  take  part  in  the 
chase  after  De  Wet,  reaching  Blaauwbank  on  August  13th. 

No  sooner  was  Eustenburg  abandoned  than  Delarey 
turned  on  the  weak  garrison  of  Elands  Eiver  and  besieged  it. 
Carrington,  with  900  men  and  several  guns,  started  out  from 
Zeerust  on  August  3d  to  relieve  Ho  re,  but  on  the  5th,  as  he 
was  approaching  Hore's  camp,  he  found  his  way  impeded  by 
a  strong  Boer  force  with  artillery.  He  was  forced  to  retire, 
under  heavy  cross  fire,  and  reached  Zeerust,  after  consider- 
able loss  in  men  and  material  on  the  7th ;  but  at  once  decided 
to  retire  still  farther.  On  his  way  to  Maf eking  he  met 
another  force  of  Boers  at  Ottoshoop  and  Malmain  on  the 
KJth  of  August,  and  had  a  skirmish  with  them,  but  drove 
them  off.  , 

Hore  was  thus  entirely  isolated  after  August  6th.  On 
the  10th  a  messenger  from  Hore  came  through  the  Boer  lines 
and  reported  the  garrison  still  resisting.  Eoberts  received 
this  message  on  the  13th,  and  at  once  ordered  Carrington 
and  Hamilton  to  return  to  the  relief  of  Hore.  Meanwhile 
Kitchener,  who  saw  the  uselessness  of  further  pursuit  of  De 
Wet,  and  hearing  of  Hore's  dilemma,  also  started  to  his  re- 
lief, reaching  Elands  Eiver  on  August  16th,  the  Boers  retir- 
ing northward.  Methuen,  giving  up  the  pursuit  of  De  Wet 
in  the  vicinity  of  Eustenburg,  started  westward  to  the  region 
about  Zeerust,  Mafeking  and  Lichtenburg,  to  restore  order 
at  points  threatened  by  the  Boers. 

When  Hamilton  on  the  17th  approached  Eustenburg  he 


198  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

learned  of  the  relief  of  Elands  River,  and  also  of  the  near 
presence  of  De  Wet,  who,  after  calling  upon  Baden-Powell 
at  Kommando  Nek  to  surrender,  had  continued  his  march 
on  the  18th  towards  the  Sterk  Stroom  north  of  Rensburg. 
Hamilton  had  reached  Olifants  Nek,  south  of  Rustenburg,  on 
the  17th,  and  Mahon,  his  advance  guard,  came  in  touch  with 
De  Wet.  Hamilton  decided  to  continue  the  pursuit;  mean- 
while Baden-Powell,  moving  towards  Rensburg  on  the  Pre- 
toria— Rustenburg  road,  attempted  to  strike  De  Wet's  flank. 
On  the  19th,  while  Baden-Powell  continued  his  turning  move- 
ment, Mahon  succeeded  in  engaging  De  Wet's  rear  guard  in 
an  action  on  the  Crocodile  River;  but  the  latter  escaped,  and 
on  the  20th  camped  near  Hebron,  20  miles  northwest  of 
Pretoria. 

It  looked  as  if  De  Wet  was  aiming  to  cross  the  railroad 
north  of  Pretoria  and  join  Louis  Botha's  forces. 

Roberts  meanwhile  had  sent  Paget  on  the  18th  of  Aug- 
ost  along  the  Pretoria — Pietersburg  road  northward,  and 
the  latter,  after  forcing  small  Boer  detachments  out  of  the 
Homes  Nek  (10  miles  northwest  of  Pretoria),  had  taken  up 
a  position  near  Hammans  Kraal  (27  miles  from  Pretoria).  On 
the  20th,  Roberts  also  sent  Clements  northward  to  take  part 
in  the  pursuit  of  De  Wet.  Baden-Powell,  turning  out  of  the 
Pretoria — Rustenburg  road,  completed  the  line  around 
De  Wet. 

On  the  2()th  Paget  allowed  himself  to  be  drawn  into  a 
fight  by  a  detachment  of  De  Wet's,  and  was  held  fast  all  day ; 
and  on  the  21st  Baden-Powell  struggled  all  day  against  the 
rear  guard  of  Grobeler  (part  of  whose  forces  had  joined  De 
Wet).  Meanwhile  De  Wet  accomplished  the  main  object 
of  his  long  and  dangerous  march,  viz.:  to  enable  President 
Steyn  (with  a  strong  detachment)  to  escape  eastward  over 
the  Pienaars  River  to  join  Kr  tiger  in  Machadodorp  through 
the  unoccupied  region  over  the  Bothas  Berge.  De  Wet  him- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  199 

self,  with  a  small  force,  turned  back  over  the  Magalies  Berge 
to  regain  the  Orange  River  Colony. 

The  force  under  Methuen  remained  in  western  Trans- 
vaal, while  Paget  and  Baden-Powell  took  charge  of  the  Pre- 
toria— Pietersburg  railroad. 

Hamilton's  division  was  taken  by  Lord  Roberts  on  the 
new  campaign  against  Botha. 

THE  SITUATION  IN  THE   ORANGE  RIVER  COLONY. 

The  capitulation  of  Prinsloo  at  Fouriesburg,  the  escape 
of  De  Wet  northward,  and  that  of  Olivier  eastward,  were 
the  events  that  marked  the  end  of  July  in  this  region.  Mac- 
donald,  who  was  pursuing  Olivier,  reached  Harrismith^ 
which  yielded  without  resistance;  Hunter  remained  at  Beth- 
lehem, while  Rundle  also  advanced  to  Harri smith,  to  secure 
the  Ladysmith — Bethlehem  railroad,  which  was  now  placed 
in  operation. 

Small  Boer  commandoes  still  infested  the  district,  how- 
ever, and  as  early  as  August  2d  one  attacked  the  line  at  Rhe- 
noster  Spruit,  compelling  Knox  to  move  out  against  it  from 
Kroonstad ;  while  another  derailed  a  train  at  Honing  Spruit 
(south  of  Kroonstad).  These  disturbances  were  all  the  more 
difficult  to  control  as  the  British  forces  had  been  greatly 
reduced  by  the  removal  of  Broadwood,  Little,  Paget  and 
Clements,  who  had  gone  in  pursuit  of  De  Wet. 

Towards  the  middle  of  August,  Olivier  suddenly  ap- 
peared south  of  Heilbron.  Hunter  moved  out  against  him 
from  Bethlehem  and  was  joined  by  Macdonald.  They  at- 
tacked Olivier  on  August  15th,  but  failed  to  capture  him,  or. 
prevent  his  escape,  and  lost  touch  with  him  in  the  pursuit. 
Soon  after,  Olivier  fell  upon  a  British  post  at  Ventersburg, 
inflicting  a  loss  on  the  British  of  2  killed  and  5  officers 
and  24  men  captured.  On  August  25th  he  attacked  Win- 


200  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

burg  from  three  sides,  but  was  defeated  by  Bruce  Hamilton, 
and,  with  three  of  his  sons,  was  made  prisoner. 

Soon  after,  a  Boer  commando  appeared  before  Lady- 
brand  and  threatened  the  town. 

These  disturbances,  evidently  intended  to  keep  the 
British  forces  divided,  decided  Roberts  once  more  to  insti- 
tute a  decisive  stroke  against  the  main  Boer  army  east  of 
Middelburg. 

THE  THIRD  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LOUIS  BOTHA. 

Lord  Roberts  moved  his  headquarters  to  Wonderfontein 
Station  (25  miles  east  of  Middelburg)  on  the  26th  of  August, 
preparatory  to  resuming  the  offensive  against  Botha. 

Buller  had  moved  out  from  Twyfelaar  (near  Carolina) 
in  a  northerly  direction  on  the  23d  of  August,  French's  cav- 
alry clearing  up  his  front  and  left  flank.  The  latter  met  with 
considerable  resistance,  but  the  advance  of  Buller's  division 
(especially  the  artillery)  compelled  the  Boers  to  give  way. 

In  this  action  (near  Geluk)  in  consequence  of  a  misun- 
derstanding, two  British  companies  advanced  about  1,500 
yards  into  a  hollow,  out  of  sight  of  the  main  firing-line,  sepa- 
rated from  the  main  body,  and  were  surrounded  by  the  Boers. 
They  lost  1  officer  and  12  men  killed,  57  men  wounded  and 
33  prisoners. 

On  the  24th  and  25th  of  August,  Buller  and  French  met 
with  increased  resistance,  and  it  became  evident  that  the 
Boers  were  preparing  to  make  a  stand  in  the  hills  west  of 
Machadodorp.  Pole-Carew  had  occupied  Belfast  on  the 
25th,  and  came  in  contact  with  the  main  Boer  army  at  Dal- 
manutha.  The  British  line  extended  from  near  Belfast  back 
along  the  railroad  some  30  miles,  and  the  Boer  front  facing 
it  was  evidently  strong  and  of  considerable  extent,  and  its 
artillery  fire  was  well  sustained.  To  form  this  line  the  Boer 
forces  in  the  Bothas  Berge,  northeast  of  Middelburg,  had  to 
be  considerably  reduced,  which  explains  the  unopposed  ad- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  201 

vance  of  Pole-Carew  to  Belfast,  the  Boer  plan  being  to  make 
an  offensive  advance  with  their  left  flank. 

French,  who  had  the  duty  of  keeping  up  communication 
between  Buller  and  Pole-Carew,  by  the  concentric  advance 
of  the  latter  necessarily  came  up  with  his  cavalry  between 
these  two  divisions,  thus  bringing  the  cavalry  in  the  center 
of  the  front  of  operations.  Measures  were  therefore  taken 
to  concentrate  the  British  troops  and  at  the  same  time  get 
the  cavalry  on  the  flank  again. 

On  August  26th  the  battle  raged  all  along  the  line. 
Buller,  with  Lyttleton's  division  and  two  cavalry  brigades, 
attempted  to  force  his  way  north  from  the  southwest  of  Dal- 
manutha,  working  around  the  Boer  left  flank.  French  took 
his  two  cavalry  brigades  behind  Pole-Carew's  division  to 
the  left  flank. 

The  reasons  for  putting  the  cavalry  division  on  the  left 
flank  were:  to  keep  the  Boers  out  of  the  malarious  and  diffi- 
cult country  of  the  Lydenburg  district,  and  to  force  them 
along  the  railroad  into  the  Portuguese  colony. 

French  forced  a  part  of  the  Boers  towards  Lekenvley 
(on  the  Belfast — Lydenburg  road,  5  miles  north  of  Belfast), 
but  the  difficult  country  (hilly,  broken  and  covered  with 
dense  brush)  prevented  his  further  advance  and  favored  the 
Boer  defence  to  such  an  extent  that  Pole-Carew  had  to  move 
out  in  support.  The  advance  met  with  stubborn  resistance, 
the  Boer  positions  being  generally  supported  by  guns  of 
heavy  caliber.  But  the  Boer  forces  were  not  directed  in  such 
a  way  as  to  bring  their  tactics  to  bear  with  full  effect,  their 
resistance  consisting  in  separate  engagements,  and  was  not 
based  on  any  general  plan.  Consequently,  in  spite  of  the  dif- 
ficulties, the  British  made  some  headway,  Buller  forcing  his 
way  to  Bergendal,  while  Pole-Carew  broke  the  Boer  resist- 
ance at  Lekenvley. 

On  the  27th  French,  on  the  left  flank,  moved  out  over 


202  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Lekenvley  on  the  Lydenburg  road  as  far  as  the  Schwartz 
Kopjes  (10  miles  north  of  Machadodorp),  and  then  cleared  up 
the  ground  in  front  of  Pole-Carew's  division. 

The  Battle  of  Bergendal. 

Buller,  however,  met  with  strong  resistance  at  Bergen- 
dal (between  Belfast  and  Dalmanutha),  a  town  lying  at  the 
foot  of  two  kopjes  commanding  the  approach,  which  led  over 
an  open  plain,  about  a  mile  broad.  The  attack  was  con- 
ducted with  excellent  skill  and  judgment.  Buller  opened 
with  a  heavy  artillery  fire  which  was  remarkably  effective, 
utterly  demoralizing  the  supports  of  the  Boer  front,  and  then 
advanced  the  Inniskilling  Fusiliers,  wrho  took  the  town  with- 
out a  halt,  and  also  occupied  one  of  the  neighboring  hills, 
thus  forcing  the  Boers  to  retire  precipitately. 

Buller  lost  1  officer  and  13  men  killed,  7  officers  and  57 
men  wounded;  the  Boers  left  20  killed  and  19  prisoners  on 
the  field.  The  Boers,  retiring  on  Dalmanutha,  disputed  the 
advance  foot  by  foot  till  dark. 

Buller's  advance  on  the  28th,  however,  met  with  little 
resistance,  and  before  noon  his  advance  guard  reached  Ma- 
chadodorp. The  Boers  retired  northward,  pursued  by  Dun- 
donald  to  Helvetia  (7  miles  north  of  Machadodorp),  where 
the  country  became  too  difficult  and  dangerous  for  cavalry 
alone. 

French  advanced  to  Elandsfontein  (9  miles  west  of  Hel- 
vetia), establishing  signal  communication  with  Machado- 
dorp. Pole-Carew  followed  French  to  the  Schwartz  Kopjes 
(10  miles  north  of  Machadodorp). 

Presidents  Kriiger  and  Steyn  fled  to  Nel  Spruit,  near  the 
Portuguese  border. 

Buller  continued  his  advance  on  Lydenburg  on  August 
31st,  over  Helvetia,  crossing  the  Crocodile  Kiver  on  the  1st 
of  September,  meeting  with  little  resistance  from  Botha's 


UNIVERSITY 
THE  SECOND  BOER  W/  * 


rear  guard.     On  the  2d,  however,  he  found  the  Boers  (3,000) 
in  a  strong  position  in  the  hills  commanding  Lydenburg. 

French  and  Pole-Carew,  having  received  orders  to  make 
a  demonstration  eastward,  did  not  join  Buller's  column. 
An  inversion  thus  resulted,  the  original  right  flank  now  be- 
coming the  left,  due  to  the  fact  that  Buller  had  started  on  the 
pursuit  of  Botha  from  Machadodorp,  while  Pole-Carew  was 
still  far  to  the  rear,  and*French  found  the  country  too  diffi- 
cult for  a  large  force  of  cavalry. 

Buller  reconnoitered  Botha's  position,  and  tried  to  turn 
its  right  flank,  but  found  it  too  strong,  and  his  artillery  was 
unable  to  silence  that  of  the  Boers. 

On  September  3d  Roberts  sent  Hamilton  from  north  of 
Belfast  to  reinforce  Buller.  Hamilton,  whom  Brocklehurst's 
cavalry  brigade  had  joined,  moved  against  the  right  flank  of 
the  Boer  position,  passing  Dulstroom  (27  miles  southwest  of 
Lydenburg)  on  the  4th,  there  coming  in  signal  communica- 
tion with  Buller,  who  was  at  the  time  engaged  in  turning 
the  Boer  left  flank. 

This  pressure  on  both  flanks  caused  Botha  to  alter  his 
position,  withdrawing  his  right  flank  in  a  northeastern  di- 
rection towards  the  Mauch  Berg,  while  a  strong  detachment 
on  his  left  flank  occupied  the  Spitz  Kop,  25  miles  to  the  east- 
ward of  Lydenburg.  By  this  change  he  avoided  the  out- 
flanking movement  against  his  left  flank,  and  also  withdrew 
his  line  out  of  reach  of  Hamilton's  move  against  his  right 
flank.  Lydenburg  was  thus  given  up  by  the  Boers,  and  was 
occupied  on  the  6th  by  Dundonald's  cavalry  (of  Buller's  di- 
vision) and  Brocklehurst's  (of  Hamilton's  column). 

Hamilton  joined  Buller  on  September  7th,  and  Buller 
prepared  to  attack  the  new  position.  A  flank  attack  was 
impossible,  consequently  a  frontal  attack  had  to  be  resorted 
to ;  but  as  it  was  well  supported  by  artillery  fire,  the  British 
took  the  position  with  little  loss. 


204  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

The  Boers  had  sent  their  artillery  on  to  Kruger's  Post 
(about  25  miles  north  of  Lydenburg)  and  fought  a  delaying 
action  only,  finally  retreating  northward,  pursued  by  Buller 
over  the  Mauch  Berg. 

Hamilton  was  sent  back  to  Machadodorp  to  take  part  in 
Pole-Carew's  advance,  while  Botha,  with  about  3,000  men, 
retired  to  Pietersburg,  joining  there  Commandant  Vorster. 

Buller  crossed  the  Mauch  Bei^  10  miles  east  of  Lyden- 
burg on  September  18th,  entering  very  difficult  country,  and, 
driving  the  Boers  before  him,  arrived  at  the  junction  of  roads 
from  east  and  south  near  Spitz  Kop  on  the  10th.  He  cap- 
tured many  wagons  of  food  and  ammunition,  and  divided 
the  Boers,  some  retiring  to  Nel  Spruit  and  others  across  the 
Sabie  Drift.  On  the  12th  he  occupied  Spitz  Kop,  and  found 
there  immense  quantities  of  Boer  supplies.  He  remained 
there  till  the  23d,  replenishing  his  supplies,  and  then  moved 
towards  Sabie  Drift  against  Viljoen's  force  north  of  the 
river.  He  met  with  little  resistance  and  advanced  to  Macmac 
River  and  Burghers  Pass.  On  October  2d  Buller  returned 
to  Lydenburg,  after  a  circuitous  march  through  the  country 
from  Spitz  Kop  via  Pilgrim's  Rest  and  Kruger's  Post. 

Meanwhile,  Roberts  continued  his  offensive  advance 
eastward,  with  Pole-Carew  and  French,  the  former  moving 
along  the  railroad,  the  latter  covering  his  right  flank;  and 
later  with  Hamilton  on  the  left  flank.  French  reached  Caro- 
lina on  September  7th,  and  moved  on  Barberton,  but  met 
with  considerable  resistance  before  he  reached  the  upper 
Buffels  Spruit.  However,  he  forced  the  Boers  out  of  a  num- 
ber of  consecutive  positions. 

At  the  same  time  the  advance  of  Pole-Carew  and  French 
compelled  the  Presidents  to  leave  Nel  Spruit  and  retire  on 
Komatipoort. 

Kruger,  leaving  Schalk  Burgher  in  charge  of  the  gov- 
ernment, left  for  Lorenzo  Marques,  on  his  way  to  Europe,  to 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  205 

ask  for  foreign  intercession.  Steyn,  taking  command  of  all 
the  Boer  forces  which  retired  eastward  from  Machadodorp, 
organized  his  forces  for  further  resistance. 

French  occupied  Barberton  on  September  13th,  and 
made  large  captures,  among  them  the  great  park  of  railroad 
rolling  stock,  including  43  locomotives.  At  the  same  time 
Pole-Carew  occupied  Kaapsche  Hoop,  to  the  northwest  of 
Barberton.  The  further  advance  of  the  British  to  the  Portu- 
guese frontier  was  practically  unopposed.  On  the  18th  of 
September  700  Boers  crossed  the  border  at  Komatipoort 
and  were  disarmed;  and  a  similar  fate  befell  most  of  those 
who  were  forced  over  the  Kaap  Berge.  But  Viljoen,  with 
a  small  force,  succeeded  in  escaping  northward,  and  marched 
over  the  hills  of  the  Lydenburg  district,  to  join  Botha  at 
Pietersburg. 

Pole-Carew  occupied  the  border  station,  Komatipoort, 
on  September  24th,  and  made  large  captures  of  rolling 
material. 

This  ended  the  campaign,  and  practically  ended  all 
larger  operations  of  the  war. 

GENERAL  SITUATION. 

On  September  2d  Lord  Roberts  announced  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Transvaal.  It  is  to  be  called,  it  is  stated,  the 
Vaal  River  Colony. 

Raids  against  the  railroads  stil|l  took  place  in  all  parts 
of  the  two  colonies,  bridges  were  destroyed,  and  (due  to  care- 
lessness in  outpost  duty)  detachments  were  attacked  and 
captured.  Indeed,  scarcely  a  day  passed  without  some  such 
incident. 

A  Boer  commando  under  Erasmus,  for  example,  made 
several  energetic  attacks  on  the  British  troops  guarding  the 
Pretoria — Pietersburg  line,  near  Pretoria,  in  the  month  of 


206  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

September.  South  of  Pretoria,  portions  of  De  Wet's  and 
Theron's  troops  made  attempts  to  destroy  the  waterworks 
of  Johannesburg,  and  succeeded  in  liberating  500  prisoners 
from  the  jail  at  Klip  River.  Along  the  Ladysmith — Johan- 
nesburg road,  especially  near  Standerton  and  Utrecht,  small 
Boer  detachments  threatened  road  and  trains  continually. 
On  the  Johannesburg — Klerksdorp  road  the  Boers  held  Pot- 
chefstroom  for  a  time.  Even  Methuen  and  Carrington,  in  the 
West,  were  kept  constantly  on  the  alert,  and  the  little  garri- 
son town  of  Mamusa  was  surrounded  by  the  Boers,  and  al- 
most taken,  before  it  could  be  relieved. 

The  most  successful  raids,  however,  were  conducted  in 
the  Orange  River  Colony  by  Fouries,  Grobeler  and  Lemmer, 
later  also  by  De  Wet.  A  Boer  force  of  3,000  suddenly  ap- 
peared before  Ladybrand  and  took  it,  but  the  approach  of 
Hunter  caused  it  to  be  evacuated  again.  At  the  beginning  of 
September  a  Boer  commando  attacked  Bruce  Hamilton  at 
Thaba  'Nchu,  but  was  defeated. 

The  British  were  compelled  to  vacate  Vrede,  Bethlehem, 
Fouriesburg  and  Senekal,  in  order  to  concentrate  their  forces 
more  effectually;  Harrismith  alone  remained  occupied. 

In  the  vicinity  of  Kroonstad,  and  even  just  south  of 
Bloemfontein,  the  railroad  was  occasionally  destroyed. 

On  September  13th  Macdonald  at  Winburg  heard  of  a 
Boer  raid  on  the  railroad  at  Brandfort,  and  immediately  set 
out  in  pursuit,  crossing  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Vet  River, 
near  Tafel  Kop.  He  came  upon  them  eight  miles  west  of 
that  place,  drove  them  over  the  Vet  River,  and  pursued  them 
north  of  the  Winburg — Smaldeel  railway,  utterly  defeating 
them,  and  capturing  a  number  of  prisoners,  wagons,  oxen, 
ammunition  and  food  supplies. 

In  spite  of  all  these  disturbances,  however,  the  main 
military  operations  were  ended. 

Lord  Roberts  returned  to  Pretoria  on  September  22d, 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  207 

and  was  appointed  Commander-in-chief  of  the  British  Army, 
to  succeed  Lord  Wolseley  (retired),  on  October  1.  On  Octo- 
ber 16th  General  Buller  relinquished  command  of  the  Natal 
forces,  to  return  home;  Lyttleton  was  left  in  command  of  his 
troops. 

The  resistance  of  the  Boers,  headed  by  Botha,  Steyn  and 
De  Wet,  continued  throughout  the  month  of  October  and  to 
near  the  end  of  November. 

During  these  months  Hildyard  operated  in  the  south- 
eastern Transvaal,  Clery  in  the  vicinity  of  Standerton,  Clem- 
ents in  central  Transvaal  near  Rustenburg  and  Krtigers- 
dorp,  Hart  southwest  of  Kriigersdorp,  Methuen  in  western 
Transvaal,  while  Paget  and  Plumer  held  the  northern  posts. 
Bundle  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Bethlehem,  Knox  at  Kroon- 
stad,  Barton  near  Kriigersdorp,  Bradley  near  Heidelberg, 
Hunter  near  Mequathings  Nek,  Macdonald  near  Winburg 
and  Senekal,  Brabant  at  Heilbron  and  Lindley,  Kelly-Kenny 
at  Bloemfontein. 

Guerrilla  warfare  continued  at  all  these  points,  and  de- 
tachments up  to  a  strength  of  1,500  or  2,000  occasionally 
assembled,  although  most  of  the  raids  were  made  by  much 
smaller  bodies. 

One  of  the  latest  and  most  important  of  the  combats 
with  the  Boer  raiders  was  that  of  Bothaville  (northwest  of 
Kroonstad,  south  of  Klerksdorp),  where  Colonel  Le  Gallais 
met  a  Boer  force  of  1,000  men  (among  them  Steyn  and  De 
Wet)  and  completely  defeated  them.  He  captured  six  field 
guns,  two  machine  guns,  and  100  prisoners,  the  Boers  leaving 
25  dead  and  30  wounded  on  the  field.  The  British  lost  3 
officers  and  8  men  killed,  7  officers  and  26  men  wounded. 

This  guerrilla  warfare  gradually  subsided  towards  the 
end  of  November,  and  the  war  virtually  ended.  Great  Brit- 
ain added  two  extensive  colonies,  rich  in  gold,  diamonds  and 
cattle,  to  her  domains,  and  sustained  a  total  loss  in  officers 
and  men  of  about  12,800. 


208  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

COMMENTS. 

At  the  opening  of  the  fifth  act  in  this  war  drama  the 
main  Boer  army  in  the  west  was  at  Middelburg  and  Hath- 
erley,  east  of  Pretoria,  and  the  question  for  Lord  Roberts  to 
decide  was,  whether  he  should  attack  this  army  and  dis- 
perse it,  or  send  a  strong  detachment  by  rail  to  Volksrust,  to 
assist  Buller  in  his  attempts  to  turn  the  Boer  position  at 
Laings  Nek,  and  hasten  the  retreat  of  Christian  Botha  north- 
ward. After  the  performance  of  both  these  tasks  he  would 
be  prepared  to  begin  operations  against  the  Boer  troops 
waging  a  guerrilla  war  in  the  Lydenburg  district,  where  the 
latter  were  strongly  ensconsed  in  the  mountains,  and  well 
provided  with  supplies  from  Lorenzo  Marques. 

The  effect  of  Roberts'  advance  to  Pretoria  undoubtedly 
made  itself  felt  on  the  resistance  of  the  Boers  at  Laings  Nek, 
but  Buller  deserves  great  credit  for  the  masterly  way  in 
which  he  maneuvered  the  latter  out  of  their  extremely  strong 
position  with  little  loss,  and  succeeded  in  cutting  them 
in  two. 

Tactically,  however,  he  failed  to  reap  the  full  reward  of 
his  strategical  measures,  since  the  Boers  escaped  without 
loss  in  men  or  material.  This  may  have  been  due  to  the  fact 
that,  having  learned  the  futility  of  purely  frontal  attacks, 
he  went  to  the  other  extreme,  and  laid  too  much  stress  on 
outflanking  movements,  which  are  never  very  successful 
tactically;  unless  the  frontal  attack  is  pressed  hard  at  the 
same  time,  in  order  to  hold  the  enemy  while  the  flanking  col- 
umns roll  them  up. 

Buller's  movement  had  another  great  advantage  in  that 
it  separated  the  Transvaal  from  the  Orange  Boers,  occupying 
the  Drakensberge  and  assembling  to  the  southwest  under 
President  Steyn,  and  prevented  the  former  from  joining  the 
latter.  Had  he  turned  their  position  by  the  east  (his  first 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  209 

plan),  the  strategic  situation  would  have  been  far  less  ad- 
vantageous. 

R  would  appear  at  first  sight  that  Buller's  proper 
course  after  reaching  Volksrust  was  to  hasten  northward  to 
join  Robert^  in  a  combined  attack  on  the  Boers  near  Middel- 
burg.  But  the  reconnoissances  from  Roberts'  army  had  de- 
termined the  position  of  the  latter,  under  Louis  Botha,  east 
of  Pretoria,  to  be  in  a  strong,  although  very  extended  line. 
Moreover,  although  Pretoria  and  Johannesburg  were  per- 
fectly quiet,  he  feared  the  effect  of  such  close  proximity  of  a 
strong  Boer  army,  and  decided  to  attack  it  without  awaiting 
the  arrival  either  of  Buller  or  Hunter. 

Roberts'  prompt  decision  to  attack  the  center  of  Botha's 
position,  as  soon  as  he  found  it  impracticable  to  turn  the 
flanks  according  to  his  previous  tactics,  thus  far  uniformly 
successful,  marks  the  general,  ready  at  all  times  to  suit  his 
methods  of  warfare  to  the  existing  circumstances.  His  fail- 
ure to  pursue,  however,  after  the  battle,  and  determine  def- 
initely the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy,  is  open  to  criticism. 

His  comparatively  small  force,  the  danger  threatening 
his  line  of  communications,  and  the  ravages  of  disease  in  the 
army  (which  were  great  in  the  months  of  May  and  June),  no 
doubt  determined  him  to  risk  no  further  engagement  with 
Botha,  but  this  does  not  excuse  the  neglect  of  reconnoissance 
of  the  enemy  during  the  retreat  of  the  latter.  * 

The  splendid  strategic  campaign  of  Lord  Roberts  ended, 
the  weaknesses  of  the  British  army  and  their  neglect  of 
proper  reconnoissance  a.nd  the  service  of  security  and  infor- 
mation once  more  come  into  prominence.  To  subdue  the 
scattered  forces  of  the  Boers  it  became  necessary  to  subdi- 
vide the  army,  thus  throwing  the  responsibility  for  the  minor 
tactical  operations  on  the  subordinate  commanders;  conse- 
quently surprises  and  captures  of  detachments  became  al- 
most daily  events.  No  doubt  much  of  the  neglect  of  outpost 

-14- 


210  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

duty  was  due  to  the  poor  state  of  the  cavalry  horses,  but 
most  of  the  failure  must  be  ascribed  to  the  lack  of  proper 
training  of  the  troops  in  such  service. 

Buller,  after  entering  the  Transvaal,  had  two  courses 
open  to  him:  on  the  one  hand,  he  could  have  operated 
against  the  Boers  retreating  on  Ermelo,  and  seized  the  Loren- 
zo Marques  railway,  cutting  off  Botha  from  his  source  of  sup- 
ply at  the  latter  point,  and  thus  ending  the  campaign  in  this 
region;  on  the  other  hand,  he  could  move  along  the  railway 
line  to  Johannesburg  and  complete  the  cordon  around  the 
Orange  Boers,  at  the  same  time  opening  a  new  line  of  supply 
for  Roberts'  army. 

The  first  plan  would  have  compelled  him  to  leave  the 
railroad  and  organize  a  large  train,  which  was  well-nigh  im- 
practicable. Roberts,  therefore,  decided  on  the  second  plan, 
which  would  also  bring  Buller's  force  in  contact  with  his 
own. 

Turning  now  to  the  campaign  against  De  Wet  near 
Bethlehem,  we  find  again  one  of  the  deficiencies  of  the  Brit- 
ish officer  coming  into  prominence,  viz.:  the  lack  of  proper 
service  of  security  and  information.  The  entire  strategic 
plan  of  Roberts — the  concentric  advance  on  De  Wet's  posi: 
tion — was  virtually  defeated  by  the  want  of  definite  informa- 
tion of  the  exact  position  of  the  latter,  and  the  slow  advance 
of  Hunter,  the  too  dispersed  order  of  march  of  Rundle,  and 
finally  the  .precipitate  dash  of  Paget,  who  became  involved 
in  a  position  where  he  had  to  await  reinforcements,  and 
changed  the  proposed  concentric  advance  into  a  mere  for- 
ward movement  of  a  single  body. 

Again,  after  Rundle  discovered  the  Boers  in  strong  force 
east  of  Rooikrans,  which  should  have  indicated  to  him  that 
De  Wet  had  selected  this  point  for  the  breaking  through,  he 
made  no  special  arrangements  to  resist  his  efforts,  and  al- 
lowed him  to  escape  with  ease,  preserving  his  too  extended 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  211 

order  of  advance  even  after  the  motives  of  De  Wet  were 
evident. 

The  capture  of  Prinsloo's  force,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
effected  with  skill  and  judgment. 

It  is  a  question,  however,  if  De  Wet  would  not  have  been 
wiser  to  have  broken  through  to  the  eastward,  over  the  Dra- 
kensberg  passes,  and  joined  the  remains  of  the  Boer  army 
northeast  of  Laings  Nek. 

The  surprise  of  the  British  garrison  at  Kustenburg  by 
Lemmer  must  be  ascribed  once  more  to  imperfect  outpost 
service;  and  to  this  same  weakness  of  the  British  troops  the 
surprises  at  Uitvals  Nek  and  Derdepoort  must  be  attributed. 

Campaign  of  Middelburg. 

In  the  organization  and  execution  of  the  advance,  four 
points  at  once  strike  the  military  student,  viz. :  first,  the  plac- 
ing of  Hamilton's  mounted  infantry  on  the  left,  and  French's 
much  more  mobile  cavalry  division  on  the  right;  secondly,  the 
broad  front  of  the  advance,  and  the  distance  of  the  flanking 
columns  from  the  main  column ;  thirdly,  the  small  force  which 
Roberts  selected  for  this  service;  fourthly,  why  Buller  was 
allowed  to  remain  practically  inactive,  when  he  might  have 
brought  fatal  pressure  to  bear  on  the  Boer  left  and  rear. 

In  the  first  place,  Hamilton's  troops  had  to  go  a  longer 
distance  to  reach  the  left  flank  than  they  would  have  had  to 
take  the  right ;  and  in  the  next  place,  both  were  familiar  with 
the  country  (from  their  advance  against  Eerste  Fabrieken) 
on  the  opposite  flanks  from  those  now  assigned  to  them. 
Moreover,  as  Roberts'  plan  evidently  involved  preventing  the 
Boers  from  retiring  into  the  hills  of  the  Lydenburg  District, 
French's  advance  north  of  the  railroad  would  have  been  far 
more  in  place.  His  flanking  movements  south  of  the  rail- 
road merely  forced  the  Boers  back  on  their  line  of  retreat. 

The  broad  front  of  Roberts'  advance,  and  the  far  out- 


212  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

flanking  movements  of  French,  prevented  concerted  action 
of  the  various  parts  on  account  of  the  distances  to  be  covered. 
On  this  account,  after  French's  scouts  crossed  Olifants  River, 
and  found  the  Boers  in  full  retreat,  it  was  impossible  for 
Roberts  to  take  advantage  of  the  situation,  because  the  cen- 
ter and  left  was  still  far  in  rear.  A  flanking  movement  can 
only  be  successful  when  the  flank  column  reaches  the  enemy 
in  good  condition,  and  can  count  on  the  assistance  of  the  rest 
of  the  army. 

The  force  assigned  to  this  service  by  Roberts  had  a 
strength  of  about  22,000  men,  and  was  destined  to  attack  a 
skillful  enemy,  well  entrenched  in  positions  of  his  own  selec- 
tion, about  12,000  strong.  Decisive  results  could  hardly  be 
expected  under  such  circumstances,  and  when  Pole-Carew 
and  French,  with  15,000,  were  left  alone  to  continue  the 
pursuit,  it  is  not  surprising  that  they  did  not-  go  beyond 
Middelburg. 

Buller's  advance  against  Middelburg  would  have  pro- 
tected the  northern  side  of  the  railroad  much  better  than 
quietly  guarding  it,  and  would  have  threatened  the  Boers  in 
front  of  Roberts  besides.  Moreover,  at  that  time  there  was 
little  danger  of  Boer  raids  south  of  the  railroad. 

After  it  was  found  that  Pole-Carew  and  French  could 
not  advance  with  safety  beyond  Middelburg,  then  at  last 
was  done  what  should  have  been  done  when  the  advance 
against  Middelburg  began — viz.,  Buller  wras  directed  against 
the  Boer  left  flank  and  rear. 

The  Chase  of  De  Wet. 

One  of  the  first  points  that  strikes  the  military  student 
in  this  pursuit  of  De  Wet  is  the  fact  that  the  separate  Brit- 
ish columns  acted  perfectly  independently,  with  no  single 
controlling  power  to  direct  the  movements  on  the  field  in- 
telligently towards  the  common  end.  Kitchener  and  Meth- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  213 

lien  were  independent,  and  when  they  struck^  De  Wet  neither 
knew  the  exact  situation. 

Smith-Dorrien,  when  he  tried  to  block  De  Wet's  way 
near  Welverdiend,  had  only  troops  which  had  been  worn  out 
by  constant  marching  to  and  fro,  due  to  conflicting  orders 
and  the  lack  of  a  directing  head,  and  so  failed  to  stop  the 
Boer  leader. 

And  finally,  Paget  and  Baden-Powell,  by  getting  them- 
selves involved  in  combats  with  small  detachments  at  a 
critical  moment,  allowed  De  Wet  to  escape  when  he  was 
practically  surrounded:  again,  the  independence  of  the  indi- 
vidual leader  caused  the  failure  of  the  strategic  measures. 

Another  point  that  strikes  the  military  student  is  the 
fact  that  the  British  failed  to  distinguish  between  the  im- 
portant or  essential  and  the  unimportant  or  trivial.  When 
Roberts  had  carried  his  campaign  against  the  main  Boer 
army,  under  Louis  Botha,  nearly  to  Middelburg,  he  returned 
with  the  mounted  infantry  of  Hamilton  and  Mahon,  giving 
up  a  serious  campaign  at  a  critical  moment,  to  secure  a  sub- 
ordinate (unessential)  object — viz.,  the  line  to  Maf eking, 
where  he  had  15,000  troops  already  posted  in  western  Trans- 
vaal. Again,  Methuen  was  taken  away  from  this  line  to  act 
against  a  paltry  1500  under  De  Wet.  Finally,  Hamilton,  after 
being  sent  to  the  relief  of  Rustenburg,  the  object  of  which 
was  evidently  to  secure  the  line  to  Mafeking,  brought  Baden- 
Powell  away  from  that  point  and  left  him  at  Kommando 
Nek,  and  himself  joined  in  the  pursuit  of  De  Wet. 

The  last  prominent  characteristic  of  these  movements 
is  the  fact  that  some  of  the  British  subordinate  commanders 
did  not  prove  equal  to  the  tactical  and  strategical  situation, 
and  that  they  failed  in  intelligent,  combined  action.  Car- 
rington's  dicision,  after  having  been  ordered  to  relieve  Hore, 
to  retire  not  only  to  Zeerust,  but  even  farther,  does  not  seem 
warranted  by  the  circumstances,  and  more  concerted  action 


214  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

by  the  other  subordinate  commanders  should  have  brought 
better  results. 

The  Third  Campaign  against  Botha. 

The  third  campaign  against  Botha,  beyond  Middelburg, 
was  conducted  in  Roberts'  true  manner,  and  his  measures 
substantiate  our  views  on  the  second  campaign  in  two  lead- 
ing particulars — viz.,  the  fact  that  the  place  for  the  cavalry 
was  on  the  left,  and  the  necessity  for  Buller's  advance  in 
flank  at  the  same  time.  Nevertheless,  the  transfer  of  the 
cavalry  to  the  left  flank  at  so  late  a  stage  failed  to  prevent 
Louis  Botha  from  escaping  into  the  Lydenburg  district,  as  it 
would  have  done  had  it  been  on  that  flank  originally;  more- 
over, Buller's  participation  came  too  late  for  decisive  effect 
in  capturing  the  Boers,  or  in  forcing  them  to  fight  a  decisive 
action.  * 

The  latter  part  of  this  campaign  was  a  splendid  achieve- 
ment and  illustrates  the  effect  of  properly  applying  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  troops  to  a  definite  purpose,  and  pursuing 
this  purpose  with  single-minded  determination  to  the  end. 

The  Boers,  on  the  other  hand,  had  split  up  their  forces, 
scattered  them  over  a  wide  area,  had  no  concerted  action 
under  single  leadership,  and  failed  to  concentrate  for  any 
definite  purpose;  consequently  their  resistance  was  rapidly 
destroyed. 

TACTICAL  DEDUCTIONS  FROM  THE  WAR.* 

In  drawing  lessons  from  the  war  in  South  Africa  the 
first  point  to  be  taken  into  consideration  is  the  general  char- 
acter of  the  armies  opposed  to  each  other.  On  the  one  hand, 
there  is  a  crude  militia,  insufficiently  organized  and  trained 

*The  author  is  indebted  for  much  of  his  information  and  many 
of  his  ideas  to  an  anonymous  article  in  Internationale  Revue,  Beiheft 
14;  and  to  the  United  Sw^vice  Magazine. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  1VJ.A'.  215 

iii  time  of  peace,  but  composed  of  excellent  though  undis- 
ciplined material,  untrained  in  tactics,  hence  incapable  of 
the  tactical  offensive,  so  indispensable  for  decisive  results. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  European  army,  composed  of  a  large 
nucleus  of  regular  troops,  disciplined  and  trained,  but  its 
greater  part  militia  and  volunteers  of  variable  quality, 
generally  only  partially  trained,  with  all  the  technical  and 
scientific  means  of  carrying  on  war  at  its  disposal. 

Fire  effect  serves  as  a  basis  for  all  tactical  deductions. 
The  Lee-Metford  and  the  Mauser  gun,  in  spite  of  certain  ad- 
vantages of  the  latter  over  the  former,  must  be  regarded 
as  practically  equal  in  the  field.  But  the  possession  of  a 
bayonet  gave  the  British  a  decided  advantage  over  the  Boera 
(who  were  without  one),  not  because  hand-to-hand  conflicts 
are  liable  to  be  very  common  in  modern  war,  but  because 
the  moral  effect  of  its  possession  confers  tenacity  on  the 
defense  and  confidence  and  esprit  on  the  attack. 

As  marksmen  the  Boers  had  the  advantage,  for  they 
were  all  trained  to  this  accomplishment  from  their  youth, 
and  kept  up  their  practice  by  their  mode  of  life.  They 
surpassed  probably,  in  this  respect,  all  European  armies. 

The  Artillery  Arm. 

The  field  artillery  material  used  by  the  two  armies  is  an 
interesting  study,  but  in  judging  of  the  relative  degree  of 
preparedness,  the  circumstances  must  be  carefully  consid- 
ered. The  Transvaal  had  been  arming  since  1896,  purchas- 
ing the  best  material  procurable,  and  it  so  happened  that 
at  this  time  the  field  artillery  of  Europe  was  in  a  transition 
stage,  but  on  the  Continent  rearmament  had  commenced, 
consequently  the  Boers  had  their  choice  of  the  latest  designs. 
England,  however,  had  been  slow  to  adopt  the  changes 
effected  on  the  Continent,  and  had  merely  modified  its  ex- 
isting carriages,  while  the  guns  remained  the  same.  The 


216  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

result  was  that  the  Boers  were  possessed  of  the  latest  quick- 
firers,  with  fixed  ammunition,  and  the  ranges  exceeded  that 
of  the  British  field  gun  by  several  thousand  yards. 

Small  as  these  differences  were,  they  soon  proved  great 
in  effect,  because  it  was  this  little  difference  that  enabled 
the  Boers  with  single  guns  to  put  a  number  of  shell  into  a 
British  battery  before  the  latter  could  reply,  and  the  only 
reason  they  failed  to  accomplish  more  than  they  did  was 
because  they  had  but  a  small  number  of  guns  and  did  not 
know  the  value  of  cencentrating  their  fire;  moreover,  they 
were  afraid  to  risk  a  stand-up  fight. 

It  has  been  urged  that  field  guns  are  not  intended  to 
engage  siege  guns;  but  the  British  guns  frequently  failed  to 
reach  even  the  Boer  field  guns  when  the  latter  could  reach 
them.  The  5-inch  field  howitzer  had  a  range  of  only  4,900 
yards,  and  frequently  failed  to  be  of  use  on  that  account.  At 
Venters  Spruit  something  might  have  been  done  to  assist 
the  British  troops  on  top  of  Spion  Kop  if  only  their  guns 
had  had  a  little  longer  range:  some  forty  British  guns  were 
forced  to  remain  idle,  while  a  few  Boer  guns  shelled  the 
crest  of  the  hill.  In  the  demonstration  against  Brakfontein 
heights,  preceding  the  attack  on  the  Vaal  Kranz,  six  field 
batteries  were  so  effectually  outranged  that  they  had  to 
stand  still,  to  be  shot  at ;  and  a  few  days  later  the  single  Boer 
gun  on  the  Doornkloof  defied  all  the  British  guns  in  the  plain 
or  on  the  Schwartz  Kop.  In  this  last  case  a  howitzer  of 
sufficient  range  was  all  that  was  needed. 

That  it  is  possible  to  combine  in  the  field  gun  increased 
range  with  mobility  is  proven  by  the  fact  that  Boers  accom- 
lished  it,  and  that  Captain  Scott  constructed  temporary  car- 
riages for  the  12-pdr.  guns  of  the  Naval  Brigade,  which 
weighed  (with  gun,  complete)  approximately  only  two-thirds 
as  much  as  the  field  equipment,  while  the  guns  were  sighted 
up  to  8,000  yards,  and  could  be  fired  at  even  greater  ranges. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  217 

The  other  advantages  of  long  range  in  field  pieces  are 
that  the  enemy's  advancing  infantry  can  be  brought  under 
shell  fire  earlier,  or  a  larger  extent  of  front  of  his  defensive 
position  can  be  swept  by  the  artillery  without  changing  posi- 
tion; moreover,  the  artillery  can  be  kept  farther  in  rear  and 
still  be  effective,  a  great  advantage  under  modern  infantry 
fire.  On  the  contrary,  short-range  field  guns  can  only  come 
up  behind  infantry,  and  must  be  correspondingly  slow  in 
getting  up. 

In  view  of  this  great  importance  of  range,  it  is  evidently 
better  to  sacrifice  some  degree  of  mobility,  if  it  be  necessary 
to  sacrifice  anything,  in  order  to  secure  a  good  heavy  long- 
range  field  gun,  provided  only  it  can  keep  up  with  the 
infantry. 

The  effects  of  earthworks  and  their  extensive  use  have 
merely  substantiated  what  was  predicted  by  the  best  authori- 
ties. They  have  demonstrated  the  necessity  for  a  howitzer 
to  search  trenches,  since  ordinary  field  guns  can  only  serve, 
by  a  constant  storm  of  shell,  to  keep  the  enemy  in  them,  but 
cannot  reach  him  there. 

The  advantage  of  quick-firing  guns  was  illustrated  at 
Brakfontein,  on  February  5th,  where  three  Boer  guns  easily 
maintained  a  rate  of  fire  and  a  storm  of  shell  on  six  British 
field  batteries  (unable  to  reply  because  outranged)  such  as  a 
battery  of  six  British  guns  could  not  have  produced  by  using 
its  most  rapid  rate  of  fire.  Another  advantage  of  quick- 
firing  guns  is  that  the  number  of  guns  to  a  battery  can  be 
reduced  to  four,  and  hence  the  target  presented  by  a  battery 
be  made  much  smaller,  and  cover  can  be  more  easily  secured. 
Quick-fire  guns  also  offer  the  great  advantage  of  quickly 
engaging  a  moving  target  and  following  it  up  readily:  at 
Brakfontein  the  slow  rate  of  fire  of  the  British  and  their  sys- 
tem of  fire  discipline  allowed  a  Boer  gun  to  retire  and  a  pom- 
pom to  be  brought  into  action  before  a  shot  from  a  field  gun 
could  be  fired. 


218  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

The  experiences  in  South  Africa  seem  to  point  to  the 
following  as  the  proper  equipment  of  an  army  as  regards 
artillery: 

1.  A  quick-fire  gun,  perhaps  a  little  more  mobile  than 
the  present  field   gun,   capable  of  accompanying   mounted 
troops  on  the  march. 

2.  A  heavier  gun  (including  the  howitzer)  of  long  range, 
capable  of  moving  with  infantry. 

3.  A  light  mountain  gun  in  country  where  only  pack- 
animal  transportation  is  to  be  had. 

The  small  actual  effect  of  the  pom-poms  of  the  Boers,  in 
spite  of  their  great  moral  effect  and  their  mobility  (which 
enabled  them  to  follow  readily  in  pursuit),  confirmed  pre- 
vious experience.  Their  high  rate  of  fire  (10  shots  a  minute) 
could  not  make  up  for  the  low  weight  of  projectile,  and  the 
consequent  limited  action  in  depth  of  troops  struck.  The 
campaign  shows  that  the  use  of  guns  of  smaller  caliber  than 
75  mm.  is  only  permissible  in  mountain  or  barbarian  warfare, 
or  against  torpedo  boats. 

The  Physiological  Effects  of  the  Infantry  Arm. 

All  authorities  agree  that  the  wounds  from  the  small- 
arm  bullets  are  more  humane  than  those  from  the  old  large- 
caliber  projectiles.  According  to  the  eminent  English  sur- 
geon, Sir  William  MacCormac,  the  human  body  can  in  many 
cases  be  perforated  by  the  bullets  without  fatal  results. 
About  96  per  cent  of  the  wounded  at  the  base  of  operations 
in  South  Africa  recovered,  and  a  large  percentage  returned 
to  the  front.  Most  of  the  wounds  leave  a  very  small  open- 
ing at  the  points  of  entrance  and  of  exit.  Most  of  them  stop 
bleeding  themselves,  and  heal  very  rapidly.  Prens,  in  the 
British  Medical  Journal,  asserts  that  at  ranges  of  from  1,500 
to  2,000  yards  the  Mauser  bullet  goes  through  bones  like  a 
needle,  and  only  at  close  ranges  (up  to  500  yards)  does  it  shat- 


THE  8ECOND  BOER  WAR. 

ter  the  larger  bones,  while  breast  wounds  heal  readily.  Am- 
putations are  rarely  necessary. 

Losses  in  Battle. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  features  connected  with  im- 
provements in  fire-arms  is  the  fact  that  the  losses  in  battle 
constantly  grow  smaller.  The  following  table  will  illustrate 
this: 

Percentage     Percentage 

of  killed  and  of  the  killed 

wounded.        in  the  total 

looses. 

Oifen-    Defen- 
sive,       sive. 

Wars  of  Frederick  the  Great 15       19      25 

Wars  of  Napoleon 13      10      21 

Crimean  War 12      17      29 

Campaign  of  1859 8        9       19 

Campaign  of  1866 8        9      24 

Campaign  of  1870-1 9        9      24 

Battle  of  Ladysmith  (10,000  British 3 

Battle  of  Ladysmith  (10,000  British) ....       3 

Battle  of  Stormberg  (2,500  British) 3.6 

Battle  of  Magersfontein  (10,000  British) . .       9 

Battle  of  Colenso  (17,000  British) 5.3 

Battle  of  Spion  Kop  (20,000  British) 7 

The  percentage  of  losses  in  officers  is  remarkably  high.  At 
Magersfontein,  for  example,  it  reached  25  per  cent,  cj"  1 
officer  for  every  14  men  killed,  wounded  and  missing. 
Relation  between  Losses  in  Battle  and  Losses  by  Disease. 

As  a  general  rule,  losses  by  disease  in  long-continued 
wars  far  exceed  losses  in  battle:  the  only  known  exception 
is  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870-1.  Another  fact  worth 
noticing  is  that  the  losses  in  battle  grow  smaller  as  war  pro- 
gresses, while  those  from  disease  grow  greater,  and  the  latter 
in  a  higher  ratio  for  the  men  than  for  the  officers. 

The  British  losses  at  short  intervals  are  given  in  the  Ap- 


220  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

pendix,  but  the  number  of  sick  is  not  clearly  stated  in  the 
official  reports. 

The  following  table  gives  some  idea  of  the  relative  num- 
bers of  those  who  were  killed  (or  mortally  wounded)  in  battle 
and  those  who  died  of  disease  (or  accidents)  at  various 
intervals : 

Killed.  Died  of  Disease. 

Officers.         Men.  Officers.         Men. 

Up  to  February  24 198  1748  20  722 

Up  to  May  26 • 285  2672  95  3127 

Up  to  July  30 324  3013  126  4270 

Up  to  September  8 368  3462  152  5573 

Up  to  October  21 391  3795  162  6350 

Transportation  of  Horses  ~by  Sea. 

Between  the  30th  of  September  and  the  24th  of  March 
about  24,333  horses  were  transported  on  some  70  vessels, 
with  a  loss  of  5.5  per  cent,  not  considering  the  Ismore,  which 
stranded  with  315  horses  on  board,  and  the  Rapidan,  which 
did  not  proceed  farther  than  the  Irish  Sea.  In  some  cases 
the  percentage  was  very  low:  in  9  ships,  for  example,  it 
ranged  between  J  and  2  per  cent.  In  others,  on  the  contrary, 
it  ran  very  high:  on  the  America,  for  example,  as  high  as. 
24.3  per  cent. 

Lessons  for  the  Defense. 

The  operations  of  the  Boers  illustrate  fully  whatever 
advantages  attach  to  the  strategical  defensive.  The  reasons 
for  their  adopting  this  form  were  probobly  three:  the  pecul- 
iar characteristics  and  nature  of  the  Boer,  his  lack  of  mili- 
tary obedience  and  discipline,  and  the  difficulty  of  replacing 
losses  in  battle  by  new  levies. 

In  Natal  they  combined  the  strategical  offensive  with 
the  tactical  defensive,  and,  as  ever,  they  were  defeated  in 
the  end. 

Their  positions  were  always  well  selected,  and  intrench- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  221 

merits  in  two  tiers  (one  over  the  other)  were  very  common. 
Fire  was  first  opened  from  the  upper  tier,  that  of  the  lower 
being  reserved  for  close  quarters.  The  Boers  also  con- 
structed dummy  intrenchments,  from  which  they  fired  with 
smoky  powder.  Perfect  use  of  the  configuration  of  the 
ground  was  generally  made,  and  at  Paardeberg  a  special 
form  of  trench  widened  at  bottom  (as  shown  elsewhere  in  the 
text)  was  made  use  of  in  the  firm  ground  found  there. 

Wire  entanglements  were  placed  in  front  of  positions, 
which  not  only  delayed  the  attack,  but  also  enabled  the 
Boers  to  guard  the  ground  in  front  with  weak  detachments, 
the  noise  of  passing  through  the  obstacle  giving  sufficient 
warning.  Such  was.the  case  at  Magersfontein,  for  example. 

The  occupation  of  advanced  positions  (in  front  of  the  gen- 
eral line)  by  the  Boers  is  contrary  to  the  accepted  ideas  of 
tacticians.  But  their  success  in  the  war  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  British  generally  resorted  to  purely  frontal  attacks, 
and  thus  enabled  the  Boers  to  make  the  very  best  use  of 
them.  Moreover,  the  Boers  were  usually  mounted,  and  their 
horses  (owing  to  the  terrain)  could  be  kept  close  at  hand,  so 
that,  when  it  came  to  the  short  ranges,  they  could  quickly 
retire. 

The  question  of  when  to  open  infantry  fire  is  compara- 
tively simple  for  the  attack,  as  it  is  determined  by  the  fire- 
action  of  the  enemy's  arm,  the  object  being  to  get  as  near 
as  possible  to  the  inner  limit  of  the  medium  battle  ranges  be- 
fore opening  fire.  But  for  the  defense  the  problem  is  more 
difficult,  because  the  opening  of  fire  at  once  discovers  to  the 
enemy  our  positions,  and  offers  targets  for  their  artillery. 
Most  European  nations  would  now  open  fire  at  about  1,000 
yards,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  ever  reaching  the  close 
range  (600  yards)  at  which  the  defenders'  heads  begin  to  be 
visible  targets. 

But  the  Boers  wisely  did  otherwise,  and  allowed  the 
enemy  to  come  to  close  range  before  opening  on  him.  This 


222  TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

action  is  entirely  justified  because  of  the  great  superiority  of 
the  British  in  artillery,  because  at  close  ranges  the  latter  can 
no  longer  take  part.  Moreover,  the  moral  effect  of  a  sudden, 
overwhelming  infantry  fire  is  enormous  even  on  the  best  of 
troops,  and  in  South  Africa  the  withholding  of  the  fire  was 
particularly  justified  because  the  British  often  approached 
close  to  the  Boer  positions  in  closed  masses,  and  in  utter 
ignorance  of  the  exact  position  of  the  enemy.  Examples  of 
these  points  will  be  found  in  the  battles  of  Modder  River, 
Magersfontein  and  Stormberg.  In  the  first  the  losses  of  the 
subdivisions  in  front  were  considerable;  in  the  second  the 
actual  losses  were  slight,  but  the  demoralized  battalions 
could  not  be  assembled  again  until  the  following  day;  and 
in  the  last  the  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  were  only  34 
per  cent,  but  in  prisoners  it  amounted  to  25.3  per  cent. 

These  examples  illustrate  the  necessity  of  accurately 
locating  the  enemy's  subdivisions  in  his  position,  and  deter- 
mining that  position  from  a  distance. 

Whenever  the  Boers  did  open  fire  at  longer  ranges  the 
British  advance  was  generally  stopped  at  900  yards. 

Lessons  for  the  Attack. 

The  British  mode  of  attack  is  characterized,  at  the  open- 
ing of  campaign,  by  its  purely  frontal  form,,  and  by  the 
insufficient  numbers  placed  on  the  line;  by  taking  up  the 
formation  for  attack  at  too  late  an  hour;  and  by  laying  too 
little  stress  on  gaining  superiority  of  fire. 

At  Magersfontein,  for  example,  the  artillery  opened  fire 
on  the  Boer  position,  while  the  infantry  remained  in  rear 
and  gave  no  assistance.  The  result  was  that  the  Boers  lay 
quietly  in  their  trenches.  The  infantry  of  the  attack  must 
move  up  and  support  the  artillery  fire  by  its  fire  action,  in 
order  to  compel  the  enemy  to  occupy  his  positions  and  thus 
offer  targets  for  the  artillery.  The  two  arms  must  work  to- 


THE  8ECOND  BOER  WAR.  223 

gether:  artillery  and  infantry  preparation  for  attack  are  not 
two  successive  phases  of  a  battle,  but  must  be  simultaneous. 

Night  marches  and  night  battles  found  considerable  appli- 
cation in  this  war.  On  the  Tugela,  at  Spion  Kop,  at  Storm- 
berg  and  at  Magersfontein  examples  are  found.  In  several 
of  these  cases  the  great  objection  to  night  marches — namely, 
the  danger  of  a  panic,  is  decidedly  in  evidence.  The  only 
remedy,  acknowledging  the  necessity  for  such  operations, 
is  for  the  officers  to  use  all  their  power  to  prevent  a  panic, 
or  to  keep  it  in  bounds.  The  great  trouble  with  the  British 
in  these  night  attacks  was  the  fact  that  they  advanced  with- 
out outposts;  this  may  be  risked  by  a  singe  company,  but 
never  by  a  column  of  all  arms,  2,000  strong. 

The  examples  prove  that  night  battles  on  a  large  scale 
are  impossible.  Th.e  taking  of  the  Spion  Kop  at  night  was 
a  proper  measure,  as  also  would  be  an  approach  by  night 
over  open  ground  to  an  enemy's  position,  but  all  these  re- 
quire careful  previous  reconnoissance  of  the  ground  to  be 
passed  over.  Moreover,  the  men  should  be  fully  impressed 
with  the  idea  that  night  fire  is  not  dangerous,  and  as  soon  as 
the  enemy  opens  it  all  the  troops  must  charge  with  all  their 
energy. 

These  are  a  few  of  the  lessons  to  be  learned  from  the 
Boer  War,  but  perhaps  the  most  impressive  lesson  of  all  is 
the  high  significance,  true  for  all  time  to  come,  of  the  tactical 
and  strategical  offensive. 


224  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


APPRNDIX. 


Distances  Between  Important  Points. 

BY  SEA. 

Nautical  Miles. 

Southampton  to  Cape  Town 5,978 

_Cape  Town  to  Port  Elizabeth 428 

Port  Elizabeth  to  East  London 131 

East  London  to  Durban *. 253 

Durban  to  Lorenzo  Marques 300 

Lorenzo  Marques  to  Beira 488 

BY  RAILROAD. 

Miles.    Hours, 

Cape  Town  to  De  Aar 500  27 

De  Aar  to  Naauwpoort 69          3 

De  Aar  to  Orange  River 70  4 

Orange  River  to  Modder  River 52%  . . 

Modder  River  to  Spytf ontein 11 

Spytfontein  to  Kimberley 14 

Kimberley  to  Warrenton 44%  ..'• 

Kimberley  to  Fourteen  Streams 47%  . . 

Kimberley  to  Taungs 84 

Taungs  to  Vryburg 43  .i 

Vryburg  to  Mafeking 96%  . . 

Fourteen  Streams  to  Mafeking 176%  .. 

Mafeking  to  Ramathlabama 15%  . , 

Mafeking  to  Lobatsi 47 

Mafeking  to  Crocodile  Pools 83%  .'. 

Mafeking  to  Gaberones 92% 

Mafeking  to  Buluwayo 389%  . . 


Port  Elizabeth  to  Rosmead  Junction  (Route  1) 243 

Port  Elizabeth  to  Rosmead  Junction  (Route  2) 283  18% 

Rosmead  Junction  to  Naauwpoort 26%  1% 

Rosmead  Junction  to  Stormberg  Junction 83%  7 

Rosmead  Junction  to  Thebus 37    '  •«, , .  - 

Naauwpoort  to  Arundel 18%  . . 

Arundel  to  Rensburg 8%  . . 

Rensburg  to  Colesberg  Junction 9 

Colesberg  Junction  to  Norvals  Pont 24%  .. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  225 

Miles.    Hours. 

Norvals  Pont  to  Spriiigfontein 32^     . . 

Rosmead  Junction  to  Springfontein 93          5 

East  London  to  Queenstown 154^     . . 

Queenstown  to  Sterkstroom  Junction 35 

Queenstown  to  Stormberg  Junction 67 

Sterkstroom  to  Dordrecht 41 

Dordrecht  to  Indwe 25 

Sterkstroom  to   Indwe 66          6 

Stormberg  Junction  to  Thebus 46*£     . . 

Stormberg  Junction  to  Burghersdorp 22 

Burghersdorp  to  Bethulie  Bridge 42^     . . 

Bethulie  Bridge  to  Springfontein 28 

Stormberg  Junction  to  Springfontein 92*4      8 

Stormberg  Junction  to  Albert  Junction 25^ 

Albert  Junction  to  Aliwal  North 29 

Springfontein  to  Bethany SO1/^     . . 

Bethany  to  Bloemf ontein 36^     . . 

Springfontein  to  Bloemf  ontein 88          4 

Bloemf  ontein  to  Karree 21 

Bloemf  ontein  to  Brandf  ort 35 

Bloemfontein  to  Vet  River 56 

Vet  River  to  Smaldeel  (Winburg  railroad  station) 6%     .. 

Smaldeel  (Winburg  railroad  station)  to  Kroonstad 70 

Kroonstad  to  Pretoria 160 

Springfontein  to  Vil joens  Drift 317        13 

Bloemfontein  to  Viljoens  Drift 230          9 

Viljoens  Drift  to  Klip  River...: 22 

Klip  River  to  Elandsf ontein .  • 20 

Elandsfontein  to  Pretoria 36 

Viljoens  Drift  to  Pretoria 78          5 

Elandsfontein  to  Johannesburg 10 

Johannesburg  to  Krugersdorp 19 

Krugersdorp  to  Potchefstroom 67 

Potchefstroom  to  Klerksdorp 30 

Elandsfontein  to  Charlestown   (Natal) 170          9 

Pretoria  to  Waterval 15 

Pretoria  to  Nylstroom 81 

Pretoria  to   Belfast 136 

Belfast  to  Komatipoort 155 

Komatipoort  to  Lorenzo  Marques 51 


—15- 


226  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Miles.     Hours. 

Durban  to  Mooi  River 541^  . . 

Mooi  River  to  Estcourt 21 

Bstcourt   to  Colenso 27 

Colenso  to  Ladysmith 16^  - .    • 

Ladysmith  to  Glencoe "41^  . . 

Glencoe  to  Newcastle 37 

Newcastle  to  Charlestown 36 

Ladysmith  to  Besters 15%  . . 

Besters  to  Van  Reenan 211/£  . . 

Van  Reenan  to  Harrismith 23^  . . 

Durban  to  Ladysmith 188%  12 

Ladysmith  to  Harrismith 60^      5 

Ladysmith   to   Charlestown 114^       6 


Beira  to  Umtali 203 

Umtali   to  Marandellas 130 

Marandellas  to  Salisbury 40 

BY  ROAD. 

De  Aar  to  Prieska 110 

Belmont  to  Douglas 52 

Modder  River  Bridge  to  Jacobsdal 10 

Kimberley  to  Barkly  West 22 

Kimberley  to    Boshof 36 

Colesberg  to  Norvals  Pont 25 

Norvals  Pont  to  Bethulie 30 

Norvals  Pont  to  Springfontein : 31 

Bethulie  to  Springtontein 23 

Bethulie  to  Smithfield 40 

Dordrecht  to  Jamestown 24 

Jamestown  to  Aliwal  North 33 

Aliwal  North  to  Rouxville 20 

Aliwal  North  to  Bushmans  Kop 60 

Aliwal  North  to  Wepener 77 

Smithfield  to  Dewetsdorp 52 

Wepener  to  Dewetsdorp 23 

Dewetsdorp  to  Bloemf ontein 40 

Dewetsdorp  to  Reddersburg 38 

Dewetsdorp  to  Thaba  'Nchu 27 

Kimberley  to  Boshof 36 

Jacobsdal   to  Koffyf ontein 24 

Klip  Drift  to  Paardeberg 11 

Paardeberg  Drift  to  Osfontein 8 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  221 

Miles.    Hours. 

Osfontein  to  Poplar  Grove 10 

Poplar  Grove  to  Abrahams  Kraal 17 

Poplar  Grove  to  Driefontein 1 

Poplar  Grove  to  Aasvogel  Kop 10 

Aasvogel  Kop  to  Venters  Vlei 18 

Venters  Vlei  to  Bloemfontein 18 

Oolesberg   to   Fauresmith 85 

Fauresmith  to  Jacobsdal 60 

Boshof  to  Bulfontein 60 

Boshof  to  Hoopstad 70 

Bloemfontein  to  Sanna's  Post 18 

Bloemf  ontein  to  Thaba  'Nchu 38 

Bloemfontein  to  Ladybrand 72 

Bloemfontein   to  Winburg 68 

Bloemfontein  to  Dewetsdorp 40 

Thaba  'Nchu  to  Dewetsdorp 27 

Pietermaritzburg  to  Dundee  (over  Greytown) 126 

Frere  to  Potgieters  Drift 23 

Ladysmith  to  Acton  Homes 26 

Ladysmith  to  Bezuidenhouts  Pass 46 

Ladysmith  to  Colenso 16 

Ladysmith  to  Pietermaritzburg 100 

Ladysmith   to  Dundee 48 

Ladysmith  to  Helpmakaar 45 

Maf eking   to   Johannesburg 160 

Pretoria  to  Tuli 360 

The  strength  and  composition  of  the  British  forces  in  South 
Africa  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  was  as  follows: 

THE  NATAL  FORCE. 

The  Natal  force  was  part  of  the  Cape  Colony  force  up  to  the  mid- 
dle of  October,  and  Major-General  Symons  was  in  command  of  it. 
Afterwards  General  White,  who  had  been  in  command  of  the  Cape 
Colony  forces,  was  sent  to  take  command  of  the  Natal  force. 

Infantry  - 

1st  battalion  Liverpool  Regiment  (originally  in  Cape  Colony,  sent 

to  Ladysmith  September  25) 750 

1st  battalion  Leicestershire  Regiment  (originally  in  Ladysmith, 

sent  to  Glencoe  September  25) 800 

2d  battalion  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers  (originally  in  Ladysmith, 

sent  to  Glencoe  September  25) 750 

1st  battalion  King's  Royal  Rifles  (at  Glencoe) 750 


228  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

2d  battalion  King's  Royal  Rifles  (at  Ladysmith,  embarked  at  Cal- 
cutta and  Bombay  September  29) 750 

1st  battalion  Devonshire  Regiment  (at  Ladysmith,  embarked  at 

Calcutta  and  Bombay  September  29) 800 

1st  battalion  Manchester  Regiment  (at  Ladysmith,  arrived  at 

Durban  September  15) 750 

2d  battalion  Gordon  Highlanders  (at  Ladysmith,  embarked  at 

Calcutta  and  Bombay  September  29) 80& 

1st  battalion  Gloucestershire  Regiment  (at  Ladysmith,  embarked 

at  Calcutta  and  Bombay  September  29) 800 

1st  battalion  Royal  Irish  Fusiliers  (at  Glencoe,  sent  from  Cairo)    700 


7,650 
Cavalry. 

5th  Lancers  (originally  in  Pietermaritzburg,  sent  to  Ladysmith 

September  25) 400- 

5th  Dragoon  Guards  (at  Ladysmith) 400 

18th  Hussars  (originally  in  Ladysmith,  sent  to  Glencoe  Septem- 
ber 25)  450 

19th  Hussars..  400 


%  1,650 

Artillery. 

Field  Batteries  Nos.  13,  21,  42,  53,  67  and  69  and  the  10th  Moun- 
tain Battery  (42  guns  in  all) 1,218 

Field  Batteries  Nos.  18,  62  and  75  (18  guns  in  all)  expected  shortly 

from  Aldershot..  .  530 


1,748 

Three  of  the  batteries  were    originally   in   Ladysmith,   sent   to 
Glencoe  September  25;  3  batteries  (21,  42,  53)  came  from  India. 

Engineers  (Pioneers). 
Field  Companies  Nos.  7,  8  and  23  and  the  29th  Garrison  Company    600 

Train. 
Companies  9,  15,  31  and  41 300 

Volunteers. 

Natal   Volunteers 760 

Natal  Carabiniers 120 

Imperial  Light  Horse 500 

Durban  Volunteers 750- 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  229 

Mounted  Police  of  Natal  (with  9  guns) 550 


2,680 

14,628 
Total,  69  guns  and  14,628  men. 

THE  CAPE  FORCE. 

Infantry. 

1st  battalion  Northumberland  Fusiliers  (sent  from  Aldershot) . . .  770 
1st  battalion  Royal  Munster  Fusiliers    (arrived   at   Cape   Town 

September  15) 750 

1st  battalion  North  Lancashire  Regiment 800 

2d  battalion  Berkshire  Regiment 750 

%  2d  battalion  Yorkshire  Light  Infantry 320 

1st  battalion  Border  Regiment  (sent  from  Malta) ' 700 

4,090 
To  arrive  October  29th: 

2d  battalion  Rifle  Brigade  (sent  from  Crete) 700 

2  companies  Garrison  Artillery,  Nos.  14  and  23 200 

5th  and  22d  Companies  Train 150 


5,140 
On  the  Western  Border. 

Estimated  (mostly  volunteers) 4,000 

Naval  Brigade,  landed  from  the  fleet  at  Cape  Town  (4  guns) 1,000 


Total 10,140 

Field  Batteries  Nos.  18,  62  and  75.     9th  Lancers. 

Grand  total,  24,768  men  and  69  guns. 

The  Mobilized  Army  Corps. 
General  Sir  Redvers  Buller. 

First  Division. 

Lieutenant-General  Lord  P.  Methuen. 
1st  Brigade  (Guards):     Major-General  Colville. 
3d  battalion  Grenadier  Guards  (from  Gibraltar). 
1st  battalion  Coldstream  Guards  (from  Gibraltar). 
2d  battalion  Coldstream  Guards. 
1st  battalion  Scots  Guards. 
Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  19). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  18. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  18. 


230  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

2d  Brigade  (English  Brigade):     Major-General  Hildyard. 
2d  battalion  Royal  West  Surrey  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Devonshire  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  West  Yorkshire  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  East  Surrey  Regiment. 
Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  26). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  2. 
Depot  Field  Ambulance. 

1  squadron  14th  Hussars. 

Field  Batteries  Nos.  7,  14  and  66  (6  guns  each). 

Ammunition  column  (1  reserve  gun). 

Field  Engineer  Co.  No.  17. 

Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  20). 

Field  Ambulance  No.  19. 

Second  Division. 
Major-General  Sir  C.  F.  Clery. 

3d  Brigade  (Scotch  Bridgade):     Major-General  Wauchope.* 
2d  battalion  Royal  Highlanders  (Black  Watch). 
1st  battalion  Highland  Light  Infantry. 
2d  battalion  Seaforth  Highlanders. 
1st  battalion  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders. 
Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  14). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  1. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  14. 

4th  Brigade  (Light  Infantry):     Major-General  Lyttleton. 
_2d  battalion  Scottish  Rifles  (Cameronians). 
3d  battalion  King's  Royal  Rifle  Corps. 
1st  battalion  Durham  Light  Infantry. 
1st  battalion  1st  Rifle  Brigade. 
Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  16). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  14. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  14. 

1  squadron  14th  Hussars. 

Field  Batteries  Nos.  63,  64  and  73  (6  guns  each). 

Ammunition  column  (1  reserve  gun). 

Field  Engineer  Co.  No.  11. 

Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  24). 

Field  Ambulance  No.  3. 

Third  Division. 

Major-General  Sir  W.  F.  Gatacre. 
5th  Brigade  (Irish  Brigade):     Major-General  Hart. 
1st  battalion  Royal  Inniskilling  Fusiliers. 

*Killed  at  Magersfontein  ;  succeeded  by  General  Hector  Macdonald. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  231 

2d  battalion  Royal  Irish  Rifles. 
1st  battalion  Connaught  Rangers. 
1st  battalion  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers. 
Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  30). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  16. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  10. 

6th  Brigade  (Fusilier  Brigade) :     Major-General  Barton. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Fusiliers. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Scots  Fusiliers. 
1st  battalion  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Irish  Fusiliers. 
Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  36). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  17. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  11. 
1  squadron  14th  Hussars. 

Field  Batteries  Nos.  74,  77  and  79  (6  guns  each). 
Ammunition  column  (1  reserve  gun). 
Field  Engineer  Co.  No.  12. 
Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  33). 
Field  Ambulance  No.  7. 

Cavalry  Division. 

Lieutenant-General  J.  D.  P.  French. 
1st  Brigade:     Major-General  Babington. 
6th  Dragoon  Guards. 
10th  Hussars. 
12th  Lancers. 

Horse  Battery  R  (6  guns). 
Ammunition  column   (1  reserve  gun). 
Field  Engineer  Troop. 
1st  battalion  Mounted  Infantry. 
Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  13). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  9. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  9. 

2d  Brigade:     Major-General  Brabazon. 
1st  Dragoons. 
2d  Dragoons. 
6th  Dragoons. 
Horse  Battery  O  (6  guns). 
Ammunition  column   (1  reserve  gun). 
2d  battalion  Mounted  Infantry. 
.  Supply  column  (Train  Co.  No.  11). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  12. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  6. 


232  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Corps  Headquarters  and  Reserve. 
1st  battalion  Royal  Scots. 
Staff  of  the  14th  Hussars. 
13th  Hussars. 

Field  Artillery  Regimental  Staff. 
Field  Artillery  Battalion  Staff. 
Horse  Artillery  Battalion  Staff. 
Horse  Batteries  G  and  P. 

Field  Batteries  Nos.  4,  38  and  78  (6  guns  each). 
Howitzer  Battalion  Staff. 

Howitzer  Batteries  Nos.  37,  61  and  65  (6  guns  each). 
Engineer  Regimental  Staff. 
Pontoneers  Section. 
1st  Section  Telegraphists. 
Field  Engineer  Co.  No.  26. 
1st  Engineer  Field  Park. 
1st  and  2d  Balloon  Section. 
10th  Railroad  Co. 
Ammunition  Park. 
Supply  column   (Train  Co.  No.  21). 
Field  Bakery  No.  40  (Train). 
Field  Ambulance  No.  5. 
Supply  Park  (Train  Cos.  No.  4,  29  and  42). 

Troops  for  Lines  of  Communication. 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  Forestier-Walker. 
2d  battalion  Northumberland  Fusiliers. 
2d  battalion  Somersetshire  Light  Infantry. 
2d  battalion  Duke  of  Cornwall's  Light  Infantry. 
1st  battalion  Welsh  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Northamptonshire  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Shropshire  Light  Infantry. 
1st  battalion  Gordon  Highlanders. 

1  Balloon  Field  Equipage. 

4  Train  Companies  (6,  8,  28  and  35). 
4  Stationary  Field  Hospitals. 
4  General  Field  Hospitals. 

2  Principal  Depots  for  Medical  Supplies. 

3  Advance  Depots  for  Medical  Supplies. 

4  Hospital  Sections. 
2  Hospital  Ships. 

4  Companies  Army  Ordnance  Corps  (1,  2,  3  and  4). 
1  Corps  Pay  Station. 
1  Infantry  Depot. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  233 

1  General  Depot. 

2  Remount  Depots. 

DISTRIBUTION    OF   THE    BRITISH    FORCES   AT   THE    END   OF 
NOVEMBER,  1899. 

Ladysmith. 

General  White. 

10,000  men,  44  (36  field,  8  navy)  guns,  12  machine  guns. 

Natal. 

General  Clery. 
15,500  men,  24  field  guns,  16  machine  guns. 

Modder  River. 

General  Lord  Methuen. 

9,400  men,  22  field  guns,  12  machine  guns. 

Kimberley. 

Colonel  Kekewich. 

2,400  men,  12  field  guns,  4  machine  guns. 

Mafeking. 

Colonel  Baden-Powell. 

1,000  men,  6  field  guns,  4  machine  guns. 

Naauwpoort  and  De  Aar. 

General  French. 
4,900  men,  6  field  guns,  6  machine  guns. 

Queenstown. 

General  Gatacre. 

4,300  men,  5  machine  guns. 

Rhodesia. 
1,000  men,  6  field  guns,  4  machine  guns. 

Gape  Town. 

3,500  men,  35  field  guns,  2  machine  guns. 

The  strength  of  the  forces  in  South  Africa  after  the  arrival  of 
the  mobile  army  corps  was  as  follows: 

Officers  and  Mon.  Horses.  Mules. 

6   Infantry   Brigades .-25,674  408  5,244 

3   Divisional   Troops... 3,579  2,289  1,119 

2  Cavalry  Brigades 5,370  4,894  2,282 

Corps  Troops 5,124  2,584  1,938 

Cavalry  Division  Staff 42  38  33 

Field  Engineer  Troops  with  the  Cavalry..      122  88  51 


Total  of  Mobile  Army  Corps 39,911      10,301      10,667 

Troops  for  Lines  of  Communication 9,387  885        2,683 


234  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


Officers  and  Men.    Horses.    Mules. 
Natal    Force 14,628  

Cape  Force 5,140  

Naval  Brigade 1,000 


70,066      11,186       13,350 

The  actual  strength  of  the  mobile  army  corps  in  line  troops,  ex- 
clusive of  the  Staffs,  was: 

Infantry 25,475 

Mounted   Infantry 1,172 

Cavalry 4,252 

Artillery .  3,435 


Total 34,334  and  114  guns. 

The  Infantry  arm  is  the  Lee-Metford  rifle  of  0.3-inch  caliber, 
the  Cavalry  arm  is  the  Lee-Metford  carbine  of  the  same  caliber,  the 
field  batteries  have  15-pounder  guns,  the  horse  batteries  12-pounders, 
the  mountain  batteries  7-pounder  guns  and  the  howitzer  batteries 
5-inch  guns. 

The  transports  landed  their  first  troops  on  November  12  at  Cape 
Town,  part  being  sent  on  to  Durban.  The  following  were  sent  on  to 
Natal: 

1st  Brigade. 
2d  Coldstream  Guards. 

2d  Brigade:     Major-General  Hildyard. 
2d  West  Surrey  Regiment. 
2d  West  Yorkshire  Regiment. 
2d  East  Surrey  Regiment. 

6th  Brigade. 

1st  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers. 
2d  Irish  Fusiliers. 

Also  parts  of  the  2d  Division  and  3  field  batteries.  Major-Gen- 
eral Clery  (commanding  2d  Division)  was  sent  as  commander-in-chief 
in  Natal. 

Lord  Methuen  (commanding  1st  Division)  was  sent  to  Orange 
River  Station  with  the  following: 
3d  Grenadier  Guards. 
1st  Coldstream  Guards. 
1st  Scots  Guards. 
1st  Northumberland  Fusiliers. 
1st  Royal  Munster  Fusiliers. 
l/2  1st  Royal  North  Lancashire  Regiment. 

9th  Lancers  (embarked  at  Calcutta  and  Bombay,  September  29>. 
Field  Artillery. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  235 

The  rest  of  the  mobilized  army  corps  (1st,  2d  and  3d  Divisions) 
embarked  in  the  first  and  second  weeks  of  November,  and  arrived 
early  in  December.  White's  troops  at  Ladysmith  constitute  the  4th 
Division. 

New  Oryanuzations. 

The  5th  Division  was  ordered  mobilized  on  November  8th  and 
has  the  following  composition: 

Fifth  Division. 
General  Sir  C.  Warren. 

10th  Brigade:     Major-General  Coke. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Warwickshire  Regiment. 
1st  battalion  Yorkshire  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Dorsetshire  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Middlesex  Regiment. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  32). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  10. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  11. 

llth  Brigade:     Colonel  Woodgate. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Lancaster  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Lancashire  Fusiliers. 
1st  battalion  South  Lancashire  Regiment. 
1st  battalion  York  and  Lancaster  Regiment. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  25). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  6. 
1  Field  Ambulance. 

1  squadron  14th  Hussars. 

19th,  20th  and  28th  Field  Battery. 

Ammunition  column. 

Field  Engineer  Co.  No.  37. 

Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  12). 

Field  Ambulance  No.  15. 

Total  strength  11,000  men,  1,263  horses,  18  field  guns,  9  machine 
guns.  Embarkation  the  end  of  November  on  fast  steamers. 

Not  Yet  Brigaded: 
1st  King's  (Liverpool). 
2d  King's  Royal  Rifle  Corps. 
2d  Rifle  Brigade. 
1st  Border  Regiment. 

In  addition  to  the  5th  Division  the  following  troops  were  or- 
dered to  proceed  to  South  Africa: 

Three  infantry  battalions,  the  1st  Suffolk  (from  Dover),  1st  Essex 
(from  Warley),  1st  Sherwood  Foresters  (from  Malta)  and  1st  Derby- 


23(5  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

shire  battalions  were  ordered  to  replace  the  Gloucester  and  Irish  Fu- 
silier battalions  captured  at  Ladysmith. 

The  4th  mountain  battery  to  replace  the  captured  10th. 
A  regiment  of  Household  Cavalry. 

A  siege  train  of  30  howitzers  (14  six-inch  and  8  five -inch  and 
8  four-inch)  and  1,000  men. 

On  December  3d  the  mobilization  of  the  6th  Division  was  ordered, 
beginning  on  the  4th  and  ending  on  the  llth  of  December.  On  the 
16th  the  transportation  to  South  Africa  was  begun,  and  the  first  troops 
would  reach  Cape  Town  about  January  8th,  pr  Durban  about  January 
12th. 

Sixth  Division. 

Major-General  T.  Kelly-Kenny. 
12th  Brigade:     Colonel  Clements. 
2d  battalion  Bedfordshire  Regiment. 
1st  battalion  Royal  Irish  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Worcestershire  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Wiltshire  Regiment. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  7). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  8. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  4. 

13th  Brigade:     Colonel  Knox. 
2d  battalion  East  Kent  Regiment  (Buffs). 
2d  battalion  Gloucestershire  Regiment. 
1st  battalion  West  Riding  Regiment. 
1st  battalion  Oxfordshire  Light  Infantry  Regiment. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  10). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  7. 
Field  Ambulance  No.  18. 

76th,  81st  and  82d  Field  Battery. 
Ammunition  column  (1  reserve  gun). 
Field  Engineer  Co.  No.  38. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  23). 
Field  Ambulance  No.  6. 

Total  strength:     9,601  men,  744  horses  and  2,405  mules. 
On  December  14th  the  mobilization  of  the  7th  Division  was  or- 
dered.   Its  embarkation  took  place  between  the  4th  and  10th  of  Jan- 
uary, and  it  reached  the  Cape  about  the  end  of  January. 

Seventh  Division. 
Major-General  C.  Tucker. 
14th  Brigade:     Major-General  Chermside. 
2d  battalion  Norfolk  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Lincolnshire  Regiment. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  237 

1st  battalion  King's  Own  Scottish  Borderers. 
2d  battalion  Hampshire  Regiment. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  31). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  19. 
Field  Hospital  No.  13. 

15th  Brigade:     Major-General  Wavell.* 
2d  battalion  Cheshire  Regiment. 
1st  battalion  East  Lancashire  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  South  Wales  Borderers. 
2d  battalion  North  Staffordshire  Regiment. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  12). 
Field  Ambulance  No.  13. 

83d,  84th  and  85th  Field  Batteries. 
Ammunition  column  (1  reserve  gun). 
Field  Engineer  Co.  No.  9. 
Army  Service  Corps  Co.  No.  17. 
Field  Hospital  No.  13. 

No  cavalry  is  assigned  to  this  division;  hereafter  volunteer 
mounted  infantry  is  to  be  attached— about  880  men  to  a  division. 

On  December  17th  Field  Marshal  Lord  Roberts  was  appointed 
commander-in-chief  in  South  Africa,  with  Lord  Kitchener  of  Khar- 
toum as  his  chief  of  staff. 

The  Government,  about  the  middle  of  December,  ordered  the 
organization  of  the  following  for  service  in  South  Africa: 

1.  Imperial  Yeomanry,  3,000  men  (selected  Yeomanry  as  mount- 
ed infantry);   the  companies  to  have  a  strength  of  5  officers  and  110 
men. 

2.  Volunteer  Mounted  Infantry,  76  selected  companies,  one  for 
each  battalion  to  be  sent  out  in  future,  8,664  in  all.    A  second  selected 
company  to  be  made  up  in  the  regimental  district  of  each  regiment. 

3.  A  battalion  of  volunteers  from  the  metropolis: 

City  of  London  Imperial  Volunteers,  1,400  men. 

8  companies  Infantry. 

2  companies  Mounted  Infantry. 

1  battery  Field  Artillery  (4  Q.  F.  guns). 

4.  The  16th  Lancers  and  2,000  reserve  horses  from  India. 

5.  700  men  of  the  Naval  Brigade  landed. 

6.  A   field   howitzer   battalion   of  3   batteries  of   6  guns   each: 
43d,  86th  and  87th  Batteries. 

The  8th  Division  was  ordered  mobilized  towards  the  end  of 
December. 

*General  Prior  first  assigned,  died  at  Aldershot. 


238  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Eighth  Division. 
Major-General  Sir  H.  Rundle. 
16th  Brigade:     Major-General  B.  B.  D.  Campbell. 
2d  battalion  Grenadier  Guards. 
2d  battalion  Scots  Guards. 
2d  battalion  East  Yorkshire. 

1st  battalion  Leinster  (Royal  Canadians),  from  Halifax. 
Army  Service  Corps. 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  21. 
Field  Hospital  No.  21. 

17th  Brigade:     Major-General  J.  E.  Boyes. 
1st  battalion  Worcester. 
1st  battalion  Royal  West  Kent,  from  Cairo. 
1st  battalion  South  Stafford,  from  Gibraltar. 
2d  battalion  Manchester. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  37). 
Litter  Bearer  Co.  No.  22. 
Field  Hospital  No.  22. 

89th,  90th  and  91st  Field  Batteries. 
Ammunition  column  (1  reserve  gun). 
Field  Engineer  Co.  No.  5. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  39). 
Field  Hospital  No.  23. 

Each  battalion  has  a  strength  of  1,019,  in  which  is  included  for 
each  a  mounted  company. 

A  cavalry  brigade  was  ordered  mobilized  at  the  same  time  with 
the  8th  Division. 

Cavalry  Brigade. 
Major-General  J.  B.  B.  Dickson. 
7th  Dragoon  Guards. 
8th  Hussars. 
17th  Lancers. 
Horse  Battery  M. 

Ammunition  column  (1  reserve  gun). 
2  companies  Mounted  Infantry. 
Army  Service  Corps  (Co.  No.  3). 
1  Company  Bearers. 
1  Field  Hospital. 

Total  strength:     2,518  men,  2,160  horses,  7  field  guns  and  2  ma- 
chine guns. 

An  artillery  corps  was  ordered  to  mobilize  at  the  same  time  as 
the  8th  Division. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  239 

Artillery  Corps. 

12th  howitzer  battalion:    43d,  86th  and  87th  Batteries. 
13th  battalion:  2d,  8th  and  44th  Field  Batteries. 
14th  battalion:  39th,  68th  and  88th  Field  Batteries. 
15th  battalion:  5th,  9th  aid  17th  Field  Batteries. 
Total  strength  2,630  men,  2,134  horses.     Each  howitzer  battery 
has  199  men,  162  horses;  each  field  battery  175  men,  137  horses. 

The  following  separate  organizations  have  been  ordered  to  South 
Africa: 

1st  battalion  Cameron  Highlanders  (from  Cairo). 

1st  battalion  Sussex  (from  Malta). 

2  battalions  from  Gibraltar. 

16th  Lancers  from  India  (sailed  January  8). 

Horse  Batteries  A  and  J  from  India. 

Ninth  Brigade. 

1st  Northumberland  Fusiliers.* 
1st  Loyal  North  Lancashire*  (part). 
2d  Yorkshire  Light  Infantry.* 
2d  Northamptonshire,  f 

COLONIAL  FORCES. 

Rhodesia. 

Rhodesia  Horse  (one  squadron  in  Natal). 
Protectorate  Regiment  (under  Colonel  Baden-Powell). 
Mounted  Infantry  (under  Colonel  Plumer). 

Kimbcrlcy. 

Diamond  Fields  Artillery. 
Kimberley  Light  Horse. 
Kimberley  Rifles. 

Cape  Colony. 

South  African  Light  Horse  (under  Col.  Byng  and  Capt.  Villiers). 
Imperial  Corps  of  Guides. 
Brabant's  Horse. 
Warren's  Horse. 
De  Montmorency's  Scouts. 
Railway  Engineer  Corps. 
Mounted  Volunteers  (Colonel  Cole). 
Prince  Albert  Cape  Artillery. 
Cape  Garrison  Artillery. 
Victoria  Rifles. 

*Originally  in  Cape  Colony  Force. 
tOriginally  on  Line  of  Communications. 


240  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Cape  Town  Highlanders. 

Prince  Albert  Guard  of  Port  Elizabeth. 

Kaffrarian  Rifles  of  East  London. 

Grahamstown  Volunteers. 

Queenstown  Rifle  Volunteers. 

British  South  African  Police  (Colonel  Walford). 

Cape  Mounted  Rifles  Police  (Colonel  Dalgetty). 

Natal. 

Amounted  to  4,500  men  in  November,  1899. 
Imperial  Light  Horse. 
Uitlander  Regiment. 
Imperial  Infantry. 
Bethune's  Horse. 
Natal  Carabineers. 
Natal  Field  Artillery. 
Natal  Mounted  Rifles. 
Border  Mounted  Rifles. 
Umvoti  Mounted  Rifles. 
Corps  of  Colonial  Scouts. 
Corps  of  Guides. 
Natal  Mounted  Police. 

Canada. 

Royal  Canadian  Regiment  of  Infantry. 
Canadian  Mounted  Rifles  (2  battalions). 
Royal  Canadian  Artillery.  Batteries  C,  D,  E  (12-pounder  B.  L.). 

Australia. 

New  South  Wales  Lancers  Squadron 80 

New   South  Wales  Infantry 120 

New  South  Wales  Mounted  Rifles 75 

Queensland  Mounted  Infantry 264 

Victoria  Mounted   Infantry 250 

South  Australia  Mounted  Infantry 125 

West  Australia  Mounted  Infantry 125 

Tasmania  Mounted   Infantry 80 


1,119 

New  Zealand. 
Mounted   Infantry... 213 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


241 


-T9- 


242  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

GENERAL  BULLER'S   COMMAND. 

December  14,  1899. 
2d  Brigade:     General  Hildyard. 
2d  battalion  Royal  West  Surrey  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  Devonshire  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  West  Yorkshire  Regiment. 
2d  battalion  East  Surrey  Regiment. 

4th  Brigade:     General  Lyttleton. 
1st  battalion  Rifle  Brigade. 
3d  battalion  King's  Royal  Rifles. 

6th  Brigade:     General  Barton. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Fusiliers. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Scots  Fusiliers. 
1st  battalion  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Irish  Fusiliers. 

Mixed  Brigade:    General  Hart. 
2d  battalion  Cameronians  (Scottish  Rifles). 
1st  battalion  Durham  Light  Infantry. 
1st  battalion  Highland  Light  Infantry. 
2d  battalion  Somerset  Light  Infantry. 

2  field  batteries  and  6  naval  guns. 

Maf  eking. 
Colonel  Baden-Powell. 

Cavalry. 
Cape  Mounted  Police. 

Infantry. 

Protectorate  Regiment. 
Volunteers. 
B.  S.  A.  Companies,  Motfnted  Police. 

Tuli. 
Colonel  Plumer. 

Kitnberley. 
Cavalry. 
Cape  Police. 

Diamond  Field  Horse  (part). 
Kimberley  Light  Horse  (part). 

Infantry. 

2d  Royal  Highlanders  (detachment). 
1st  Loyal  North  Lancashire  (4  companies). 
Local  Volunteer  Corps. 
Townsmen. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


243 


BRITISH  FIELD  GUN  WITH  CLARKE  RECOIL  BRAKE. 

Artillery. 
Field  Batteries. 
Garrison  Artillery. 
Diamond  Fields  Artillery. 

Engineers. 
1  Detachment. 
R.  A.  M.  C. 
Hospital. 

British  Artillery. 

At  the  end  of  the  year  1899  the  British  had  in  South  Africa  (omit- 
ting those  lost  in  battle)  the  following  artillery  material: 
4  batteries   (G,  O,   P,   R)  Royal  Horse  Artillery,   6   guns   each, 

12-pounder,  3-inch,  breech-loaders 24 

24  batteries  (Nos.  4,  7,  13,  14,  18.  19,  20,  21,  36,  42,  49,  53,  62, 
64,  66,  67,  69,  73,  74,  75,  76,  77,  79,  92)  Royal  Field  Artillery, 

6  guns  each,  15-pounder,  3-inch,  breech-loaders 144 

3  batteries  (Nos,  37,  61,  65)  Royal  Field  Artillery,  6  guns  each, 
5-inch  field  howitzers,  firing  shrapnel,  canister  and  lyddite 

shell 18 

1  mountain  battery  (No.  4),  6  guns,  2.5-inch,  muzzle-loaders....         6 

192 


244 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


4.7-t.V.  Q.  F.  NAVY  GUM,  ON  6-IN.  HOWITZER  CARRIAGE. 
The  Artillery  of  the  Transvaal  Boers. 
Old  Guns. 

8  cm.  field  guns,  Krupp,  old 40 

6  cm.   mountain   guns,   Krupp,  old 40 

80 

7-pounder  R.  P.  Maxim-Nordenfeldt  (captured  in  Jameson  Raid)  1 

3-inch  R.  F.  Maxim-Nordenfeldt  (captured  in  Jameson  Raid) 1 

New  Guns. 

7.5  cm.  R.  F.  Krupp  field  guns,  new 8 

7.5  cm.  R.  F.  Schneider-Canet  field  guns,  new 16 

8  cm.  R.  F.  Maxim-Nordenfeldt  field  guns,  new 5 

3.7   cm.    Automatic  Maxim-Nordenfeldt   guns,    new 24 

12  cm.  field  howitzers,  Krupp,  new 4 

12  cm.  field  howitzers,   Schneider-Canet,  new 4 

3.7  cm.  R.  F.  mountain  guns,  Krupp,  new 4 

Dynamite  gun  (like  Simms- Dudley),  new 1 

15.5  cm.  long  siege  guns,  Schneider-Canet,  new 4 

72 


BRITISH  4.7-IN.  NAVY  GUN  ON  40-PDR.  CARRIAGE. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


245 


Machine  Guns. 

0.45-inch  Maxim  guns 30 

0.30-inch   Maxim    guns 20 

50 
The  Artillery  of  the  Orange  Boers. 

7.5  cm.  field  guns,  Krupp 12 

3.7  cm.  field  guns 1 

Field  guns 13 

Maxim  machine  guns 6 

Guns  captured  by  the  Boers 26 

Small-Arms  in  the  War. 
British:     Lee-Metford  gun.     Boers:      Mauser  gun,  M.   93,  95  and  98. 

Henry-Martini  gun. 

The  small-arms  used  in  the  Boer  War  are  of  especial  interest 
to  the  military  world  because  in  this  war  small-caliber  magazine 
rifles  are  used  on  a  large  scale  for  the  first  time  in  history. 

The  arms  of  the  two  opposed  nations  are  contrasted  in  the  fol- 
lowing table: 


Wt.  of  rifle  alone  (mag.  empty)  — 
Wt.  of  rifle  and  bayonet(mag.  full) 

British. 

Boer. 

Lee-Metford, 
89,  Mil. 

Henry- 
Martini,95 

Mauser, 
93-95. 

Henry- 
Martini  (old) 

9.2  Ibs. 
10.9  Ibs. 
4  ft.  \yz  in. 
5 
0.303  in. 
5 
Bolt. 
14  grams. 
f  2.2  grams. 
\     cordite. 
28.3  grams. 
21.49f.  s. 

1900  yds. 
38  in. 
115 

0.303  in. 
5 

14  grams. 
2.2  grams, 
cordite. 
28.3 

8.4  Ibs. 
9.6  Ibs. 
4  ft.  Y2  in. 
5 
0.276  in. 

Bolt. 
11.2  grams. 

2.2  grams. 

24.8  grams. 
2389  f  .  s. 
4380  yds. 

55  in. 

0.45  in. 

31.2  grams. 
5.5  grams, 
bl'k  powder. 

Number  of  cartridges  in  magazine. 
Caliber  of  bore  
Number  of  grooves     

Mechanism  
Weight  of  bullet           

Charge           

Total  weight  of  round 

Velocity  (muzzle)  •• 

Extreme  range  

•Sight  graduated  to 

Penetration  in  deal  at  12  m  
Rounds  carried  by  soldier  . 

The  British  Army  is  armed  principally  with  the  Lee-Metford 
rifle  89  M.  II.,  but  in  1895  the  old  Henry-Martini  guns  were  altered  at 
Enfield  and  furnished  with  a  bore  of  the  same  dimensions  as  the 
Lee-Metford,  and  firing  the  same  projectile.  These  guns  were  issued 
to  the  volunteers  at  that  time,  and  it  is  probable  that  some  of  them 
are  now  in  use  in  South  Africa. 

The  Boer  Army  has  mostly  the  Mauser  gun;  the  Transvaal 
Boers  the  model  93-95,  the  Orange  Boers  the  latest  model  (98);  but 
the  latter  use  in  part  the  old  0.45-inch  Henry-Martini,  a  number  of 
which  they  purchased  from  England  in  1894. 


246 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


LEE-METFORD  GUN.— Kriegatech.  3. 


MAUSER  RIFLE.— Kriegstech. 

Results  of  Firing  of  Mauser  Rifle. 

Height  of  trajectory  at  500  m 3  feet      5  inches. 

550  m 4  feet      3  inches. 

"                  "             600  m 5  feet      4  inches. 

Deviation  (mean)  at  200  m.  vertical 6  inches. 

horizontal . .  5  inches. 


1200 


vertical  ..............  4  feet  5y2  inches. 


horizontal  ...........  3  feet 

1500        vertical  .............  10  feet 

horizontal  ...........  5  feet 

2000        vertical  .............  20  feet 

horizontal  ...........  5  feet. 

Space  completely  swept  for  Infantry,  1969  feet. 
"    Cavalry,  2297  feet. 

ADDITIONAL  COLONIAL  CONTINGENTS. 

Canada. 
1,247  men. 

4  squadrons  Mounted  Infantry. 
3  Field  Batteries. 


%  inch. 
11  inches. 
10  inches. 
7  inches. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


247 


HENRY-MAR  flNI.—Kriegstech.  3- 

Australia. 

Infantry.     1,250  men. 
1  Field  Battery. 

New  Zealand. 
200  men,  4  Hotchkiss  guns. 

I  ml  ia. 

i 

250  mounted  men. 

Ceylon* 
125  mounted  men. 

ADDITIONAL  TROOPS  ORDERED. 

The  8th  Division  sailed  from  England  in  the  latter  part  of  March 
and  arrived  at  Port  Elizabeth  and  East  London  about  the  middle  of 
April. 

The  1st  battalion  Leinster  Regiment  came  from  Halifax,  Nova 
Scotia,  to  England  to  be  mobilized  and  did  not  embark  there  for  South 
Africa  till  April  18th.  The  three  batteries  first  assigned  to  tfie  division 
were  left  behind,  but  after  the  loss  of  7  guns  at  Koorn  Spruit  (March 
31,  1900),  two  other  batteries  for  this  division  were  ordered  mobilized 
at  Aldershot. 

Of  the  Militia  29  battalions  have  been  (up  to  the  end  of  April)  sent 
to  South  Africa,  4  to  Malta,  1  to  Cairo  and  1  to  St.  Helena  (to  replace 
other  troops  and,  at  the  last  mentioned  place,  to  guard  prisoners). 

Of  the  Imperial  Yeomanry  79  companies  were  organized  into  20 
battalions,  besides  a  battalion  of  Sharpshooters,  one  of  Rough  Riders, 
and  one  called  Paget's  Corps.  They  began  to  arrive  in  South  Africa 
on  the  9th  of  February,  and  on  the  21st  of  April  there  were  58  com- 
panies in  South  Africa,  12  at  sea,  and  9  still  at  home. 


248  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

TROOPS  IN  SOUTH  AFRICA. 

At  the  opening  of  Lord  Roberts'  campaign,  about  the  middle  of 
February,  England  had  the  following  troops  in  South  Africa: 

Army  of  operations  at  the  front 110,000  men,  216  guns. 

In  Ladysmith 8,000      "        46 

In  Kimberley 2,600      "•        76 

In  Mafeking 1,000      "        16 

Reserves,  and  on  Line  of  Communications: 

In  Natal 4,000      "    ) 

In  the  Center  and  West 8,500      "    (.32      " 

In  Cape  Town 5,500      "    I 

In  Rhodesia 2,000      "          6 

Non-combatants 22,400 

Losses  in  killed,  wounded  and  pris- 
oners   10,000 

Sick 5,000      " 


Total  in  South  Africa 179,000  392 

On  the  way  to  Cape  Town 17,150  men,  172  guns. 

Embarked:     4th  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Mobilizing 17,150  men,    24  guns. 

Ordered  mobilized:    9th  Division. 

The  Boers  had  about 65,000  men,  110  guns. 

Up  to  the  end  of  February  the  total  number  of  troops  sent  from 
England  amounted  to  141,165  men,  24,103  horses  and  379  guns. 

TOTAL  BRITISH  FORCES  IN  SOUTH  AFRICA,  INCLUDING 
COLONIALS. 

Unmownted.        Mounted.          Total. 
(includ.  artillery.) 
February  15,*  15,142,800  37,800  180,600 

BOER  LOSSES. 

Up  to  the  middle  of  January. 

Mafeking 500 

Belmont 400 

Graspan 250 

Modder   River 400 

Magersf ontein 700 

Kuruman 100 

Douglas 75 

Against  Gen.  French 300 

*Not  including  8th  Division  or  4th  Cavalry  Brigade. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  249 

Against  Gen.  Gatacre 100 

Glencoe 300 

Elandslaagte 600 

Ladysmith 2,000 

Sundry 400 

Total 6,125 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  (OFFICIAL) 

Up  to  February  24th. 
161  officers  and  1,490  men  killed. 
194  officers  and  5,795  men  wounded. 
133  officers  and  2,669  men  prisoners  and  missing. 


Total,  488  officers  and  9,954  men. 

CHANGES  IN  COMMAND. 

Feb.  10,  General  Colville  to  command  9th  Division,  newly 
formed. 

Feb.  10,  Colonel  Douglas  to  command  9th  Brigade,  vice  Colville, 
promoted. 

Feb.  27,  General  Hart  to  2d  Division,  vice  Clery,  injured. 

Feb.  27,  Colonel  Norcott  to  5th  Brigade,  vice  Hart,  promoted. 

Feb.  27,  Colonel  Kitchener  to  llth  Brigade,  vice  Wynne,  wounded. 

THE  NAVAL  BRIGADE. 

The  Terrible  arrived  at  Simons  Bay  on  October  14th,  and  while 
getting  ready  to  land  the  small-arms  and  field  guns,  the  captain 
(Percy  Scott)  concluded  that  heavier  guns  would  be  needed  at  the 
front,  and  therefore  commenced  to  mount  the  navy  guns  on  carriages 
for  field  use  and  on  platforms,  carrying  on  the  work  first  on  board  and 
then  in  the  dockyard.  The  Powerful  arrived  on  the  same  day  and 
took  up  the  same  work.  On  the  26th  the  latter  was  ordered  to  Durban, 
and  on  the  day  of  arrival  Captain  Lambton  took  to  Ladysmith  two 
4.7-in.  guns,  three  long  12-pounders  and  one  short  12-pounder,  some 
Maxims,  300  rounds  per  gun,  and  286  officers  and  men.  On  November 
2d  the  Terrible  received  orders  for  Durban,  arriving  November  6th, 
and  at  once  landed  the  heavy  guns: 

One  4.7-inch  Q.F.,  on  wheeled  mounting. 
Sixteen  long  12-pounders,  on  special  mountings. 
Two  short  12-pounders,  on  field  mountings. 
Two  Maxims,  on  field  mountings. 
300  rounds  for  each  piece. 


250  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

21  officers  and  250  men  were  also  landed,  all  for  the  defense  of 
Durban. 

Four  12-pounders  were  soon  taken  to  Pietermaritzburg,  to  replace 
two  long  12-pounders  which  had  been  landed  by  the  Powerful,  these 
having  been  ordered  forward  to  the  Mooi  River. 

On  November  23d  two  more  were  sent  from  Durban,  the  four 
previously  sent  having  also  been  sent  forward  to  Mooi  River  and  Est- 
court.  The  guns  sent  forward  were  manned  by  men  of  the  Tartar, 
Philomel  and  Forte.  On  November  26th  two  4.7-inch  guns  and  four 
more  12-pounders  were  ordered  forward  manned  by  the  Terrible. 

On  December  1st  Capt.  Scott  (Terrible)  mounted  a  search-light  on 
a  railway  car.  On  December  8th  eight  more  guns  were  ordered  to  the 
front.  The  two  4.7-inch  and  six  of  the  12-pounders  were  in  action  at 
Chievely  on  December  12. 

THE  NATIVE  VOLUNTEER  BODIES. 

Bethune's  Mounted  Infantry. 

Border  Horse. 

Brabant's  Horse. 

British  South  Africa  Police. 

Cape  Garrison  Artillery. 

Cape  Medical  Staff  Corps. 

Cape  Mounted  Rifles. 

Cape  Town  Highlanders. 

Cape  Town  City  Volunteers. 

Duke  of  Edinburgh's  Own  Rifle  Volunteers. 

French's  Scouts. 

Frontier  Mounted  Rifles. 

Imperial  Light  Horse. 

Imperial  Light  Infantry. 

Kaffrarian  Rifles. 

Kaffrarian  Mounted  Infantry. 

Kitchener's  Horse. 

Montmorency's  Scouts. 

Prince  Alfred's  Own  Cape  Artillery. 

Prince  Alfred's  Volunteer  Guard. 

Protectorate  Regiment. 

Oueenstown  Rifle  Volunteers. 

Rhodesia  Regiment. 

Rimington  Imperial  Guides. 

Roberts'  Horse. 

South  African  Light  Horse. 

Thornycroft's  Mounted  Infantry. 


TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  251 

COLONIAL  CONTINGENTS. 

Australia. 

New  South  Wales  Lancers. 
1st  Australian  Horse. 
Mounted  Rifles. 
A  Battery. 

Queensland  Mounted  Infantry. 
South  Australian  Infantry. 
Tasmanian  Contingent. 
Victorian  Contingent. 
Mounted  Infantry. 
West  Australian  Contingent. 
New  Zealand  Mounted  Rifles. 

Canada. 

1st  and  2d  battalions  Canadian  Mounted  Rifles. 
2d  battalion  Royal  Canadian  Regiment  of  Infantry. 
C,  D  and  B  batteries  Royal  Canadian  Artillery. 

Ceylon. 
Ceylon  Contingent. 

THE  ARTILLERY  MATERIAL. 

BRITISH  ARTILLERY. 

Strength  and  Distribution,  February  15,  1900. 
Field  Gwns. 

Roberts'  Army 156 

Buller's  Army 60 

Gatacre's  Army 18 

At  Arundel  and  Naauwpoort 26 

Cities  and  lines  of  communication. .  .  .100 


360 
Field  Howitzers. 

Methuen's  Corps 12 

Buller's  Army 6 


18 
Navy  Gutns. 

Buller's  Army 12 

In  Ladysmith 8 

Roberts' Army 12 

Elsewhere .26 


58 


252  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Additional:  March  15, 1900. 

Field  guns 72 

Field   howitzers 18 

4.7-inch  Armstrong  guns 6 

Mobilizing:  Field  guns 24 

The  Field  Gwn» 

The  field  gun  is  called  a  15-pounder,  M.  95;  it  is  of  3-inch  caliber, 
firing  only  shrapnel  (besides  canister),  initial  velocity  1,574  feet, 
weight  14  pounds;  maximum  range  (15°  elevation)  5,468  yards,  but  can 
fire  2,000  yards  farther.  Its  mean  dispersion  (double  the  mean  devi- 
ation) in  range  at  5,468  yards  (for  percussion  shell)  is  155  yards,  while 
that  of  the  German  gun  is  only  54  yards.  It  is  sighted  up  to  5,500 
yards,  but  the  shrapnel  is  timed  only  to  4,000  yards.  It  was  not  orig- 
inally a  quick-firer,  but  with  the  Clarke  brake  it  is  now  practically 
such. 

The  City  of  London  Volunteers  were  supplied  with  a  battery  of 
3-inch  Vickers  guns.  These  guns  are  wire  guns,  firing  a  12.5  pound 
shrapnel  with  a  muzzle  velocity  of  1,575  feet.  It  is  sighted  up  to  5,000 
yards,  and  carries  shrapnel  and  shell.  It  is  mountd  on  an  improved 
Darmancier  carriage. 

The  City  of  Elswick  Volunteers  were  supplied  with  a  battery  of 
3-inch  quick-firing  Armstrong  guns. 

The  Horse  Artillery  Gu>n» 
The  horse  artillery  gun  is  a  wire  gun  of  3-inch  caliber,  12-pounder. 

The  Mountain  Guto*. 
A  7-pounder  muzzle-loader. 

The  Field  Howitzer. 

The  field  howitzer  is  5-inch  caliber,  firing  lyddite  shrapnel  weigh- 
ing 50  pounds,  with  time  fuse  graduated  to  3,390  yards,  maximum 
range  4,900  yards.  The  guns  of  the  siege  train  sent  over  from  England 
on  December  9th  comprised  mainly  6-inch,  but  partly  also  4.7-inch  and 
4-inch  howitzers,  firing  lyddite  and  other  shell. 

Navy  Guns. 

These  are  6-inch,  4.7-inch  and  3-inch. 

The  4.7-inch  navy  guns  with  Methuen's  column  were  mounted  on 
40-pounder  carriages. 

Those  at  Ladysmith  on  6-inch  howitzer  carriages,  the  recoil  gear 
for  fixed  platform  removed. 

This  gun  fires  a  50-pound  shell,  with  a  muzzle  velocity  of  1,750 
foot-seconds,  and  great  range. 

The  Machine  Gun. 
Maxim  gun  firing  small-arm  ammunition. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


253 


BOER   ARTILLERY. 

44    quick-fire    modern    field    guns,    7.5    cm.    or    3-inch    (Krupp? 
Schneider-Creusot  and  Maxim-Nordenfeldt). 


254  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

These  guns  fire  (besides  canister)  shell  and  shrapnel,  with  from 
1,475  to  1,510  feet  muzzle  velocity. 

6  older  7.85  cm.  (3.1-inch)  guns. 
4  old  6  cm.  (2.4-inch)  guns 

4  new  3.7  cm.  (1.46-inch)  Krupp  mountain  guns. 
24  3.7  cm.  (1.46-inch)  Maxim-Nordenfeldt 
50  Maxim  machine  guns  firing  either  the  ammunition  of  the  old 

Henry-Martini  gun,  or  that  of  the  Mauser  gun. 
8  12  cm.  (4.7-inch)  field  howitzers  (Krupp  or  Schneider-Creusot). 
These  fire  shell,  shrapnel  and  torpedo  shell,  and  are  much 
more  mobile  than  the  British  howitzers. 

6  long  Creusot  or  Krupp  15.5  cm.  (6-inch)  siege  guns  (including 
the  Long  Tom  at  Ladysmith),  firing  an  88-pound  projectile  with 
a  muzzle  velocity  of  1,574  feet. 

The  British  cannot  utilize  the  maximum  range  of  their  field  guns 
(about  7,500  yards),  because  their  sight  is  not  graduated  beyond  5,500 
yards,  and  their  tables  are  not  worked  out  beyond  this  range;  whereas 
the  Boers,  by  burying  the  trail  and  by  firing  as  they  generally  do  from 
above  downward,  can  attain  the  extreme  range  of  7,500  yards. 

Moreover,  the  Boer  (Krupp)  fuse  is  graduated  to  4,200  meters  (or 
550  meters  farther  than  the  British),  so  that  they  can  fire  with  shrap- 
nel farther  than  the  British.  The  British  have,  however,  fired  their 
shrapnel  (on  account  of  the  great  range  of  the  Mauser  rifle)  at  too 
great  ranges— ranges  over  3,600  meters— where  the  shrapnel  bullets 
have  too  low  a  velocity  to  be  effective.  Hence,  the  great  advantage 
of  the  Boers  in  possessing  also  shell,  in  addition  to  shrapnel,  by  means 
of  which  they  can  fire  effectively  at  ranges  beyond  the  maximum 
effective  range  of  the  British  shrapnel.  The  British  have  nothing  in 
the  way  of  a  field  piece  to  oppose  to  the  Boer  shell  fire  of  over  5,000 
meters,  or  even  over  4,000  yards  (the  limit  of  the  British  time  fuse). 

The  Boers  have  no  real  idea  of  tactics  in  their  use  of  artillery, 
for  we  never  hear  of  batteries  in  the  various  engagements  that  have 
taken  place,  but  always  of  single  guns,  and  after  the  second  Upper 
Tugela  fight  a  single  gun  only  pursued  the  British. 

The  British,  having  only  shrapnel,  were  practically  without  any 
effect  on  the  Boer  infantry  in  its  S-shaped  trenches,  even  when  they 
had  a  flank  fire  on  them.  Such  trenches  could  only  be  reached  by 
high  angle  fire,  but  the  maximum  range  of  the  British  field  howitzer 
is  only  4,900  yards,  and  good  ranging  with  this  piece  requires  well- 
trained  cannoneers,  specially  when  the  enemy  is  as  expert  in  mask- 
ing its  trenches  as  the  Boers  were.  Moreover,  the  British  artillery 
lacked  tactical  handling,  in  that  the  superior  artillery  officers  were 
generally  detached,  and  the  work  was  left  mainly  to  the  battery  com- 
manders: there  was  no  concentration  of  groups  of  batteries,  no  fire 


THE 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  255 

control  of  the  entire  artillery;  indeed,  the  great  lesson  of  the  war  of 
1870-71,  the  use  of  masses  of  artillery,  seems  to  have  been  forgotten. 
In  an  attack  the  artillery  preceded  the  infantry,  but  did  not  always 
accompany  it  in  its  advance,  so  that  the  latter  really  met  unshaken 
infantry  in  the  assault.  There  is  no  question  of  the  excellent  and 
fearless  handling  of  the  separate  batteries  in  advance  or  in  covering  a 
retreat,  but  no  great  tactical  result  has  been  accomplished  by  a  large 
mass  of  artillery  on  any  of  the  fields,  although  the  two  groups  in  the 
battles  of  the  5th  to  the  8th  of  February  seem  to  hae  worked  in  uni- 
son, and  in  surrounding  Cronje,  Roberts  undoubtedly  attained  an 
artillery  mass  fire. 

BRITISH  CASUALTIES  OF  THE  WAR  TO  MARCH  9. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 132  1,583 

Died  of  wounds 38  309 

Missing  and  prisoners 138  3,191 

Died  of  disease 32  793 

Died  of  accidents 2  20 

Sent  home  as  invalids..                   83*  2,428* 


Total 8,739 

CHANGES  IN  COMMAND. 

General  Joubert  died  in  Pretoria  March  27th. 

General  Louis  Botha  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  Trans- 
vaal Boers,  while  President  Kriiger  assumed  the  command-in-chief 
of  the  Boer  troops. 

General  Clery  returned  to  the  2d  Division  March  30th. 

General  White  left  Ladysmith  on  March  9th,  to  return  to  Eng- 
land for  rest  and  recuperation.  General  Lyttleton  took  command  of 
the  Ladysmith  garrison,  with  Howard  and  Knox  in  command  of  the 
brigades. 

The  10th  Division  was  placed  under  General  Hunter.  It  com- 
prised the  5th  and  6th  Brigades. 

April  15th  Gatacre  was  recalled  to  England,  and  Pole-Carew  suc- 
ceeded him.  Colonel  Inigo  Jones  received  the  Guards  Brigade. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  LORD  ROBERTS'  ARMY. 

Before  the  Advance  on  Bloemfantein. 
1st  Division.  6th  Division. 

Methuen.  Kelly-Kenny. 

^Includes  some  of  the  wounded. 


256 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


1st  Brigade.  9th  Brigade. 

Pole-Carew.  Douglas. 

7th  Division. 

Tucker. 

14th  Brigade.  15th  Brigade. 

Chermside.  Wavell. 


13th  Brigade.  18th  Brigade. 

Knox.  Stephenson. 

9th  Division. 

Colville. 

3d  Brigade.  19th  Brigade. 

Colville.  Macdonald. 


Artillery. 

11  field  batteries,  2  howitzer  batteries,  4  navy  4.7"  guns,  4  navy 
12-pounders,  3  Vickers-Maxim  automatic  guns  (37  mm.). 


Mounted  Troops. 
Cavalry  Division. 


Mounted  Infantry 

Division. 

1st  Brigade.      2d  Brigade. 
Hannah.  Ridley. 


French. 

1st  Brigade.      2d  Brigade.      3d  Brigade. 
Porter.          Broadwood.          Gordon. 
7  horse  batteries. 
1  balloon  section. 
6  companies  Engineers. 

The  8th  Division  (Rundle)  landed  at  East  London  March  30th, 
and  was  sent  to  the  front  at  once,  reaching  Springfontein  April  12th. 

B&fore  the  Advance  from  Bloemfontchi. 


1st  Division. 

Methuen. 

1st  Brigade.  2d  Brigade. 

Douglas.  Paget. 

6th  Division. 
Kelly-Kenny. 

12th  Brigade.  13th  Brigade. 

Clements.  Wavell. 

8th  Division. 
Sir  Leslie  Rundle. 
16th  Brigade.  17th  Brigade. 

Campbell,  Boyes. 


3d  Division. 
Pole-Carew.* 

22d  Brigade.  23d  Brigade. 

R.  E.  Allen.  W.  G.  Knox. 

7th  Division. 

Tucker. 

14th  Brigade.  15th  Brigade. 

J.  G.  Maxwell.  C.  E.  Knox. 

9th  Division. 

Colville. 

3d  Brigade.  19th  Brigade. 

MacDonald.          Smith-Dorrien. 
(Highlanders.) 


llth  Division. 

(Vacancy.) 

Guards  Brigade.  18th  Brigade. 

I.  R.  Jones.  Stephenson. 


21st  Brigade. 
(Newly  formed.) 
Bruce-Hamilton. 


::'-Pole-Carew   was    later    transferred   to    the   new   llth    Division,   Chermside 
receiving  the  3d. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


257 


1st  Brigade. 
Porter. 


Cavalry  Division. 

French. 
2d  Brigade. 
Broadwood. 

Independent. 
4th  Brigade. 

Mounted  Infantry. 
Hamilton. 


3d  Brigade. 
Gordon. 


1st  Brigade. 
Hutton. 


2d  Brigade. 
Ridley. 


THE  NATAL  ARMY, 


April  15th. 


2d  Division. 

Clery. 

2d  Brigade.  4th  Brigade. 

Hildyard.  Cooper. 

5th   Division. 

Warren,  t 

10th  Brigade.  llth  Brigade. 

Coke.  Wynne. 


4th  Division. 

Lyttleton. 

7th  Brigade.  8th  Brigade. 

W.    F.    Kitchener.  Howard. 

10th  Division.* 
Sir  A.  Hunter. 

5th  Brigade.  6th  Brigade. 

Hart.  Barton. 


1st  Brigade. 
Burn-Murdock. 


Cavalry  Division. 

2d  Brigade. 
Brocklehurst. 


3d  Brigade. 
Dundonald. 


BRITISH  CASUALTIES  OF  THE  WAR  TO  APRIL  7. 

Officers.  Mf)n. 

Killed 211  1,960 

Died  of  wounds 48  465 

Died  of  disease 47  1,485 

Died  of  accidents 3  34 

Sent  home  as  invalids  J 29  1,828 

Missing  and  prisoners 168  3,722 

Wounded .627  9,883 


Total 


20,510 


"•Early    in    April    Hart's  Brigade  was  transferred  to  the   western  theatre  to 
join  Brabant.    Barton's  followed  and  was  sent  to  Kimberley. 

fRelieved  on  account  of  his  failure  at  Spion  Kop,  and  sent  to  the  western  the- 
atre on  duty  other  than  that  at  the  front.    Hildyard  placed  in  command  May  1st. 

tNot  including  the  wounded. 
-17- 


258  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  APRIL 

Officers. 

Killed. . 218  2,062 

Died  of  wounds 53  492 

Died  of  disease 64  2,028 

Died  of  accidents 48 

Sent  home  as  invalids  (not  wounded) 29  3,101 

Wounded 764  9,225 

Missing  and  prisoners 171  3,925 


Total  (not  including  invalids) ....         22,180 

CHANGES  IN  COMMAND. 

May  1st  Hildyard   received  command  of     the  5th  division,  vice 
Sir  Charles  Warren. 

BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  MAY  19. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 224  2,131 

Died  of  wounds 58  517 

Died  of  disease 84  2,719 

Died  of  accidents 54 

Died  in  captivity 1  49 

Sent  home  as  invalids* 525  9,893 

Wounded 697  9,522 

Missing  and  prisoners 171  4,304 


Total  (not  including  invalids) 20,680 

*Including  some  of  the  wounded. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


OFFICIAL  TABLE  OF  CASUALTIES. 
June  19,  1900. 


Casualties  in  Action. 

Killed. 

Wound- 
ed. 

Died  of 
wounds   in 
S.  Africa 
(included 
in  wound- 
ed). 

Missing 
and 
prisoners. 

Total  killed, 
wounded, 
missing, 
and 
prisoners. 

Officers. 

03  r' 

«  a 

73     ' 

Officers. 

O  d 
O>o 

Officers. 

N.  C.  O.'s 
and  men. 

•  QJ 
0-0 

fc'ol 

Officers 

N.  C.  O. 
and  me 

Officers 

o! 

•  ~ 

Uelmont,  Nov.  23  
Colenso   Dec  15            

3 
7 
5 
8 
5 
8 

6 
8 

1 

22 
23 

1 
4 
17 

•2 
2 
1 
3 

27 

14 
6 

2 

5 
66 

235 

50 
128 
58 
40 
50 
13 

57 
20 

20 
11 

241 

148 

13 

66 
238 

23 
10 
11 
16 

245 
32 
11 

167 
63 

36 
63 
453 

2283 

25 
43 
19 
11 
3*1 
6 

9 
84 

9 
6 

90 
45 

8 
20 
74 

18 
2 
6 
16 

53 
7 

1 

88 

3ti 

15 
10 
215 

841 

220 
719 
342 
84 
169 
163 

244 
129 

152 
101 

1530 
646 

180 
393 
1135 

326 
33 

08 
118 

1050 
51 
66 

284 
280 

H8 
147 
1786 

10564 

1 

2 
1 
3 

1 

1 
1 

3 

3 

6 

1 
2 

6 

4 

3 

25 

21 
20 

18 

6 
3 

10 
6 

11 

1 

75 
35 

3 
31 
65 

8 
1 
4 

7 

39 
1 
2 

25 

29 

4 
6 
120 

551 

28 
71 
24 
44 
35 
9 

58 
42 

10 
6 

113 

68 

9 
24 

98 

20 
12 

7 
37 

87 
20 
2 

47 
42 

18 
16 
329 

1276 

270 
1054 
402 
430 
223 
185 

1226 

187 

172 
119 

1782 
902 

197 
461 
1436 

354 
440 
111 
541 

1646 

702 
85 

453 
355 

157 
250 
3265 

17405 

21 

25 

43 

5 

1 

7 

8 
18 

7 
13 

1 

1 
1 
19 

200 

207 
2 
306 
4 
9 

925 

38 

Driefoniein,  March  10  
Dundee,  Oci  ober  20  

Elandslaagte,  October  21.. 
Enslin  (Graspan)  Nov.  25... 
Farqu  bar's    Farm     and 
Nicholsons  Nek,  Oct.  30.  . 
Johannesburg  &  Pretoria 
Karee,     near     Brandfort, 
March  29                    ... 

Klip  Kraal   Feb  16  ... 

7 

11 

108 

4 

2 
63 

5 
397 
2 
407 

351 
619 

8 

2 

12 

3 
40 
1026 

4558 

Lady  smith,      Relief      of, 
Feb.  19  to  27  

Magersfontein,  Dec.il  
Monte   Christo   (Colenso), 
etc..  Feb.  15-18  
Modder  River,  Nov.  28.... 
Paardeberg,  Feb.  1627  
Potgeiters    Drift,    Feb.    5 
to  7               .... 

Reddersburg,  April  3  4  
Reiifontein,  Oct.  24  
Sanna?  Post,  March  31  
bpion   Kop,  etc.,    Jan.     17 
to  24  

Stormberg  Dec  10 

Willow  Grange,  Nov.  23  

At  Ladysmith  during  in- 
vestment- 
Battle  of  January  6  
Other  casualties 

At  Kimberley   during   in- 
vestment   

At  Maf  eking            

Other  casualties        .... 

Total  casualties  in  ac-  ) 
lion    reported   up  to  V 
June9  ) 

260  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

CHANGES  IN  COMMAND. 

Juno.  Colonel  Carew,  7th  Hussars,  appointed  brigadier  general 
commanding  1st  Brigade  Rhodesia  Field  Force,  comprising  1st  and 
2d  Bushmen's  regiments.  Colonel  Grey  commanding  2d  Brigade. 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  JUNE  16. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 243  2,353 

Died  of  wounds 64  558 

Died  of  disease 123  3,782 

Died  of  accidents 60 

Sent  home  as  invalids 724  15,039 

Missing  and  prisoners* 41  1,469 


Totaly 24,456 

CHANGES  IN  COMMAND. 

July  1.  The  9th  division  broke  up,  General  Colville  relieved, 
Macdonald's  (Highlander)  brigade  assigned  to  Hunter's  (10th)  divis- 
ion, Smith-Dorrien's  to  Methuen's  1st  division. 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  JUNE  23. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed ,...250i  (2,384 

Died  of  wounds 68  589 

Died  of  disease 125  3,985 

Died  of  accidents 66 

Sent  home  as  invalids 784  16,358 

Missing  and  prisoners* 37  1,650 


Totalf 26.296 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  JUNE  30. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 254  2.403 

Died  of  wounds 70  610 

Died  of  disease 133  4,204 

Died  of  accidents 66 

Sent  home  as  invalids 844  18,433 

Missing  and  prisoners* 65  2,624 


Totalt 29,706 


""•Excluding  those  who  have  been  recovered. 

fExcluding  sick  and  wounded  now  in  British  hospitals  in  South  Africa. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  261 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  JULY  13. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 255  2,411 

Died  of  wounds 70  625 

Died  of  disease 137  4,398 

Died  of  accidents 68 

Died  in  captivity 1  84 

Sent  home  as  invalids 916  19,742 

Missing  and  prisoners* 59  1,927 


Totalf 30,963 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  JULY  27. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 271  2,502 

Died  of  wounds 73  681 

Died  of  disease 141  4,836 

Died  of  accidents 1  72 

Died  in  captivity 1  85 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,044  24,058 

Missing  and  prisoners* 76  2,718 


Totalf 36,559 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  AUGUST  4. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 272  2,534 

Died  of  wounds 74  696 

Died  of  disease 145  4,937 

Died  of  accidents 1  77 

Died  in  captivity 1  85 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,105  25,049 

Missing  and  prisoners* 59  2,740 


Totalf 37,775 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  AUGUST  11. 

Officers.  .1/Vw. 

Killed 272  2,549 

Died  of  wounds 77  712 

Died  of  disease 146  5,036 

Died  of  accidents 1  81 

^Excluding  those  who  have  been  recovered. 

tExcluding  sick  and  wounded  now  in  British  hospitals  in  South  Africa. 


262  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

Officers.  Men. 

Died  in  captivity 1  85 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,151  26,123 

Missing  and  prisoners* 55  2,768 


Totalf 39,057 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  AUGUST  18. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 275  2,560 

Died  of  wounds 78  724 

Died  of  disease 147  5,130 

Died  of  accidents 1  86 

Died  in  captivity 1  85 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,151  26,123 

Missing  and  prisoners* 54  2,751 


Totalf 39,166 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  AUGUST  25. 

Officers.        Men. 

Killed 281        2,599 

Died  of  wounds 79  732 

Died   in  captivity • .    . .       1  85 

Died  of  disease 148        5,215 

Died  of  accidents 1  90 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,188      27,309 

Missing  and  prisoners* 55        2,778 


Totalf 40,561 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  SEPTEMBER  1. 

Officers.        Men. 

Killed 283        2,655 

Died  of  wounds 83  758 

Died  in  captivity 1  85 

Died  of  disease 148        5,332 

Died  of  accidents 3  95 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,213      27,937 

Missing  and  prisoners* 45        1,007 

Totalf 39,645 

*Excluding  those  who  have  been  recovered. 

tExcluding  sick  and  wounded  now  in  British  hospitals  in  South  Africa. 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  SEPTEMBER  8. 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 283  2,683 

Died  of  wounds 85  791 

Died  in  captivity. 3  86 

Died  of  disease.. 149  5,472 

Died  of  accidents 3  101 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,219  27,937 

Missing  and  prisoners* 40  945 


Totalf 39,785 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  SEPTEMBER  17. 

Officers.  Mew* 

Killed 285  2,718 

Died  of  wounds r.    ......     86  797 

Died  in  captivity 3  86 

Died  of  disease 149  5,582 

Died  of  accidents 3  107 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,239  28,199 

Missing  and  prisoners* 12  809 


Totalf 40,075 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  SEPTEMBER  22. 

Officers.  Hem* 

Killed 287  2,738 

Died  of  wounds 86  813 

Died  of  disease 149  5,653 

Died  of  accidents 3  108 

Died  in  captivity 3  88 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,279  29,957 

Missing  and  prisoners* 9  799 


Totalf 41,972$ 

TOTAL  REDUCTION  OF  BRITISH  FORCES  THROUGH  THE  WAR. 

Officers.        Man* 

Deaths  in  South  Africa 528        9,400 

Missing  and  prisoners 9          799 

Invalids  who  died  in  England 4  183 

Invalids  discharged  for  disability 814 


Total.. ll,737t 


*Excluding:  those  who  have  been  recovered. 

•FRxcludiner  sick  and  wounded  now  in  British  hosmtals  in  South  Africa. 

|The  great  majority  of  those  invalided  home  had  recovered  and  rejoined. 


264  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  SEPTEMBER  29 

Officers.  Men,. 

Killed 287  2,750 

Died  of  wounds 86  825 

Died  of  disease 150  5,753 

Died  of  accidents 3  114 

Died  in  captivity 3  89 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,326  30,300 

Missing  and  prisoners* 7  812 


Totalf 42,505$ 

TOTAL  REDUCTION  OF  BRITISH  FORCES  THROUGH  THE  WAR. 

Officers.  Men. 

Deaths  in  South  Africa 529  9,531 

Missing  and  prisoners 7  812 

Invalids  who  died  in  England 4  193 

Invalids   discharged  for   disability 873 


Total 11,949$ 

TOTAL  BRITISH  CASUALTIES  TO  OCTOBER  31 

Officers.  Men. 

Killed 302  2,902 

Died  of  wounds 89  893 

Died  of  disease 155  6,115 

Died  of  accidents 4  145 

Died  in  captivity 3  90 

Sent  home  as  invalids 1,422  33,077 

Missing  and  prisoners* 7  822 

Totalf 46,026  J: 

TOTAL  REDUCTION  OF  BRITISH  FORCES  THROUGH  THE  WAR. 

Officers.  Men. 

Deaths  in  South  Africa 553  10,145 

Missing  and  prisoners 7  822 

Invalids  who  died  in  England 4  208 

Invalids  discharged  for  disability 1,030 


Totalf.... 12,769$ 


-Excluding  those  who  have  recovered. 

tExcluding  those  in  South  African  hospitals. 

$The  great  majority  of  those  invalided  home  had  recovered  and  rejoined. 


TEE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  265 


OFFICIAL  TABLE  OF  CASUALTIES. 
(Principal  actions  only.) 


Killed.    Wounded.  Missing. 

C       —          o          -          o        £ 

0      S 

0 

SB       O 

Sunday  River.     April  10  

1 

14 

1 

Wepener.    April  9-18  

...     6     17 

17 

105 

Zwartkopjesfontein.     April  19-20  , 

3 

16 

26 

Dewetsdorp.     April  20  

1 

9 

Wepener.     April  17-24  , 

8 

36 

Wakkerstroom.    April  21,  25  

3 

19 

Karrefontein.    April  22  

3 

2 

26 

3 

Grootefontein.    April  24  

3 

35 

Thaba  'Nchu.     April  28-30  

3 

3 

46 

13 

Gen.  Ian  Hamilton's  force.    April  30  

....     1       3 

10 

6     1 

9 

Jacobsrust.     April  30-May  3  

5 

2 

35 

10 

Brandfort.       May  2-5  

3 

48 

8 

Wellow.     May  4  

....     2 

1 

6 

Boordam.     May  4  

8 

2 

35 

1 

Kroonstad.     May  10-11  

3 

1 

37 

3 

Wepener.    May  10  

.  .  .  .     3     27 

14 

109 

1 

Zand  River.     May  10  

....     1     15 

5 

31 

1 

Maritsani.    May  13  

5 

1 

22 

3 

Vryheid  (ambuscade).     May  20  

....     3 

2 

1 

Winburg.     May  25-26  

3 

16     1 

1 

Kheis.    May  28  

....     1       4 

5 

17 

Roodepoort.    May  28  

1 

2 

31 

Hammonia.    May  28-29  

3 

1 

4     2 

38 

Senekal.    May  29  

.  .  .  .     1     41 

11 

129 

11 

Florida.     May  26  

.  .  .  .     1     19 

11 

112 

Douglas.    May  30  

18 

2 

36 

Lindley.     June  1  

.  .  .  .     1     18 

9 

43 

13 

Bothas  Pass.     June  6-8  

8 

2 

34 

Swalkranz.     June  4  

1 

53 

Roodeval.     June  7  

6 

1 

21 

4 

Hoilbron.     June  7  

2 

1 

2     1 

6 

Vredef  ort.    June  7  

1 

17 

Roodeval.    June  11  

1 

1 

17 

Diamond  Hill.    June  11  

....     6       6 

10 

119     1 

3 

Almonds  Nek.    June  11  

17 

116 

266  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


Killed.  Wounded.   Missing. 

03  03  CO 

sfi      ®  5£  ®       £      ® 

o    a  o  s     o    a 

Diamond  Hill.    June  13  ......................  1    21  1  81    2 

Leuwspruit.    June  14  ........................  1  4  4            60 

Vredef  ort.    June  17  ..........................  1  18  11 

Rhenoster.    June  17  ..........................  1  3    2      51 

Honingspruit.     June  22  ......................  1      4  2  18 

Amersfoot.    June  29  .........................  2  7 

Machadodorp.     July  3  ........................  25 

Lindley.    July  3  ..............................  1      2  3  10              8 

Reitzf  ontein.     July  7  ........................  2      4  1  28 

Bethlehem.    July  6-8  .........................  10  6  111 

Rustenburg.     July  7  .........................  2  1  4 

Derdepoort.    July  11  .........................  1      2  2  5            18 

Uitvals  Nek.    July  11  ........................  1    16  3  50          183 

Krugersdorp.     July  11  ...................  ....  1  2  33 

Potchefstroom.    July  19-22  ...................  3  23 

Bank  (captured  in  derailed  train).    July  19...  31 

Palmeitfontein.    July  19  .....................  4  4  18              3 

Oliphants  Nek.    July  20  ......................  2  1  5 

Koster  River.    July  21  .......................  5  6  20              6 

Spitz  Kop.    July  21-22  .......................  4  2  20 

Stafferts  Nek.     July  23  ......................  1      8  3  28 

Retiefs  Nek.    July  23-24  .....................  9  6  77 

Rooi  Koppies.    July  24  ......................  2  1  21 

Stinkhoutboom.     July  24  .....................  4  8  24 

Slaapkrans.     July  28  ........................  3  3  27 

Stepannskraal.    July  29  ......................  1  1  21 

Frederikstad  R.  R.  accident.    July  30  .......  18  1  43 

Zelekats  Nek.    August  1  .....................  2  2  41 

Elands  River.     August  4-6  ..................  1      4  1  32    1        9 

Elands  River  (Carrington's  force).  August  4-6.  1      2  1  10              1 

Amersf  oort.     August  7  .......................  22 

Venterskroon.     August  7  ..................  1  6  13 

Greylingstad.    August  13-14  ..................  2  5  8 

Wilport.     August  14  .........................  4  1  41 

Buffels  Hoek.    August  19  ....  .................  6  9 

Klipfontein.     August  19  ......................  5      21 

Hammans  Kraal.     August  20  ...............  1      1  1  11 

Van  Wyks.     August  21  ......................  7  2  22              5 

Geluk.     August  23-26  ........................  19  2  97    2      51 

Belfast.    August  24-26  ........................  3  2  45              3 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  26*7 

Killed.    Wounded.   Missing. 

2              2  S 

8Q>  05 

0      jS  &      JB      £ 

55      ©        S  ®        SB       © 

O      S        O  S        O      2 

Doomoek.     August  26 1  10              6 

Bergendal.    August  29 1    12      9  95 

Jachtfontein.     August  29 116  1 

Kwaggasfontein.     August  31 5      6  11              2 

Badfontein.    September  1-4 1  17             7 

Mauchberg.    September  9 1  6 

Lydenburg.    September  4-10 3  34             2 

Rochf  ontein.     September  11 2      1  14 

Ventersburg.    October  10 1  11 

Jagersfontein.     October  13-16 11      1  13 

Carolina.     October  13-14 6  21 

Carolina  to  Bethel.    October  15-19 1      5      3  21              3 

Frederickstad.     October  19-25 1    22      4  89             3 

Jacobsdal.    October  25 11  16 

Bethlehem.    October  26 3      1  16 

12  miles  south  of  Belfast.    November  2 1      1      2  12             1 

Bothaville.    November  6 . .  26724 


268  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


CONTENTS. 


Preface 5 

Introduction 9 

The  Theatre  of  War 13 

The  Forces  Engaged 16 

The  English  Troops 16 

The  Boer  Troops 18 

The  Strategic  Position , 19 

The  Operations 19 

II. 

The  Campaign  in  Natal 37 

The  Campaign  in  Natal  (continued) 62 

III. 

The  Campaign  in  Natal 85 

The  Third  Attempt  to  Relieve  Ladysmith 94 

The  Campaign  in  the  South  and  West 99 

Lord  Roberts'  Campaign 101 

The  Southern  Theatre  of  War Ill 

The   Situation   in   Natal 112 

IV. 

General  Roberts'   Campaign 131 

Events  in  the  Southern  Theatre 136 

Events  in  the  Western  Theatre 138 

Events  in  Natal •  -139 

Lord  Roberts'  Campaign 141 

The    General    Situation 148 

Lord  Roberts'  Campaign 155 

Events  in  the  South 160 

Events  in  Natal 16° 

Events  in  the  Extreme  West 161 

Lord  Roberts'  Campaign 163 

Events   in   the   South 167 

Events  in  the  Extreme  West 167 

Events  in  Natal • 168 

Comments 169 


THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR.  269 

V. 

Events  in  the  Orange  River  Colony 185 

Events  in   the   Transvaal 189 

Campaign  of  Middelburg 192 

The  Situation  in  the  Orange  River  Colony 199 

The  Third  Campaign  against  Louis  Botha 200 

General  Situation 205 

Comments 208 

Tactical  Deductions  from  the  War 214 

Appendix 224 


270  THE  SECOND  BOER  WAR. 


IJST  OF  MAPS. 


Sheet    1.— The  General  Theatre  of  War. 

Sheet    2.— Sketch  Map  of  Natal. 

Sheet    3.— Sketch  Map  of  Ladysmith  and  Vicinity. 

Sheet    4.— The  Theatre  of  War  in  Natal. 

Sheet    5.— The  Siege  of  Ladysmith. 

Sheet   6.— Jacobsdal  to  Paardeberg. 

Sheet    7.— Paardeberg  to  Bloemfontein. 

Sheet    8.— Bloemfontein  to  Wepener. 

Sheet    9.— Bloemfontein  to  Winburg. 

Sheet  10.— Winburg  to  Kroonstad. 

Sheet  11.— Kimberley  to  Fourteen  Streams. 

Sheet  12.— Fourteen  Streams  to  Vryburg. 

Sheet  13.— Vryburg  to  Mafeking. 

Sheet  14.— Kroonstad  to  Wolvehoek. 

Sheet  15.— Wolvehoek  to  Johannesburg. 

Sheet  16.— Johannesburg  to  Pretoria. 

Sheet  17.— Newcastle  to  Volksrust. 

Sheet  18. — Lindley  to  Bethlehem,   Fouriesburg. 

Sheet  19.— Rustenburg  and  Vicinity. 

Sheet  20.— Pretoria  to  Lorenzo  Marquez. 

Sheet  21.— Belfast,  Lydenburg,  Nelspruit. 

Sheet  22.— Vredefort  to  W^elverdiend. 

Sheet  23.— Vicinity   of  Colesberg. 


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